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Abstract
The thesis explores the changing  relations between the Zimbabwean state and local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) after independence.  It focuses on debates over the role
of NGOs in democratization in developing countries, using Zimbabwe as an example.  The
thesis argues that the study of democratization is best accomplished through detailed empirical
case studies, relying on  historical narratives and participant-observation research. Such research
reinforces our understanding of democratization as a complex and dynamic process.
The thesis proposes a framework for understanding state and society relations in Zimbabwe,
emphasizing the ruling party’s use of coercive and consent-generating mechanisms  to establish
hegemony over the new nation. It examines the changing relationship between NGOs and the
state after independence, when the ruling party’s efforts to include most groups within its
nationalist coalition extend to NGOs.  Case studies of NGO coalitions show how activist
NGOs fail to mobilize others owing to the unwillingness of many NGOs to challenge the
ruling party’s control over policy-making.  
The establishment of the National Constitutional Assembly by some NGOs, churches and
trade unionists set the stage for an increasingly tense engagement between NGOs and the state
after 1997. The constitutional debate opened up the public sphere in new ways.  As the ruling
party attempted to retain control over the political sphere and the constitutional debate, NGO
politics became increasingly polarized. The emergence of the opposition Movement for
Democratic Change, and the prominence of NGO activists within its leadership, led to further
conflict.  After losing the February 2000 constitutional referendum, the regime sanctioned
violent attacks on white farmers, businesspeople, and NGOs.  While the ruling party attempted
to shore up its support through nationalist rhetoric and financial incentives, groups perceived
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University of Newfoundland. Among the many stimulating teachers and colleagues I had
over the course of my five years there, Dr Gunther Hartmann stands out.  This thesis is
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Glossary of Selected Zimbabwe-specific Terms
chimurenga the war of liberation
inyika our land (name of a pro fast track land reform NGO)
gukurahundi the word used to describe the Matabeleland Conflict, 1982-87
mujibas/chimbwidos young men and women who assisted the Guerrillas but were
not members of the liberation armies
mafela The fallen one (name of NGO working with ex-combatants)
musasa an indigenous tree (name of a women’s NGO) 
pungwe all night (political) rally
vapostori members of the Apostolic Faith Church




AAG Affirmative Action Group
AAPS  African Association of Political Science
AHT Air Harbour Technologies
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AWC Association of Women’s Clubs previously African Women’s Clubs
BINGOS Big International NGOs
CAZ Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CBO Community Based Organisation
CC                   Constitutional Commission
CCJP Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CFU  Commercial Farmers Union
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings
CIDA Canadian International Development Association
CIO Central Intelligence Organization
CZI Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DFID Department for International Development (UK) previously ODA
DP Democratic Party
DRC                Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDICESA Ecumenical Documentation and Information Centre for Eastern and Southern
Africa
EJN Economic Justice Network
EMAT Election Monitoring Advisory Team
ESAP II Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (1995-) see also ZIMPREST
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (1990-1995)
ESC Electoral Supervisory Commission
ESS Ecumenical Support Services
EU European Union
FES                  Friedrich Ebert Stifting
FORUM Forum Party of Zimbabwe also FPZ
FPD Front for Popular Democracy
FPZ Forum Party of Zimbabwe also FORUM
GALZ Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe
GONGOs Government NGOs
GOZ Government of Zimbabwe
HSCO Harare Street Children’s Organisation
HIVOS Humanistic Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries (Holland)
IBDC Indigenous Businessmen’s Development Centre
ICU Industrial and Commercial Workers Union
IDS Institute for Development Studies (University of Zimbabwe)
IFIs International Financial Institutions
IMF International Monetary Fund
INGOs International NGOs
IRI International Republican Institute
JPR Justice, Peace and Reconciliation
LAG Lobbying and Advocacy Group
LOMA Law and Order Maintenance Act
LRF Legal Resources Foundation
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MHS Matabele Home Society
MIC Movement of Independent Candidates 
xii
MISA Media Institute of Southern Africa
MMPZ            Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe
MP Member of Parliament
MWENGO Mwelekeo wa NGO 
MZWP  Matabeleland Zambezi Water Project
NANGO National Association of NGOs
NCA National Constitutional Assembly
NCC NGO Coalition for Change
NCDPZ National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe
NCSS              National Council of Social Services
NDI National Democratic Institute
NEPC National Economic Planning Commission
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
NGO-LAG NGO Lobbying and Advocacy Group
NODED National Organisation for the Development of the Disadvantaged
NPA  Norwegian People’s Aid
NWPC National Working Peoples Convention
ODA Overseas Development Assistance (UK) later DFID
ORAP Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress
PVO Private Voluntary Organisation
RBVA Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association
RF Rhodesian Front
RCC Rhodesian Christian Council
RNA Rhodesian Native Association
SAFOD Southern Africa Federation for the Disabled
SAPES Southern Africa Political and Economic Series Trust
SDF Social Dimensions of Adjustment Fund also Social Development Fund 
SFN Society for the Needy
SHD Self-Help Development Foundation
SIDA Swedish International Development Assistance
SKIP Street Kids in Production
SRANC Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
SRBC Southern Rhodesia Bantu Congress
SRC Students’ Representative Council (of the University of Zimbabwe)
SRMC Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference
SRNCC Southern Rhodesia Native Christian Conference
SRNWA Southern Rhodesia Native Welfare Act
UANC United African National Congress
UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UN United Nations
UNAC United Nations Association in Canada
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UP United Parties
USAID United States Aid for International Development
VIDCOs Village Development Committees
VOICE Voluntary Organisations in Community Enterprise 
WADCOs Ward Development Committees 
WAG Women’s Action Group
WCC World Council of Churches
WILDAF Women in Law and Development
ZACT Zimbabwe Association of Community Theatre
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army armed wing of ZANU
xiii
ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union after 1987  ZANU(PF)
ZANU-Ndonga Name given to fraction of ZANU led by Revd. Ndabaningi Sithole
ZANU (PF) Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front before 1987 ZANU
ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZAPU 2000 Zimbabwe African People’s Union 2000
ZBC                Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZCBC             Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference
ZCC Zimbabwe Council of Churches
ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trades Unions
ZIANA Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency
ZIBF Zimbabwe International Book Fair 
ZIDS Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies later IDS
ZIMFEP Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production
ZIMPREST Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Structural Transformation
ZimPro  Zimbabwe Project
ZimRights Zimbabwe Human Rights Association
ZINA Zimbabwe Nurses Association
ZINASU          Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZIPRA. Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army armed wing of ZAPU
ZLP Zimbabwe Liberators’ Platform
ZNA Zimbabwe National Army
ZNLWVA  Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 
ZRP Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZUD Zimbabwe Union of Democrats
ZUJ                 Zimbabwe Union of Journalists 
ZUM Zimbabwe Unity Movement
ZUNA Zimbabwe United Nations Association
ZWLA             Zimbabwe Women’s Lawyers Association
ZWRCN Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network
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Part I    Studying Democratization in Africa
“At independence, we laid down our advocacy..and we have paid a heavy price”
 Paul Themba Nyathi, Zimbabwe Project,
18 September 1995
“Donors come and donors go but the Ministry is always there.”
Vimbai Zinyama, Indigenous Businesswomen’s Organisation
30 October 1996
“Comrade Minister, some of the NGOs are now turning political but we want to dance to your
tune forever.”
NGO representative in play performed by ZimRights drama troupe, 
NGO Convention, 28 April 1997
“Some of these [NGOs] come to you with a packaging which looks good  but the contents
would be satanic. Do not accept such type of assistance.”
 Ignatious Chombo, Minister of  Local Government, Public Works and National Housing
15 July 2001
A central theme of studies of African politics in the 1990s has been the significant, if partial,
change in many countries from authoritarian forms of rule towards more accountable forms
of politics, in which ‘civil society organizations,’ like churches, trade unions and  non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), have played an important part.  The focus of this thesis
is on Zimbabwean NGOs, and their contribution to promoting democratization in the 1990s.
Zimbabwe differs from other African countries in that it retained an ostensibly democratic
multi-party system after independence in 1980. At the same time, there are parallels to be found
with those African countries in which states and societies continued to be dominated by single-
parties into the 1990s, so that the study of this case contributes to the wider, African discussion
of the place of NGOs in processes of democratization. 
I show through case studies of NGO-state relations, how the Zimbabwean ruling party
used the mechanisms of the state to set up a pattern of authoritarian rule in which societal
groups sought to be included in the hegemonic framework of the ruling élites.  While they may
not always have accepted the government’s entire agenda, few want to be excluded from access
to spoils, which are social and cultural, as well as material.  A combination of selective coercion
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and inclusion created a resilient authoritarian regime which endured with little challenge from
1980 to 1997.  NGOs, by virtue of their historical origins and commitment to the government’s
‘progressive’ developmental agenda, became deeply bound up in this hegemonic process.  As
NGOs themselves were able both to acquire resources and provide social standing, competition
to control them intensified.  The regime was able to manipulate personal and patronage politics
within NGOs to further its own political agenda. 
In many ways, NGOs in Zimbabwe have been unwilling democratizers. They are wary
of detaching themselves from the state’s social networks for the unproven benefits of exclusion.
Even though external donors provide most of their material resources, the state’s willingness
to use coercive measures remains a significant sanction.  In the late 1990s, activist NGOs
attempted to engage the state in debates about policy-decisions, although they framed these
interactions in depoliticized language and spoke through ‘non-political’ mouthpieces.  It is only
when the state adopted their agenda of constitutional reform, and attempted to retain control
on political discourse, that the debate became radicalized and centred on the issue of
representation and accountability.  When voters in the February 2000 constitutional plebiscite
affirmed the right of NGOs to speak for the people of Zimbabwe vis-à-vis the state and ruling
party, the party’s authority was dented.  Fearing that this failure would transmute itself into
political defeat in the June 2000  elections, the party used the state machinery to threaten and
coerce all those who might ally themselves with the nascent opposition. While groups
acknowledging the party’s dominance continued to be courted with the benefits of inclusion,
NGOs are increasingly excluded and targeted as outsiders. The revived exclusionary nationalist
discourse challenged their right to speak and act on the political stage and questioned their
commitment to the social and economic development of Zimbabweans.  
This account of recent Zimbabwean politics relies upon participant-observation
research and detailed empirical case studies.   In this first section of the thesis, Chapter 1
introduces its  methodological concerns. Chapter 2 links them to the question of
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conceptualizing research questions, arguing for an empirically-grounded method of studying
African politics, especially in times of rapid change.  The two chapters together situate the thesis
methodologically as a critique of the  political science of Africa’s experiences of democratization
and an agenda for research which methodologically and conceptually examines the importance
of consent and coercion in establishing relations between state and society in authoritarian
regimes.  
1  Sara Rich, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society in Africa:
Zimbabwe’s experience with structural adjustment, 1990-1995.” Unpublished MPhil thesis,
Oxford, 1996. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction and Methodology
1.1 A Dual Mandate?
This thesis investigates the changing relationship between state and society in independent
Zimbabwe.   It focusses  on local NGOs and  examines how they relate to the state and to each
other.  NGO-state relations provide a lens though which to examine and interpret state-society
relations.  We need to understand the wider politics in order to make sense of NGOs.  This
leads at times to an awkward attempt to balance the two mandates:  a focus on NGOs
sometimes obscures the bigger picture of Zimbabwean politics,  while the recent excitements
of party politics and political chaos sometimes threatens to overwhelm the more mundane
concerns of NGOs.  This specific study of Zimbabwean NGOs and politics is intended to
contribute to the wider political science literature on African politics, and especially the
literature on NGOs and ‘democratization’. 
This thesis began in 1996 as an attempt to show that we had to understand the politics
of Zimbabwe in order to make sense of the failure of NGOs to engage with policymakers.  In
my MPhil thesis, I argued that NGOs in Zimbabwe avoided ‘politics,’ preferring to keep their
relations with the state non-adversarial.1  Both NGOs and politics in Zimbabwe have changed
since then, and so, therefore, has this study.  It is now, to a significant extent,  about the role
played by NGOs in Zimbabwean politics.  Yet the original premise stands, and is in some ways
reinforced.  To understand the nature of NGO-state relations, which have changed during the
period of study, we need to understand both NGOs and politics.  The thesis therefore moves
between the micro-politics of individual NGOs, the middle-level politics of NGOs working
together in coalitions, and the high politics of NGOs on the more political stage of electoral
contestation.  
2  On Uganda see: Susan Dicklitch, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1998) and Christy Cannon Lorgen, “Non-Governmental Organisations in
Transition in Uganda: A Study of the Health Sector” Unpublished D.Phil University of Oxford,
1998. On Tanzania see: Andrew S Kiondo, “Structural Adjustment and NGOs in Tanzania”
in Peter Gibbon, ed. Social Change and Economic Reform in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, 1993) and  Aili Mari Tripp, “Local Organizations, Participation and the State
in Urban Tanzania” in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, Governance and Politics in Africa (Lynne
Rienner: Boulder, 1992). On East Africa more generally: Joseph Semboja and Ole Therkildsen
eds. Service Provision under Stress in East Africa: The State, NGOs and People’s Organizations in Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda (CDR: Copenhagen, 1995).  On Egypt: Maha Abdelrahman, State-Civil
Society Relations: the Politics of Egyptian NGOs, DPhil Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague,
2001 and Amani Kandil, “The Non-Profit Sector in Egypt” in Helmut K Anheier, and Lester
M Salamon, eds. The nonprofit sector in the developing world (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1998).
3  The most comprehensive study of Zimbabwean NGOs is Sam Moyo, John Makumbe
and Brian Raftopoulos,  NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare: SAPES, 2000). Shorter,
earlier studies include: Sam Moyo, Non-governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe: Context, Role and
Relationships Working Paper December 1990; Sam Moyo, NGO Advocacy in Zimbabwe:
Systematising an Old Function or Inventing a New Role?  (Harare: ZERO, 1992); Ann Muir
with additional material by Roger C Riddell, Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in rural poverty
alleviation, ODI Working paper 52 (London: ODI, 1992); Diana Conyers, “Report of a study
of existing NGO activity in Zimbabwe” November 1991 [study undertaken for ODA and the
British High Commission in Zimbabwe]; Marleen Dekker, “NGOs in Zimbabwe:
Developments and Changes since 1990" Livelihood and Environment Working Paper, August
1994; Andrew Green and Ann Matthias, NGOs and health in developing countries (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1997) see esp. Chapter 7: Zimbabwe: a country case study, 110-123.
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1.2 Methodological Approaches
Studies of NGOs in Africa are usually based on interview research focussing on a wide number
of organizations within a particular sector.2   Zimbabwean NGOs are amongst the most
studied, but these studies still conform to this tendency.3  This method prevents detailed study
of individual NGOs.  It becomes less easy to interrogate certain aspects of NGO behaviour,
such as internal decision-making. Neither the history of the NGO,  how it interacts with the
history of the country or region, nor the people within the NGO are examined, except as
background detail.   Thick description of how NGOs functioned was sidelined in the interest
of labelling and categorizing them. 
Methodology has to some extent been dictated by the research agenda of donors and
international institutions. In the 1980s, official aid was increasingly channelled not to bilateral
4  Two good discussions of the rising importance of NGOs in development assistance
are: Ian Smillie, “At sea in a sieve? Trends and issues in the relationship between Northern
NGOs and Northern Governments” in Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich, with Tony German
and Judith Randel, Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships for International Development (London:
OECD and Earthscan, 1999), 7-35 and Olav Stokke, “Foreign Aid: What Now?” in Olav
Stokke, ed. Foreign Aid Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and Challenges (London: Frank Cass,
1996), esp. 99-100. 
5  Christiane Loquai, Kathleen Van Hove and Jean Bossuyt, The European Community’s
approach towards poverty reduction in developing Countries.  ODI Working Paper 111, 49.
6 Terje Tvedt, Angels of mercy or development diplomats? (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 128-
165.
7  See for examples of studies of individual Zimbabwean NGOs, Sjef Theunis, Non-
Governmental Development Organizations of Developing Countries: And the South Smiles (Dordrecht:
Novib/Nijhoff, 1992), chapter 21: ORAP, 265-276;   Kate Wellard and James G Copestake,
eds.NGOs and the State in Africa: Rethinking roles in sustainable agricultural development (London:
Routledge, 1993), Part I: Zimbabwe, 15-86.
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partners, but through northern NGOs to local communities or local NGOs.4  Local NGOs
were seen in the 1980s and 1990s as ‘apolitical’ development organizations.  For example, an
assessment  of the “rapid growth” of interaction between NGOs and the European Community
notes that:
...the Commission perceives NGOs as vehicles for targeting the poorest and
most marginalised sections of the population, which tend to be neglected by
official policies or have difficulties to access bilateral aid.5
As a result of this emphasis, most early studies of NGOs  were undertaken for donors with
particular sets of questions,  such as how well NGOs ‘fit’ demands set before them, with
respect to their efficiency, participation levels, and transparency  although Tvedt argues that
these values are actually rarely measured.6    Within this agenda, NGOs were  understood to be
engaged in technical development practices such as health provision, rural development or
poverty-reduction.7   The interview methodology, with its emphasis on data collection, met the
donor’s need to assess their expenditures.  It failed to position NGOs within a more political
or historical setting, and to explain how they relate to the state, donors, and each other.
This decontextualization became problematic  as donors and researchers took on the
idea that NGOs might also contribute to expanding good governance and democratization.
The landmark 1989 World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth called
8    World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington: World
Bank, 1989) see esp. xii, 6–61.
9  Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton eds, Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1992), esp. chapters 1, 2 and 12.
10  UNDP. Human Development Report 1992 ((New York: OUP, 1992), 26-27.
11  Alan Fowler, “The role of NGOs in Changing State-society relations: perspectives
from Eastern and South Africa” Development Policy Review 9 (1991), 53-84.
12  For example, Sam Moyo, Non-governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe: Context, Role and
Relationships Working Paper December 1990; Sam Moyo, NGO Advocacy in Zimbabwe:
Systematising an Old Function or Inventing a New Role?  Harare: ZERO, 1992; Sam Moyo, “Towards
and Understanding of Zimbabwean NGOs” Paper prepared for the NANGO/MWENGO
Self-Understanding Workshop, November 1995; Alan Thomas, “Does Democracy Matter?
Pointers from a comparison of Ngos influence on environmental policies in Zimbabwe and
Botswana” Open University DPP Working paper 31; GECOU Working paper 4. June 1995.
13  Alan Fowler, “Non-governmental organisations and the promotion of democracy
in Kenya” DPhil Thesis, Sussex, 1994. 
14 Alan Fowler, “Civil Society, NGDOs and Social Development: Changing the rules
of the Game” UNRISD Occasional Paper no. 1 January 2000; Alan Fowler, “Non-
governmental Organizations As Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective” Journal
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for economic reforms to “go hand-in-hand with good governance.”8  As part of what came to
be known as the ‘governance agenda,’  NGOs were expected to go beyond being service
providers and become active participants in policy-making.9  NGOs and civil society were
integrated into previously apolitical conceptions of human development.10  Development
organizations were to be ‘turned into’ activist or advocacy organizations: “financing NGOs in
Africa as potential agents of democracy should be at the top of donor agendas in the 1990s.”11
While interview and survey-based research helps explore what NGOs are doing, it is less useful
in explaining why or how they become (or don’t become) involved in democratization-related
activities.12  In response, some researchers developed detailed case studies of individual NGOs.
This methodology has the benefit of positioning NGOs more clearly against the political
backdrop of the country and the institutional history of the organization studied. 
Three studies of Kenyan NGOs, all concerned with the relation between NGOs and
the state,  illustrate this particularly clearly.  Alan Fowler’s study of Undugu, an organization
working with homeless and poor residents of Nairobi,  examines how the provision of welfare
services enabled it to pursue more politically sensitive work.13 His case study, developed as part
of a doctoral thesis, contrasts with his more programmatic published accounts.14   Fowler
of International Development 5 (1993), 325-339;  Fowler, “The Role of NGOs in Changing State-
Society Relations.”
15 Fowler, “Non-governmental organisations and the promotion of democracy in
Kenya”, 292. Emphasis added.
16 Stephen Ndegwa, The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa (West
Hartford: Kumarian, 1996).
17  Lisa Aubrey, The Politics of Development Cooperation: NGOs, Gender and partnership in Kenya
(London: Routledge, 1997), see especially 83-85.
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emphasizes the ability of Undugu to work with particular parts of the state apparatus: 
...as long as Undugu’s activities did not question or threaten the power status
quo it work was politically beneficial and encouraged. ...despite the overall trend
in state-society relations that was reducing scope for autonomous civic and
developmental action, situation-specific factors maintained political space for Undugu’s
work.15 
Stephen Ndegwa compared Undugu to the more oppositional Greenbelt Movement,   arguing
that the former was more institutionalized and therefore less available for mobilization behind
political goals.16  In contrast, Wangari Maathai, the charismatic leader of the Greenbelt
movement, is portrayed as using the NGO to promote her political aims against the KANU
regime.  Ndegwa’s organizational analysis enables him to contrast the decision-making patterns
– and histories – of the two NGOs to good effect, although his account of Undugu is less
convincing than that of Fowler, whose thesis he does not consult. 
Unlike Ndegwa and Fowler who are interested in ‘democratization’,  Lisa Aubrey is
concerned with how state and donor influence affects the capacity of an NGO to do
‘development work’.  However, her  study of the women’s NGO, Maendeleo ya Wanawake
(MYWO), adds greatly to this account of NGO-state relations in Kenya.  Through her study,
it becomes clear that the Kenyan ruling party uses the colonial-era and nationalist-linked
organization as a foil against both the more abrasive feminism of Maathai and the party’s own
women’s league.17   Her detailed history of MYWO reveals the links between several
generations of leaders of the NGO, and leaders of KANU, culminating in the affiliation of
MYWO to KANU in 1989, and its ‘cheerleading-role’ on the government’s behalf in the early
1990s.   As Aubrey discovers, MYWO’s lack of autonomy vis-a-vis the state can only be
18  Aubrey, Politics of Development Cooperation, Appendix A.1 Hypotheses; Appendix A.II
Sub-hypotheses; Appendix A.III Key variables and their definitions; Appendix B. Survey
Instrument. 169-178.
19  Aubrey, Politics of Development Cooperation, 107.
20  Tvedt, Angels of Mercy?, 156.
21 John Farrington and Anthony Bebbington, Reluctant Partners?  Non-Governmental
Organisations, the state and Sustainable agricultural development (London: Routledge, 1993), 57.
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understood in the context of this historical trajectory.  
All three of these studies are based mainly on interview research, although they also
make use of primary  documents produced by the organizations, and include some observation
of NGO activities.  Of the three studies, Aubrey seems to have approached her research with
the most formalized set of hypotheses, sub-hypotheses, models and survey instruments.18  In
the course of her research, she discarded all her hypotheses and many of her intended survey
questions.  Not only did she have trouble finding people to interview, but she found that many
of her questions are inappropriate:
 ..there were questions which I asked interviewees that were sometimes viewed
as ‘too political’ ...questions about MYWO sometimes angered
interviewees....questions about ‘power’ and ‘feminism’ caused tremendous
confusion...19
As this devastatingly honest account of field research during a period of political change
reveals, interview research is sometimes not the most appropriate method.  In contrast to this
‘outside looking in’ approach to NGOs, I propose that NGOs need to be examined  from the
‘inside’ – trying to understand through participant-observation why staff, members, and clients
become involved with the NGO and  how and why decisions are taken within that NGO. As
Tvedt notes, there is no reason for researchers to think that NGOs function in any predictable
ways simply because they are NGOs.20   The purpose of  research is therefore to dispel illusions
and generalizations about NGO behaviour, which as we shall see in chapter 2, create
problematic assumptions amongst donors and political scientists alike. 
While the lack of participant-observation research had been noted by commentators
few researchers have attempted to redress the situation.21  Those who have are often trained as
22  Diana Joyce Fox, An Ethnography of four non-governmental development organisations (New
York, Edwin Mellen Press, 1998); Erica Bornstein, “The Good Life:  Religious NGOs and the
Moral Politics of Economic Development in Zimbabwe.”  Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of
Anthropology, University of California, Irvine.  2001.
23  The classic study of NGO/donor projects is undoubtedly  James Ferguson,The Anti-
Politics Machine (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) ; More recent studies include
Tim Kelsall, “Subjectivity, Collective Action, and the Governance Agenda in Tanzania”
unpublished Ph.D. thesis , School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 2000;
David McDermott Hughes, “Rezoned for Business: How Eco-tourism Unlocked Black
Farmland in Eastern Zimbabwe”, Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol.1 No.4,October 2001, 575
–599;   Steven Sampson, “The social life of projects: importing civil society to Albania” in Chris
Hann and Elizabeth Dunn eds, Civil Society: Challenging western models (London: Routledge, 1996),
121-142.
24  Greg Cameron, “Taking stock in Tanzania: Pastoralist NGOs and the Indigenous
Question” paper presented to the Association for the Study of Anthropology, 2000; Jim Igoe,
“Ethnicity, Civil Society, and the Tanzanian Pastoral NGO Movement” Unpublished PhD
Thesis Boston University, 2000. 
25  Mahmood Mamdani, “A Glimpse at African Studies, Made in the USA” CODESRIA
Bulletin, 2 (1990), 7-11.
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anthropologists, like Diana Joyce Fox and Erica Bornstein, whose research  focusses on
international NGOs.22  ‘Local’ NGOs have their own sets of issues, distinct from international
NGOs, because they are caught up in local politics, which particularly affect their role in
democratization.    Other anthropological research has tended to use  NGO or donor projects
as the unit of analysis rather than the organizations themselves.23  Unknown to me, at the same
time as I was conducting research, and writing up, two studies of local NGOs in Tanzania were
also being carried out –  Jim Igoe’s anthropology thesis on ethnic NGOs and Greg Cameron’s
article based on his work with pastoralist NGOs, both of which provide salutary critiques of
romanticizations of NGOs.24  Their viewpoints enable them to ask serious questions about the
internal politics of NGOs, although neither  investigates the relations of these NGOs to the
state or issues of democratization.    
Criticism of research into processes of democratization in Africa has been present from
the start.  In 1990, Mahmood Mamdani, criticized the tendency of Africanists based in the
United States to romanticize processes of change. In particular, he attacked the propensity of
scholars to generalize about ‘Africa’ rather than identifying specific and concrete social
processes.25  The speed and dramatic nature of the political changes in some countries led
26 Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997).
27  Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, “The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in
Zambia” Review of African Political Economy 54 (1992), 75-91.
28  Chris Allen, “Understanding African Politics” Review of African Political Economy 65
(1995), 302; see also, Chris Allen, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, “Surviving Democracy?”
Review of African Political Economy 54 (1992), 3-10.
29  Laurence Whitehead, “On Theory and Experience in Democratization Studies” draft
chapter forthcoming in Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 10.
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researchers to emphasize change, rather than continuity.  The simultaneity of political change
also encouraged wide comparison emphasizing the similarities between transitions rather than
differences.26  
Not all researchers were equally vulnerable to such criticisms.  Carolyn Baylies and
Morris Szeftel’s analysis of the Zambian transition emphasized the elements of continuity
between the new and old regimes, drawing on many  years of research.27  More recently, Chris
Allen usefully  linked the current transitions clearly to post-colonial regime forms by
differentiating the multiple paths which democratization has taken in Africa.  Allen’s work
makes it clear that we need to understand the specificity of the transitions: “there is too much
variation in politics in Africa, even when reduced to the simplest historical sketches of
individual states, for a single political structure or process to be adequate for the analysis of
those histories.” 28 
Now, when continuities and the importance of understanding transitions as the result
of specific historic paths have made themselves clear to most observers, these critiques seem
fairly obvious, but they continue to have important methodological implications.  The
understanding of democratization as a re-configuration of state and society relations in a series
of very different and complex post-colonial societies should affect our choice of research
techniques.  Whitehead notes in a significant re-assessment of the interaction between theory
and empirical research on democratization: “the best and perhaps the only, way to grasp the
dynamics of a long-term open-ended process is through narrative-construction.”29   If we
30  Whitehead, “On Theory and Experience,” 1, 2.
31  Max Weber, Economy and Society: an outline of interpetive sociology ed. and trans. Guenther
Roth and Claus Wittich, (New York, Bedminster, 1968), vol 1, 4.
32  Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” in Philosophy and the Human
Sciences, Vol 2 (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), 15-57.
33 Gavin Williams, Brian Williams and Roy Williams, “Sociology and Historical
Explanation” African Sociological Review 1 (1997), 79.
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conceptualize democratization “as a complex, dynamic, long-term and open-ended
process...then the type of theory-building and hypothesis-testing that would be possible and
appropriate...would be interpretative rather than demonstrative.”30  This brings us back to a
more Weberian social science,  where the purpose of research is  “ interpretative understanding
of social action...and causal explanation of its course and consequences.”31 More recently
Charles Taylor has similarly made a powerful case for the importance of a hermeneutical
approach to the sciences of man.32   As Williams et al note,  drawing explicitly on the Weberian
tradition, social scientists seek to “construct interpretative narratives of particular events.”33  In
response to these critiques, this thesis attempts to provide a detailed narrative account, with the
aim of helping us better understand particular processes of democratization.  In order to
achieve this goal, it draws on empirical although not ‘empiricist’ methods of research, which
are described in the sub-section below.
1.3 Methodological Practice 
Despite the arguments made above for participant-observation, multiple modes of research
techniques were used over the course of several distinct periods of research. In 1991 and 1994,
I participated in two youth exchanges between the United Nations Association of Canada and
the Zimbabwe United Nations Association, funded by the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), which gave me my first experience of NGO life in Zimbabwe.  As an
undergraduate, I then tried to write a thesis on the political and economic impact of newly
implemented structural adjustment policies in Zimbabwe, but was unable to find any political
impacts—no political parties and few NGOs tried to politicize the issue, despite the manifest
34  Sara Rich, “The Political and Social Effects of Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe”
Unpublished BA (Honours) Thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1994.
35  Sara Rich, “Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society in Africa:




 After coming to Oxford, I began more formal research, this time trying to understand
why NGOs were not politicizing ESAP, when so much of the writing on structural adjustment
and civil society expected that they would.  This research was primarily based on interviews
with NGO staff in August and September of 1995 and became my MPhil thesis, submitted in
1996.35  That research led me to ask why so many false assumptions were being made by
researchers about NGOs. Believing that part of the problem was methodological, I chose to
pursue participatory research for my DPhil thesis.  Between October 1996 and September 1997,
I worked with two NGOs—ZimRights and Ecumenical Support Services—with the intention
of participating in their activities to try and understand how they functioned. 
This participatory research positioned me within two of the smaller and newer, but
most active, NGOs concerned with advocacy and activism.  Working inside these NGOs meant
that I got to work with and know many of the most significant leaders of the NGO community
in Zimbabwe.  They knew my work, relied on me for contributions and were therefore open
about their decisions.  In addition to internal projects for these NGOs, I worked most intensely
on the NGO campaigns and coalitions which are discussed in Chapter 6.  Providing
administrative and logistical support for these campaigns, I was in a privileged position to
observe and contribute to their strategizing and decision-making. 
While this research was enormously productive in many ways, it also imposed some
limits.  Zimbabweans talk about politics – and indeed other issues – in somewhat cryptic ways,
often using allusions to avoid specific references.  Even those considered straight-forward often
take a great deal of knowledge for granted – and I was often wary of revealing my ignorance,
for fear that it would shut off the flow of reminiscences or comments.  In the period after the
14
February 2000 referendum,  at the very end of my field-research, I found that peoples’
willingness to talk about politics and make specific allegations had been transformed.  The
brutality and intolerance of the ruling party, and the confidence engendered by the referendum
win, meant that people talked with more specificity and clarity than in the past.  However, for
most of my research period, it was difficult to ask questions, while remaining ‘in character’.
NGOs’ members who knew me as a staff member and colleague, found my occasional
trespasses into interview research puzzling and muddling.   I had not tried to mislead people
about my status, everyone knew I was a research student from overseas.  However, the
participatory research depended upon my being accepted as one of them, to the extent possible.
This made me equally vulnerable to the ‘don’t ask difficult questions’ culture that was
particularly endemic at ZimRights.  I therefore pursued the opportunity to return in 1999  and
interview many of those with whom I had worked.  This period of research also allowed me to
examine the changes that had occurred in my absence.
In 2000, I again found myself working within a Zimbabwean NGO, as a member of the
Zimbabwe Council of Churches/World Council of Churches Ecumenical Peace Observer
Mission during the June parliamentary elections and is the final period of field research upon
which I draw in the thesis. 
I have also made extensive use of archival materials of various sorts.  In 1995, I spent
several weeks at the National Archives of Zimbabwe, but found that they contained relatively
little material on the post-independence period.  Then, and in subsequent research periods, I
relied extensively on the network of NGO-based information centres, especially the Ecumenical
Documentation and Information Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa (EDICESA), the
Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN), and the SAPES Trust Library.
For access to newspapers, I relied upon the excellent ZIANA library of clippings files, as well
as micro-fiche copies of the Herald held at Rhodes House Library, Oxford, and the British
Newspaper Library at Colindale.  Increasingly, Zimbabwe’s newspapers are available on-line,
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and I have made extensive use of these websites and archives. Many of the NGOs I worked
with and studied also made invaluable materials from their files available to me.
As a result of these multiple sources, the thesis relies on ‘thick description’ based on
participant-observation, interview research, and material gathered from primary and secondary
written sources, but attempts to provide a narrative account which enhances our ability to
understand Zimbabwean politics. 
1.4 Outline
The thesis is divided into 4 parts.  Part I, including this chapter, introduces  my project and its
theoretical and empirical concerns.  Part II, which is based on primary and secondary materials,
presents a discussion of state and society in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1990 in Chapter 3
and between 1990 and 1997 in Chapter 4.  It is not merely a chronology, but presents an
argument about how state and society have inter-acted to create a particular form of rule.  Part
III examines the specific issue of relations between NGOs and the state between 1980 and
1997.  Chapter 5 examines relations between  NGOs and the state, as well as relations with an
NGO, through a case study of one NGO.  Chapter 6 examines NGO attempts to network and
work together between 1995 and 1997.  Part IV extends this discussion of NGO-state relations
from 1997 until 2000, with two main case studies: the Constitutional debate in Chapter 7 and
the June 2000 elections in Chapter 8.  This organization reflects the dual mandate referred to
above, and is an attempt to structure a somewhat fragmented text chronologically and topically.
Each of these sections therefore begins with a brief introduction, which sets out its contents,
and relates it to the wider literature. Part V, comprised solely of Chapter 9, links the
Zimbabwean case to broader issues in the study of politics in Africa, and the developing world.
1  See for instance, Paul Richards,  Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in
Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”, Atlantic
Monthly  February 1994, 44-76; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1998); William Zartman, ed. Collapsed states : the disintegration and restoration of legitimate
authority (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Richard Joseph ed. State, conflict, and democracy in Africa
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, The
Criminalization of the State in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 1999); Critical responses to this
approach include: Africa Development XXII Nos 3&4 1997 and Thandika Mkandawire, “The
terrible toll of post-colonial ‘rebel movements’ in Africa: Towards an explanation of the
violence against the peasantry” unpublished draft paper 2001.
2  See for instance, Juan Linz, Larry Diamond and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds.,
Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2, Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner1988); B. Caron, A.
Gboyega, E Osaghae, eds, Democratic Transition in Africa (CREDU: Ibadan, 1992);  J. Wiseman
(ed), Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (London: Routledge, 1995); Michael
Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,1997); Adebayo Olukoshi ed. The Politics of Opposition in Africa  (Uppsala:
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998); John Daniel, Roger Southall and Morris Szeftel, Voting for
Democracy: Watershed Elections in Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Larry Diamond and Marc F
Plattner, eds. Democratization in Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999). 
3  Third World Quarterly, Special Issue 10, 1 (1988) Review of African Political Economy
Special Issue, 54 (1992);  Africa, Special Issue 63, 3 (1993); Commonwealth and Comparative Politics
Special Issue 36, 2 (1998); Commonwealth and Comparative Politics Special Issue 38, 3 (2000).
4  Journal of Democracy first issue 1990; Democratization first issue 1994. 
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Chapter 2   Reconsidering Democratization, Civil Society and NGOs
Political science literature on Africa since the 1980s has focused almost exclusively on either
state collapse1 or  democratization.2   Whereas thinking about ‘state collapse’ has focused mainly
on West Africa and the Congo, thinking about democratization has dominated political research
in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa.  The concept is central to discussion of the  politics
of Africa in the 1990s and the new millennium.  Special issues of most African studies and
developing country journals have examined trends toward multi-party elections and
democratization.3  This is, of course, not a phenomena confined to Africa, but is world-wide.
Key political science journals now exist which focus entirely on the process of democratization.4
Yet, it is not clear how this concept of ‘democratization’ has helped us to understand
African politics.  There are both methodological and conceptual problems with the way in
which it is used to explain processes as varied as the de-racialization of South Africa, the post-
civil war effort to rebuild Mozambique, and the different patterns of change to multi-party
5  Michael Schatzberg, “Power, legitimacy and ‘democratisation’ in Africa” Africa, 63,
4, (1993), 457.
6  Chris Allen, Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, “Surviving Democracy?” Review of
African Political Economy 54 (1992), 3-10; Chris Allen, “Understanding African Politics” Review
of African Political Economy, 65 (1995), 301-320.
17
politics in Kenya, Zambia and Malawi.  Labelling the politics of the 1990s as a period of
democratic transition raises questions about cases such as Zambia, where the ruling party lost
power but was in turn replaced by a remarkably undemocratic regime.  They help even less to
explain those countries where no transitions to opposition parties occured, such as Kenya or
Zimbabwe.  As Michael Schatzberg posits:
To view these political changes as ‘democratisation’ is both arbitrary and
terribly premature.  Such a label confuses a normatively desired end with a still
bewildering and most uncertain process whose direction is far from unilinear
and whose ultimate destination is still far from determined.5
Analyses of the politics in the 1990s which are de-contextualized from the politics of the
previous decades are profoundly ahistorical.  Long-term relations between state and society are
rarely considered.  As I propose below, we must examine the ways in which the authoritarian
regimes reproduce and maintain themselves in power – often for many decades – in order to
understand how and why they break down.  Democratization in Africa in the 1990s has
followed different paths depending on the form of authoritarian government being removed.6
It is crucial to examine both the construction of consensus and the apparatus of coercion in
order fully  to understand the relations of state and society under authoritarian regimes and in
the period of transition. 
In sections 2.1 and 2.2  I problematize the ways in which ‘democratization’ is used to
explain African Politics.  Despite obvious difficulties, this democratization literature has been
adopted wholesale by the development and aid world, who have seized upon recommendations
to strengthen ‘civil society’ in order to bring ‘democracy’.  Their desire to achieve these aims
is all too often translated somewhat simplistically into funding and support for NGOs, in the
hope that the pluralization of the political sphere will encourage a more democratic order.   In
7  See for example, Dagmar Engels and Shula Marks eds, Contesting Colonial Hegemony:
State and Society in Africa and India ((London: BAP, 1994); Les Switzer, Power and Resistance in an
African Society, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).
8  Engels and Marks, Contesting Colonial Hegemony, 2.
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sections 2.3 and 2.4 I examine the ways in which the development industry has adopted and
used these political science concepts.   In sections 2.5 and 2.6, I examine how the changing
importance of NGOs to the development industry, coupled with internal organizational
pressures,  influence the NGOs and outline the structure and argument of the thesis. 
2.1 Democratization ‘revisited’ 
In historical studies of colonial and settler Africa, some of the most useful and lasting insights
have come from scholars who take seriously questions of power and ideology – looking at how
coercion and consensus were used to build colonial hegemonies that linked state and society.7
These insights help us to understand how society and state interacted, in ways that allow us to
usefully understand the processes of resistance and rebellion that led, eventually, to
decolonization and independence.  Yet, despite the rhetorical references to the ‘second
liberation’ of the African continent, studies of democratization in the post-1989 period have
failed to adopt such nuanced approaches. Instead, democratization has been seen as a
teleological, univocal process of oppressed peoples rising up against the might of the state.
Engels and Marks criticize historians of the colonial state for having: 
always stressed its coercive capacity, rather than the ways in which its political
strategies were directed at creating consent...the emphasis has thus been on
what has been regarded as the inevitable resistance and protest of the
oppressed....8
Political scientists have been equally guilty of over-emphasizing coercion and down-
playing consent in their examination of de jure and de facto one-party states in Africa.  These
states’ remarkable endurance has been assumed to derive from their (demonstrated) coercive
capacities, and little attention has been paid to their attempts at creating consent.  One
exception to this is Schatzberg’s study of the Zairean state which emphasizes that:
9  Michael Schatzberg, The Dialectic of Oppression in Zaire (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1988), 5.
10  Sudipta Kaviraj, “In Search of Civil Society” paper presented to the SOAS Politics
Seminar, London,  20 October 1999. 
11  Mahmood Mamdani, "State and Civil Society in Contemporary Africa:
Reconceptualizing the Birth of State Nationalism and the Defeat of Popular Movements."
Africa Development XV (1990), 49.
12  Immanuel Wallerstein, “Voluntary Organisations” in J S Coleman and Carl Rosberg,
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa 2nd printing (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1966), 318-338.
13 Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2000), 229,
citing William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale, 1965),
143, citing Leopold Senghor.
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No state can govern through coercion alone; there are usually ideological
mechanisms to induce people to internalise the state’s normative and
behavioural rules.  Sometimes explicitly articulated ideologies accomplish
this....but myth, metaphor, and the symbolic dimension of politics also
contribute.9  
Nationalist politicians were particularly poised to dominate the post-colonial political
scene ideologically and symbolically, because, as Kaviraj reminds us:
Nationalism, making colonialism responsible for everything wrong with
colonial society, was making an insidious preparation for its own title to
dominate all domains with unquestioned legitimacy.... it spoke for everyone.10
Nationalist governments in Africa,  faced in the 1950s and 1960s with governing newly
independent societies, developed corporatist strategies to absorb and contain the demands of
the people within what Mamdani calls “state nationalism.”11  Most organizations had already
been brought underneath the nationalist umbrella, as we are reminded by Wallerstein.12   Those
organizations such as unions which had remained formally outside the nationalist network were
brought inside through structural reforms, while others such as churches and NGOs retained
formal independence but were symbolically and rhetorically united with the government.  
These one party states were indeed parties unifiés rather than parties uniques.13   As
Stanley Trapido has emphasized, nationalist politics is fundamentally the politics of coalition-
building ie incorporative or inclusive rather than exclusive, although the composition of the
14  Stanley Trapido, “African and Afrikaner Nationalism” Unpublished draft paper. June
2001.
15  Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,166.
16  Mamdani, “State and Civil Society in Contemporary Africa”, 55.
17  Zolberg’s analysis of Sékou Touré’s thinking about unity makes for particularly
worth-while reading in this context.  Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party States of
West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), esp. 44-47; Ruth Iyob’s study of the Eritrean
national struggle emphasizes the use made by the Ethiopian regime of ‘unity’ to discredit the
Eritrean nationalist project: Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence (Cambridge: CUP,
1995), esp. 47-58.
18  Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa Translated by Mary Harper, Christopher and
Elizabeth Harrison (London: Longman, 1993) 209; Mahmood Mamdani, “A Glimpse at African
Studies, Made in USA” CODESRIA Bulletin 2 (1990), 8-9 and “A Critique of the State and
Society Paradigm in Africanist Studies” in Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba
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coalition may change over time.14   This nationalist coalition building manifests itself as limited
pluralism in a pattern typical of authoritarian states, where demobilization is a strategy for
balancing conflicting interests within the coalition: 
Effective mobilisation, particularly through a single party and its mass
organisations, would be perceived as a threat by the other components of the
limited pluralism, typically, the army, the bureaucracy, the churches or interest
groups.15  
Nationalism depended upon the “delegitimation of all contemporary democratic struggles as
detracting from national unity.”16  This post-independence demobilization and subsequent
societal quiescence is the key to understanding the success and durability of the authoritarian
regimes of East and Central Africa, as well as their problematic transitions to democracy.
Those few societal forces which were not included or incorporated within the nationalist
project – especially opposition political parties –  were delegitimized and excluded from
participating within the political sphere.17
In contrast, state-society relations have been portrayed within the ‘democratization’
literature as overwhelmingly dichotomous.  In particular, institutions like churches, NGOs and
unions, have been identified (rightly in some cases) as sites of opposition to authoritarian
regimes.  They are then portrayed as the only resistance to authoritarianism, and romanticized
accordingly.18  Despite the contribution of some of these organizations to opening up or
eds.  African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995); Björn
Beckman, “The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal ideology and Political Theory” Review
of African Political Economy, 58 (1993), 20-33; Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, eds.  Civil Society:
challenging western models (London: Routledge, 1996); Emmanuel Akwetey, Trade Unions and
Democratization (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1994), 108.
19 For instance, Jean Francois Bayart, The State in Africa; Jeff Haynes, Religion and Politics
in Africa (London: ZED, 1996); Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1992).
20 Quintin Hoare, “State and Civil Society: Introduction” in Quintin Hoare and
Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. and trans.  Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci
(New York: International Publishers, 1971), 207.
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liberalizing state-society relations, neither churches, unions, nor NGOs are inherently pro-
democratic forces.  Many of them were historically and contemporaneously part of the state’s
inclusionary politics. An analysis of the ways in which these groups were integrated into the
nationalist coalition helps us to better understand the ambiguity of their interaction with the
state in the later years of independence.
 
2.2 Power, Culture and Hegemony
In order to capture the dynamics of these processes of inclusion and exclusion, we need a
theoretical framework that allows us to understand the inter-actions of state and society and to
consider how power is exercised within the post-colonial state.  This means that we must take
seriously the role of culture and ideology in creating hegemony. 
Recently, Gramscian concepts have been drawn upon by scholars of African politics
to advance arguments about strategies of accommodation and alliance within state and society.19
However, there is more to Gramscian egemonia than just networks of support and access to
material goods: “...his constant preoccupation was to avoid an undialectical separation of the
‘ethical-political aspect of politics or theory of hegemony and consent’ from the ‘aspect of force
and economics.’”20  Regimes must be understood as reproducing their rule through the use of
both the coercive forces at their disposal but also through the organization of consent.  Regime
transition, or democratization, occurs when legitimacy is eroded, and neither consent nor
coercion can be mobilized effectively to maintain a ruling regime in power. 
21  Robert A Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven:
Yale, 1961).
22  Peter Bachrach and Morton S Baratz, “The Two faces of Power” American Political
Science Review 56 (1962), 947-52;    Peter Bachrach and Morton S Baratz, “Decisions and Non-
decisions” American Political Science Review 57 (1963), 641-51; Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politics
of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-decisionmaking in the Cities.(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971).
23  Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1974) see especially,
21-25.
24  John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 1982), 5.
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Power has proven a difficult concept for political scientists to operationalize and study.
Robert Dahl’s well known attempt to examine power in a New England community,
emphasized the observable and measurable aspects of power by studying political decision-
making.21  Dahl’s approach was criticized for ignoring the, less easy to measure,  exercise of
power in keeping certain issues off the agenda of decision-makers.22  Steven Lukes’ Power: A
Radical View extended these critiques, proposing a conception of power, which includes not just
decisions made, or not-made, by individuals but also the impact of social forces and historical
patterns.23 This clearly corresponds to Gramsci’s conception of hegemony.  John Gaventa, a
student of Lukes,  proposed that this conception of power “...may be developed into a tentative
model for more usefully understanding the generation of quiescence as well as the process by
which challenge may emerge.”24   Gaventa’s study of the oppression of coal-miners in the
Appalachians by local élites and international investors neatly operationalizes and examines the
interaction of social forces and individual decisions across a long historical trajectory.  
This seems to be one of the key issues which is lacking from most current studies of
democratization in Africa – that the process of challenging authority, whether we call it
rebellion, revolution, liberation or democratization, must be understood in the context from
which it is derived.  It is only by understanding the nature of the authoritarian system that we
are able to understand the challenge –  or lack of challenge – to it.  
25  William A Gamson, “Political discourse and collective action” International Social
Movement Research 1 (1988), 219.
26  Antonio Gramsci, “The Modern Prince” in Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell
Smith, eds. and trans.  Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York:
International Publishers, 1971), 182.
27  James Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale, 1985). 
28  James Scott, Weapons of the Weak (New Haven: Yale, 1985) and Domination and the Arts
of Resistance (New Haven: Yale, 1990).
29  Scott,  Weapons of the Weak, 338.
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We need to make sense of the “legitimating frame that provides the citizenry with a
reason to be quiescent.”25  Hegemony or rule by consent originates in legitimating myths of the
state which become powerful contributors to regime stability where they appeal to a
nationalist/popular “common sense.”26   Resistance and rebellion occur when that mutual
understanding breaks down.  In James Scott’s well-known case of Malaysian landlords and
tenant farmers, the moral economy breaks down under the impact of mechanization of farm
labour.27  As the landlords attempt to redefine the terms of leases and labour-provision, tenants
resist through holding landlords accountable to previously hegemonic norms of religious and
moral behaviour.  The crisis of nationalism in African politics reflects the breakdown or crisis
of the nationalist social contract which had underpinned the post-independence regime
durability. 
The problem, as James Scott points out, is that Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is often
understood as an élite theory of civil society, in which subordinate classes are  unable to see that
they are being exploited.28 Against this reading of Gramsci, Scott argues that “..the very process
of attempting to legitimate a social order by idealizing it always provides its subjects with the
means, the symbolic tools, the very ideas for a critique that operates entirely within the
hegemony.”29  Gramsci’s emphasis on the need for a revolutionary party to challenge this
project from without downplays the strategies developed by the subaltern players from within
the dominant framework.  It is not simply that the dominated suffer from false consciousness
or fail to understand the power relations, but that they respond using the means immediately
30  Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 105.
31  William Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention” in Gilbert M
Joseph and Daniel Nugent, Everyday Forms of State Formation (Durham: Duke University Press,
1994), 360.
32  Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” 361.
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available to them, from within a moral economy or ideological framework which they share
with their oppressors. 
Scott emphasizes that, whereas Gramsci saw hegemony as operating at the level of
thought, it has far more impact on action than on thought.  Subaltern groups may know
themselves to be exploited, but fail to act upon it.  Coercion does play an important role in
maintaining regime strength: people may refrain from taking action for fear of personal safety
or job security and because they fear the repercussions on their family and friends.  Or
resistance may be cloaked by the adoption of the terms of reference in the hegemonic discourse
such that they “...cannot be accused of sedition, inasmuch as they clothe themselves in the
public professions of the élite.”30   At the same time, the claims they make on their élite are
recognizable, because they are framed within the terms of the discourse that is extant.  Peasants
know how to make claims on their landlords, because they inhabit the same moral universe,
albeit from different standpoints.
Roseberry, similarly, argues that hegemony must be understood as a process, in which
subaltern and élite social groups interact dynamically:
...while Gramsci does not see subordinate populations as the deluded and
passive captives of the state, neither does he see their activities and
organisations as autonomous expressions of a subaltern politics and
culture....they exist within and are shaped by the field of force.31
Discourse, symbol, and claims to represent the nation are therefore contested within and
between the subaltern and élite groupings:
...words, images, symbols, forms, institutions and movements used by
subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate
themselves to or resist their domination are shaped by the process of
domination itself.32
33  Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 309.
34  Roseberry, “Hegemony and the Language of Contention,” 361.
35  Jeremy Gould, “Political Culture: Reflections on Method and Discursive Politics”
an unpublished paper prepared for the Workshop on Interrogating the ‘New’ Political Culture
in Southern Africa, 13-15 June, 2001. 
36  For a thorough examination of the impact of such claims see  Alexander, McGregor,
and Ranger, Violence and Memory, especially 6-8.
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Scott’s term for this is “reciprocal manipulation” of discourse.33   Like the peasants and
labourers studied by Scott, NGOs, churches and other societal groups use the élite discourses
of development and nationalism in order to frame challenges against the status quo using their
own terms of reference.  The construction and maintenance of hegemony depends on  “...not
a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking
about and acting upon social orders characterised by domination.”34  As Gould suggests,
drawing on both Scott and Roseberry, “political culture can be understood as an active site of
contestation in an unfolding hegemonic process.”35  Democratization, then, is not a break in
political tradition, but a continuing unfolding and elaboration of contested claims to represent
the people.  In countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia, the political debates of the
1980s and 1990s were framed around the nationalist social contract formed in the 1950s and
1960s. Potent claims and counter-claims continue to be made about the nationalists’ role in
bringing liberation on the one hand, and their failure to bring the material and social benefits
of liberation on the other.36 
This approach to understanding regime creation as a dynamic of asserting and
contesting hegemony seems particularly useful because we want to examine how
understandings change and are modified and how power shifts from one group to another in
a period of regime transition. In subsequent chapters, I shall examine the material and cultural
ways in which the Mugabe regime attempted to transform nation-building into an exclusive and
elitist process.   
37  A study of how peasants, or poor urban residents understood the politics of
independent Zimbabwe might emphasize more of a disjuncture between élite and subaltern
understandings, as have anthropologists Angelique Haugerud and Harri Englund’s studies of
the multi-party transitions in Kenya and Malawi respectively.  Angelique Haugerud, The culture
of politics in modern Kenya (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); Harri Englund, “Between God and Kamuzu:
the transition to multi-party politics in central Malawi” in Richard Werbner and Terence
Ranger, eds. Postcolonial Identities in Africa (London: Zed, 1996) and “The dead hand of human
rights: contrasting Christianities in post-transition Malawi” Journal of Modern African Studies
(2000), 579-603.
26
The regime uses the institutions of the state to structure and legitimate its political
dominance.  The state apparatus propagates the ruling party’s ideology, provides it with the
means for the exercise of  coercion, and gives it the material resources to distribute to society.
These bases of state power – culture, force, and interests – are inter-related and inter-
dependent.  Ideological claims, derived from the liberation struggle, are both refracted and
reinforced through the discourse of development.  The interests of society and the state
coincide in advancing both personal and corporate goals, under rubrics such as ‘development,’
‘africanization,’ ‘nation-building’.  The use of coercive force against society  is  justified and
legitimated through recourse to these ideologies.    
In order to understand this style of politics, it is useful to look at how brokers –
especially those like NGOs, which become important in the 1990s, but also political parties,
unionists and church-leaders – negotiate these discourses.  We shall see how NGO élites use
the language of the dominant groups and work within their power structures, while sometimes
challenging particular policy decisions.  Yet, at the same time, the state and its dominant
discourse of development is rarely seen as something alien or ‘out there’ because these élites
move within and are absorbed into much the same intellectual, cultural, and social milieu as the
politicians and civil servants with whom they interact.37 This is why the dyadic understandings
of state-society relations, which posit an inevitable antagonism between them fail to explain
transitional politics successfully.
38  Gordon White, “Civil society, democratization and development” in Robin Luckham
and Gordon White, Democratization in the south: the jagged wave (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1996).
39  John W Harbeson, “Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa” in John W
Harbeson, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan eds. Civil Society and the State in Africa(Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1994), 1-2.
40  Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC:
Carnegie, 1999), 207. 
41  Nelson Kasfir, “The conventional notion of civil society: a critique” Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics 36, 2 (1998), 6-7 .
42  Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 157-206.
43 Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, “The Burgeoning World of Civil Society
Aid” in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers eds.  Funding Virtue: civil society and democracy
promotion (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2000), 11; See also, Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad,
210-211.
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2.3 Democratization = Civil Society = NGOs?
In the preceding sections, I sketched out an approach to comprehending the ‘democratization’
processes in East and Central Africa.   The dominant thinking about democratization in Africa
– and especially that which has contributed to policy and aid decisions by western donors – has
focused around what Gordon White called  a “developmental panacea” – the issue of
“strengthening civil society.”38  Civil society is cited as the “missing key to sustained political
reform”39 and is often operationalized as non-governmental organizations.  Thomas Carothers’
useful account of American promotion of democracy abroad notes that:
the current keen interest in this... almost forgotten concept was stimulated by
the dissident movements in Eastern Europe in the 1980s [which] fostered the
appealing idea of civil society as a domain that is nonviolent but powerful,
nonpartisan yet prodemocratic, and that emerges from the essence of particular
societies, yet is nonetheless universal.40
Civil society is understood as formally organized groups, ideally with democratic structures and
pro-democratic norms.41  For aid bureaucrats, supporting civil society was a low-cost alternative
to unsuccessful and expensive attempts to reform state institutions.42  The practical difficulties
of funding grass-roots organizations means that most donor-support goes to
“...professionalized NGOs dedicated to advocacy or civic education.”43    These groups are
visible and accessible.  With university educated staff, it is relatively easy for them to interact





with donors and provide the desired skills of accounting and report-writing.  
Normatively and programmatically, civil society is advocated by the development
community and donors who propose that funding civil society (i.e. support to non-state sectors)
is both an end in itself and a means to an end of democratic governance.    A recent critical
examination of  donor funding states:
In the eyes of many donors and recipients, and even of many democratic
theorists, the idea that civil society is always a positive force for democracy,
indeed even the most important one, is unassailable.  An active – ‘vibrant’ is the
adjective of choice – civil society is both the force that can hold governments
accountable and the base upon which a truly democratic culture can be built.
There follows from this assumption the related idea that promoting civil society
development is key to democracy-building.44
The Ford Foundation, for example, has a unit dedicated to “Governance and Civil Society”
whose goal is “to strengthen the civic and political participation of people and groups in
charting the future of their societies.”45  The official American development agency,  USAID,
funds “civil society organizations” as one of its four democracy sectors because:
The hallmark of a free society is the  ability of individuals to associate with
like-minded individuals, express their  views publicly, openly debate public
policy, and petition their government. ‘Civil society’ is an increasingly accepted
term which best describes the non-governmental, not-for-profit, independent
nature of this segment of society.46
Similarly, Sweden’s International Development Agency explicitly states that Sweden funds
NGOs because of: 
....its aim of contributing to democratic development of society. A large number
of  organisations which, between them, represent various interests and parties
is viewed as  a guarantee of democracy. 47
Activists in the developing and developed world echo this usage and there has been a
48  White,  “Civil society, democratization and development” 180-181.
49  See for example, Kasfir, “The Conventional Notion of Civil Society”, 7; Mahmood
Mamdani, “A Glimpse at African Studies, Made in USA” CODESRIA Bulletin 2 (1990), 8-9
50  Chris Hann, “Introduction: political society and civil anthropology” in Chris Hann
and Elizabeth Dunn eds. Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (London: Routledge 1996), 19.
51  Bjorn Beckman, “Alliance Politics and Public Spheres: the case of civil ociety
reconsidered” paper delivered to the conference on Civil Society, Authoritarianism, and
Globalization, Stockholm Sweden, 18-20 September 1998, 5.
52  Emmanuel Akwetey, Trade Unions and Democratization (Stockholm: University of
Stockholm, 1994).
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remarkable consensus within development and aid circles across sectors and ideologies:
Neo-populist development theorists and practitioners extol the virtues of grass-
roots non-governmental organizations....Economic liberals [emphasize] how
these policies contribute to the emergence of business interests to counter-
balance and discipline way-ward states.  Treasury-based cost-cutters see
devolution of government finance to voluntary organisations as an ideologically
palatable way of reducing state expenditure. Conservative thinkers see it as a
way of preserving traditional social solidarities...Radical socialists zero in on the
potential role of social organizations...in transforming society.48 
Academics have been critical of this enthusiasm, for three main analytical reasons.  First,
the dominant conception of civil society has been criticized for its western-derivation and
assumptions.49  In contrast, Chris Hann and Bjorn Beckman both challenge the superiority of
western academics who “when students under some repressive regime take up the call for ‘civil
society’ and make this central to their struggles for democratization ‘...advise the youth that their
models of democracy and civil society are flawed, due to their Western bias.’”50  As Beckman
confesses, “...my earlier ‘rejectionist’ position, while being theoretically sound and politically
appropriate...is of limited use to those, who for respectable reasons...have opted for civil society
for their own platform for fighting authoritarianism.”51  
Second, despite the tendency towards over simplistic dichotomous formulations in
which state and society are counter-posed and presumed to be in conflict with one another  it
is increasingly clear from empirical studies that state and civil society in post-colonial Africa are
mutually interpenetrated.52  Studies of western state-society relations similarly suggest that the
53  For example, Hann and Dunn, Civil Society: challenging western models.
54 Charles Taylor, “Modes of Civil Society” Public Culture (1990), esp. pp. 104-105.
55  Taylor, “Modes of Civil Society”, 117.
56  Antonio Gramsci, “”State and Civil Society” in Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell
Smith, eds. and trans.  Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York:
International Publishers, 1971), 238.
57  Three key interventions in this debate are: Rene Lemarchand, “Uncivil States and
Civil Societies: how Illusion became reality” Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 2 (1992), 177-
191;  Robert Fatton Jr, “Africa in the age of democratization: the civic limitations of civil
society” African Studies Review 38, 2 (1995), 67-99; and Asef Bayat, “Un-civil society: the politics
of the ‘informal people’” Third World Quarterly 18, 1 (1997), 53-72.
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state-society dichotomy is over-stated.53  
Common usages of ‘civil society’ also misrepresent how some, although not all,
philosophers have derived and used the term ‘civil society’.  Charles Taylor, in an influential
article, charted two streams of thought in philosophical usages of ‘civil society’ proposing that
one stream, derived from Montesquieu’s writings emphasizes civil society and the state as
mutually supportive, while the other, derived from Locke, sees society as prior to and therefore
‘outside’ the state.54  Taylor proposes that western civil society draws from both these traditions,
and is “...not so much a sphere outside political power; rather it penetrates deeply into this
power, fragments and decentralises it.  Its components are truly ‘amphibious.’”55  This is a much
more Habermasian conception of civil society, in which public opinion is a fundamental base
for governmental legitimacy.  Yet, it is not so far either from Gramsci’s notion of civil society
as a ‘bulwark’ of the state or supporting and protective shield around the state.56  This
conception of civil society seems a much more suitable way to depict the state-society relation
in much of Africa, which is best described as mutually interpenetrated and interdependent.
The third concern raised by academics is the linkage, generally unquestioned by donors,
between associational life and respect for the views of the majority and the rule of law implicit
in the notion of civility.  Much of ‘civil society’ is in fact fundamentally uncivil.57  One response
to this on the part of policymakers has been to ‘define out’ certain segments of the population.
Operationalizing such policies in development programme funding may lead to the exclusion
58  Susan  Dicklitch The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa : lessons from Uganda 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 176.
59 Alan Fowler, “The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations: Perspectives
from Eastern and Southern Africa” Development Policy Review 9 (1991), 78.
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of unions, corporate interests, and fundamentalist or anti-democratic groups.  This further
contributes to the tendency to prioritize NGOs, which conform more clearly to the familiar
forms of the western charity sector.  A further point needs to be made. While NGOs may  not
be uncivil, they may still not necessarily contribute to ‘democratization’. NGOs’ own agenda and
interests may or may not contribute to democratization.  These and other reasons, discussed
in the following section, lead us to conclude that they do not provide an eternal development
panacea. 
2.3.1 Capacity Critiques:  Fowler and Dicklitch
NGOs have been criticized for lacking the capacity to ‘bring democratization’, carry out
advocacy activities, or ‘build civil society’ and tend instead towards ‘gapfilling’ supplementing
the state’s agenda.  On one level, this merely recognizes that most NGOs in developing
countries are dedicated to the provision of development goods, often in co-operation with
government ministries.  The policy prescription offered by Dicklitch in the conclusion to her
study of Ugandan NGOs, is to encourage them to go beyond this sort of gap-filling, to “...take
a more pro-active, empowerment role towards democracy and development in Africa.”58
Fowler, similarly, proposes that funding for NGOs must be arranged to move them away from
gap-filling: “strengthening civil society must therefore be a deliberately designed and targeted
activity of aid.”59  As a result, development NGOs are increasingly funded to ‘network’ and
‘develop civil society’ in addition to their more mundane development tasks. 
Capacity critiques propose that while NGOs don’t do advocacy very well, they can be
funded to do so.  Donors assume that the problem is how to  programme, fund, organize or
otherwise catalyze democratic or participatory structures. The ready-made assumption is that
60 Dicklitch, The Elusive Promise of NGOs, 172.
61  Fowler “The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations,” 64-78.
62 Michael Bratton, “The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa” World
Development 17 (1989), 407.
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NGOs want to engage in advocacy work, but merely lack the resources to do so.  Questions
of attitude or viability are rarely raised.  While criticizing the weakness of Ugandan NGOs,
Dicklitch touches briefly upon the lack of a “spirit of voluntarism...necessary for the sustenance
of a strong voluntary sector” which she attributes to the “economy of survival that necessitates
that individuals have more than one job.”60  The implications for this lack of voluntarism for
the agenda of ‘civil society’ are not considered.  
Fowler, in a broader, comparative study, proposes that states use a variety of techniques
to weaken NGOs and civil society—through legislation, administrative co-option, and political
appropriation.  At the same time, he details several ways in which donors can weaken
NGOs—by increasing bureaucracy and reducing autonomy.  Therefore he concludes that aid
must be channeled and directed at strengthening NGOs so that development can be
demonstrated to be: “people-oriented and democratic.”61  
In order to understand why NGOs are assumed to contribute to a process of
‘democratization’ we need to examine both what donors think NGOs are, and their relationship
with the state, as well as how this plays out in practice. In particular, we need to examine the
changes that have resulted from the increased resources made available to the NGO sector.
  
2.4 Exit, Voice and Material Engagement
In the 1980s and 1990s, donor funds directed to NGOs  increased, even as states were being
pressured to reduce their commitments to social expenditure and public sector employment.
The disenchantment with the state on both left and right degenerated into a study of  “the
retreat of the African state.”62 NGOs became more important sources of revenue and
employment as the state sector declined.  As we shall see, the relations between state and society
63  See for example, Victor Azarya, “Civil Society and Disengagement in Africa” in John
W Harbeson, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan eds.  Civil Society and the State in Africa.
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 83-100.
64 Ronald Kassimir, “The Social Power of Religious Organisation and Civil Society: the
Catholic Church in Uganda” in Commonwealth and Comparative Politics vol 36 no. 2 (1998), 57.
65 John Clark, “The State, Popular Participation, and the Voluntary Sector” in Hulme
and Edwards, NGOs, States and Donors, 47.
66  Björn Beckman “Explaining democratization: notes on the concept of civil society”
in Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson eds. Civil Society, Democracy, and the Muslim World
([Istanbul] : Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 1997).
67 John Clark, Democratising Development: the role of voluntary organisations (London:
Earthscan, 1991). 
68  Lloyd Sachikonye, “State and social movements in Zimbabwe” in Lloyd Sachikonye,
ed. Democracy, Civil Society and the State: Social Movements in Southern Africa (Harare: SAPES, 1995),
157.
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became more intense under these pressures. 
Like welfare organizations, churches, and informal markets, NGOs were ‘discovered’
by academics and donors disenchanted with the state.63  In a rush of enthusiasm, the origins of
these non-state organizations or what influences accounted for their formation, their policy
goals, their activities were little studied.  As Kassimir notes in relation to churches, civil society
approaches “decid[ed] in advance that civil organisations are principally independent variables
and assign[ed] them a role rather than analysing it.”64   This holds also for NGOs.  Clark, for
instance, talks of NGOs “overcoming their inhibitions and seeking closer collaboration with
their governments.”65   NGOs which get too close to their own states are ‘co-opted’— no
longer ‘real’ NGOs nor part of civil society but ‘defined out’ because they do not fit pre-defined
notions.66  In proposing that we must distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false’ NGOs, Clark
demands that organizations fit the definitions of donors and researchers, rather than vice-versa.67
State-society relationships are fluid and fragmentary rather than monolithic and fixed.
In a study of students and labour  in Zimbabwe, Sachikonye concludes that social movements
tend to be “dormant and amenable to co-optation at certain conjunctures” while “engaging in
spirited contests on both parochial concerns and national issues” at other times.68   But what
is interesting is why and how these tendencies change.  He proposes that “dormancy” may
69  Sachikonye, “State and social movements in Zimbabwe,” 157.
70  Jessica Vivian and Gladys Maseko, NGOs, Participation and Rural Development
Discussion Paper 49 (Geneva: UNRISD, 1994), 34.
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occur when a social movement has a fluid institutional base, ideological vacuity, or there is no
local issue to rally around.   Presumably, these three factors make organizations and movements
more amenable to co-option or to “negotiating some favourable pact or social contract with
the state.”69  Yet how this occurs is less clear—why should NGOs be “ideologically vacuous”
at one time, but not at another? Sachikonye raises more questions than he answers.  These
questions are overlooked by  many studies: Who works for NGOs? Why? What ideological or
moral convictions do they have?  While asking many questions about the motives of donors and
host states, few ask questions about the NGOs themselves.  
The NGO literature seems to assume that NGOs spring into being fully-formed and
without political ties or links, unless they are run by civil servants, MPs or Presidential wives
in which case they are pathologized as Government-NGOs (GONGOs). Yet, in reality, NGO-
state relations are better understood as a continuum.  NGOs may have cabinet ministers as
board members; staff members may be related to government officials; the President or first-
lady may be a patron.  NGOs which challenge the state at the local level may have excellent
relations at the centre, or vice-versa. Linkages exist between all NGOs and power-brokers which
change over time, and differing relations may exist with different levels of the state. 
These linkages are often enhanced by material but also by cultural and social
connections between élites, as NGO staff often come from or seek to join the same relatively
small bourgeoisie.  NGOs may use their personal connections with politicians and civil servants
to increase their profile and enhance  their ability to accomplish their goals.  School ties, church
adherence, and time spent in exile, in the liberation movements, or in prison may all link NGO
staff and politicians.  They  may also receive or be keen to receive funding from the state.70
Vivian and Maseko's study of development NGOs in rural Zimbabwe questioned the
71  Vivian and Maseko,  NGOs, Participation and Rural Development, 33.
72  Ann Muir with additional material by Roger C Riddell, Evaluating the Impact of NGOs
in rural poverty alleviation ODI Working paper 52 (London: ODI, 1992), 19.
73  Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: altruism under fire - nonprofit organisations and international
development (London: IT Publications, 1995), 20.
74  Wallerstein, “Voluntary Associations,” 322. 
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assumption that NGOs tend to be in conflict with the state but it did not address the question
of how and why NGO-state relations take this form.71  While we shall see that this changes in
Zimbabwe throughout the 1990s: many NGOs continue to insist that their policy aims are
better met by quiet diplomacy.  NGOs may maximize gains within their contexts, “rather than
in trying to alter that environment or engage in debate to initiate change.”72   
2.4.1  Problematizing Voluntarism and Professionalization
As part of the widescale rejection of the state, both the ‘Afro-pessimist’ and the more positive
‘cornucopian’ schools of donors and policy analysts have seized upon the  voluntary sector as
the solution to ‘development’ problems.73   The NGO sector is presumed to be based on the
Tocquevillean principles of voluntary action and charitable assistance.   However, the majority
of NGOs do not operate on voluntary principles.  Indeed, ‘voluntary association’ as the term
was originally used to describe African colonial-era institutions was based on a distinction
between traditional ascriptive associations and new, often urban, organizations which included
churches, savings groups, burial societies, and sports clubs.  As Wallerstein notes, they are
“‘voluntary’ in that no one’s membership was fore-ordained at birth, or automatic.”74           
  Donors and policy-makers are rarely explicit about how exactly the ‘voluntary sector’
promotes democracy.  Michael Bratton has elucidated these points in some detail.  At the risk
of making an ‘Aunt Sally’ of his argument, I will take his contribution to the influential Carter
Centre report on Governance to illustrate ideas that often remain implicit in donor discourses.
On an institutional level, it is assumed that encouraging NGOs to do advocacy and
policy-related work strengthens ‘civil society’ by  providing  “alternative structures to the
75  Michael Bratton, “Enabling the voluntary sector in Africa: the policy context” in
Carter Centre, African Governance in the 1990s (Atlanta, Carter Centre, 1990) 104.
76  Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, 222.
77  Bratton, “Voluntary sector” 104.
78  Robert Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti. Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); See for  instance,
“Pro bono publico - Civics lessons” Economist 6 February 1993. 
79 Ronald Kassimir, “The Social Power of Religious Organisation and Civil Society: the
Catholic Church in Uganda” in Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 36, 2 (1998), 56.
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monopolies of the state.....voluntary organizations can empower like-minded members to
articulate a collective interest and take collective action.”75   A more ‘indirect’ route to
democracy-enhancement presumes that the interactions of the voluntary sector lead to the
natural development of a vocal society, in what Carothers has called “the benevolent
Tocquevillean vision underlying US assistance to civil society....”76  To quote Bratton again,
“voluntary organizations can promote a democratic political culture....they offer a training
ground for democratic practices of governance.”77   These ideas were  further reinforced by the
publicity surrounding the 1993 publication of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work which
advocated the importance of ‘civic’ associations for the consolidation of democracy.78
Civil society theory, as implemented by donors, is predicated on the assumption that
voluntary organizations have the capacity and desire to both mobilize and socialize their members
and the wider society.79  Voluntary organizations are reified in this construction because their
voluntary nature is the key to socialization, while their membership is presumed to be available
for mobilization.  Donors and others endeavouring to strengthen civil society have increasingly
used this justification for channeling funds into the NGO sector.  
But is it really this straight-forward?   Are NGOs necessarily based on voluntary action?
The increased funding, in particular, further complicates these assumptions.  With  access to
large amounts of donor funding NGOs become ‘professionalized,’ functioning instead as
implementing agencies:
With increased funding has come increased demands for accountability,
professionalism, and demonstrated impact of activities.  As a result, many
80  Henrik Secher Marcussen, “NGOs, the State and Civil Society” Review of African
Political Economy 69 (1996),  415.
81  ODA, “ The Impact of External funding on the capacity of Local NGOs.” Final
Report Number R5968 N.D, see especially 40-52. See also the less detailed article based on this
research, Mick Moore and Sheelagh Stewart, “Corporate Governance for NGOs” in Development
in Practice, 8, 3(1998). 
82  Helmut K. Anheier and Lester M. Salamon, Defining the nonprofit sector : a cross-national
analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 366-367.
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NGOs have begun to transform themselves, reducing the voluntary part of
their activities in favour of staff being trained as professionals and having
explicit professional qualifications.80
The implications of this shift from voluntary to professional staff can be profound, but has not
yet been taken account of by donor agencies and mainstream researchers.  An ODA report
which engages specifically with the issue of the impact of external funding and
professionalization on local NGOs considers only half of the problem. The researchers
recognize that NGOs are particularly vulnerable to internal crisis and personnel turn-over after
their first tranche of major funding.  In this case, professionalization is a trend in which older,
volunteer members are replaced by  younger, professional staff.81   However,
professionalization also occurs when members become the professionalized staff, a particularly
volatile combination where both the government and private sectors are less attractive career
options.   In either case, it is clear that whether or not NGOs are ‘naturally’ voluntary, the
increased funding throughout the 1990s has made this claim less and less relevant. 
2.5 Pragmatic Decision-making
We now turn to the implications of these multiple misunderstandings of how NGOs function
and how they relate to the state.  NGOs derive diverse benefits from their newly increased
roles.  While sceptics point to the material benefits of NGO careers – and these are not
insubstantial – we should not ignore the ‘immaterial’ yet substantive benefits which churches
and mosques have long recognized when they have gained converts through the provision of
health or education services.82  NGOs, like any organization, take pride in their growth and
83  Sheelagh Stewart, ‘Happily ever after in the market-place: NGOs and uncivil society”
Review of African Political Economy 71 (1997), 24.
84  Michael Bratton, “Micro-democracy?  The merger of farmer unions in Zimbabwe’
African Studies Review 37, 1 (1994), 12.
85  Sam Moyo, NGO Advocacy in Zimbabwe: Systematising an Old Function or Inventing a New
Role?  (Harare: ZERO, 1992); Stephen Burgess, “NGOs and the State in Africa: Competition
and Conflict Avoidance in rural Zimbabwe” Paper presented to the African Studies Association
Annual Meeting, Toronto, Ont. Canada, 3-6 November 1994, 20.
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high-profiles locally and internationally and senior positions in NGOs may bring with them
considerable public recognition.  There is also a potential down-side to the ‘profitability’ of the
non-profit sector.  Entrepreneurs may also form NGOs to provide employment, prestige and
connections to the well-resourced development sector, rather than for any commitment to
abstract ideals advocated by donors. 
Although the ‘beneficiaries’ of NGOs are often defined simply as those whom the
programmes are designed to benefit, the term should probably include the entire network that
relies upon NGO funding, such as employees and consultants.83  In some cases, this wider
group is seen as merely part of societal patronage networks.  Leaders of NGOs are thought to
seek to enhance their own prestige, rent-seeking potential, and client base.84   Such analyses
pathologize these NGOs for abandoning the voluntarist, altruistic goals of ‘real’ NGOs.  It
seems more important to think critically about the political implications of such motivations
on the part of NGO staff, leaders and hangers-on.  How do the incentives to work for and gain
office in NGOs, the increased stakes in doing so, and the personal motivations of office-
holders influence the way in which NGOs and interest organizations interact with the state? 
In Zimbabwe, it is widely accepted that NGOs use non-confrontational tactics,
variously defined as  entryism and inclusion, to influence  various levels of state and party
apparatus.85  Where the state remains relatively administratively competent, typically,  all the
‘sticks’ — closure, deregistration, investigation and co-ordination — and ‘carrots’ — tax
exemption, access to policy-makers and public funding — are seen as emanating from the state,
86  David Hulme and Michael Edwards eds , NGOs, States and Donors: too close for comfort?
(London: Macmillan and Save the Children, 1997), 13.
87  Beckman “Explaining democratization: notes on the concept of civil society” 5.
88  Alan F Fowler, “Non-governmental organisations and the promotion of democracy
in Kenya” (DPhil Thesis, Sussex, 1994), 293. 
89 Fowler, “Non-governmental organisations and the promotion of democracy in
Kenya,” 288. 
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Kenya,” 291 
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while the NGOs have little, if any bargaining power.86  NGOs may therefore seek access to the
state to influence its policies as well as to avoid conflict or secure protection.87   As Fowler
noted in his well-grounded study of Kenyan NGOs, “it appears that more can be achieved by
appearing to support, respect, and improve prevailing systems, rather than openly agitating
against them.”88  NGOs often initiate these interactions with states – and are not always ‘co-
opted’ by the state.   As development organizations, NGOs exercise strategic pragmatism in
order to ensure that their clients continue to benefit from the ‘goods’ they bring.  Fowler’s
thesis extends this point and emphasizes that “providing welfare services can be an important
factor allowing other, more politically sensitive, work to take place.”89  The Undugu Society in
Kenya, which both provides services to street-children and advocates for policy reform,
“pursues an emancipatory agenda through a managed mix of macro and micro  activities
designed to reinforce each other so exploiting the limited development space that exists and the
opportunities which arise within it.”90  NGOs, therefore, may refrain from political activity in
order not to risk their primary goal but, at the same time, their role as development
organizations also enables them to press for certain policy changes.
2.6 Authoritarianism ‘Revisited’
In 1998, I argued that three inter-connected  factors influenced and constrained the operations
of NGOs in Zimbabwe: 
First, NGOs exist within the political hegemony of state and ruling party,
ZANU(PF), which depends on a context of ‘legitimacy’ created by the
91 Sara Rich Dorman, “NGOs and State in Zimbabwe: Implications for civil-society
theory” forthcoming in Bjorn Beckman, Anders Sjogren and Eva Hannsen eds. Civil Society,
Authoritarianism and Globalisation. 
92  Brian Raftopoulos, “The State, NGOs and Democratization” in Sam Moyo, John
Makumbe and Brian Raftopoulos, NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe (Harare: SAPES,
2000), 23.
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liberation war and entrenched by post-war development, the lack of
opposition parties, and the Mugabe government’s willingness to coerce and
co-opt would be dissidents.  Second, NGOs operate under material and
organizational constraints—that they are as much centres of employment as
sites of activism—which encourage them to develop good working
relationships with the state and constrains them from contentious challenges
to its authority.  Third, and resulting from these first two points, NGOs
exercise strategic pragmatism, framing what few challenges they make to the
political order in a depoliticizing discourse in order to make themselves
acceptable to their colleagues and the state.  In short, NGOs are often
constrained from taking on the roles imputed to them by the civil society
theorists, by virtue of having a stake in the....system.91
In 2000, Brian Raftopoulos indicated that while this was a:
useful summary of the role of NGOs....there are indications that, in the
changed conditions of the late 1990s, sections of the NGO community have
begun to depart from this strategy and move into a more confrontational
mode, in the context of a broader social movement.92
It is the process of charting this change in state-society relations that requires us to return to
the issues broached in section 2.2. In order to comprehensively explain the post 1997 shift in
the relationship between NGOs and the state in Zimbabwe, we must take account of shifting
power relations, declining hegemony and the re-alignment of state and society.  While NGOs
in Zimbabwe come to have less of a stake in the declining system, their relations with the state
remain ambiguous. 
Attempts to understand democratization must be rooted in both an understanding of
the material and social processes through which the authoritarian state itself was constructed
and maintained, and an analysis of the internal organizational politics of the civil society
organizations under consideration.  We need first to examine the bases of the regime’s power
over society, which is not simply coercive, but connects ideology, coercion and material
interests to include society within the regime’s hegemonic framework.  As sections 2.7 and 2.8
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have shown, organizations like NGOs are particularly bound-up in the institutions of
government and the state.  They also have their own internal dynamics that pressurize them to
pursue the organization’s interests in growth and expansion.  They respond, therefore, to the
pressures of the regime when their interests coincide.  This further reproduces and strengthens
the state’s discursive hegemony.  In order to understand the complexity of processes of
democratization we need to take into account both the multiple sources of state control and the
institutional dynamics of organizations like NGOs.
The politics of inclusion as practiced by the Mugabe regime in independent Zimbabwe
is characterized by societal quiescence and demobilization.  The construction of consent
integrates social groups into the ruling, nationalist, coalition.  This potentially disparate coalition
is based on alliances which depend to differing extents on coinciding interests, ideological
commitment,  and the threat of the use of force. The rhetoric of inclusion closes out alternative
social and political space, rendering projects outside the ruling party’s sphere nearly unthinkable
and profoundly unimplementable.  But this inclusionary politics depends upon the regime
making material and social resources available to alliance members. When these resources are
reduced, either because of competing ideologies or fiscal exhaustion, the coalition’s stability is
threatened and coercion is called upon to a greater extent. Exclusionary politics reflect a
diminishing in the ideological or cultural elements of power, as well as the material.  This leaves
coercive force on its own, in a much weaker position than when justified by rhetoric or
resource distribution.  The mobilization and privileging of certain members of the coalition
weakens the regime’s hold over others.  It also opens spaces for alternative accounts of
nationalism or other ideologies to flourish.  Exclusion is no longer unthinkable because the
ever-increasing ranks of the excluded develop their own justificatory rhetoric and resources.
Competition for control of the state is based on competing ideologies and interests, which
manifest themselves in electoral and physical conflict.  Without a conception of politics that
recognizes the multiple bases of political power in and over society, theories will over- or
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under-emphasize particular factors, creating parsimonious, yet  unsatisfactory models of
relations between state and society.   
Zimbabwean politics is characterized by continuity as well as change.  As chapters 3
and 4 will show, in the 1980s, the Mugabe regime retained power through successfully creating
consent.  While coercion was used, to brutally repress political opponents, it was merely one
element of a variety of legislative and policy tools that comprised a broader nation-building
project.  NGOs, like churches, unions, and other societal groups were caught up in and
contributed to the construction of hegemony.  The internal politics of these organizations were
affected both by this external environment and  the shifting international sphere, as discussed
in chapter 5. 
In the 1990s, as policy goals are reversed and the nationalist social contract unravels,
NGOs emerge slowly as potential challengers.  This story is not straight-forward or
unambiguous, as the case studies in Chapter 6 reveal. The cultural power of the regime is
resilient. Yet, after 1997  NGOs and other social groups  form an alternative coalition which
fundamentally challenges the ruling party’s authority in the referendum of February 2000, as
discussed in Chapter 7.   Chapter 8 concludes with an examination of the move  towards a more
exclusionary and intolerant conception of nationalism after the referendum. 
1  Brian Raftopoulos, “Zimbabwe: Race and Nationalism in a Post-colonial State” in
Preben Kaarsholm and Ian Hultin, eds.  Inventions and Boundaries Roskilde University Occasional
Papers (1994), 75.
2  Ian Phimister, “The combined and contradictory inheritance of the struggle against
colonialism” in Colin Stoneman, ed. Zimbabwe’s prospects: issues of race, class, state and capital in
Southern Africa (London: MacMillan, 1988), 8.
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Part II    The Politics of Inclusion, 1980-1997
As many noted at the time of the Lancaster House transition, the Mugabe regime took power
in a country well endowed with resources, communications, and road networks.  It was also
riven by civil strife and a potential legacy of race divisions,  what Raftopoulos has called
“...serious ambiguities in the discourses and practices of race and nationalism currently
operational in Zimbabwean society.”1  
As several studies have shown, the very nature of the ‘revolution’ that brought the
Mugabe regime into power was “profoundly ambiguous,” bringing further contradictions in its
wake.2   Perhaps this made it inevitable that the relationship between rulers and ruled in
independent Zimbabwe would be problematic. Thus, although this section of the thesis
focusses on state and society in the 1980s and 1990s, it is important first to examine and
consider the legacy of the liberation war upon which the politics of independent Zimbabwe was
built. This will be done through a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the
extensive secondary literature on Zimbabwe’s liberation war and the early years of the
independent state.
Questions of ideology and mobilization have been examined in some depth to explain
both the course of the liberation struggle and the structure of power in independent Zimbabwe.
In a much rehearsed set of academic arguments, debate has raged over the extent to which
guerilla leaders utilized existing grievances within peasant communities to mobilize them, and
the extent to which coercion was used to draw out material support.   Ranger, in his influential
Peasant Consciousness,  proposed a model of nationalism in which peasants were mobilized by
3 Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe (London: James
Currey, 1985).
4 Norma J Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge, CUP, 1992).
5 David Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerilla and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (London: James
Currey, 1985).
6 David Maxwell, Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1999) 139-140.
7 Jocelyn Alexander, “Things fall apart, the Centre can hold” in Ngwabi Bhebe and
Terence Ranger eds. Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (Harare: UZ, 1995)  176-179; Jocelyn
Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory (Oxford: James Currey,
2000).
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local complaints concerning land use and agricultural production.3  In response to this, Kriger
proposed that guerillas also resorted to the use of coercive force against peasants in order to
gain their acquiescence.4  In intersecting discussions, Lan emphasized the role of spirit mediums
in mediating between guerillas and peasants,5 while Maxwell calls for further differentiation
between different mediums and different guerrilla units, emphasizing the importance of locality
in determining reactions.6  The newest addition to this debate, Alexander, McGregor and
Ranger’s study of northern Matabeleland, further emphasizes that  that the liberation war had
very different impacts  in different regions.  These differences in the context of guerrilla-peasant
relations depended on their earlier historical experiences, as well as their proximity to security
forces and accessibility to guerillas and among different groupings within local areas divided by
age, gender, and access to land.7  
Within the liberation movement itself, recent work has shown there to have been  equal
if  not greater struggles and differentiation: between generations of guerillas, between those at
the front and the leadership, and between ideological factions, leading to suggestions that the
revolution ‘lost its way’ long before encountering the pragmatic difficulties of ruling the nation.
Indeed, ambiguities and divisions between radicals and reformers in ZANU, as well as between
liberals and ‘nationalists’ within the Rhodesian state and within the peasant communities — all
8 Christine Sylvester, “Simultaneous Revolutions: the Zimbabwe Case” Journal of Southern
African Studies, 16, 3 (1990).
9 André Astrow,  Zimbabwe : a revolution that lost its way? (London: Zed, 1983), 135-144;
Stoneman and Cliffe point out the tautology inherent in Astrow’s argument — the nationalist
movement was a nationalist movement and therefore unable to also be a Marxist movement:
Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society  London: Pinter, 1989),
2. 
10 Astrow, Zimbabwe : a revolution that lost its way? 82-90.
11  David Moore, “The Zimbabwe People’s Army: Strategic Innovation or more of the
same?” in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger eds. Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (Harare:
UZ, 1995), 73-86; David Moore, “The Ideological Formation of the Zimbabwean Ruling Class”
Journal of Southern African Studies 17, 3 (1991), 488-495; David Moore, “The Contradictory
Construction of Hegemony in Zimbabwe” (unpublished PhD thesis, York University, 1990).
12 Ronald T Libby, “Development Strategies and Political Divisions within the
Zimbabwean State” in Michael G Schatzberg ed, The Political Economy of Zimbabwe (1984), 144-
163.
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contribute to explaining the lack of a ready-made integrative hegemonic discourse, on  which
the new state could easily draw.8
The impact of these ‘struggles within the struggle’ has dominated much of the literature
that attempts to ‘explain’ the early years of the Mugabe regime.   Astrow argues that the petty
bourgeois nature of the leadership and its class interests prevented the creation of a
revolutionary state.   The nationalist movement was never, in Astrow’s analysis, an anti-
capitalist movement; it was rather a classic nationalist movement focussed on removing the
discriminatory structures of settler society.9  In this reading, struggles within the struggle, were
not tribal (as often alleged) but instead generational.10  Moore gives rather more credit to
ideological divisions within the nationalist camp, in particular the suppression of the more
radically marxist March 11 movement in ZAPU and the Zimbabwe People’s Army in ZANU,
 by the more conservative leaderships which adopted their rhetoric and maintained
dominance.11
Some of these divisions were further explicated in post-independence policy-making
as reflecting ‘technocratic’ approaches in contrast to ‘populist’ and by implication, socialist,
appeals to the masses.12     Mandaza, however,  is particularly dismissive of this dichotomy
between technocratic and populist forces within the government, preferring to stress the
13 Ibbo Mandaza, “The State and Politics in the Post-White Settler Colonial Situation”
in Ibbo Mandaza ed. Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 (Dakar: CODESRIA,
1986), 55.
14 Patrick Bond, Uneven Zimbabwe (Trenton, NJ: AWP, 1998) esp. chapter 6. 
15 On ZANU and socialism see for example, “ZANU(PF) to decide soon on new party
ideology, says Mahachi” Herald 29 January 1991, 3; “ZANU(PF) leaders debate need to update
socialism” Herald 23 March 1991, 1; "Chidzero speaks on new thrust: investors assured of
commitment to marker economy”  Financial Gazette 28 March 1991, 1; “Mutasa makes U-turn
on socialism”   Financial Gazette 28 March 1991, 1; R G Mugabe, “President calls for full debate
on socialism”, Financial Gazette 28 March 1991, 4; “Socialism not for now: Chidzero” Sunday
Mail 28 April 1991, 1.; on indigenization see for example,  “Towards the IBDC Congress”
Herald 12 June 1991, 5-8; “Big Business and IBDC urged to work together” Herald 13 June
1991, 1; on ESAP see for example, “$42bn economic reform plan out” Herald 15 February
1991, 1.
16  Grace Kwinjeh, "Corruption eating Zimbabwe’s heart” PANA 1 December 1997;
Duduzile Nkomo & AFP, “Mugabe admits to graft in own cabinet” Mail and Guardian 21 July
1999;  Susan Njanji, “Corruption: the evil unveiled in Zimbabwe” Mail and Guardian 26 July
1999.
17  Hevina Dashwood, Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transition (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2000).
46
internal ‘class fractions’ of the leadership and  international pressures as determining policy.13
 He emphasizes the international factors – the negotiated settlement of Lancaster House,
international capital and geo-political considerations – that constrained decision-making in
independent Zimbabwe, rather than  the internal legacies of either the settler-state or the
liberation war. 
Bond argues that Zimbabwe’s economic policy since 1980 has been predominantly
capitalist, covered up with socialist rhetoric.14  Since the end of the cold war, much of the
ideological ‘gloss’ of ZANU has slipped—with the party ‘debating socialism’, introducing
economic liberalization, and encouraging the development of indigenous capitalists.15  The
conspicuous accumulation of many ministers and party officials—including Mugabe, despite
the widely held perception of his ascetic disposition—and increasing accusations of corruption
within the state, have further damaged any pretensions to ‘socialist’ development.16  In a similar
vein, Hevina Dashwood’s recent study proposes that economic policy changes reflect the
embourgeoisement of the ruling class in Zimbabwe.17
18 Jonathan Moyo, “State Politics and Social Domination” Journal of Modern African
Studies (1992), 329.
19  Richard Werbner, “Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the dead, memory
and reinscription in Zimbabwe”, in Richard Werbner ed.  Memory and the Postcolony, (London :
Zed Books, 1998) 77.
20  Raftopoulos, “Race and Nationalism”, 87.
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Other studies of Zimbabwe’s post-independence politics have tended instead to focus
on the institutional and the structural impacts on decision-making and policy-making.  In
explicit reaction to earlier  preoccupations with ideological rhetoric, Jonathan Moyo assessed
the state’s accomplishments in education, health, agriculture, land reform and the economy,
concluding  that the “stability of the social system during the first decade of transition...has
largely depended on a careful and sometimes precarious balance of the lower and high strata.”18
 Herbst, like Moyo, focussed primarily on the state’s ‘distributive’ role in education, health,
agriculture and the economy.  Both these analyses  of the Zimbabwean state ignore the state’s
use of power to shore up its support.  Both Moyo and Herbst seem to perceive a state that
attempts to meet the needs of constituents – a state driven more by societal pressures than by
developing hegemony or asserting control over various constituencies. Moyo’s critique of what
we might broadly call the ideological school  is rightly balanced by his focus on “the actual
situation.”  However,  this approach presumes an administrative state, assessed solely on the
basis of its material accomplishments, and ignores the role of the party or fractions within the
party in assuming and retaining power.   
Redressing the balance towards ideological questions,  Werbner, writing from an
anthropological perspective,  has emphasized the long-term impact of the liberation war,
suggesting that, “wartime suffering and sacrifice dominate the notion of national origin.”19   
Raftopoulos identifies the discursive use of an “ideology of sacrifice”20 as well as the state’s
effective appropriation of the discourse of nationalism.   This section will further these attempts
to balance and integrate the study of the discourses and practices of the Zimbabwean state.  It
will look at the different discourses used by the state and also study its choice of policies.  It will
21  Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy.” in
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 51-
53.
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focus particularly on how this construction of hegemony by the state has affected counter-
hegemonic struggles. 
The predominance of studies of the formal institutions of governance – and especially
their legislative and executive arms – has weakened analysis of Zimbabwe’s post-colonial
politics by emphasizing the coercive nature of the state.  Using mechanisms of consent-building
and incorporation has proved a more reliable tool of the post-independence regime, although
they have not been averse to the use of violence to crush and incorporate opponents. The cases
of ZAPU in the 1980s and the independent candidates and the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) in the late 1990s reveal that the ruling party is quite willing to make use of  the
state’s monopoly of force. Yet these instances do not explain the relative quiescence during
much of the 1980s and 1990s.  Przeworski has argued that transitions do not occur except when
there are organized alternatives to the existing ruling group, which seems quite
commonsensical, and which does help explain the durability of the Mugabe regime.21  Yet, the
Zimbabwe case requires us to ask, why were there no organized alternatives? What was it that
prevented their emergence?
A key question then, is how groups, which according to most accounts, had been
mobilized to a fever pitch during the independence war, were demobilized.  It is crucial that we
first examine the process of state-formation in Zimbabwe, and the meshing of both ideological,
material, and legislative means that the state used to build its hegemony in the 1980s, to
withstand challenges from students and workers in the late 1980s, and to retain an albeit
crumbling hold on power into the 1990s.   
Chapter 3 will first examine the secondary material on legacy of the nationalist struggle
on the Mugabe government.  Secondly, it will examine  primarily government documents,
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newspaper accounts  and official speeches, to identify the discursive basis of the regime.  Then
it will consider the more concrete policy decisions, especially the introduction of laws, which
have contributed to demobilizing potential opponents of the regime.  This will entail examining
the institutions used to shore up the post-colonial regime — the media, judiciary, party and
security forces — and the social movements and groups which they target — students,
churches, NGOs, unions.    The 1980s can best be understood as a period in which the regime
was constructed – building on the success of ZANU in bringing a fairly peaceful transition, and
the avoidance of excessive white flight.  At the same time, the government used force to subdue
Matabeleland and absorb its main rival – ZAPU.  Despite the party’s reconfiguration as
ZANU(PF) in 1987, the one-party state was never legalized.  1990 is chosen as the conclusion
of this period not just because it divides two decades neatly, but also because of the significance
of the one-party state debate. 
Chapter 4 will examine the 1990s, as Zimbabwe, like the rest of Africa, confronted the
post-cold war world.  In the 1990s we see the weakening of ZANU(PF) hegemony, but only
the incremental emergence of an alternative regime.  The politics of the late 1990s, perhaps best
understood as a crisis of nationalism,  will be examined in more detail in chapters 7 and 8,
where we will be in a position to examine the re-mobilization of these social groups as the
nationalist coalition dissolves, despite desperate attempts to breathe life back into the
mythology and networks of the liberation struggle. 
1 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, “Nationalism, democracy and development” in Sugata
Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds. Nationalism, democracy and development (Delhi: Oxford University
Press,1997), 1.
2 Norbert Tengende,”Workers, Students and the Struggles for Democracy: State-Civil
Society relations in Zimbabwe” (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Roskilde 1994), 153. 
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Chapter 3  Constructing Hegemony: Discourse and Action, 1980-1990
Following the over-whelming victory in the 1980 election, the Mugabe government set about
welding together the disparate elements of the nationalist movement, in an attempt to develop
their hegemony over the new nation. In order to understand this period, we must examine the
“complementary, contradictory, reciprocal, and symbiotic aspects of the complex relationship
between nationalism, democracy and development.”1
The joint nation and party-building which will be examined in section 3.1 was defined
in terms of  three inter-locking concepts: reconciliation and unity;  development; and nationalist
rhetoric and symbolism.  The party was aided in this programme by its external and internal
legitimacy/credibility provided by its electoral mandate, which supplied it with willing
accomplices, even amongst those sectors that had not supported its aims during the war.  At
the same time, the regime’s new legislative and security powers based upon the oppressive laws
of the Rhodesian state, allowed it to regulate widely providing a political-military framework
through which to dominate and demobilize society, which is the subject of section 3.2.  As the
late Norbert Tengende argued in a little-known but valuable thesis, “Nation-building....became
an instrument of domination and control...marked by the marginalization of popular
participation.”2  
3.1 Nation-building
As we shall see, nation-building projects involved many arms of the state including the national
media and the education system in attempting to inculcate the values described above.  For
example, the curriculum proposed for the new nation was said to be designed to emphasize
3  “Political subjects to be placed on new curriculum” Herald 13 November 1981, 6.
4  Fay Chung, “Education: revolution or reform” in Colin Stoneman ed.,  Zimbabwe’s
Prospects (London: MacMillan, 1988), 118-132.
5  “Address to the nation by the Prime Minister: The wrongs of the past must stand
forgiven and forgotten” Herald 18 April 1980, 4.
6  Brian Raftopoulos, “Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in
Zimbabwe,” Review of African Political Economy 54,  64.
7  Victor de Waal, The Politics of Reconciliation (London: Hurst, 1990), 7. 
8  Ibbo Mandaza, “The State in Post-white settler colonial situation” in Ibbo Mandaza,
ed.  The Political Economy of Transition (Dakar: CODESRIA,1986), 54.
9  Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 231.
10  Lloyd Sachikonye, "The National-state project and conflict in Zimbabwe” in Liisa
Laakso and Adebayo Olukoshi eds, Challenges to the nation-state in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet,1996), 142.
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“national unity, patriotism, civics and local history”3 even if curriculum reform was the weakest
aspect of the government’s programme in education.4
The policy of reconciliation and unity was aimed at both whites and those blacks  who
had not supported ZANU during the liberation struggle.    On the eve of independence
Mugabe “...enjoin[ed] the whole of [the]  nation to march in perfect unison.”5   This gesture
was widely seen as  a pragmatic acceptance of existing forces in the country and the region, as
well as the current international climate,6 although Victor de Waal  described the success of  this
policy as being based on “conscious moral principle.”7   Obviously, unity was crucial in a state
riven not just by unequal development but by explicit policies of divide and rule practiced by
the Smith regime and its British colonial predecessors.8   Yet this policy was also used to excuse
authoritarian policies, abuse the monopoly of force, and justify limitations on human rights and
freedoms.  Even within ZANU, the unity agenda was challenged because those “who had
contributed to guerilla support were in no mood to be reconciled with those who had fled their
rural homes in the war and now wished to return.”9 
In practice nation-building was  narrowly conceptualized “from a party political
perspective.”10  And so, a major part of policy was to dominate the available political space,
squeezing out competing voices which could lay claim to the nationalist discourse or otherwise
11  Werbner, “Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun,” 79.
12  Tor Skålnes, The politics of economic reform in Zimbabwe : continuity and change in development
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); Carolyn Jenkins, “The Politics of Economic Policy-making in
Zimbabwe” Journal of Modern African Studies 35, 4 (1997); Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe
(Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1991).
13  Carolyn Jenkins, “The Politics of Economic Policy-making in Zimbabwe” Journal of
Modern African Studies 35, 4 (1997), 588.
52
appeal to the voting population.  Most crucially, attempts to sideline ZAPU in the early eighties
had:
far reaching implications for certain newly-emergent yet basic political realities:
for nation-building, for state-made ethnic polarisation, for the concentration
of power within the state and indeed for the very critique of what state power
could or should be.11  
3.1.1 Reconciliation and Deracialization
Deracialization was in some ways the simplest implementation of the ‘reconciliation and unity’
package.  The civil service and the lower levels of industry and commerce—secretarial and
shop-floor assistants, for example—were rapidly ‘indigenized’ especially because these lower-
class whites were the most likely to have left before or at independence.  Industry, banking, and
other sectors of the economy remained white controlled at the top levels with the implicit
connivance of the state, aiming to avoid the ‘white-flight’ which had typified Mozambique’s
decolonization.  Because of this, it is in economic-policymaking that the continued influence
of whites remains most visible.  Indeed, students of interest group behaviour in Zimbabwe
argued that in the 1980s the strongest interest groups in Zimbabwe were those identified as
‘white’ such as commercial farmers and industrialists.12  This is due in part to their
organizational and research strengths, as well as their strategic economic importance.  The
‘ministerial’ or ‘executive’ dominance in decision-making is said to have increased the strength
of white interest groups, who have become “...much stronger outside Parliament than ever the
[Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ), a successor to the RF] would have been inside.”13
14  See for instance,  Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elites.
15  Schatzberg, “Power, Legitimacy and Democratization”, 449. 
16  See for example, Nathan Shamuyarira, “An overview of the struggle for unity and
independence” in Canaan Banana ed. Turmoil and Tenacity, Zimbabwe 1890-1990 (Harare: College,
1989), 13-24.
17  David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Faber and
Faber, 1981), 31; Carol Thompson, Challenge to imperialism : the frontline states in the liberation of
Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985), 44-55; Masipula Sithole, Zimbabwe:
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 While a few whites sat as ZANU MPs or Ministers, most retreated from formal politics and
concentrated on their businesses and social lives.14
The constitutional requirements of Lancaster House also prevented the government
from acquiring land, other than through willing-seller agreements.  The resultant stability of
tenure did much to reassure farmers and investors of the regime’s willingness to support white
endeavours.  But, as we shall see in the next chapter, pent-up land hunger became a potent
mobilizing force for and against the Mugabe regime throughout the 1990s.
3.1.2 Party Unity
Unity was not just about relations between blacks and whites, but also crucially about relations
between ZANU and ZAPU, as well as the UANC which, under Bishop Muzorewa, had
accepted the ‘internal settlement’ and controlled the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979-
80.     
Michael Schatzberg argues that the emphasis on unity and the one-party state, which
is indeed seen in many of the post-colonial authoritarian regimes, reflects an African conception
of power: “...power here cannot easily be divided or shared.”15  However, we can more usefully
trace the evolution of this concept to the historical experience of the nationalist politicians. 
Considering the divided nature of the liberation movements – exacerbated by Rhodesian
attempts to ‘divide and rule’ – it is not surprising that the issue of unity had dominated the
politics of the liberation struggle.16  It was often perceived as a condition set by the
Organization of African Unity and the Front Line States17 leading to the attempted formations
Struggles within the Struggle 2nd edition (Harare: Rujeko, 1999),191-208.
18  Terence Ranger “Legitimacy, Civil Society and the State in Africa”1st Alexander
Visiting Professor Lecture presented at the University of Western Australia, 2 December 1992,
23. 
19  “We must be vigilant and united, says President” Herald 3 January 1981, 1.
20  “Unity is prosperity, says Minister” Herald 18 October 1982, 1.
21  “No one party state, yet, Mugabe pledges” Herald 5 August 1982, 1.
22  “Unity of Party and state our objective – Zvogbo” Herald 2 November 1981, 1.
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of umbrella organizations amongst the liberation movements, but Ranger suggests that unity
was also an internal demand: 
...the first Congress movement in the late 1930s and 1940s was a more or less
powerless federal grouping of much more potent and virtually autonomous
association; the rhetoric of unity failed to overcome effective pluralism.  But
this was regularly lamented in the black press as a grave failure; the idea of a
sphere outside the political process in which issues of religious belief,
domesticity, education, gender, sport, work etc etc were resolved came more
and more under attack.  By the late 1950s with the emergence of mass
nationalism it had come to be accepted that the nationalist movement must
now dominate all these other spheres.18
In the post-independence period, the claimed unity of the nationalist struggle itself became
mythologized:  “in unity we fought for independence and in unity we must now strive to
consolidate it” President Banana claimed in early 1981.19  This theme of unity was then
elaborated in terms of  party unity, which claimed to be an ideological demand for a form of
rule appropriate to African society, but was also a demand for control by ZANU(PF). The
relationship between citizens, party and state was described by one deputy minister as being like
the Holy Trinity:  “the people are God the Father; the Government is God the Son; and
ZANU(PF) is the Holy Spirit.”20 The proposed – although never accomplished –
implementation of a one-party state further extended this thinking: “We are one state, with one
society and one nation, one party, and one leader.”21  As ZANU’s publicity secretary claimed
in late 1981:
ZANU(PF) is aiming at a situation where there is no separation between party
and state....we are convinced...that before the middle or end of next year, we
will have so re-organized the party that it will be impossible for any other party
to operate on the ground.22 
23  Joseph Hanlon, “Destabilisation and the battle to reduce dependence” in Colin
Stoneman ed.,  Zimbabwe’s Prospects (London: MacMillan, 1988); Michael Evans, “The security
threat from South Africa” in Stoneman ed.,  Zimbabwe’s Prospects.
24  Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy”, 254; for useful
discussion of the genesis and differences between these organizations see Lawyers Committee
on Human Rights, Zimbabwe: Wages of War (New York: Lawyers Committee, 1986)  chapter 3;
ZimRights, Choosing the Path to Peace and development: Coming to Terms with Human Rights Violations
of the 1982-1987 Conflict in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces (Harare: ZimRights, 1999) section
3.2.
25  Christine Sylvester, “Unities and disunities in Zimbabwe’s 1990 election” Journal of
Modern African Studies 28, 3 (1990), 376.
26  The dynamics and ramifications of this process are best described in:  Jocelyn
Alexander, “Dissident perspectives on Zimbabwe’s Post-Independence War”, Africa 68 (2)
1998.
27  Alexander, “Dissident perspectives”.
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The use of violent force to control and remove threats to unity were justified through
reference to destabilization attempts by South Africa.23  Security organs, which included the
Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the army, and various police units were also deployed
against civilians who might be seen to be “anti-unity, anti-government and disloyal to the
state.”24  As Christine Sylvester reminds us, each manifestation of the claim to ‘unity’ by the
ruling party “...can be deconstructed to bring disunities into the spotlight.”25
The violent conflict in Matabeleland between 1981 and 1987 was part of ZANU(PF)’s
determination to assert its dominance over the whole country.  This derived both from the
divisions of the liberation war and also from the under-resourced and under-organized
demobilization of ZIPRA and ZANLA.  Exacerbated by the ‘negotiated’ nature of the
settlement, the demobilization exercise was conflict-prone from the start, with guerillas and
leaders conflicting over access to stockpiles of arms, and conflict breaking out around
designated Assembly Points.26   While the government media contributed to claims that there
was an ‘organized pattern’ to outbreaks of violence,  Jocelyn Alexander argues that it was
violence within the newly created Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) that led many ex-ZIPRA
combatants to desert – these were the men subsequently labeled dissidents.27  While there seems
to be no base to the government’s claim that dissidents adhered to a political agenda,  the
28  Ronald Weitzer, “Continuities in the Politics of State Security in Zimbabwe” in
Michael Schatzberg, ed. The Political Economy of Zimbabwe (New York: Praeger, 1984),   543
(italics in the original). 
29  “Division will destroy us, says Mugabe” Herald 18 October 1982.
30  For example, after the launch of ZUM, “[Editorial] Let us make sure we remain a
united nation” Herald 22 December 1989, 10; “Democracy boosted by unity - President” Herald
1 January 1990, 1.
31  Ncube’s discussion of these claims and counter-claims is instructive. Welshman
Ncube, “The Post-unity Period: Development, Benefits and Problems”, in Banana ed, Turmoil
and Tenacity, 320-24.
32  Sylvester, “Unities and Disunities”, 386.
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regime’s claims were “...congenial with its own distinctive interests in consolidating state power and
entrenching ZANU hegemony in the political system.”28 The government’s rhetoric against the
so-called dissidents is redolent of unity as both a historical good and as necessary for future
development.  Mugabe said:
If you show divisionist attitudes the enemy will come among us and will
destroy us.  Our forefathers fought together during the first Chimurenga war
and it is our duty to be united as well...Dissidents still have shallow mentality
(sic), because they are encouraging tribalism in the country. Zimbabwe was not
liberated for any one tribe and it is pertinent that she remains united.29
Following this conflict, the detention and trial of high-level ZAPU members for
treason,  and Nkomo’s long period in exile, ZAPU was dismantled as an independent party, and
incorporated into ZANU in 1987.  The agreement known as the  Unity Accord created a ‘new’
party named  ZANU(PF).  The ‘PF’ stood for the Patriotic Front, under whose banner ZANU
and ZAPU had negotiated the Lancaster House accord.  Despite the rhetoric of partnership and
unity, the terms of the agreement, symbolized by the loss of ZAPU’s name,  reflected ZANU
triumphalism.
After the Accord, elections and party politics continued to be completely dominated
by this rhetoric of unity.30  In part, this was doubtless an attempt to delegitimize the Zimbabwe
Unity Movement (ZUM) formed by the former ZANU MP Edgar Tekere in 1989, as an explicit
attack on proposal to create a one-party state.31  ZUM also capitalized upon the language of
unity, operating, as Sylvester puts it, “in and against the ambiguities of the situation.”32     Little
33  See for instance, ZANU (PF) election manifesto reprinted in the Herald 5 March
1990, 2-3; also, adverts throughout March 1990, including “ZANU(PF) Harare Province Unity
gave us victory” advertising Nelson Mandela’s attendance at an election rally, Herald 3 March
1990, 8; Another Harare province rally advert concluded in large print: “Let us all remain
united! Let us all prepare ourselves for the new decade of unity, peace and development by
voting ZANU(PF)....Vote ZANU(PF) for Unity, Peace and Development!” Herald 24 March
1990, 3.
34  “Muzorewa arrested” Herald 2 November 1983, 1; “Why Muzorewa being detained -
Premier” Herald 4 November 1983.
35  “New grounds for the detention of Muzorewa” Herald 5 November 1983, 1.
36  “Bishop’s Zaire link exposed” Herald 19 November 1983, 1.
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really changed, as we will see below, ZANU(PF)’s election manifesto in 1990 opened with “the
imperative of national unity” and this point was reiterated throughout their advertizing
campaign.33
The other minor parties were also affected by these policies.  Bishop Muzorewa, who
remained head of the UANC,  was detained for 10 months in 1983-84 on charges which
included conspiring with his “intimate friends in the leadership of the South African
government”34 to  “making derogatory remarks about the government of Zimbabwe”35 to
funding “former ZIPRA dissidents” and conspiring with Israel, Zaire, and Uganda.36
Ndabaningi Sithole,  the leader of ZANU-Ndonga, which retained support in the Ndau areas
of Manicaland, remained out of the country in self-imposed exile for most of the 1980s. After
his return in the 1990s, he too was jailed on dubious charges as we shall see in section 4.2.2.
3.1.3 Symbolic Nationalism
The state has also undertaken a more gradual – and predominantly symbolic –  nation-building
programme.    Typified by the omni-present ‘official portrait’ of the president, this development
has tended to reflect ‘presidentialism’ rather than nationalism, especially after the establishment
of the executive presidency, which Robert Mugabe contested and won in 1988.  In a moment
of grand political theatre, Patrick Kombayi escorted the members of the Gweru City Council
from their council meeting to remove a picture of Ian Smith from an office wall and replace it
37  “One picture worth a thousand years” Herald 3 November 1981, 1.
38  “Graffiti man faces deportation” Herald 18 December 1981, 1.
39  See for a useful discussion of this metaphor, Michael Schatzberg, “Power, legitimacy
and ‘democratisation’ in Africa” Africa, 63(4), 1993.
40  Stanslaus Muyebe and Alexander Muyebe, The religious factor within the body of political
symbolism in Malawi, 1964-1994, (Florida: Universal Publishers, 1999).
41  “Maiden Speech for new MP” Herald 1 June 1990, 2.
42  “Cities, towns’ streets renamed” Herald 7 March 1990, 1, 3; “New names to give
Zimbabwe true identity” Herald 23 April 1985, 1; “Names changed: Colonial legacy wiped out
in 32 centres” Herald, 21 April 1982, 1;  “Getting to the root of Zimbabwe’s place-names”
Herald 3 May 1982, 4.
43  “War memorial to be smashed” Herald 18 November 1981, 1.
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with one of Mugabe.37   In at least one case, a Dutch national’s defacing of the official portrait
was punished by his extended detention without charge, followed by deportation.38  However,
the father of the nation motif was not pushed to the extent seen in Zaire, Kenya or Malawi.39
Similarly, the attribution of divine qualities or status to Mugabe has not extended as far as in
Malawi,40  although the occasional reference appears in  public discourse, such as when novice
MP Tony Gara told Parliament that “this country and its people should thank God almighty
for giving us His only other son, by the name of Robert Gabriel Mugabe.”41
Nationalist and liberation war iconography has also come to have a prominent place
in Zimbabwe, from the change of the country’s name  to that of towns and streets between
1982 and 1990.  Just as the streets of Salisbury had elevated the heroes of the pioneer column,
their new names are mostly those of dead ZANU heroes of the liberation war.  No living
Zimbabweans have been so honoured,  with the notable exception of Mugabe, whose name was
given to roads throughout the country in 1990.42   Memorials to whites killed during the
liberation war were removed.43
The state also abolished Rhodesian holidays and created the new Zimbabwean
Independence Day, as well as Heroes’ Day (and in 1998 Unity Day to celebrate the 1987 signing
of the Unity Accord).  The mass celebration of these public holidays, in Rufaro Stadium or the
newer National Stadium, became controversial and increasingly unpopular with the younger
generation. Welshman Ncube dates the decline in turn-out to such events from 1988, and
44  Welshman Ncube, “The post-unity period: developments, benefits and problems”in
Banana,  Turmoil and Tenacity, 312.
45  Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War, 140.
46  “Who is a hero – ZAPU?” Herald 16 September 1982, 7.
47  “Who is a hero”  Zimbabwe Mirror 23 July 1999.
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suspects that the unity accord made these celebrations less politically salient.44  Increasingly,
workers traveled to their rural homes, or remained in the high-density areas, instead of turning
out for the formal celebratory speeches.
Heroes’ Acre monuments were designated at the national, provincial and district level,
as places to commemorate the dead of the liberation war.  The National Heroes’ Acre in Harare
is an imposing monument built by the North Koreans.  Despite its nationalist credentials it is
designed to honour the few, not the many  – as selected ‘national’ heroes are buried there.  It
is also—for ‘security reasons’— not accessible without a special permit issued by the Ministry
of Information, and one is escorted around the premises by military personnel.  This makes it
a formal site, more often visited by tourists than by Zimbabweans from the surrounding
townships.  
More controversial has been the politics of choosing heroes, determining who should
be buried in the National Heroes’ Acre.  This, in Norma Kriger’s words  “exposed the gap
between the political rhetoric of equity, participation, and unity on the one hand, and the
realities of an enormous disparity between...leaders and masses.”45   Politicized decision-making
came into question as early as 1982, during the construction of the National  Heroes’ Acre,
when ZAPU MPs asked for clarification in Parliament of the criteria for selection.46   In
practice, heroes have been  chosen by the ZANU(PF) politburo, not by the nation or its
Parliament.47   Provincial and District Heroes’ Acres are under-resourced, and often little more
than dusty burial sites.  Werbner contrasts the top-down hierarchical establishment of national,
provincial and district heroes’ acres with “popular-counter memorialism” in Matabeleland.  Ex-
ZIPRA soldiers erected shrines to fallen comrades in unofficial sites in rural areas, “sacralizing
48  Werbner, “Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun,”  91
49  Karen M Lee, “The Historical Development of Zimbabwe’s Museums and
Monuments” (Unpublished Mphil Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1995), 75-91; Peter J.
Ucko, “Museums and sites: cultures of the past within education – Zimbabwe, some ten years
on” in Peter G Stone and Brian L Molyneux eds. The Presented Past: Heritage, Museums, and
Education (London: Routledge in association with English Heritage, 1994), 237-282.
50 Joost Fontein, “Ancestors, the State and International Discourse on Great Zimbabwe:
A Study of Conflicting perspectives on heritage” paper presented at the Britain-Zimbabwe
Society Research Day “New perspectives on Zimbabwe” 12 June 1999, Oxford.  
51  Ucko, “Museums and sites,” 246-256.
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their own traces of national sacrifice on the landscape of Zimbabwe....[denying] the regime the
legitimacy of unquestioned national symbolism.”48  
Attempts to nationalize museums and monuments have also been less than successful,
falling into conflicts over whether archaeology should serve local interests, the interests of the
wider nation,  or be aimed at revenue-creating international tourism.49  While nationalist
historians and politicians attempted to claim the Great Zimbabwe ruins as a secular landmark
– especially potent as the derivation of the new name of the state – local chiefs and spirit
mediums continue to contest their authority.50  Similarly, at the prototype ‘Culture House’ in
Murehwa, which was intended to include local people in the preservation of local culture,
conflict arose between the intentions of the policy-makers, the local community and a Christian
administrator who banned the practices of spirit mediums and traditional healers.51 Although
many Zimbabweans have a general knowledge of and pride in their heritage, museum policies
have been less than inclusive and remain predominantly oriented towards the tourist trade.
3.1.4 Development
Development was a motivating force of government ideology – encapsulating all that had been
denied by the Rhodesian regime.  At the same time, however, people were able to measure the
changes in their day-to-day lives and assess for themselves how well the new regime was
meeting their expectations.   In her useful discussion of how developmentalism sustains
authoritarian rule through legitimization and demobilization, Crystal emphasizes the ways in
52  Jill Crystal, “Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World” World Politics
46 (1994), 288, also 280-281.
53  Crystal, “Authoritarianism and its adversaries,” 280.
54  See for instance Robert G Mugabe, “Welcoming address by the Right Honourable
Prime Minister” in Let’s Build Zimbabwe together: ZIMCORD. Report on Conference Proceedings,
Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development Salisbury, 23-27 March 1981. 
55  Diana Auret, A Decade of Development (Gweru: Mambo/CCJP, 1990), 17. 
56  Fay Chung, “Education: revolution or reform” in Stoneman ed.,  Zimbabwe’s Prospects,
121.
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which developmentalism is an ideology of “indefinitely deferred gratification” against which
states cannot be held accountable.52 Yet, the Zimbabwean state’s emphasis on its achievements
vis-à-vis the Rhodesian state did enable comparison.  Development, therefore needs to be
understood as both a material good and a rhetorical form, an ideal with which to motivate, but
it can also be a material gauge against which the government’s record can be judged.  However,
Crystal is correct to emphasize the ways in which an ideology of developmentalism foster the
belief that “the state must play the central role in promoting economic growth and that, to that
end, individuals and social organisations must relinquish power to it, allowing it the routine, if
temporary use of force against enemies.”53 The rapid improvement in socio-economic
status for many Zimbabweans in the 1980s did legitimate the government’s tactics and
strategies. 
Aimed primarily, but by no means exclusively,  at the rural population, the government
implemented a policy of ‘national development’ focusing on reconstruction after the war years
and the deracialization of service provision.54  In particular, emphasis was put on deracializing
education and health service provision, implementing a minimum wage and extending
agricultural buying points in former tribal trustlands.   Between 1979 and 1989, the numbers
of students in primary and secondary education expanded by 332%.55   Fay Chung considered
this the “biggest achievement of majority government.”56  Better access to health clinics, and
the deracialization of hospitals also lowered infant mortality rates. Child mortality which had
been at 100-150/1000 in 1980, by 1989 had fallen to 46/1000 births.   Expanded immunization
57  Jean Lennock, Paying for Health (UK: Oxfam, 1994), 6.
58  Dashwood, Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transformation, 43-46.
59  UNDP, Poverty Reduction Forum, Institute of Development Studies,  Zimbabwe
Human Development Report 1998.  
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covered 80% of the population and decreased the incidences of communicable diseases.57
Although the greatest increase in spending on healthcare occurred between 1980 and 1982,
expenditure levels were maintained throughout the decade.58 
Questions have been raised about the neutrality of the ‘developmental’ state both in
terms of regional equity and in terms of social groups.  Certain areas of the country — namely
Matabeleland, the Zambezi valley and Chipinge — are generally thought to have received less
in the way of post-independence reconstruction and improved services.  Bulawayo, as a city,
has declined in prominence vis-à-vis Harare.   Matabeleland and Chipinge consistently elected
opposition MPs through the 1980s, while the Zambezi valley is the home of the minority Tonga
ethnic group.  At the same time, other regions, notably the President’s home area of Zvimba
began to be seen as receiving excess largesse. Nonetheless, data collected in the late 1990s does
not entirely reflect these beliefs. There continues to be widespread poverty in both the
apparently wealthier commercial farming areas of Mashonaland and the peripheral districts in
Manicaland and Matabeleland.59
But these perceived inequities were not confined to regional or ethnic groups, but
reflected access to power as well. For example, access to land began increasingly to be
determined by social class – or closeness to the government –  rather than by need.  While land
resettlement was always key to overall developmental goals,  it became a prime example of how
institutional and social constraints prevented a post 1979 re-distribution of wealth.  In the early
1980s 52 000 families were resettled on about a quarter of what had been commercial sector
land (much of it land which had been abandoned during the war). The scheme stalled after this,
60  Robin Palmer, “Land reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990" African Affairs 89, 355 (1990),
169-171.
61  Bill Kinsey, “Land reform, growth and equity: emerging evidence from Zimbabwe’s
resettlement programme” Journal of Southern African Studies,, 25 (1999), 173-196; J. G. M.
Hoogeveen and B. H. Kinsey, “Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from
Zimbabwe’s Resettlement Programme – A Sequel”  Journal of Southern African Studies, 27, (2001),
126-136.
62  ODA.,   Land resettlement in Zimbabwe: a preliminary evaluation. Evaluation report
EV 434. September 1988.
63  Palmer, “Land reform in Zimbabwe” 175.
64  Jocelyn Alexander, “State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe” Review of African
Political Economy 61, 334.
65  Palmer, “Land reform in Zimbabwe”, 173-174.
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constrained by the relative unavailability of land for sale and high land prices, as well as pressure
from donors and the World Bank after 1983 to reduce expenditure.60    
Assessments of the resettlement programme have by no means all been negative.
Kinsey’s research suggests that resettlement schemes did meet the goals of decreasing poverty
and increasing social welfare.61  An ODA assessment of the household resettlement schemes
in 1988, was broadly positive, but the co-operative schemes were unpopular and unsuccessful.62
By the late 1980s, the resettlement programme was becoming tainted as it gradually
became known that ‘chefs’, including cabinet ministers,  had acquired commercial farms, while
population pressure in communal areas continued to build.63  Among those who have been
resettled, insufficient technical support was provided.   Bureaucratic control also made the
schemes less than popular with families, as farmers were  not given security of tenure, their
access to land in communal areas was removed, and the head of household was not allowed to
pursue wage labour, but had to farm full-time.  As Alexander noted, “settlers were expected to
sever all social and cultural ties with their past lives.”64    The government’s overambitious target
of 162 000 households  probably contributed to this perception that land reform was a failure.65
The perception that ‘chefs’ were benefitting at the expense of the ‘povo’ began to
circulate by the mid-eighties, with the Paweni scandal which involved the falsification of claims
made by  transport firms contracted to distribute drought relief.  A cabinet minister, Kumbirai
66  “Paweni likely to face trial by end of July” Herald 8 June 1984, 1; “PM calls for
overhaul of tender system” Herald 12 June 1984, 1, 5; “Paweni corruption hearing begins”
Herald 24 July 1984, 1, 3; “Paweni bribed me: mystery man” Herald 26 July 1984, 1, 15; see also,
Andrew Meldrum, “Food relief fraud in Zimbabwe” Guardian (UK), 5 June 1984.
67  See discussions in Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, 135; Skålnes, Politics of Economic
Reform 79.
68  Jenkins, “The Politics of Economic Policy-making in Zimbabwe” 592.
69  Weitzer “Continuities in the Politics of State Security in Zimbabwe”.
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Kangai, was implicated in this scandal, but not formally convicted nor forced to resign.66  The
next major corruption scandal in 1988, implicated several senior ministers. ‘Willowgate’ as it
came to be known,  involved the re-selling of cars and trucks assembled in Zimbabwe at the
Willowvale plant, to which they had preferential access, at much higher prices than they had
paid.  This scandal led several ministers to resign, and one to commit suicide.67  As we shall see,
it also stimulated the first public protests by workers and students which criticized government
policy. 
In the 1980s,  the government did invest seriously in social welfare and agricultural
sectors and reached some of its developmental goals, especially in the rural areas.  Jenkins is
probably correct to suggest that we must understand the focus on rural areas as a political or
strategic decision, rather than an ideological one — the government is attempting to “secure
rural votes” in order to “guarantee control of the state.”68   While expectations of improved
living standards were relatively easily met in the 1980s, as the economy weakened in the 1990s
and further scandals emerged, the regime’s commitment to the developmental state became less
convincing.  
3.2 Societal Demobilization
Yet while this laudable nation-building took place, the regime was also conducting campaigns
against those groups which might potentially compose an opposition, often using the legislative
and administrative tools of the  Rhodesian state.69  The rhetoric of unity was used  as a theme
with which to drive societal demobilization.  Unity, implicitly, unity with the government,  was
70  “Create Unity, Mutumbuka urges 5000 head-masters” Herald 13 November 1981, 3.
71  “Nhongo urges unity of sexes for progress” Herald 27 January 1982, 3.
72  “Breakthrough in abttle to unite all businessmen” Herald 28 January, 1982, 1.  
73  “Workers told to unite” Herald 27 January 1982, 2; “Unite or be disowned, warns top
ZCTU man” Herald 29 January 1982, 11; “Workers unity is vital” Herald 3 May 1982, 4.
74  “Clothing unions’ merger ‘is valid’” Herald 3 February 1982, 4.
75  “Unity vital – Townsend” Herald 6 November 1981, 15. Townsend was chair of the
Mashonaland Farmers Association, and was speaking in support of the establishment of a
National Commerical Farmers Union. 
76  Ranger “Legitimacy, civil society and the state in Africa” 23. 
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demanded of apparently non-political social groupings such as schools, churches, businessmen,
and unions and the sexes in a series of ministerial speeches in the early 1980s.  Secondary
school-masters were adumbrated to “create unity between their students regardless of colour”
by the Minister of Education.70  The Minister of Community Development and Women’s
Affairs,  urged “unity of sexes for progress.”71  A breakthrough was heralded in the “battle for
unity of all businessmen.”72  Workers and their unions were told repeatedly to “unite or be
disowned.”73  At the same time, leaders within these groups themselves claimed legitimacy on
the basis of unity.  The ZCTU claimed that “unity among rival unions in each industry” was its
main task.74 A prominent commercial farmer said in a newspaper report entitled “unity vital”:
We cannot stand apart as a separate community.  If there is no future for the
country as a whole, there is no future for us.  If we are to prosper, we must do
it alongside other Zimbabweans.75       
While the demobilization of the victorious nationalist movement might at first glance
seem surprising, the very  nature of the nationalist movement, which subsumed individual
tendencies,  itself seems to have enabled the process.76  Two caveats must be made to the study
of demobilization.  Firstly, many organizations willingly distanced themselves from overt
political involvement, other than through ZANU and dedicated themselves to development
work.  After independence, many organizations which had supported the liberation movement
were keen to work with the state to build a new country.  
77  Sachikonye, “The Nation-State Project and Conflict in Zimbabwe” 140.
78  Weitzer,  “Continuities in the Politics of State Security in Zimbabwe” 556.
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Secondly, many state actions against potential or fragmentary social movements must
be understood as at least partially ad-hoc.77   The regime rarely seems  to plan its strategies of
control, at least in so far as the actions of its agents frequently seemed to be quashed by the
courts.  On the other hand, Weitzer argued that in the 1980s the regime could be seen to be
using the mechanisms of the state carefully and deliberately, for the most part, in constructing
and maintaining its hegemony.78  However, since Weitzer wrote, incremental battles have been
won against the state, in which government policies were rejected by Parliament or, more
frequently,  condemned as unconstitutional by the courts.  The government’s policies are
increasingly implemented piecemeal, rather than consistently.  Further, Weitzer suggested that
no forces existed during the post-colonial period with “both an interest and a capacity to set
about reshaping the nation’s arsenal of repressive powers and structures.”79  However, as we
shall see, in the late 1980s and 1990s forces did arise which managed to strategically challenge
elements of the governments’ plans, revealing them to be poorly grounded in the constitutional
framework.   
3.2.1 Ex-combatants
The first major challenge for the new state was the integration of the three fighting forces into
the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and the re-integration of demobilized ex-combatants
back into society.   As suggested in section 3.1, this process was rapidly politicized and broke
down into violence that lasted until the government’s amnesty in 1987. The subsequent
unification of ZANU and ZAPU set  the stage for the de facto one-party rule which
characterized the political system after between 1987 and 2000.   
80  Teresa Barnes, “The Heroes’ Struggle: Life after the Liberation War for four ex-
combatants in Zimbabwe” in Bhebe and Ranger, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, 128-129.
81  See for example,  Barnes, “The Heroes’ Struggle,” also Jeremy Brickhill, “Making
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Ngwabi Bhebe, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (Harare: UZ, 1995) especially notes 11 and
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82  Norma Kriger, “Les vétérans et le parti au pouvoir: une coopération conflictuelle
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Ex-combatants who did demobilize and sought training or the means to invest in
farming, also faced steep hurdles.  Demobilization payments were often exhausted in
supporting re-housing and education for family members.80  NGOs like the Zimbabwe Project,
Danhiko, and the Mafela Trust emerged to work specifically with ex-combatants in supporting
producer co-operatives and training. Although formal data is lacking, oral reports seem to
indicate that most ex-combatants gained little to recompense their sacrifices post-independence.
Many, indeed, felt rejected or abandoned by both their party leadership and by society in
general.81   Norma Kriger’s study of war veterans reveals how they consistently made claims for
“preferential access to state resources” based on their “allegedly superior contribution to the
liberation struggle.”82   They wanted not only “symbolic recognition” but also “commensurate
material benefits” which were not forthcoming.83   Although the party used veterans in ‘labour
committees’ to negotiate with private sector employers, this practice diminished after the state
gained  control of labour relations through the creation of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trades
Unions (ZCTU).  After the early 1980s, veterans became  less useful to the state and received
fewer benefits.84  After the unity accord, and perhaps in an attempt to prevent their joining
Tekere’s ZUM, veterans were permitted to create the Zimbabwe National Liberation War
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), firmly under the control of the party and the patronage of
the President.85 
86 Christine Sylvester, “Zimbabwe’s 1985 Elections: a Search for National Mythology”
Journal of Modern African Studies, 24, 1  (1986), 246.
87  Kriger. Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War, 217-218.
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ZANU-PF used legislation, state-funding, violence and election rigging to create and then
maintain its dominance within both local and national elections.  Christine Sylvester, for
instance, in her study of election discourse in the 1985 election, emphasizes the way in which
the party continued to mouth socialist rhetoric, while actual campaign speeches emphasized
instead the dominance of the party: 
Less than 11% of the pro-ZANU(PF) comments...propagated Marxist myths
of class empowerment.  Instead, nearly 33% advocated that oligarchic power
should be vested in ZANU(PF), because it is the only vehicle for achieving
national unity, for rooting out colonialism, and for establishing a government
which is not composed of personalist leaders....86 
Although local-level politics has been little studied, it is clear that they were, at least as
politicized,  if not more so,  than at the national level.  In local elections after the war, low-level
ZANU(PF) officials prevented non-members from being appointed to temporary district
commissions and from contesting the first district elections.  In Mutoko, Kriger reports that
the commission was forced to stop holding meetings because “...it had been appointed by a
white district commissioner and it was not a monolithic ZANU(PF) commission,” while in
Wedza it was demanded that non ZANU(PF) commissioners be removed.87  Alexander notes
that in Chimanimani new policies were introduced “through the party structures.”88  Current
confusion about distinctions between party and government developed out of processes such
as these in rural areas where not only were the institutions of ‘councils’ discredited by their
associations with the former Rhodesian regime, but where the incoming regime was
indistinguishable from the party.  This confusion could only have been exacerbated by the
89  John Makumbe, Democracy and Development in Zimbabwe: Constraints of Decentralisation
(Harare: SAPES, 1998)  22. 
90  Alexander, “The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics in Zimbabwe” 183.
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appointment of ex-combatants, especially those who were political commissars within ZANU
as “Local Government Promotion Officers.”89  
Rural local government reforms were brought in through Prime Minister’s directives
in 1984 and 1985, which created Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward
Development Committees (WADCOs), which were intended to provide for democratic
participation in decision-making. District councils, and VIDCOs and WADCOs, after 1985,
were used predominantly to implement directives and inform lower-level officials of policy
decisions.  Alexander emphasizes that these local institutions had neither the resources nor the
expertise to develop policy.90  And as Makumbe discovered a decade or so later,  this under-
resourcing led to disenchantment and disillusionment amongst those intended to participate in
the process.91   Although party membership was required for participation in such institutions,
the party itself “...had been ‘demobilized’.”92 
Makumbe’s focus group research suggests that, especially in rural areas,  respondents
were aware of the need to organize within the party, but also that even where they attempt to
mobilize, and identify needs,  most decisions were taken without considering their input.  As
he argues, the ‘winner’ of local government reform has been “the ruling ZANU/PF party,
central government...and selected or favoured regions in the country.”93  Nevertheless, we shall
see in the following chapter that some of the most significant early challenges to the
ZANU(PF) regime occurred in local councils. 
On the national level,  ZANU(PF) consistently controlled parliament during the 1980s,
but opposition parties were significant. In addition to the 20 seats reserved for whites–  none
of which were contested by ZANU – at independence, ZANU(Ndonga) held 1 seat and ZAPU
94  See for instance, Tony Rich, “Legacies of the past? The results of the 1980 election
in Midlands province, Zimbabwe” Africa 52 (1982), esp. 50-52.
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had 15.  While the transitional elections were alleged to have irregularities and intimidation from
guerillas and UANC auxiliaries,94  they were generally thought to reflect the majority opinion.
Both major parties benefitted from pre-independence legacies – ZAPU benefitted from the
continuity of older party structures in Matableleland, while ZANU gained seats primarily within
their former operational areas of Mashonaland.95 
Yet despite these obvious  legacies  it is impossible to ignore the coercive mechanisms
used by the various wings of ZANU to enhance its hegemony during elections. The 1985
election was notable both for the on-going  violence in Matableleland, and for the relative
peacefulness of the polling days.  Violence erupted after the election, with ZANU supporters
in urban areas harassing,  beating up and evicting members of minority parties from their
houses.96
The 1987 Unity Accord which incorporated ZAPU into ZANU  “eliminated the
thorniest source of opposition to [ZANU].”97  After the 1990 election, the number of non-
ZANU seats dwindled to 2.98  Although elements within ZANU(PF) pressed for the creation
of a one-party state after the unity accord, the 1990 election marked an explicit threat to this
plan, when the governing party  was unexpectedly challenged from the Zimbabwe Unity
Movement (ZUM), led by former ZANU stalwart Edgar Tekere.  Violence, outside
Matabeleland, was more prevalent in this election.  Patrick Kombayi, another prominent ex-
ZANU member, contesting the Gweru Central constituency for ZUM was shot and other
supporters were beaten.  In a sign that this violence was condoned at the highest levels, Mugabe
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wrong in getting aid from anyone” Herald 12 March 1990, 1.
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pardoned the two men convicted of this assault.  The ruling party’s continuing rhetoric of unity
has already been discussed in section 3.1.2, but this election also saw the re-emergence of a
more exclusionary discourse, targeting ZUM for accepting donations from the Conservative
Alliance of Zimbabwe (CAZ).99  Mugabe accused ZUM of being a puppet organization of
former Rhodesian Front leader Ian Smith100 and alleged that Tekere was plotting a coup that
included the assassination of all the ZANU(PF) leadership.101  The implication of these
allegations was that ZUM supported Zimbabwe’s external enemies, as it was also contended
that ZUM was being backed by South African interests, and had connections with the
Mozambican RENAMO.102  The predominantly white  Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and
the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) were quick to distance themselves from
ZUM.103
Serious questions were raised about the accuracy of the voter’s roll, which was out of
date,  and the ‘gerrymandering’ of constituency boundaries to benefit ZANU(PF) in at least one
case.104  ZUM won only two seats in the parliamentary election but  20% of the overall vote and
30% of the urban vote.105  
Following the Unity Accord and the impending end of the Lancaster House
constitution, ZANU (PF) moved towards realizing its long-term goal of creating a one party
state.  In the wake of the Willowgate scandal and concerns about the power wielded by the new
Executive Presidency, this was immediately seized upon and criticized by students, academics
106  See for instance the collection of essays in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye eds,
The One Party state and Democracy: the Zimbabwe Debate (Harare: SAPES, 1991).
107  See for instance, Charles Samupindi, “One party system has failed in Africa” Herald
26 June 1990, 4; Charles Samupindi, “The one party state and some economic effects” Herald
27 June 1990, 8.
108  “No one-party state by law – President” Herald 28 September 1990, 1; “No move
on one-party issue” Herald 3 October 1990, 1.
109  Lan, Guns and Rain, 226-7; Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 291-2; 296.
110  Maxwell, Christians and Chiefs, 211; Alexander, “The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural
Politics in Zimbabwe,” 181.
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and the churches, who found common ground for the first time on this issue.106   Debate on
this issue took place not just within the meetings of political scientists, or the pages of
independent magazines, but penetrated even into the official media.107  While ZANU(PF)
seemed to continue to favour a one-party system, in September 1990, the party’s Central
Committee took the quite unexpected decision not to legislate for a one party state.108  
3.2.3 Peasants
Peasants who might have been expected to be a militant, mobilized force as a result of their
involvement in the liberation war, have instead been reduced to apparently passive supporters
of ZANU(PF).  Peasant farmers have benefitted as their levels of production of marketable
crops improved, from policies that provided access to credit, marketing boards and extension
services.  Generally high producer prices benefitted those with a marketable surplus and access
to buyers. 
Village committees, which were established in semi-liberated areas before the war and
in others afterwards,  are often portrayed as being systems of participatory local democracy with
the potential to both liberate the peasants from the ‘traditional’ rule of chiefs and headmen and
to provide local governance for the nation.109  As suggested in 3.2.2 the rhetoric of
decentralization and participation did not, in practice, enable peasant priorities to be achieved.
Maxwell and Alexander both document peasants initially confronting the new state and
demanding resources but gradually recognizing the intransigence of the bureaucracy.110 Kriger
111  Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War, 214.
112  Brian Raftopoulos, Problems of Research in A Post-colonial State: the Case of Zimbabwe
(Harare: ZIDS,1988), 7.
113  Lloyd Sachikonye, quoted in Richard Saunders “Associations and Civil Society in
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and Human Rights in Zimbabwe, September 1996. 18.
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– the ‘herald of socialism’ Herald 3 April 1982, 7 and “Stormy ZIDS Bill passage” Herald 15
February 1984, 5.
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suggests that the village committees permitted a ‘conservative’ revolution of elders who
recouped power temporarily lost to guerillas and the young (mujibas and chimbwidos) during the
war.111 
3.2.4 Intelligentsia and Students
Immediately post-independence many of the intelligentsia, including former supporters of the
UANC, were absorbed into the civil service.112  The state became a prime facilitator of upward
mobility, with “...academics and intellectuals who otherwise might be leading social
critics...being appointed as ambassadors and directors of parastatals.”113  Such a relationship did
not engender “fully critical and engaging debates surrounding the emerging character of the
state and ruling party.”114 
In 1982, the Zimbabwe Institute for Development Studies (ZIDS) was launched by
Ibbo Mandaza, the then Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Manpower, Planning and
Development, to provide training and education for civil servants.  The Institute was designed
to “...unite all the ministries to serve not only the short-term goals of the government but also
the long-term ambitions of the people.”115  At its inauguration the board of directors included
nine cabinet ministers.  Writing from within ZIDS six years later, Raftopoulos suggests that the
state’s ambivalence towards researchers led the latter to be “hesitant and at times even
subservient ....Uncomfortable information is not always conducive to job security, promotion
116  Raftopoulos, Problems of Research, 21.
117  Raftopoulos, Problems of Research 23.
118  David Moore, “The Zimbabwean ‘organic intellectuals’ in Transition” Journal of
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prospect, and organizational consensus.”116 The ambiguous role of intellectuals in the post-
colonial state was also reflected in the writing of intellectuals outside the formal remit of the
state. The relationship was burdened by the history of conflicts between the younger
intellectuals and ‘old guard nationalists’ during the liberation war. Others were seen as having
only been peripherally involved in the war, which could be equally damning.117   In general,
researchers tended to support the government’s socialist inclination, and were relatively
uncritical.  As David Moore noted in a review of significant post-independence political studies,
“...the major lack in this ‘political economy’ is a study of politics.”118   
Despite this, in the mid-1980s, with the creation of an active African Association of
Political Science (AAPS)  Zimbabwe chapter and the development of the Southern Africa
Political and Economic Series (SAPES) Trust ‘think-tank,’ public debates began to be pursued
within a generally left-leaning academic sphere.   These became  significant fora for the one-
party state debate, when intellectuals, journalists and activists came together in a relatively
united front to combat the ruling party’s agenda.  Nevertheless, in 1990, Morgan Tsvangirai
criticized “...so-called progressive intellectuals who have the habit of lecturing workers and
peasants through journals published from their mansions in low density suburbs.”119  
 After independence, the renamed University of Zimbabwe was “re-oriented” and
“harnessed to the national development objectives of the newly elected government.”120 
Angela Cheater points out that when the university was originally established, its founders
sought a Royal Charter to protect the institution in the context of colonial racism, from political
control:  “after independence...however, many people, (including some within the university)
121  Angela Cheater, “The University of Zimbabwe: University, National University,
State University or Party University” African Affairs 90 (1991), 189-90.
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believed that the threat of government intervention had passed.”121   She documents how the
1982 University of Zimbabwe Act increased government control, in ways unforeseen at the
time.  In particular, the State President, then a ceremonial officer, was made Chancellor of the
university, and given extensive powers.  The shift from a ceremonial to an executive presidency
in 1987 gave this action a new significance.122 
Tengende’s fascinating study of students at the University reveals a much closer
relationship between students and the state/ruling party nexus in the early 1980s than has
hitherto been described.  He notes that although some students did not want to be associated
with the ZANU(PF) Youth Brigade, which they perceived as uneducated, the Students’
Representative Council (SRC) leadership was linked into ZANU(PF) networks.  Indeed, until
1986, the candidates for SRC President were formally vetted by the party structures on
campus.123  He notes that in 1981:
...about 100 students even went out to demonstrate in support of the
government’s fight against dissidents and demanded to be armed to go and
join the fight...the students shouted slogans against the leader of ZAPU, Dr
Joshua Nkomo and encouraged the government to embark on a national
service programme ‘ to prepare them to defend the country.124
Like their lecturers, students also saw the public service as their best career option, and until
1985 most graduates were assured jobs: “the SRC afforded the opportunity to establish ‘radical
credentials’ which could secure a job in government.”125  After the 1985 election, the SRC
leadership wrote to Prime Minister Mugabe saying  “we would like to assure you that we are
fully behind you and that we are in step with you in our march towards the set and desired goal
of socialism.”126
127 “ZCTU man detained” Herald 7 October 1989, 5.
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Yet, between the mid-80s and 1990,  the student movement became the most visible
sign of protest in Zimbabwe – images of students leading protest marches and having running
battles with the riot police and tear gas were common long before any other groups found such
behaviour acceptable.  Student activism seems to have been sparked in 1987 by the election of
a new SRC and their subsequent concern with issues of student welfare, such as
accommodation,  transport and finance.  Attempts to negotiate with the university
administration became problematic and the riot police aggressively dispersed student
demonstrators.  
Another new SRC, elected in 1988, moved  student demands further into the political
sphere, with the September 1988 anti-corruption protests linked to the Willowgate scandal,
which led to further conflict between students and police, when the police refused to give
permission for the students to march into town.  In reaction to this and subsequent unrest, the
government withdrew the loans and grants of all 15 SRC members in January 1989.   In
September 1989, attempts to organize a ‘commemoration’ of the previous year’s
demonstrations led to the arrest of SRC members and students.  The ZCTU Secretary-general,
Morgan Tsvangirai’s  support for the detained students in the form of a press-release led to his
own arrest for issuing subversive material.127  These anti-corruption protests merged into the
one-party state debate, with students taking a prominent position in opposition to the proposed
constitutional change, and aligning themselves with labour and civic groups such as the CCJP.
 The students voted overwhelmingly against the one-party state on the basis of both events in
Eastern Europe and lessons from one-party states elsewhere in Africa at SRC convened
128  Arthur Mutambara, “The One Party State, Socialism and Democratic Struggles in
Zimbabwe: A Student Perspective” in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye, The One-Party State
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meetings.128  The government’s response was to close the university and send the students
home.129  
Patrick Bond is probably correct to suggest that a major reason the regime continued
its socialist rhetoric through the 1980s, was to disarm this potent critique from the left,
comprised of students and workers.130  And, as Tengende notes, the mobilization of the ZANU
(PF) youth league to demonstrate against the university students was doubtless designed to
prevent any potential alliance between the two socially divided groups.131
3.2.5 Labour
Workers were in an unusual position in the early years after independence in that many of them
were seen as not having supported the nationalist struggle which now formed the
government.132  Despite the early urban base of the nationalist movements, Rhodesian labour
legislation was constructed to prevent union linkages with nationalist parties.133  To make
matters worse, in 1980-81 it is estimated that there were 150 strikes in all sectors in Zimbabwe
and over 300 000 production days lost.134  Workers were castigated by the new regime for not
having used strikes as political mechanisms against the Rhodesian era – and these new strikes
were portrayed as illegitimate tools of a ‘labour aristocracy’ which refused to wait patiently with
peasants and veterans for the fruits of liberation.
135  Shadur and Schiphorst both emphasize how long-standing but non-ZANU unionists
were sidelined and replaced by those with less formal unionist credentials:  Mark Shadur, Labour
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ZANU seems to have taken advantage of this weakness, in attempting to incorporate
the labour movement more firmly within its sphere. The government seized control of the
fragmented trade unions, creating the Zimbabwe Congress of Trades Union (ZCTU) and
stacking it with ZANU(PF) affiliated members and staff.135  Accusations of supporting
opposition parties were used to silence opponents: “most of the problems of rivalry which the
ZCTU is facing are caused by supporters of minority parties bent on introducing their politics
of disunity into the ZCTU.”136   Where more than one union existed within an industry, unions
were pressurized to unite and then join the new ZCTU.137 
As Larmer indicates, the ZCTU and ZANU(PF) relationship was so close for much of
this period that they shared offices.138  Tengende argues that through the introduction of the
minimum-wage policy, which reduced income disparity and mitigated worker militancy – and
gave the ZCTU little negotiating power –  the government turned the party into a supra-union
and established the workers as a client group.139  
Gradually between 1980 and 1985, the ZCTU began to distance itself somewhat from
the party, criticising government policies for being anti-worker.  The Labour Relations Act of
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1986, in particular, was condemned for giving the Minister of Labour “draconian powers.”140
By 1987, it could be said that the ZCTU was functioning as a labour relations “watchdog.”141
 Until this point, the management of the ZCTU had continued to be disorganized and
susceptible to allegations of corruption.142  With the election of Morgan Tsvangirai in 1988,
Schiphorst asserts that the ZCTU was:
no longer an organization that was lead by one man...strategies, tactics and
direction that the ZCTU adopted...were all the result of deliberations and
decisions of the general council...this made the ZCTU a stronger
organization.143  
In August 1988, the ZCTU retracted its previous calls for representation within
ZANU(PF), claiming to be politically neutral vis-à-vis existing parties, and in April 1990 took a
formal position in favour of the multi-party system.144  May Day 1990 demonstrated this change
in the ZCTU approach, as workers demonstrated against the one-party state and in support of
the right to strike.145   In September, the ZCTU also withdrew its long-standing request for
corporate representation within parliament.146
3.2..6 Churches
Relations between the post-independence state and church denominations depended to some
extent on the stances which they had adopted during the liberation war.147  However, with few
148  David Maxwell, “The Church and Democratisation in Africa: the case of
Zimbabwe” in Gifford, ed. The Christian Churches and the Democratization of Africa (Leiden: Brill,
1995), 109.
149  “Help us create socialism, PM tells Church” Herald 1 May 1982, 1; Interestingly,
however, this position was not held by all members of the government. Simba Mubako, then
the Minister of Justice, suggested that: “...any close alliance with any political ideology could
lead the church into over-looking injustices perpetuated under that system...too close a
relationship with the government brought the church into disrepute” “Church must fight
injustice- Mubako” Herald 9 August 1982, 1. 
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exceptions the church hierarchies linked themselves to the state’s developmentalist ambitions,
in both discourse and practice.148   
 Indeed, many of these organizations, with their origins in the struggle for
independence, were only too keen to accommodate themselves with the state.  At the same
time, those churches implicated in support for the UANC internal settlement, such as the
Methodists,  were attempting to (re)gain favour with the government.   The President, Revd
Canaan Banana (a Methodist) and the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe (a Catholic) strongly
encouraged them to do so.  In addresses made to the heads of denominations, the President
and Prime Minister both called for unity between the churches and state, with the churches co-
operating in ‘developing’ the newly independent Zimbabwe.149  The Catholic Church was widely
reported to support the government’s policies.150  In a letter to the Herald written in her
personal capacity, AKH Weinrich, a sociologist and Catholic sister, appealed, “to all church
leaders to give their full support to, and participate actively in, all the efforts made by the
Government to raise the dignity of the human person.”151  President Banana, in a much
publicized press conference in 1982, said that while some churches had “joined with the
government in promoting unity in the nation, there were still a few who were asking for the
resuscitation of the political past.”152 After this warning for churches not to “continue
associating with the enemy” the Roman Catholic, Anglican and Methodist churches all
“affirmed their support for the Government’s policy of reconciliation” and said that “...their
153  “We support the state, say churches” Herald 29 January 1982, 11.
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churches stood firmly behind the Government’s intentions to rebuild the country and pledged
their continuing support for non-racialism.”153
The Catholic Bishops, perhaps in response to these appeals for unity, re-asserted
control over the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in 1981, through
constitutional changes that limited the commission’s autonomy from the Bishops’ Conference.
In particular, the reforms required the CCJP to obtain  the permission of two Bishops for all
public statements.154  In addition, the Bishops were opposed to the continuing directorship of
John Stewart, the Acting Director, probably  because he was potentially outspoken and not easy
to control.155
The churches’ perceived antagonism to socialism was potentially an issue of contention.
Prime Minister Mugabe explicitly exhorted the churches to “help create socialism”... “the
Church should find no objection to socialist philosophy because Christian teaching could not
be reconciled to the ‘avaricious’ nature of capitalism.”156  Similarly, the Minister of Lands said
that “the church should change its old role as a colonial, capitalist institution” and should
instead “help build a socialist Zimbabwe.”157  Deputy Prime Minister Muzenda called on
preachers to use the pulpit to “counter the untruths,  prejudices, crude stories and myths about
Zimbabwean socialism.”158  Although rhetoric during the liberation war had suggested that
some churches were anti-socialist, after independence the Catholic church rebuffed this notion.
Roman Catholic Archbishop Chakaipa called for church organizations to “promote the
government’s socialist policies.”159 Anglican Bishop Hatendi, on the other hand, was more
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equivocal, “we are not being asked to preach socialism, as the Government interprets it, from
the pulpit.  I am bitterly opposed to scientific socialism....which is atheistic.”160  However,
elsewhere, he indicated his support for a Christian Socialist Movement in Zimbabwe.161 
The state took a particular interest in the ZCC, as the largest ecumenical grouping.  In
November 1981, President Banana criticized the ZCC  in the national press for taking a “wait
and see” attitude towards the government.162   He claimed to have heard this criticism from the
WCC, which was withholding funding because of the “unco-operative attitude of the Christian
Council towards the Government’s policy of reconciliation and reconstruction.”163 The
involvement of Bishop Muzorewa –  who had been President of the short-lived Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia –  with the  ZCC, and the Secretary-General’s association with Ndabaningi Sithole’s
ZANU (Ndonga), apparently led the state to see the ZCC as a political irritant.  These
developments led the ZCC to replace its general secretary, in the hope of restoring relations
with both the state and the WCC.
The independent churches were castigated and sidelined for being anti-development.
The Apostolic Faith and Jehovah’s Witness communities known for their reluctance to
immunize children and accept other western medication, were portrayed as sites of disorder and
disease, and forced to accept ‘bio-medicine’.164 Gradually, they too  were integrated into the
developmental state.165
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Probably the most significant post-independence division between church and state
came as the state sent troops into Matabeleland, allegedly to quell ‘dissident’ activity instigated
by ZAPU, which retained political strength in the area, and South Africa. The activities of the
security forces against the civilian population of Matabeleland, led to numerous reports of
human rights abuses being made to the CCJP.  Their attempts to document and publicize the
abuses being perpetrated by the security forces were rebuffed and denied by the state.166  At the
peak of the conflict, the CCJP Director, Nick Ndebele and the Chairman, Mike Auret, were
arrested, although they were eventually freed by direct intervention of Prime Minister
Mugabe.167  
In the late 1980s, the church, like the students and labour movements, was involved
in the one-party state debate.  The  ZCC organized a day of fasting against the one party-
state.168 The Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral letter which argued against constitutional
changes which might curtail peaceful ways of changing the government, while the CCJP spoke
explicitly against “the formation of a de jure one party state in Zimbabwe”.169  The CCJP was
later to claim that the one party state debate was one place where they had concretely affected
government policy.170
3.2.7 Media
Richard Saunders’ study of the media in the 1980s captures how the media moved from being
a “civic appendage of the ruling white fraction” into an equally dominated and controlled arm
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University, 1992) 112.
172  Saunders, “Information in the Interregnum,” 109.
173  Saunders,“Information in the Interregnum,” 248-9. 
174  Saunders, “Information in the Interregnum,” 161-2.
175  Saunders, “Information in the Interregnum,” 250-253.
176  Saunders, “Information in the Interregnum,” 351
177  Saunders, “Information in the Interregnum,” 353.
84
of ZANU.171  Both the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Information and the media it controlled
were repoliticized, as vacant posts were filled by party members and former ‘bush-broadcasters’
– veterans of the Voice of Zimbabwe which broadcast from Maputo during the liberation
war.172
The creation of the Mass Media Trust to mediate between government and print media
in the newly independent state, was intended to nationalize the media, which had previously
been dominated by white Rhodesian and South African financial interests, “...it was held that
future relations between the “people’s government; and the national press should be....co-
ordinated in the interests of development and unity.”173  But “by the turn of Zimbabwe’s first
decade, the popular perception was that the trust (and particularly its main public face,
Zimpapers) had been effectively ‘annexed’ by ZANU, another casualty of the ruling party’s
invasion of nominally ‘autonomous public institutions.’”174  This was accomplished through
behind-the-scenes ministerial contact with editors and publishers, and more public firings – or
promotion – of a series of editors who challenged government policy.175
In addition to the state-controlled radio, TV, and newspapers, however, independent
print media did exist, and indeed, flourished in the 1980s.  The Financial Gazette, a tabloid-sized
business weekly, underwent substantial growth, as well as shifts in ownership and readership.
At independence, the Financial Gazette had a print run of  4000 copies while at the end of decade
it had increased to 20 000.176  Readership shifted  from an estimated 20% black readership at
independence to 80-85% in 1990.177  The Financial Gazette  provided a key forum for the one-
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party state debate.   In 1989, Geoff  Nyarota, who had been removed from the editorship of
the Bulawayo Chronicle for revealing the Willowgate scandal,  was appointed editor.178  When the
state attempted to discredit the Financial Gazette, accusing it of maintaining ‘Rhodesian’ links,
its publisher, Modus, was bought out by black businessmen.179
The monthly magazines — Moto, Parade — and their more didactic  partners —
SAPEM, Read On,  and Social Change — also contributed to the ‘opening up’ of the media
because they reached a primarily black readership, but only Parade could boast a wide
circulation.  
3.3 Conclusion
The politics of inclusion typified ZANU’s approach to nation and party-building in the 1980s.
The regime was able to capitalize ideologically on its successes in the liberation war and
substantial victory in the independence elections to build a network of alliances with its former
supporters and enemies.  This coalition was broader than that which had fought the liberation
war –  incorporating such disparate elements as white farmers, former Rhodesian politicians,
and western donors.  The demands of these groups were carefully balanced against those of the
historic nationalist coalition, which was demobilized or selectively integrated into the state
apparatus.
Coercion was not absent from this process. Significant challengers to ZANU’s
authority like ZAPU were summarily crushed and incorporated. The external South African
threat, coupled with the strength of the Rhodesian security state, made for the continuation of
a strong militaristic tendency. Less important political individuals and groups were harassed and
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marginalized from power.  Yet coercion was simply one strand of the power-relationship, which
relied on and contributed to the party’s control of institutions and ideological hegemony. The
regime’s control over the media, army, and other state institutions gave it impunity over the
massacre of civilians in Matabeleland. 
Nation-building metaphors and policies contributed to societal demobilization as
groups took the government at its word and contributed to the development of the new nation.
 Rhetoric of participation and decentralization concealed the continuation of Rhodesian-era
top-down decision-making patterns.  Tangible and real progress on extension of services to
rural areas and the deracialization of education, healthcare and the civil service, were seen as
evidence of the regime’s commitment to development.  The few groups with access to funds
independently of the state, like churches and unions, were firmly and thoroughly incorporated
into the new regime.   
In the period after the Unity Accord, public debate did emerge which challenged the
government’s commitment to socialist development.  The revelation of corruption amongst the
ranks of ministers was particularly damaging.  Groups formally outside the party – academics,
lawyers, and students – debated the value of the party’s demand for a de jure one-party state.
Yet, in a coup-de-grace, the regime internalized even this debate, and resolved it within the party,
taking away the incipient opposition’s strongest card and retaining control of political debate.
1 Naison D Mutizwa-Mangiza, “Urban Informal Transport Policy: the Case of
Emergency Taxis in Harare” in Lovemore Zinyama, Daniel Tevera, and Sioux Cumming,
Harare: the Growth and Problems of the City (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1993), 97-108.
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Chapter 4   The Regime Endures,  1990-1997
1990 provides an interesting point at which to stop and assess the status of the Mugabe regime.
Having apparently ‘lost’ the one party-state debate, and weathered its first corruption scandal,
the regime was also faced with both economic crises and the political costs of implementing
a structural adjustment programme.  
The economic crisis in 1990 was probably most obvious in terms of shortages of
foreign exchange and concomitant shortages of paper and cement from 1987, and increasing
pressure on the transport system. While such burdens may have disproportionately affected the
urban élite, the impact of cement shortages, for instance, was felt both in rural areas which were
attempting to build dams and in the home construction industry in poor urban areas. The
transportation crisis was particularly disruptive for urban workers, many of whom spent up to
six hours a day commuting.1   The easy ride the government had had in the 1980s,  as it
benefitted politically from the visible increases in public welfare, was beginning to slow down.
In response to these crises and to external pressure, in 1990, ZANU(PF) reversed its stand on
socialism and the government implemented a structural adjustment programme known as
ESAP, (Economic Structural Adjustment Programme).   Corruption scandals, which had so
shocked the nation in 1987, became commonplace, and contributed substantially to a more
critical perception of President Mugabe, whose personal reputation had remained relatively
unscathed throughout the 1980s.  The increase in availability – and aggressiveness – of the
independent media also made knowledge of scandals widespread, at least in urban areas. 
So, in section 4.1 we will chart the process whereby economic weaknesses impeded the
effectiveness of the mantra of  ‘unity, development and nationalism’ that had hitherto had
remarkable success. And, indeed, as the earlier co-optive mechanisms become less effective, we
2   Naison D Mutizwa-Mangiza, “Urban Informal Transport Policy: the Case of
Emergency Taxis in Harare”, 97-108. 
3  A. S. Mlambo, The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: The Case of Zimbabwe, 1990-
1995. (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1997).
4  “Five thousand students in Mashonaland West stay in ‘bush-boarding’ facilities’ Herald
14 July 1999, 6. 
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shall see in 4.2 the increase in the use and availability of coercive mechanisms (through new
legislation, a new security apparatus and militarization of existing bodies).  In section 4.3 we
look at how ‘nation-building’ techniques recognizable from Chapter 3 gradually become more
extreme and exclusive. 
4.1 The ‘Development Agenda’
From 1990, the development agenda which was so central to the government’s political
platform was constrained by the implementation of ESAP, the declining economic conditions,
and the impact of AIDS.  Although great changes were made in the 1980s, post-ESAP and
AIDS both the education and health systems have been in crisis and many of the gains made
negated.  In some ways, adjustment redistributed economic  burdens, helping urban commuters
through much of the 1990s through the deregulation of the transport sector which massively
improved availability of transport (a crucial dimension considering the continued colonial
spatial patterns of most urban areas).2  However, increased fares throughout the 1990s soon
came to dominate household budgets. 
The implementation of structural adjustment  led to declining performance in education
and health indicators. In particular, the introduction of user-fees in education and health, led
to lower take-up levels.3    The breakdown of the rural infrastructure was particularly noted in
shortages of nurses and doctors to run community hospitals.  Educational facilities were equally
under stress, with teacher shortages, as well as a shortage of schools in rural areas.  In the mid
to late 1990s, the phenomenon of ‘bush-boarders’ began to gain attention as older students
squatted in the bush near teaching facilities.4
5  Helen Jackson, AIDS action Now: information, prevention and support in Zimbabwe(Harare:
AIDS Counselling Trust, 1988), 114-116; “Council to combat Aids” Herald 7 October 1989, 5.
6  UNAIDS/WHO, Zimbabwe Epidemiological Fact Sheet (UNAIDS/WHO, 2000), 3.
7  UNAIDS/WHO, Zimbabwe Epidemiological Fact Sheet, 3.
8  UNAIDS, The Socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS in Africa (UNAIDS, 2000).
9  CFU, Aids Prevention for Rural Areas, 1999; UNAIDS,  Socio-economic impact of
HIV/AIDS in Africa.
10  Dashwood, Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transformation, 107. 
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The Zimbabwe government recognized the seriousness of the AIDS crisis early on, and
was one of the first countries to screen donated blood in 1985.  From 1986, the Ministry of
Health had an AIDS advisory committee. The Ministry initiated a major AIDS awareness
campaign in 1987, which was extended into the 1990s.5  However, HIV prevalence in women
attending ante-natal clinics in Harare increased from 10% in 1989, to 36% in 1994.6  By 1999,
an estimated 1.5 million Zimbabweans were believed to be infected, 1.4 million of whom were
adults aged between 15 and 49 years, representing an estimated 25% of the most economically
active age cohort.7  High infection rates among teachers, doctors and nurses further affected
the provision of healthcare and education, while the prevalence of the disease among the
general population over-strained the healthcare system.  It is estimated that in 2005, AIDS
treatment costs will absorb over 60% of the Ministry of Health’s budget.8  The consequences
for  food security in rural households are also worrying, with an AIDS death in the family
causing a 61% decrease in maize production, and 49% reduction in vegetable production.9   Life
got increasingly more difficult for most Zimbabweans, as average incomes declined and the cost
of living increased.
However, the changes in Zimbabwe’s  development policy which are evident after
1990, are not solely the result of external constraints.  Shifting domestic political constituencies
and agendas also influenced these changes. As Dashwood suggests, not only were peasants and
the working class increasingly marginalized in policy discourses, but ‘progressive’ voices within
ZANU (PF) have been quieted.10  She attributes this to the changing configuration of class
forces within ZANU(PF), which have led to a changing set of priorities within government:
11  Dashwood, Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transformation, 4.
12  Dashwood, Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transformation, 110.
13  For a discussion of the problems of earlier housing policies, see: “Presentation by
Minister J L Nkomo” and “Discussion with the Minister” in the special issue on Housing and
Shelter, Social Change and Development 47 (May 1999), 3-6.
14  Colleen Butcher, “Urban Low-income Housing: a Case Study of the Epworth
Settlement Upgrading Programme” in Zinyama, Tevera, and Cumming, Harare, 66.
15  Graham Tipple “Transformations in Zimbabwe” unpublished ms 1999, 2. 
16  Sunday Mail, 23 October 1994, cited in Diana Auret, Urban housing: a national crisis?
(Gweru: Mambo/CCJP, 1995) 1.
17  “Backyard shacks spring up in Mutoko, Murehwa” Herald 13 June 1990, 2.
18   Minister Chikowore in address to parliament, Herald 4 August 1994, cited in Auret,
Urban housing, 1.
90
The embourgeoisement of the ruling élite explains the failure to combine
[market-based reforms] with measures that would protect the welfare of the
poor.11 
While in general the government has continued to respond to rural crises, such as droughts,
with food aid Dashwood suggests that this approach represents an ad-hoc,  reactive response
to crises, rather than a coherent welfarist strategy.12
Urban services continued to decline throughout the decade.  Although this becomes
most marked after 1997, the roots of the crisis are to be found in the preceding years.13   The
rising costs of construction meant that the number of housing units constructed declined each
year between 1980 and 1985.14  By 1991, it was estimated that there was a deficit of 70 000
dwellings in Harare.  This figure is probably derived from the housing waiting list, which by
1994 had increased to 92, 251 households.15  Most of these families were probably ‘lodging’–
sharing houses with house-owners or occupying shacks in their backyards, although 110 000
people were thought to be living in squatter settlements in and around Harare in 1994.16  Even
small rural ‘growth-points’ faced housing shortages.17  For the country as a whole it was
suggested that up to 1.5 million people were without adequate housing in 1994.18 
At the same time as the government was failing to provide services, further allegations
– and evidence – of large scale corruption surfaced, especially in the allocation of tenders to
19  “If Strive was Leo?” Independent 14 February 1997; on indigenization more broadly
see also, Brian Raftopoulos, and Sam  Moyo “The Politics of Indigenisation in Zimbabwe” East
African Social Science Review  XI, 2 (1995), 17-32 and Scott Taylor, “Race, Class and
Neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe” in Richard Joseph ed, State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999). 
20  “Hazy images shroud proposed Harare terminal” Independent 7 March 1997; “Airport
forex negotiations underway” Independent 20 September 1996; Iden Wetherell, “Zimbabwe
airport furore” Mail & Guardian 30 May 1997.
21  “Telecel project goes ahead despite tender suspension” Independent 4 April 1997;
Lewis Machipisa, “Cellular man Strive gets his day in court” Mail & Guardian  23 September
1997. 
22  Vincent Kahiya, “Ministers cash in on housing fraud” Independent 25 April 1997, 1,
2; “VIPS in ‘luxury homes’ scandal” Horizon July 1997, 14-15.
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ZANU-connected businesspeople.19 Cabinet overturned a tender board decision and awarded
the contract for the building of a new Harare airport to the highest rather than lowest bidder.20
A Cabinet secretary also intervened during the introduction of cell-phone networks, overturning
another tender board decision, although the High Court later nullified  the decision.21
Two other scandals particularly challenged government claims as both ‘liberators’ and
bringers of ‘development’.  The first was the so-called VIP housing scheme which involved
illegal – and massive – loans to senior government officials, from a fund designated for low-
income housing.22   Second, senior government and party officials were similarly implicated in
looting funds intended for the assistance of veterans who had been injured or disabled during
the liberation war.  In 1996, Independent MP, and former war veteran,  Margaret Dongo
revealed in parliament that the War Victims Compensation Fund had been looted by senior
party and government officials.  A Commission chaired by Justice Chidyausiku was mandated
to investigate, and its report confirmed that ‘prominent persons’ had created a ‘fast-track’
scheme for compensation,  that claims had been falsified and that officials responsible for the
fund had received substantial kick-backs for the processing of claims.  In particular, the
commission noted the  Dr Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzwi, the president of the War Veterans
23  GOZ, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of the War
Victims Compensation Act (Chapter 11.16), May 1998; “Magistrate remands Hunzvi in
Custody” Herald 28 November 1998; “Hunzvi’s relatives appear in court” Herald 1 December
1998; “Hunzvi bail application ruling set for Monday” Herald 12 December 1998;  “High Court
dismisses Hunzvi’s bail application” Herald 15 December 1998; “Hunzvi’s last ditch bail bid
dismissed” Herald 19 December 1998; “Hunzvi refused bail for the fourth time” Herald 31
December 1998; Tonderai Katswara “Court grants Hunzvi $50 000 bail, set other conditions”
 Herald 16 January 1999; Dumisani Ndlela, “Amnesty for war fund looters?” Independent 19
March 1999;“Hunzvi’s trial postponed indefinitely” Daily News, 20 July 1999, 5.
24  Andrew Rusinga, “Government under pressure to review economic reforms.” Africa
Information Afrique, 20 October 1993.
25  Watson Daika, “Consumers suffering without food subsidies.” Africa Information
Afrique,. 18 August 1993.
26   “1993: Year of the Capitalist” Horizon December 1993, 21.
27  “State orders a ‘blackout on strike” MISA 28 August 1996; “Civil servants strike to
continue” Independent, 30 August 1996; “Civil Servant strike costs $120 million” Independent 30
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Association, had falsified claims of examination, submitted false claims on behalf of his family,
and attempted to disguise his signature so as to hide his involvement.23   
Perhaps the most politically sensitive result of the decreased expenditure and weakened
economy, was the increase in protests, strikes, and stay-aways that spread gradually to most
sectors of Zimbabwe’s previously quiescent work-force throughout the 1990s. When bread
prices doubled in 1993 followed by the removal of maize subsidies, consumers fought back
with the first food riots in independent Zimbabwe.  In March riots erupted when maize meal
importation was disrupted and shortages were encountered. Armed riot police accompanied
trucks distributing supplies of maize meal.  And in September, bread riots broke out in  Harare
and Bulawayo.24  Consumers then boycotted bread and maize.  In one bakery, sales dropped
overnight from 6000 dozen loaves to 200 dozen when the price of a loaf of bread increased
from Z$1.63 to Z$2.20.  Similarly, when the wholesale price of maize was raised 55 percent,
consumers began buying their meal in the rural areas and grinding it at hammer-mills, in the
home industries centres and backyards of high-density urban areas.25  Later, rent
demonstrations erupted in Zvishavane and other regional centres.26  The civil service strike,
in August and September 1996, spearheaded by nurses and doctors,  appeared to be resolved
by civil service employees being awarded a 20% raise.27  Nurses and junior doctors in Harare
August 1996; John Vekris, “Chronicle of two strikes” Social Change and Development February
1997, 3-7, 29.
28  “Government slated for its handling of strike” Independent 15 November 1996; Vekris,
“Chronicle of two strikes” 3-7, 29.
29  “Strikes spread countrywide” Independent 8 November 1996; Vekris, “Chronicle of
two strikes” 3-7, 29.
30  “General Strike in Zimbabwe” ICFTU, 12 November 1996; Vekris, “Chronicle of
two strikes” 3-7, 29.
31  “Hospitals turn away patients.” Independent 10 January 1997; Vekris, “Chronicle of
two strikes” 29; "Nurses demand reinstatement” Standard 31 October 1999; “Dismissed nurses,
doctors demand five years  pay” Financial Gazette 20 April 2001.
32  “More strikes ahead?” Standard 13 July 1997, 1.
33  Iden Wetherell, “Mugabe and the sudden rebellion” Mail & Guardian 12 December
1997; Lewis Machipisa, “Zim's MPs flex muscles over higher taxes” Mail & Guardian 3
December 1997; 
34  “ZCTU bills strike the most successful ever” Financial Gazette 11 December 1997;
Never Gadaga, “Rage at police attacks in Zimbabwe” Mail & Guardian 11 December 1997;
Chris McGreal, “Zimbabwe’s ‘unholy alliance’: black workers, white farmers” Mail & Guardian,
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resumed the strike in October, in protest against delays in contractual negotiations to confirm
the increment.28  The dismissal of the striking workers and prosecution of the strike leaders
caused the strike to spread to Bulawayo and other regional hospitals.29  In November the ZCTU
called for a two-day stay-away or general strike in protest at suppression of demonstration in
support of the medical profession, although it was not widely heeded.30  The strike eventually
petered out, with most personnel being reinstated, although 58 doctors and nurses, who were
not re-hired were still claiming unlawful dismissal 5 years later.31  
In July 1997, a series of apparently un-related strikes occurred with bank employees,
railway workers, petrol attendants, telecommunications workers, and security guards all striking
concurrently over demands for wage increments, citing the increasing cost of living.32
It was in this already tense atmosphere that the government’s decision in October 1997
to award lump-sum ‘payouts’ to war veterans, to be paid through a proposed 5% levy on
salaries was rejected by both parliament and ZANU(PF).33   Although the proposed ‘war
veteran’s levy’ was not implemented, the  ZCTU called for a two-day general strike in protest
at sales tax increase on electricity and a twenty percent increase in the price of fuel, which
erupted into violence as riot police attempted to prevent workers from entering the city.34 
17 December 1997. 
35  For example, interviews with, Cont Mhlanga, Amakhosi Theatre Productions, 26
September 1995; Mike Auret, CCJP, 14 September 1995; similar observations recorded by
Tengende “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 294-295; See also, Welshman
Ncube, “The Post-unity Period: Development, Benefits and Problems”, in Banana, Turmoil and
Tenacity, 309.
36  Personal communication from Kenneth Mkiza, ZBC Newsreader.
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4.2 Tools of Defense and Offence
As might be expected considering this upsurge in civil unrest, the 1990s were marked by the
introduction of a series of laws designed to control specific sectors of society. But at the same
time, these laws were increasingly contested by the social groups.  Ironically  the unity accord
had lead to an opening in political space.  Activists who had felt unable to speak in the early and
mid-1980s  because they would have been labeled ‘opponents’ , felt more able to be critical of
the state by the early 1990s.35  
This section will examine the relationship between the media, opposition parties,
churches, unions, and the judiciary, as they interact with the ruling party and government. 
4.2.1 Media
The state maintained its dominance in TV and radio through a series of probably
unconstitutional actions.  The print media, on the other hand, have been profoundly
transformed in the 1990s.
State control remained visible on TV and in the state-controlled newspapers, where
presidential or ministerial activities regularly held the spotlight.  Newsreaders continued to
check with the Minister of Information before broadcasting items that might reflect badly on
the government.36  Although pre-publication censorship rarely occurred within the  
37  Tendayi Kumbula, “Press freedom in Zimbabwe” in Festus Eribo and William Jong-
Ebot eds. Press Freedom and Communications in Africa (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1997),
179.
38  “Former Herald Editor speaks out” Standard 15 October 2000.
39  “ZBC fires DJ for rapping police action” Financial Gazette, 18 December 1997.
40  Richard Saunders, “The Press and Popular Organization in Zimbabwe”, unpublished
paper,  15.
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official press, “...the government hardly ever had to use all the resources at its disposal...[e]ditors
were conscious that the government could have them demoted, fired or transferred.”37
Bornwell Chakaodza, editor of the Herald discovered this to his cost when he was fired for
attempting, he claimed, to “..return the paper to a position of credibility and objectivity” after
the June 2000 election.38 
Radio 3, which broadcasts in English and plays western music, was perceived as less
subject to control, but the ousting of disc jockey, Gerry Jackson, after she broke a news
blackout during the December 1997 strike revealed that insubordination was not tolerated there
either.39
In the early 1990s, Parade and Horizon, which had been key independent sources of
information  “shifted their editorial content away from critical political features towards light
entertainment and sports.  Politics and investigative journalism it appears, no longer sell
magazines in a congested, restricted market.”40  However, other  technologies continued to
make alternative viewpoints available.  Satellite TV  boomed with the increasing accessibility
of satellite dishes, which, while they are obviously owned only by the élite, are often watched
by employees at places of business, hotels and in private homes.
In the early 1990s a brief attempt by the publishers of the Financial Gazette to create a
second weekly, the  Sunday Gazette, and a daily entitled the Daily Gazette failed. However, since
the start of the Zimbabwe Independent in 1995, and the Zimbabwe Standard in 1997, both originated
by the former publishers of Financial Gazette, there has been a quite vital and vibrant alternative
press.  All three of these weeklies have suffered from being perceived as ‘white’ papers because
41  According to African Rights, in 1999, after the Chavunduka and Choto affair, Clive
Murphy sold his stake in the Independent and Standard to Trevor Ncube.  African Rights,
Zimbabwe: In the Party’s Interest, Discussion paper 8 June 1999, 20.
42  Mark Chavunduka, Royal Commonwealth Society Meeting, London, 16 April 1999.
43  “Magoche factions launches democratic party, Sunday Mail, 29 September 1991, 1;
“ZUM announces new executive” Herald 30 October 1991, 5; “Who is who in ZUM” Sunday
Mail, 10 November 1991, 1.
44  Forum Party of Zimbabwe & ORS V. Minister of Local Government, Judgement
No. S-129-97 ZLR 1997 (2); “Supreme Court dismisses appeal by Forum Party, Herald 15
August 1997; Tandeka Nkiwane, “Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: the struggle within the
struggle” in Adebayo Olukoshi ed, The Politics of Opposition in Africa (Uppsala, Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, 1998), 103.  
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they were originally owned and published by local white-owned companies, and because they
are all quite expensive compared to the Herald.41  
Independent journalists are also very aware of the constraints imposed by the state.
Mark Chavunduka, of the Standard, detailed the legislation which creates a ‘legal minefield’ for
independent journalists: the Official Secrets Act, Parliamentary Privilege Act, the Prisons Act,
and the Law and Order Maintenance Act.  In addition, he noted that “requests for comments
or clarification [from Ministers] are more often than not refused; after a story is published,
often it is rebutted in the official press.”42   
4.2.2 Elections and Opposition Parties
After the brief burst of excitement that followed ZUM’s contestation of the 1990 election, the
early to mid 1990s presented little change on the electoral front.  ZUM itself fragmented, and
a splinter regrouped as  the Democratic Party.43  Other fragments of ZUM moved into the
Forum Party in 1993, which was expected to provide a strong challenge to ZANU(PF) in the
1995 elections, but which was also weakened due to factional divisions.  Forum did pursue legal
challenges to some municipal elections, with mixed success – winning nullifications in
Masvingo, Bulawayo and Harare, but not in Gweru.44  The United Parties (UP) – which
combined Muzorewa’s UANC with Forum, ZUM, and ZANU-Ndonga – as an electoral front
made little impact in the 1995 and 1996 elections.  Late in the campaign, the UP called for a
45  Interview, Isaac Manyemba, Information Secretary, UP, 16 June 1997.
46  Research notes, Supreme Court, 30 July 1997;  United Party v. The Minister of
Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, ZLR 1997 (2) 254; Judgement no. SC 139-97 30 July
and 5 September 1997; “Fifteen-seat threshhold for public funding ‘unconstitutional’” Herald
6 September 1997, 1, 3. 
47  Dongo v. Mwashita & ORS 13 & 27 July and 10 & 30 August 1995 Judgement No.
HH-106-95, ZLR 1995 (2) 228 (H);  Interview Margaret Dongo, ZUD, 17 June 1997.
48  Interview, Margaret Dongo, ZUD, 17 June 1997; Interview Kempton Makamure,
ZUD,16 June 1997. 
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boycott on the basis that the regulations created an unfair contest.45  In response, they contested
the validity of the Electoral Act and the Political Parties (Finance) Act in the Supreme Court,
winning a partial, but not unsubstantial, victory in 1997 –  when the Political Parties
(Finance)Act was declared unconstitutional.46  
Margaret Dongo and her Independent Candidates group won prominence through the
twin measures of court challenges and campaigning primarily in restricted areas — municipal
wards and mayorality contests. Like the UP and Forum, the independent candidates  used the
judicial system to great effect.  Dongo, an ex-combatant, ex-CIO agent, and the sitting MP for
Harare South was not re-selected as the ZANU (PF) candidate in 1995.  Along with a small
group of other de-selected candidates she decided to run as a ‘ZANU (PF) Independents’.
When Dongo lost the election she contested the result which was overturned in court and she
convincingly won the re-run election,  setting a precedent by challenging ZANU(PF)
hegemony.47  By developing an informal grouping of opposition candidates in 1996 to challenge
ZANU(PF) in the upcoming municipal elections, Dongo began a crucial process of consistently
and thoroughly fighting elections — not just complaining about unfair playing fields.48   The
candidates who ran under the banner of  Independent Candidates — later  the  Zimbabwe
Union of Democrats (ZUD) — rapidly became expert both at exposing fraudulent registrations
and encouraging their supporters to register to vote.
Priscilla Misihairabwi, an NGO activist who sought to contest the urban council
elections as an Independent Candidate, compiled such a convincing dossier of fraudulent voter
49  Research notes, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 21 July 1997;  Interview, Priscilla
Misihairambwi,  18 June 1997; “Court rules Misihairabwi had right to contest poll” Herald 8
August 1997, 1, 17.
50  Fidelis George Mhashu v. Tichakunda Chiroodza & Chitungwiza Town Council &
Andrew Jiri & ZANU (PF) & Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.
High Court Judgement HH 43- 97; Interview Fidelis George Mhashu, 17 June 1997.
51  “Sithole Refused Trial Date in Plot to Kill Mugabe” Sapa-AFP 1 June 1996.
52  “Sithole says he is innocent of treason charges.”  Independent 27 June 1997, 1.
53  See for instance, Sam Moyo, The Land Question in Zimbabwe (Harare: SAPES, 1995),
257; “Churu farm: the land blues continue” SAPEM 7, 1 (October 1993), 9-11.
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registrations in Harare’s Avenues district (including vacant lots with hundreds of registered
voters) that ZANU(PF) sought to force her out — with the Registrar-General, Tobaiwa
Mudede,  declaring her candidacy invalid.  Misihairabwi took her case all the way to the
Supreme Court, which ratified her right to contest the election.49  Similarly, Fidelis Mhashu, a
former ZANU(PF) municipal councillor who contested the Chitungwiza mayoral election as
an independent candidate after failing to get selected as the official ZANU(PF) candidate,
convinced the High Court that the Chitungwiza electoral roll — comprised of lists of home-
owners — “was so defective that it cannot be said that the electoral process was itself  not
flawed.”50   Neither of these two battles were ultimately successful, because the elections were
not re-run, yet they revealed the depths to which ZANU(PF) would go in order to maintain
control of the electoral process.   However, two members of the Independent Candidates did
win municipal council seats in the high-density suburbs of  Mbare and Sunningdale.  
The arrest and trial of Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of ZANU(Ndonga), in 1995 for
treason was widely interpreted as politically motivated.51  Convicted and sentenced to one year
in jail, Sithole denied allegations that he plotted to assassinate President Mugabe and organized
military training outside the country for his recruits.52  The designation for acquisition of
Sithole’s Churu farm also appeared to be influenced by political pressure.53
54  Moyo, Voting for Democracy, 149.
55  John Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics of
Zimbabwe’s 1995 General Elections (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2000), 220.
56  Moyo, Voting for Democracy, 147
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4.2.3 The Elections Machinery
The elections machinery includes the Registrar-General Tobaiwa Mudede and the Elections
Directorate, as well as the Election Supervisory Commission (ESC).  The Registrar-General and
the Directorate supervise the delimitation committee and the voter registration process,
while the ESC is intended to observe and report on the process. 
The voter registration exercise in 1990 was a dubious procedure and, just before the
elections, the Registrar-General announced that all Zimbabwean citizens would be allowed to
vote upon presentation of proof of citizenship and residence.54  Although his office produced
a  voter’s roll, it was only  made available late in the nomination period, impeding candidates’
attempts to find registered voters who could nominate them.  The 1995 election, while probably
less violent than either 1985 or 1990, revealed more irregularities in the polling process.
Margaret Dongo’s court challenge over the election fought in Harare South revealed that in
addition to irregularities in the voter’s roll, the government also stuffed the ballot boxes, such
that there were over 1 000 more ballots counted than had been issued to voters.55 
In both 1990 and 1995, questions were raised about the impartiality of the delimitation
commission.  In 1990 last  minute ‘corrections’ were issued which moved the high density area
of Mkoba from Gweru Central to the predominantly rural Gweru South, giving Muzenda an
edge over Kombayi.  As Moyo pointed out, “the general public was left with the impression
that President Mugabe had used the commission to protect his Vice-President, Simon Muzenda,
who appeared to be heading for certain defeat.”56 Similarly,  Harare North (contested in 1995
and 2000 elections by Trudy Stevenson, first for FORUM and then for MDC), while mainly
a low-density suburb included Hatcliffe number 1, a high density area, and Hatcliffe extension,
57  “Commission now better equipped to supervise poll” Herald 27 March 1995.
58  “ESC Sworn in” Herald, 7 July 1994; “Political parties lambast poll team” Daily
Gazette, 8 July 1994.
59  Makumbe and Compagnon, Behind the Smokescreen, 285.
60  Maxie Matavaire, “Elections free, not fair” Sunday Gazette, 23 April 1995, Ramson
Muzondo, “1995 elections unfair” Sunday Gazette, 13 August 1995, “Election was unfair: ZCC”
Herald, 21 August 1995, and “State Press snaps at watchdog’s ‘unfair poll’ verdict.” Horizon, July
1995, 9.
61  “Poll conduct taxes man of the cloth’s patience” Financial Gazette 30 September1999.
62  Interview, Fidelis Mhashu, 17 June 1997.
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a holding camp for squatters.  Bulawayo South, a mainly  low-density constituency also had the
high density suburb of Nketa added to it in 1995.  
The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), which might have been expected to
oversee this process, was widely considered underfinanced and staffed.57  Criticisms have also
been made about the President’s control of appointments to the ESC.58  Makumbe and
Compagnon speak particularly bitterly about the ESC’s failure to support Margaret Dongo’s
complaints in 1995.59   Irregularities led to the election being  widely condemned as ‘free but
unfair’.60 The 1999 local elections, in which the ESC did not receive a copy of the electoral
register until after business hours on the eve of the election,  led Anglican Bishop Peter Hatendi
who chaired the ESC to call it a “toothless bulldog.”61  He called for the establishment of an
independent commission and resigned in February 2000 when this was not forthcoming.  In
the 1996 municipal elections ZANU(PF) attacks on the independent candidates included the
assault on Fidelis Mhashu, who was  attacked and beaten by ZANU(PF) supporters who had
been holding a rally attended by four MPs, including Cabinet Minister Witness Mangwende.
Despite his being badly beaten, the police, who were present at the time of the attack, did not
lay any charges.62  Priscilla Misihairabwi’s attempts to stand for election in Avenues ward of
Harare were also subject to explicit political meddling, as it was shown that Registrar-General
Mudede had taken action only after consulting ZANU(PF).  Judge Korsah, who presided over
Misihairabwi’s appeal to the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged party political interference,
saying, “The facts are screaming out from the page; why did the judge below [in the High
63  Research notes, Supreme Court, 21 July 1997.
64  See for example the debate on Excombatant teachers in Parliamentary Debates 8 and
9 May 1991 and the extensive coverage in the Herald: “Spotlight on pay for ex-combatant
teachers”  Herald 8 May 1991, 5; “MPs urge fair deal for teachers” Herald, 10 May 1991, 1;
“MPs now debate with supporting documentary evidence” Herald 12 May 1991, 7.
65  “School fees: the MPs may say no, chef!” Financial Gazette, 22 March 1991, W9;
“MPs block Passage of Sports Bill” Herald 25 April 1991, 1; “Kwidini runs into barrage of
queries on Sports Bill” Herald 26 April 1991, 1; Parliamentary Debates 7 May 1991, 9 May 1991;
“MPs now debate with supporting documentary evidence” Herald, 12 May 1991, 7.
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Court] not declare it?  What is the motive for his resistance?”63  The unspoken fact, as all in the
courtroom were aware, was that the High Court judge was a ZANU(PF) appointee.  
These election challenges were significant because until that time there had been no
substantiated allegations that ZANU(PF) was rigging elections, although intimidation was
frequently alleged.  While monitoring organizations noted structural irregularities, such as the
ruling parties’ access to funds, vehicles, and the media, they rarely suggested that voting had
been manipulated in or at the polls.  However, the independent candidates repeatedly showed
how the manipulation of electoral rolls was accomplished by the ruling party using the official
electoral machinery.  As we shall see in Part 4, this intensified during the 2000 election.
4.2.4 Parliament
Parliament, while overshadowed by the policy-making role of the Party and the Executive, is
still a forum for contestation, primarily because it provides an arena for MPs to publicize issues.
In the 1990s,  such issues as the treatment of war veterans, led to  much debate.64  
In 1991, parliamentarians made their opposition to the Executive known on such
disparate issues as the reintroduction of school fees and the establishment of a sports
commission.  In the latter case MPs prevented the minister responsible from being able to
“steam roller” the Bill through parliament for the first time in independent Zimbabwe and later,
when the Bill was properly introduced vigorously challenged the minister on issues of
ministerial impartiality.65   In 1992, Parliamentarians twice blocked a vote on salaries for
66  Jimu Simbwi, “To Cde President with Love”Moto, no. 120, January 1993, 5. 
67 “MPs again refuse to pass governors pay” Herald 3 October 1992, 5;  “MPs vote for
governors salaries” Herald 8 October 1992, 1, 9.
68  See for example, “Era of openness at full tide” Standard 11 May 1997, 6;  “”Mps defy
government over Airport deal” Financial Gazette 22 May 1997, 1, 2; Barnabas Thondhlana,
“Government to get tough with MPs over controversial airport funding” Independent  23 May
1997, 3; Francis Murape, “Mugabe’s Winter of Discontent” Mail and Guardian 13 June 1997, 10;
Barnabas Thondhlana ““Government defies parliament over airport”  Standard 27 July 1997,
1.
69  “Another attempt to short-circuit parliament” Standard 27 July 1997, 6; “Yet another
stand-off in Parliament?” Standard 10 August 1997, 9.
70  Barnabas Thondhlana, “MPs call for better communication with government”
Independent 5 September 1997, 11.
71 “Backbenchers break ranks and vote with ‘indis’” Horizon July 1997, 6.
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provincial governors, calling instead for the position to be abolished.  However, they were
eventually bullied into supporting the budgetary allocations on the premiss that the
governorships were constitutionally guaranteed positions.  The debate was less about loyalty
to the Constitution than loyalty to the Executive.  The President was recorded as saying “True,
let them (MPs) make all the noise. Don't forget we are ruling. Otherwise they will be saying
government has no power.”66  The motion was eventually passed unanimously.67  In 1997, MPs
challenged government over particularly sensitive cases, including the tender and loans for the
building of a new Harare airport.68  Later that year, as the government attempted to amend 19
Acts through the passage of one Bill, MPs questioned the method and decisions of the
Executive.69  In response to this MPs were chastised in Parliament by the Minister of Justice
who suggested that any difficulties should be worked out in caucus — not in parliament.
Moses Mvenge, MP for Mutare Central interpreted this as MPs being treated like children,
arguing that membership in ZANU(PF) did not mean that MPs had to support every
government policy.70   In 1997, the issue of corruption within the administration of the War
Victims Compensation Fund also led MPs — for the first time since independence — to
support and pass a private members bill sponsored by Margaret Dongo, the lone independent
MP.71  
72  Welshman Ncube, “Controlling Public Power: the role of the constitution and the
legislature” Legal Forum 9 August 1997, 20.
73  “MPs shed culture of fear” Horizon, July 1997, 6-8.
74  “Gara scolds mum MPs” Financial Gazette 22 March 1991, W3; Barnabas
Thondhlana, “MPs call for better communication with government” Zimbabwe Independent 5
September 1997, 11.
75  Tengende,  “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 184.
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As Ncube notes, “..quite often the ruling party’s Parliamentarians are sufficiently
objective to oppose particular legislative proposals during debate and yet when the Government
insists on enactment of the objectionable provisions....the parliamentarians vote in favour of
the provisions they would have spoken against.”72  This was certainly the case in the ratification
of the tender for the new international airport terminal, which involved loans said to be worth
ZWD 1.2 billion to Air Harbour Technologies (AHT), a company represented locally by Leo
Mugabe (the President’s nephew), although the tender board had ranked AHT fourth because
it had neither the financial resources nor the technological know-how of other tenderers.
Cabinet overturned the Tender Board’s recommendation, causing the withdrawal of ZWD 1
billion in foreign donor support.  After making it clear that they, and the public,  were unhappy
with this tendering, MPs were faced with a three line whip, which would have forced their
resignations from the party if they had defied it.73  However, outspoken MPs frequently
harangued their colleagues for allowing themselves to be ‘steamrolled’ rather than turning up
for debates prepared to scrutinize legislation.74
4.2.5 Unions
Following  the ZCTU’s increasing independence at the end of the 1980s, the government
attempted to weaken the unions in the 1990s.  In direct contradiction to its earlier emphasis on
‘unity’ between workers, attempts were made to re-fragment the movement.  Tengende
illustrates how efforts were made, starting in 1991, to weaken the railways union, by creating
an unlawful ‘splinter union’.75  Both Tengende and Nordlund suggest that this was part of a
76  Tengende,  “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 437-8; Nordlund,
Organising the Political Agora, 184.
77  Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora 184.
78  Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora 190.
79  In re Munuhumeso & Ors 1994 (1), ZLR 49 (S); Nordlund identifies this as ‘...the
most substantial advancement of democratic rights in Zimbabwe since independence”
Organising the Political Agora, 200.
80  Schiphorst, Strength and Weakness, 121-2.
81 See for a discussion of this shift, Paris Yeros, “Labour Struggles for Alternative
Economics in Zimbabwe: Trade union nationalism and Internationalism in a Global Era”
(Unpublished MS, 2000).   
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larger process, preparing the way for the removal of the one-industry-one-union policy, in
which the ZCTU was portrayed as rejecting pluralism and freedom of association.76
And, indeed, in 1992, the government introduced legislation to amend the Labour
Relations Act which revoked the policy of ‘one industry-one-union’ and thereby weakened the
ZCTU.  As with the University Amendment Act (1990) and the PVO Act (1995), the Bill was
presented to Parliament before the ZCTU knew the draft was in existence.77  Somewhat
reluctantly, the  ZCTU leadership organized a protest march on June 13th, which went ahead
despite the lack of police permission, as required under the Rhodesian Era Law and Order
Maintenance Act (LOMA).78 Police presence was heavy, and the arrest of six protesters in
Harare led to the 1994 striking down of the LOMA as unconstitutional, an unintentional
outcome of the march, but one which was to have a profound impact on the ability of
protesters to assemble in future.79  Despite the ZCTU’s opposition, the labour regulations were
rapidly implemented. 
This was the final hostile encounter between labour and the state for some time. As the
ZCTU’s members encountered the increasing difficulties of structural adjustment the labour
movement “...adopted a different tone...a conciliatory approach...It now presented itself as an
advisor to Government.”80 Gradually, the  ZCTU moved towards working in a conciliatory
manner on structural adjustment policy, social security and tripartite bargaining.81    After the
82  Nordlund, Organising the Political Agora 200-201; Schiphorst, Strength and Weakness, 125-
128.
83  “Fire gutted offices” Sapa- AFP, 5 March 1998.
84  “Tens of thousands defy Mugabe in Zimbabwe anti-government strike” Sapa-AFP,
3 March 1998; Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe Strikers ignore Mugabe Threat” Guardian(UK)
4 March 1998, 12
85  “Basildon Peta, “Demo ban unconstitutional” Independent 1 August 1997; “ZCTU
defies ban” Independent11 December 1998.
86  For an early discussion of some key cases, see Richard Sklar “Reds And Rights:
Zimbabwe’s Experiment ” in Dov Ronen, ed. Democracy and Pluralism in Africa (Boulder: Lynne
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previous confrontation between unions and state, by 1995 there was a relatively less conflictual
relationship, based more on give-and-take bargaining.82
However, between 1996 and 2000, there was a series of disruptive strikes in both the
public and the private sector, and of politically mandated stay-aways.  In particular, the ZCTU
can be seen to have changed its strategy in response to a more militant public support for
workers, and began calling for national strikes or stay-aways in response to particular policy
decisions – starting with the call for workers to stay-out in support of striking doctors and
nurses in 1996, and the increasingly effective protests at the war veterans levy in 1997, and food
and fuel tax increases in 1998 (as discussed in Section 4.1). 
But these successes have not been without retribution.  In December 1997 after the
protest against the war veteran’s levy, Morgan Tsvangirai was attacked and beaten.  The day
after the national strike in March 1998, the ZCTU’s Bulawayo regional office was set on fire.83
 The government’s labelling of the ZCTU as an “...opposition party...playing politics” after the
series of strikes in 1998, was also a clear warning that they were raising the stakes in a battle for
control.84 Throughout 1997 and 1998, the government attempted to make the calling of strikes
over political issues illegal.85    
4.2.6 Judiciary
In the 1980s, the courts provided a strong check against joint executive and legislative
challenges to the constitution.86  However the judicial  checks and balances were effective only
Rienner, 1986); On parliamentary resistance to judicial autonomy see, “Supreme Court judges
hit back at Mutasa over Smith ruling” Herald 10 November 1989, 1 and “Cabinet backs court
in Smith’s pay row” Herald 22 November 1989, 1; On the executive’s use of legislative power
to reverse judicial decisions see inter alia Welshman Ncube, “Controlling public power: the role
of the constitution and the legislature” Legal Forum, 9, 3 1997, esp. 18-20.
87 Adrian de Bourbon, “Are magistrates independent?” Legal Forum 1 December 1989,
7.
88 African Rights, Zimbabwe: In the Party’s Interest, Discussion paper 8 June 1999, 10. 
89  On the PVO Act, see section 6.3.2; On the Political Parties Finance Act see section
4.2.2.
90  Geoff Feltoe, “Deciding not to decide: case note on the case of Holland & Ors v the
Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, S-15-97", Legal Forum, 43-45.
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at its topmost levels.  Magistrates are not only poorly paid and overworked, but also subject to
pressures from the executive.  As Adrian de Bourbon commented in a comparison of the
independence of magistrates in Zimbabwe and provincial court  judges in Newfoundland: “...it
was considered that the remuneration of its provincial judges made them financially
independent: I doubt if this is the position in Zimbabwe.”87  The lack of independence of
magistrates was particularly visible after the January 1998 riots.   African Rights alleges that the
miscarriages of justice after the food riots suggests that magistrates were not just overwhelmed
by the numbers of detainees, but that they “were acting under orders.”  As Tendai Biti said:
We know for a fact that when these guys [alleged rioters and looters] were
brought up the magistrates were instructed to deny them bail.  It is difficult for
someone who is so underpaid to be impartial.  They are very vulnerable...the
judiciary has to look up to the executive.88
As section 4.2.2. showed, court judgements were an important component in the
success of the independent candidates.  In 1997, the courts also ruled the  PVO Act and the
Political Parties (Finance) Act, to be unconstitutional.89  Despite the profound impact of the
decisions which went against the government and in some cases also ZANU(PF), the Supreme
Court is also noted for  ‘deciding not to decide’ or rendering a more limited judgement than
might be considered necessary in order to “uphold the constitution.”90  It has not, on the whole,
been a crusading bench. 
91   Ngoni Chanakira, “Academic Freedom in Higher Institutions of Learning in
Zimbabwe” SAPEM April 1991, pp 30-31; Cheater, “The University of Zimbabwe”, 200-203.
92  Sachikonye, “State and social movements” 151.
93  Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 500. 
94  Tengende,  “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 508.
95  Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 402.
96  See Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 219-221, for
an excellent discussion of the class and gender dynamics among students.
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4.2.7 Students
Students, it has been seen, were key players in the late 1980s political movement against the
one-party state.  In October 1990, the government rushed the University Amendment Act
through Parliament in a week. The Act increased the role of the Minister of Education in the
administration of the University, strengthened the Vice-Chancellor’s powers and  reduced the
academic freedom of staff and students.91  This led to two years of often violent protest on the
part of the students. The state’s main levers of control over the students were expulsion and
the withdrawal of grants.92  Conditions of study also became more difficult for students.  With
the price increases that accompanied economic liberalization, student grants had less buying
power, and their families were less able to help them out financially.   The university was also
affected by a ‘brain-drain’ as it was no longer so attractive to either local or ex-patriate staff.93
Students were increasingly taught in large classes, without access to sufficient teaching
resources.   To some extent then, protests about student welfare issues, were also critical  of
government economic policy: “students linked their own demands with broader national
political and economic issues.”94
Student protests rapidly became known for their violence – on the part of both the
students and the riot police.  Tengende attributes the student violence to the recruitment by the
SRC of a ‘minority sub-culture’ of hooligans, which was institutionalized by the SRC in 1991-2
to create a ‘military wing’ which led demos.95  These partly originated in class and gender
divisions on campus.  Female students felt threatened by the so-called ‘University Bachelor’s
Association’ which dominated the SRC.96  Moreover, as students ‘squandered’ their right to
97  Tengende, “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 517. 
98  Eg discussions with Shelton Mupumbwa, SRC member, 1996-7; Ronald Mubaiwa,
student 1996-9. 
99  Although in 1997 the Registrar-General claimed that a law to ‘reduce the number of
churches’ was being drafted (cited in Oskar Wermter, “Police to enforce ten commandments?:
a look at Church and State in Zimbabwe” Moto February 1998, 8).  Students, labour and NGOs
were the subject of ‘pre-emptive’ legislation throughout the 1990s in the form of the UZ Act
(1990), the Labour Relations Act (1992), and the PVO Act (1995).
100  “Churches, laymen from Zimbabwe and South Africa speak out” Sunday Mail 20
August 1995, 1, 4; “Demo against homos in city” Sunday Mail 17 September 1995, 1.
101  Gifford, African Christianity 345; Jan Raath, “Church tries to evict Harare’s black
bishop” Times (UK) 20 May 1995. 
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demonstrate in the city centre, by failing to maintain discipline, they rapidly became seen as
centring on ‘parochial’ concerns rather than facilitating linkages with other social groups.97
Through the later 1990s, frequent student protests –  usually about their own living conditions
– were followed by tear gas attacks by riot police, periodic closure of the University, and the
expulsions of successive generations of SRC leaders.98 
 
4.2.8 Churches
While the state was not shy of demanding the obedience and participation of the churches in
the development process, it stopped short of legislating explicit controls on them.99  In the
1990s, the Anglican and Catholic hierarchies remained relatively entwined with the ZANU state.
In the mid-1990s, the Anglicans, along with the Pentecostal movement,  linked themselves
fervently to Mugabe’s crusade against homosexuals in Zimbabwe.100   Gifford has also
suggested that the refusal of Peter Hatendi, the  Anglican Bishop of Harare, to retire restricted
the church’s ability to criticize President Mugabe’s similar reluctance to hand-over the reins of
power.101    
The Catholic church has also retained its close links with the Mugabe family — two of
the President’s sisters worked at Silveira House, the Catholic development institution, and in
1996 Bishop Mutume married President Mugabe to his young secretary, despite widespread
102 “Wedding costs taxpayers $3 million” Independent 28 August 1996.
103   Interviews, Mike Auret, 14 September 1995, 28 September 1999; “Auret snubbed
bishops over strife report” Sunday Mail, 1 August 1999; “Catholic Commission accused of
politicking” Sunday Mail, 6 July 1997; CCJP/LRF.  Breaking the Silence: Building True Peace. A
Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988.  (Harare: CCJP&LRF,
February 1997).
104 Dumisani Muleya, “Auret resigns from CCJP” Independent 2 July 1999.
105  David Maxwell, “Catch the Cockerel Before Dawn: Pentecostalism and Politics in
Post-Colonial Zimbabwe” Africa 70, 2 (2000).
106  Maxwell, “Catch the cockerel”.
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public condemnation.102  In 1997, the CCJP/LRF report on the Matabeleland atrocities was
published in South Africa. Although this report was compiled under the auspices of the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the Bishops refused to make the report public in Zimbabwe
without the acquiescence of President Mugabe.103  The power struggle between the CCJP staff
and members – most of whom wanted to be more publically outspoken – and the Bishops –
who were inclined to take up issues with the President privately –  weakened the organization,
and led to the resignation of the much respected National Director, Mike Auret.104
Nevertheless, as Chapters 5 and 6 reveal, the church-NGOs associated with the mainstream
Protestant and Catholic churches became important players in policy advocacy and voter-
education.  
The Pentecostal and Apostolic churches, which had been somewhat sidelined during
the 1980s, became more significant players in the political sphere in the 1990s.  Although
Maxwell has suggested that the Pentecostal churches have sought to distance themselves from
the state,  at least within some age-groups and subaltern groups,  he also suggests that the
hierarchies of the evangelical churches may be courting the President’s approval (and vice-
versa), rather than seeking to distance themselves from secular authority.105  These groups were
targeted for inclusion in the ZANU(PF) political project as elections became more and more
contested.  During the 1995 election, Mugabe, a Catholic,  was noted imitating the distinctive
Pentecostal form of prayer at a prayer breakfast.106 A year later, during the Chitungwiza mayoral
election,  when the ruling party was unsure of its ability to beat the independent candidate,
107  Dumisani Ndlela, “ZANU (PF) seeks spiritual help” Horizon July 1997, 11, 42.
108  Ndlela, “ZANU (PF) seeks spiritual help” 11, 42.
109  “Bob Mugabe’s wailers silenced” Standard 25 March 2001
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Mhashu, the party called on the support of the normally apolitical Vapostori or apostolic faith
congregations.  At the close of the voter registration exercise a church leader claimed that at
least 3000 members had registered, in hopes that ZANU(PF) would provide them with land
on which to worship.107  At a meeting with 2000 members of the Vapostori, Zionist and
Pentecostal churches in Chitungwiza, ZANU(PF) leaders used both religious rhetoric “Mugabe
could not take you across the river (Jordan), so he gave you a Moses called Jiri [the mayoral
candidate] to take you across the river” and pragmatism, “..if Mhashu were elected mayor he
would not be able to present the grievances of Chitungwiza’ residents to the government
effectively because he would be like ‘paraffin in the sea’ which could not mix well with water.
‘In his absence, no councillor would represent him because all the councillors are
ZANU(PF).’”108
4.3 Reactive Nation-building: the backlash to ‘reconciliation and unity’?
Nation-building efforts, as described in the previous chapter continued throughout the 1990s,
but were both rejected by many and judged inadequate by other groups.  
4.3.1 National Symbols
National symbols – from the presidency to national holidays and national monuments –  came
under increasing criticism in the 1990s.    There was criticism of presidentialism and the
apparent distance of President Mugabe from the people,  with questions asked about the need
for the heavily armed outriders of his motorcade and his heavily guarded and fortified
residence.109  In addition, the apparent changes in his lifestyle after his marriage to Grace
Marufu, and their tendency to travel abroad came in for criticism and lampooning, as the
110  Jan Raath, “Mugabe lost in love while Zimbabwe smoulders” Mail & Guardian 2
November 1996; “New globetrotting record” Standard 15 October 2000; “Mugabe’s foreign
trips gobble $10 billion” Independent 21 January 2000; Editorial cartoon,  Independent, 7 November
1997; Basildon Peta, “Grace Mugabe charters Boeing 737 for SA trip” Independent 8 August
1997, 1.
111  “Political tension hovers over Heroes’ Day”  Financial Gazette 7 August 1997;  “Fears
rise about youths disrupting Zimbabwe Day” PANA, 15 April 1998; “Pressure groups attack
govt over Unity Day” Independent 24 December 1998; Daniel Manyandure, “The Flame has
Died” Standard 18 April 1999; “Is the Unity accord still alive?” Standard 17 December 2000.
112  Daniel Manyandure, “Independence: the flame has died”  Standard, 18 April 1999.
113  “Leaders told to rise above village politics” Herald 24 December 1998.
111
President, allegedly the most traveled head of state in Africa, was dubbed ‘Vasco da Gama’.110
In 1998, the government added another new holiday,  by creating Unity Day to
celebrate the 1987 signing of the Unity Accord.  Turn out to public celebrations of the
politically significant public holidays – Heroes’ Day, Independence Day and Unity Day – had
decreased dramatically throughout the decade.111  As one young Zimbabwean recently told the
press, “That’s the day I watch my favourite sport, soccer, without paying a cent.  Apart from
that, I don’t know what the day would mean.”112   Officials continued to use these official
functions to rehearse official rhetoric.  At the first Unity Day celebrations in 1998, party
officials were clearly warned against regionalizing or tribalizing  ZANU(PF) and told that
development would only come through unity:
Without unity there is no peace, without peace there is no
development...Indeed, this unity we are celebrating now is the key to the future
development of this country.113
4.3.2 Race, Reconciliation and Affirmative Action
The long term impact of the policy of reconciliation described in chapter 3 has also been
problematic, as demands have been made for more of the economy – much of which remained
white-dominated – to be shifted into the hands of black investors and producers.  
These interests organized into powerful interest groups in the form of the Indigenous
Businessmen’s Development Centre (IBDC) in 1990 and the Affirmative Action Group (AAG)
in 1994, and other associated groupings demanding access to capital, markets and technology.
114  Skålnes, Politics of Economic Reform, 101.
115  Brian Raftopoulos, “The State, NGOs and Democratisation”, Unpublished paper,
n.d. n.p. 
116 Brian Raftopoulos and Sam Moyo, “The Politics of Indigenisation in Zimbabwe”
East African Social Science Review 11, 2 (1995), 23-24.
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While these groups have lobbied  the state, they are tolerated because of the overlap between
them and ZANU(PF) in both membership and interests.  Tor Skålnes interpreted the formation
of black business organizations (in implicit opposition to the white dominated business groups)
as reflecting the failure of the government policy of “one sector, one organization.”114 
However, a more accurate interpretation is that the formation of these groups was a
continuation of the ZANU (PF) policy of  establishing splinter unions (see 4.2.6).  As
Raftopoulos says, the indigenous business organizations can be “...regarded as wings of
[ZANU(PF)].”  He suggests that the strategy of these groups was to “subordinate themselves
to the ruling party, seek political patronage and to pursue their objectives as an integral part of
ruling party politics.”115   
ZANU(PF) originally shunned the promotion of indigenous business in part because
it was problematic for the purportedly socialist party-state nexus, but also because a black
bourgeoisie might present an alternative power structure in ‘civil society’.  However, the
economic reform programme, and pressure from international organizations and donors gave
greater legitimacy to demands for indigenization.  As well, in the 1990 elections ZUM
“demonstrated the ability of an alternative party to mobilise frustrated and ambitious members
of the Black Middle class.”116   So, gradually, the government has moved away from a stance
in which whites were left alone to pursue their business interests, into one in which the
advancement of black business has become integral to advancing the interests of ZANU(PF).
The establishment of  groups like the IBDC and the AAG  is not a failure of government
policy, but instead represents a significant  shift in its policy.
117  For example, “National Strike cripples economy for second day” Sapa-AFP, 4
March 1998; Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe Strikers ignore Mugabe threat”  Guardian (UK),
4 March 1998, 12.
118  For example, Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elites, 183; Raftopoulos, “Race and
Nationalism in a post-colonial state”, 87.
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of Zimbabwean Politics” Speaking at the Britain-Zimbabwe Society Research Day, Oxford, 3
June 2000.
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March 1995, 1, 5;  “Problems can be solved through unity” Herald 21 July 1999..
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From 1994 onwards, the Mugabe regime itself picked up on themes of racial discord
apparently whenever an attempt to distract attention from economic problems and land
shortages was needed.  Faced with food riots, labour strikes over economic policy, and general
discontent Mugabe and various Ministers  have accused whites of fomenting unrest and
economic instability.117  Because of the nature of the liberation struggle, discourses of race,
development and opportunity frequently overlap.  Joshua Nkomo’s clash with Bulawayo city
council in 1993 over indigenization is often quoted both because he explicitly invoked the
‘struggle metaphors’ and criticized white and Asian businesses, “..he harangued councillors in
Ndebele, though some were white, saying that he had spent 11 years in jail, claiming that it was
illogical for Zimbabweans to have to pay for development in their own country.”118
Race has also been an effective tool against NGOs and political parties, who are accused
of being funded by international whites and supported by local whites.   Increasing tendencies
from 1997 to label whites and foreigners, but also city-dwellers as ‘foreign’ were clearly an
attempt to limit the legitimacy of such groups – with their foreign funding and predominantly
urban support – to speak on national issues.119
The 1990 ZANU(PF) election manifesto had set out “The Imperative of National
Unity” and this rhetoric continued through the next decade.120  In 1995 and 1999, faced with
internal party divisions, the President called almost desperately for the cessation of intra-party
divisions which threatened the party’s stability.121   
122  "Kangai warns people of Chipinge...Vote ZANU(PF) or there will be no
development.” Herald, 25 March 1995, 5.
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During the 1995 election, Kumbirai Kangai warned the people of Chipinge, whose MP
was ZANU(Ndonga) leader, Ndabaningi Sithole, “..that there will be no development in their
area if they continue to vote for opposition parties.”  Kangai said, “People in Chipinge should
unite.  If you do not unite...there will be no development.”122  Other Manicaland constituencies
were also given such warnings.123   Similarly, in Matabeleland, also perceived as a source of
dissent, the provincial governor warned local councillors that without unity there would be no
development in their region.124  This tone is also found in Mugabe’s threat that “we may go
back and remove the clothes of reconciliation”125 and the ominous warning of Colonel Dube,
of the Zimbabwe Defence Industries that: “peace is vital for development and the main
ingredient for peace is unity.”126 More concretely, election monitors reported that access to
drought relief and seed packs was linked to voting ZANU(PF) by party officials and traditional
leaders during the 1995 election.127    
This overworked idea of ‘unity’ nonetheless continues to resonate beyond ZANU(PF)
claims to dominance.  Even the opposition parties, who might be expected to resist and resent
this discourse of unity, use it themselves.  The United Parties’ (so called because they brought
together the remnants of FORUM, UANC etc)  slogan was “Unity is Power” and their
Manifesto declared their intention to form a “united, stable and strong” opposition, with the
capacity to be a basis for an alternative government.128  Similarly, the Zimbabwe Union of
129  Stephen Ndlovu and Stanley Gama, “Dongo launches political party” Sunday Mail
20 December 1998.
130  Alexander, “State, peasantry and resettlement”, 338.
131  “Mugabe backs down to western demands for legal land reform” SAPA 3 March
1998.
132  Robin Palmer, “Mugabe’s land grab in regional perspective” paper presented to the
Conference on Land Reform in Zimbabwe – the Way Forward, SOAS, London, 11 March
1998.
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Democrats, led by Margaret Dongo, took the famous balancing rocks as a party symbol because
they symbolize “unity, stability and political balance.”129
4.3.3 Land
Twenty years after independence, land remained a potent motivating force and as such,
remained an important political ‘trump’ card for the ruling party.  During the 1990 election
promises of land were revived — by the party — not by land hungry peasants; as Alexander
notes, “the government’s promises of resettlement depended to a great degree on its perception
of its political vulnerability.”130   
The Lancaster House constitutional restraints on land reform had ended in 1990.  As
expected, the government then brought in a constitutional amendment that enabled
expropriation of land, followed by the 1992 Land Acquisition Act.  Yet, this process was not
straightforward, but instead was typified by bureaucratic bungling.  Out of the seventy farms
designated in 1993, thirty-three were later excluded.  Then in 1997, the government proposed
a list of 1471 farms to acquire.  In March 1998, in the face of widespread donor criticism, it
agreed that the list was problematic and said that “..no productive land would be nationalised,
that white farmers would be fully compensated, and that reforms would be carried out within
the government’s limited money and administrative capacity.”131  Inaccuracies on the list and
its failure to accord with previous criteria led analysts to suggest that it had to have been
politically motivated.132
133  Mercedes Sayagues, “Zimbabwe peasants seize four farms”, Mail &Guardian, 26
June 1998.
134  “Mutasa incites farm takeovers”  Standard 18 April 1999.
135  African Rights, “In the Party’s Interest?”, Discussion paper 8, 41-42
136  Andrew Rusinga, “Land redistribution threatens reconciliation”, AIA 15 October,
1993.
137  Tengende,  “Workers, Students and the Struggles for democracy” 446; see also,
“War veteran’s constitution” Herald 1 May 1989, 3. 
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Although some squatting continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the issue only
became visible in the media and public discourse again in 1998 as squatters again began to
occupy land in Zimbabwe on a large-scale.133   Such squatting was alleged to have been at the
instigation of ZANU(PF) officials.  Indeed, Didymus Mutasa, incited supporters to
‘demonstrate’ at commercial farms deemed appropriate for resettlement.134  However, as
African Rights points out, there were also several cases of squatters targeting senior party
officials who own farms themselves.135 
With the intensification of the land issue, the discourse changed from reconciliation
back towards racial inequalities, with Mugabe calling farmers “a greedy bunch of racist
usurpers.”136   These images came to the fore again in the 2000 election, as white farmers were
defined in ZANU(PF) election propaganda as traitors to the nation.
4.3.4 ‘War Veterans’
The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) was formed in
1990, in response to the existence of impoverished war veterans “whose plight was not only
an embarrassment to the government, but who had also become...potential recruits to ZUM.”137
 Indeed, while this group was affiliated to the ruling party, and led by party loyalists, it had the
potential to radically critique the government’s post-colonial achievements.  In 1996, when
Margaret Dongo revealed in Parliament that the War Victims Compensation Fund had been
looted by senior party and government officials, the Chidyausiku Commission was set up and
138  "Meetings with war vets turn nasty” Herald 21 July 1997, 1, 8, 11; “Ex-combatants
loot ZANU(PF) headquarters”  Herald 14 August 1997, 1, 9.
139  "Meetings with war vets turn nasty” Herald 21 July 1997, 1, 8, 11; “Ex-combatants
loot ZANU(PF) headquarters”  Herald 14 August 1997, 1, 9; “War veterans threaten to seize
white-owned land”  Independent 29 August 1997, 12.
140  "Meetings with war vets turn nasty”, Herald 21 July 1997, 1,8,11; “Angry
Zimbabwean War Veterans Chase Ministers” PANA 20 July 1997.
141  Although, there are indications that at least one leader of the riots was detained and
charged.  “War vet leader Released from Police Custody” PANA 4 January 1998.
142  “Discontent emerging over Zimbabwe’s veteran’s levy” PANA 30 November 1997.
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mandated to investigate.  The commission suspended payments to veterans, leading to a series
of riots and protests in June-August 1997.138 
The continued saliency of the liberation war to national mythology was particularly
evident.  Few issues, if any, compel the same level of passion and eloquence during
parliamentary debates. Indeed the war veterans were the only sector able to protest and
demonstrate with impunity and to which the state has made concessions.  In 1997, war veterans
not only held regular protests without being tear-gassed and dispersed or charged, but occupied
and looted the ZANU(PF) party headquarters, took over a courtroom—chasing out judges and
court officials, disrupted Heroes’ Day celebrations across the country and demanded and
received meetings with senior party officials and President Mugabe.139  Ministers holding
meetings in Harare were forced to flee, in Bulawayo, veterans threatened to beat up Home
Affairs Minister Dumiso Dabengwa, and in Lupane John Nkomo, Minster of Local
Government Rural and Urban Development was also forced to flee the fury of ex-fighters,
while elsewhere ministers were faced with verbal abuse and shouted down.140  At a time when
church prayer meetings were being tear-gassed with little or no cause, both the temerity of the
war veterans and the impunity which the state accorded them spoke volumes about their place
in the national power structures.141  The government rapidly conceded to their demands.  Yet,
taxpayers and Parliament were appalled that these concessions – in the form of increased
pensions – were agreed without recourse to Parliament, and the government was forced to back
away from plans to implement a levy on tax-payers to finance the veterans’ pensions.142 
143  Margaret Chinowaita, “War veterans get 41% pensions increment” Standard 5 March
2000.
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However, the granting of both a lump sum pay out and monthly pensions, strongly re-
integrated the war veterans into the party and state security apparatus, as we shall see in more
detail in Chapter 8.143
4.4 Conclusion
In the 1990s,  the ideas and practices on which the regime based its legitimacy were challenged
both by the failures of economic policy and the evidence of enrichment and privileges that
accumulated around the chefs and their families.   With the introduction of economic
liberalization, the politics of inclusion reached out to more firmly incorporate the black business
and middle classes, affirming their capitalist ventures.  War veterans were granted permission
to form an interest group, in an attempt to keep them under party control, but they emerge as
a potent political force in 1997.   The rhetoric of land resurfaced before the 1995 elections and
again in 1997, but there was little actual land redistribution.    
Coercion manifested itself through a multiplicity of laws implemented to further
control and regulate potentially restive social movements: labour, students, academics, and
NGOs.  The infrequent protests and rallies were broken up with little tolerance.  The security
forces, especially the CIO, were widely feared.  Independent candidates were also the victims
of violence from ZANU(PF) party activists.  
Despite this, quiescence dominated the political scene, masking  building discontent
with economic conditions, health and education provision, and employment prospects.  By the
late 1990s, the regime’s commitment to the ideology of development, nationalism and unity had
begun to be questioned.  Revelations about the Matabeleland massacres in the national press,
declining health and educational standards, and corruption scandals forced tax-payers to ask
questions about developmental priorities.  
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As the party’s hegemony frayed, isolated political alternatives started to emerge and
challenge ZANU(PF)’s dominance.  Significantly, both Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo, the
most prominent political challengers in the 1990s, were ex-combatants and ex-ZANU MPs.
Their challenges began within the party, and were pursued outside only after they were expelled.
For some time after her expulsion from the party, Dongo continued to seek reinstatement. Yet,
her eventual position as an independent MP was significant.  She became an  independent
voice, able to challenge the government on her own terms.   Her support for both former
ZANU and novice politicians in council elections further challenged the ability of ZANU (PF)
to dominate political debate.  Her effective use of Parliament to question government policy
also challenged the benefits of ‘unity’.  
The regime’s ability to reward its allies  diminished along with their political capital. Yet,
for much of the 1990s, those groups which did question the regime’s decisions, or propose
themselves as alternate leaders, did so almost entirely from within the dominant paradigm of
‘unity, development and nationalism’ as we shall see in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
144   Diana Conyers, Report of a Study of Existing NGO Activity in Zimbabwe November
1991; Maureen Dekker, NGOs in Zimbabwe: developments and changes since 1990 Autumn 1994; Ann
Muir, Evaluating the impact of NGOs in rural poverty alleviation ODI 1992.
145  Martin De Graaf, “Context, Constraint or Control”, 292.
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Part III    NGOs and the State in Zimbabwe, 1990-1997
In Part II, a framework was set out for understanding how organized groups within society
related to the state between 1980 and 1997.  The discussion in chapters 3 and 4 was derived
mainly from secondary sources and newspapers.  In this part, I want to use my own empirical
research to demonstrate how NGOs fit into this broader state-society framework in Zimbabwe
during the same time-frame.  NGOs differ from the groups considered above because they
were relatively insignificant in both financial and political terms at independence. From the late
1980s onwards, however, they become increasingly significant as employers, participants in
development provision, and as commentators on political events. 
Most writing on NGOs in Africa  focuses on and evaluates NGOs as development
organizations.  This is certainly true of most published material on Zimbabwean NGOs in the
1980s and 1990s.144 These studies rarely examined the dynamics of NGO decision-making other
than to assess if they were ‘donor-driven’ or  ‘GONGOs’ (government-NGOs).  As I argue in
this part,  many different pressures may affect the functioning of NGOs, especially the differing
agendas of staff, members and trustees.  These agendas then affect the ways in which NGOs
relate to the state and other NGOs.  
Compared to the broad, theoretical discussions of NGOs, country-specific studies of
the relations between NGO and the state in Zimbabwe has been relatively nuanced.  Martin de
Graaf, who was based in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, wrote that, in contrast to presumed NGO
suspicions of donors and western governments:
...there seems to be fully internalized recognition and acceptance of the
Government’s mandate to direct development and change. The supremacy of
ZANU(PF) under Mugabe’s leadership appear to be genuinely accepted, with
a far-reaching tolerance for the inevitable frailties and failures of this political
system....Government is seen as the only source of political authority.145
146  Julius Zava, “State seizes control over local NGOs” Horizon, July 1995, 11.
147  Lizwe Moyo, “Zimbabwe: government and NGOs lock horns” AIA 11 March
1996.
148  Richard Saunders, “The Press, Civil Society and Democratic Struggles in
Zimbabwe” paper presented to the Conference on National Identity and Democracy, Cape
Town, March 1997, 13.
121
This depiction continued to be true well into the 1990s.  Despite this, journalists and some
political scientists seemed particularly prone to statements which made claims about NGOs’
confrontation with the state.  For instance, articles about the implementation of the PVO Act
in Zimbabwe claimed that “NGOs are fighting for their lives”146  and  “NGOs protested
vigorously.”147  In Chapter 6, we will see that a more detailed, empirically-grounded
consideration of the process by which the PVO act was brought in reveals very little concern
on the part of most NGOs and a thoroughly ambiguous attitude towards the state.  
In 1997 Richard Saunders argued that 
...it appears that the space for democratic activism continues to open, with a
reformulated popular nationalist critique ranged against ESAP and its World
Bank and IMF sponsors being one of the most effective wedges used by civics
to pry their way into engagement with the state.148  
In contrast, my examination of this process in Chapter 6 reveals that what Saunders terms
‘civics’ represented a narrow segment of the wide sector of extra-governmental organizations
and that they failed entirely to engage with the state.  While this ‘cheer-leading’ attitude to state-
society interactions is understandable, it does not make for nuanced analysis.  Research which
documents the reaction of some NGOs, without considering whether they are representative
of NGOs as a whole, or examining the process through which discontent is voiced, may
exaggerate the levels of conflict and therefore misunderstand the relationship between NGOs
and the state.  What is needed is more detailed and grounded research, which examines the
debates within and between NGOs as they consider engaging with the state.
Chapter 5 focuses on the intra-organizational level of decision-making, looking first at
the NGO sector in general, followed by a case study of a prominent NGO – ZimRights.  This
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chapter examines how individual NGOs related to the state, for much of the 1980s and 1990s.
Chapter 6 moves to the inter-organizational level, examining the ways in which NGOs relate
to each other and to the state as a sector. The ability of NGOs to organize and lobby
collectively depends on their internal decision-making, but can also influence it in return.  This
chapter examines ways in which NGOs attempted to mobilize around policy issues, and
emphasizes the difficulties encountered in doing so.  
1  Interview, Grace Moyo, ORAP, 27 September 1995.
2  Interview, Charles Gotosa, HSCO,  18 September 1995.
3  Interview, Fisherman Chiyanike, Society for the Needy,  23 August 1995.
4  Interview, Murombedzi Kuchera, 11 September 1995.
5   Jessica Vivian and Gladys Maseko,  NGOs, Participation and Rural Development (Geneva:
UNRISD, 1994), 33-34.
6  Interview, Makusha Mugabe, ZimRights 25 September 1995.
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Chapter 5  NGOs and the State: the Intra-politics of NGOs
5.1 Determinants of Strategic Pragmatism
For much of the 1980s and early 1990s, most Zimbabwean NGOs emphasized that on a day-
to-day level they  interacted regularly and informally with individual ministries within the
Mugabe government.  NGOs described these relationships as “co-operative,” “positive,” or
“good.”  In interviews in 1995, they often emphasized  the extent to which they complement
governmental development efforts: “We are the hand of the government to help it boost the
people;”1 “We are supplementing and complementing [Social Welfare's] efforts;”2  The
government is not able to reach everyone, we are trying to help government, to work hand-in-
hand with government;”3 “We are not trying to be the government...in many ways our efforts
are complementing a lot, to a large extent to the social uplifting of the lives of people....If we
can find the ground to work together, that is the best we can do.”4   This supports the evidence
of survey  research carried out among NGOs in the early 1990s.  Although some NGO leaders
wished to make demands upon the government, the majority of rural development NGOs
described the state as primarily co-operative (60%) or as both co-operative and interfering
(27%).  Similarly, 43% described their relations with the state as generally positive, 18% had
mixed positive and negative relations, and 25% had isolated problems, leaving only 14% with
generally negative relations.5   NGOs did attempt to influence policy, yet this was rarely
predicated on adversarial action, although some described themselves as being “forced into”
confrontation with the state.6  NGO staff members avoided confrontation because it wasted
7  Research Notes, Public Policy Training Workshop, Bulawayo, 14 July 1997.
8  Sam Moyo, NGO Advocacy in Zimbabwe: Systematizing an Old Function or Inventing a New
Role? (Harare: Zero, 1992), 7-10.
9  Moyo, NGO Advocacy, 9-10.
10  Moyo, NGO Advocacy, 8-9.
11  Moyo, NGO Advocacy, 7.
12  Moyo, NGO Advocacy, 7.
13  Moyo, NGO Advocacy, 10.
14  Moyo,  NGO Advocacy, 11.
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resources and was self-defeating.  In a workshop-based discussion on the nature of advocacy,
several participants emphasized that no matter what tactics were used “...we must avoid
confrontation.”7   
Sam Moyo presents a useful analysis of NGO-State relations which helps us make sense
of this preference for non-confrontational tactics.  He proposes that NGOs exercise different
modes of advocacy:  passive resistance,  collaboration,  entryism, and opposition.8  He defines
passive resistance as a tactic used by NGOs who want to empower people through alternative
development strategies different from  those professed by the state: “we do what the
government official tells us to do while he is there, and as soon as he leaves, we do our own
thing.”9  The collaborative model reflects the existence of NGOs which work closely with
ministries but which have little interest in policy change; instead they are more concerned with
implementing particular  projects.10  In contrast, entryism is a tactic whereby “organisations
attempt to penetrate the state machinery in order to influence policy directions and decisions
from within.”11  As Moyo notes, this strategy presupposes an existing positive relationship
between NGOs and state, as well as “general political trust and openness” but it does entail
attempts by NGOs to change specific policies.12   More confrontationally, NGOs may adopt
tactics of the oppositional model and use high-profile appeals, protests and demonstrations in
attempting to bring about policy change.13 
In Zimbabwe, entryism is by far the most common  form of policy lobbying.14   Where
the state remains relatively administratively competent, typically,  all the ‘sticks’ — closure,
15  David Hulme and Michael Edwards, NGOs, States and Donors: too close for comfort?
(London: Macmillan/Save the Children, 1997), 13.
16  Steven Burgess, “Non-Governmental Organisations and the State in Africa:
Competition and Conflict Avoidance in Rural Zimbabwe” Paper presented to the African
Studies Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Ont. Canada, 3-6 November 1994., 20;  Bjorn
Beckman “Explaining democratization: notes on the concept of civil society” in Elisabeth
Özdalga and Sune Persson eds. Civil Society, Democracy, and the Muslim World ([Istanbul] : Swedish
Research Institute in Istanbul, 1997.),  5.
17  Interview, Sally Zimbiti, SHDF, 19 September 1995.
18  David Korten, “Third Generation NGO strategies”  World Development 15 supplement
(1987), 145-59.
19   Interview,  Rudo Kwaramba, Musasa Project, 25 September 1995.
20  Interview, Vimbai Zinyama, IBWO, 30 October 1996.
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deregistration, investigation and co-ordination — and ‘carrots’ — tax exemption, access to
policy-makers and public funding — are seen as emanating from it. By contrast, NGOs have
few, if any, such resources with which to bargain.  Not surprisingly in such circumstances,
entryism may be a means by which NGOs seek to avoid conflict with the state.15  Incorporation
then, is not just the strategy of states seeking to dominate civil society.  It also involves social
forces seeking to secure access and extract protection from the state.16   Although the
government has on several occasions used heavy-handed tactics against NGOs  I found that
those who reported problems took great pride in having ‘patched up’ relations.17 
Some theories of NGOs propose that in the 1990s, a new generation of organizations
arose in reaction to ‘new’ problems, such as homeless people, Aids, and women’s rights.  These
NGOs were interested in changing the conditions within which they operated,  and focused on
policy-advocacy rather than welfarist strategies.18   In the 1990s,  such a group did develop in
Zimbabwe, with less coherent linkages to the state and therefore less innate ability to practice
‘entryism’.  Despite their reduced access to the state, even these attempted to forge links with
government and ruling-party figures by inviting MPs to sit on their boards.19  In general then,
the government was neither avoided, nor perceived as an opponent.  As one NGO staff
member said, “donors come and donors go, but the Ministry is always there.”20
21 ODA. “The Impact of External Funding on the capacity of local Non-governmental
organisations” Final Report no. R5968. (1997) 51.
22  ODA, “The Impact of External Funding,” 10.
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As this suggests, Zimbabwean NGOs practiced strategic pragmatism in their decision-
making, seeking incorporation when possible.  Like the unions, churches and students whom
we considered in Chapters 3 and 4, NGOs existed within the political hegemony of state and
ruling party, ZANU(PF).  Despite the significance of Ministry and Party, however, other
influences also need to be considered.  Donors, and donor funding, have an increasing
influence on NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, as state capacity and resources decline. 
As they became increasingly important sites of job opportunities and career
advancement,  NGOs were also affected by material and organizational factors, which affected
their ability to practice advocacy politics vis-à-vis the state.   Under donor pressures to
‘professionalize,’ NGOs, which may have started as a group of volunteers, hire staff to carry
out their activities.  Where employment opportunities are limited, volunteers and unemployed
NGO members may seek access to newly created jobs. Even those with jobs elsewhere may
wish to move into the sector because of its superior remuneration  in comparison to the public
service, and access to such perks as vehicles, housing, and foreign trips.   As Moore and Stewart
note in their ODA assessment of NGOs in Zimbabwe and Nepal, this ‘life-style dependence’
is a much more serious and far-ranging problem than direct corruption.21  NGO staff may be
understandably reluctant to engage in activities which might threaten their security of
employment.  This further reinforces the already described tendency towards risk-averse
behaviour.
Moreover, this pressure to professionalize has other implications:
[Local] NGO budgets increase rapidly.  The number of different donors with
whom they interact grows just as fast.  And much of their money comes from
...donors who are demanding in terms of ‘bureaucratic’ skills and capacities to
interact professionally with external donors.22
23  ODA, “The Impact of External Funding,” 63.
24  See for instance, George Maxwell Jackson, The Land is Bright (Salisbury: National Arts
Foundation of Rhodesia, 1974) and National Federation of Business and Professional Women
of Rhodesia. Profiles of Rhodesia’s Women (NFBPW: Salisbury, 1976).
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This ‘professionalization’ has at least two potential impacts.  First, donors fund NGOs as part
of their scheme to support civil society, yet:
there is an assumption made that smallscale, voluntary organisational
characteristics can be retained while the organisation is scaled-up to deal with
largescale developmentally complex issues without any explanation of how this
might be possible.23 
Second, it affects the balance of power and authority between members, staff, and donors – in
peculiar and not always predictable ways – which may lead to organizational crisis and
breakdown, effectively destroying the intentions of both members and donors in supporting
the NGO.  Donor funding and organizational growth may thus actually impede – in unintended
ways – the viability of the organization. 
These influences on NGO decision-making are examined in more detail in the sub-
sections that follow.   In 5.2 and 5.3 I examine the influence of the nationalist period, the
legitimacy created by the liberation war, and how it was entrenched by post-war development
and the Mugabe government’s willingness to coerce and co-opt would-be dissidents.  In 5.4,
the emphasis turns to donor funding and professionalization, through a case-study of the
Zimbabwe Human Rights Organization.
5.2 The Historical Roots of NGOs: the Nationalist Era
Unsurprisingly, most organizations in Rhodesia before independence like the SPCA or theatre
groups,  were run by and on behalf of  interests of the white community.24  Yet there were also
a variety of inter-racial, often church-related, organizations, as well as  political and welfare
associations for blacks.  These organizations developed in response to particular needs and
employed varied tactics, depending on their resources and their goals.  A brief overview of the
25  See for instance, Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-
1933. (London: Pluto, 1976), 198 and Louis Masuko, “The Zimbabwean Burial Societies” in
African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy Mahmood Mamdani and Ernest Wamba-dia-
Wamba eds. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995), 285.
26  van Onselen,  Chibaro, 199.
27  Masuko, “The Zimbabwean Burial Societies”, 285.
28  T.O. Ranger,  The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930 (London: Heinemann,
1970.), 78.
128
evolution of the more prominent bodies indicates how they evolved from often tribally based
welfare organizations, to non-oppositional political associations and subsequently into
nationalist political parties, in response to grievances over land and workers’ rights
The first category of important organizations of Africans formed in the 1910s – 1920s
were welfare associations which brought black workers together, in urban areas and on the
mines.   Informal social get-togethers organized by the rapidly urbanized black work-force prior
to World War I created an organizational base for the burial societies, mutual aid societies and
other welfare associations that developed in the colonial towns and in mining compounds
during the war years.25  The development of these associations reflected the needs of urbanized
blacks without family networks to support them as living conditions deteriorated and during
the 1918 flu epidemic.  Demobilized soldiers provided models of organization and hierarchy,
as the Beni dance societies of the era demonstrated.26  The principles of these clubs spread to
more formal institutions, taking a pro-active role in the welfare of members.  The colonial
regime recognized these welfare associations under the 1891 Friendly Societies Act.27 
Within the same time frame, the first ethnic Ndebele associations were formed. 
During WWI, Nyamanda, the son of Lobengula, brought together a coalition of forces to
protest the grievances of the Ndebele people, which became known as the National Home
Movement and organized in the 1920s for both the return of  land to the people and also the
return of Nyamanda as Head Chief.28  This movement was regenerated and radicalized in the
29  Ranger, Are we not also men?, 142.
30  Hooker, “Welfare Associations” 58-9 and Ranger, The African Voice, 107-108.
31  Ranger, The African Voice,  175-179.
32  Ranger, The African Voice, 181.
33  Ranger, Are we not also men?, 88-93.
34  Richard Gray, The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias
and Nyasaland. (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 316.
35  Ranger, The African Voice 165.
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1950s, taking up the issue of evictions in Matabeleland.29  It eventually fed into the proto-
nationalist Southern Rhodesian Bantu Congress and the All-African Convention.
In the 1920s, the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association (RBVA) and the Rhodesian
Native Association (RNA) developed to represent élite demands for amendments of the pass
laws, the right to buy Crown land, the reducing of franchise restrictions and educational
reforms.30  The Gwelo Native Welfare Association gained momentum in 1926 in reaction to
the Morris Carter Land Commission, renaming itself the Southern Rhodesian Native Welfare
Association (SRNWA) and combining the support of Ndebele and Shona Chiefs with their
originating membership of the ‘progressive’ educated élite.31  This success in building a broad
support base for their movement was their undoing, and it crumbled under opposition from
the Government.32  
In the 1930s, other explicitly politicized groups also formed, including the Southern
Rhodesian Bantu Congress, later the Southern Rhodesian National Congress (SRNC) which
brought together groups,  including the Southern Rhodesian Native Missionary Conference,
into what became a mass organization.33 
Trades unions often replicated the roles of welfare associations.  The Rhodesian
Railways African Employees Association, for example, grew out of the Bantu (Transport)
Benefit Society, a mutual aid society.34  As Ranger says of the Rhodesian Industrial and
Commercial Worker’s Union (ICU), “It did not really function as a Trade Union at all.  Its
forum was the public square rather than the workshop.”35  Similarly,  Burombo described his
African Worker's Voice Association as “just an association in general.”   As Bhebe notes, the
36  Ngwabi Bhebe,  B. Burumbo: African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1947-1958. (Harare: College
Press, 1989), 41.
37  See for instance, I.R. Hancock, "The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Africa"
Rhodesian History IX (1978); Hardwicke Holderness, Lost Chance (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing
House, 1985), 122-135;  James R. Hooker, “Welfare Association and other Instruments of
Accommodation in the Rhodesias between the World Wars.” Comparative Studies in Society and
History 9 (1966); Bhebe,  B. Burumbo; and Jane Farquar, Jairos Jiri: the Man and his Work 1921-1982
(Gweru: Mambo Press, 1987). 
38  Terence Ranger “Legitimacy, Civil Society and the State in Africa” (1992). 
39  C. D. Watyoka, 25 years of struggle (ZCC: Harare, 1991).
40  Carl F. Hallencreutz, “Council in the Crossfire: ZCC 1964-1980,” in Carl F.
Hallencreutz and Ambrose M. Moyo eds Church and State in Zimbabwe, (Gweru: Mambo,
1988), 57-59.
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Voice was really a “political pressure group acting on behalf of all Africans in Southern
Rhodesia.”36 
The nationalist political parties, which dominated associational life in the 1950s and
1960s, grew out of this combination of the trade union movement and the often more elitist
associations, including the inter-racial Capricorn Africa Society.37  In 1957, the Bulawayo branch
of the SRNC and the Youth League – which began as a civic organization in Harare –
organized the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, which moved these organizations
into the realm of nationalist mass politics, and soon enabled black-led associational life.38 
The 1960s and 1970s also saw the formation of several church related bodies in
response to the intensifying racial politics of the post-UDI Smith government.  The Christian
Council was founded in response to a division within the Protestant Christian Conference over
the ‘hanging bill’ which became the Law and Order (Maintenance)Act (LOMA).39  The
Council’s mandate was ostensibly to work with youth, urban questions, including work in
African townships, and supporting Christian values in home and family life. However, the
intensification of political activity leading to the declaration of UDI in 1965, meant that the
Council was an integral supporter of for the families of detained nationalists.40 
Christian Care was founded in 1967 to take over these welfare provision duties in
response to the Rhodesian government’s implementation of the Welfare Organisations Act
41  Watyoka, 25 years, 10-11.
42  Hallencreutz, “Council in the Crossfire”, 60.
43  Hallencreutz, “Council in the Crossfire”, 61.
44  Kenneth Skelton, Bishop in Smith’s Rhodesia (Gweru: Mambo, 1985), 102.
45  Skelton, Bishop in Smith’s Rhodesia,  102.
46  Michael Lapsley, Neutrality or Co-option?  Anglican Church and State from 1964 until the
Independence of Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo, 1986), 75.
47  Lapsley, Neutrality or Co-option?  73.
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which would have prevented the Christian Council from visiting political detainees in prisons
and camps.41  Nonetheless, the Christian Council did not keep away from politics.  At its first
meeting in 1964, a statement was issued rejecting the demands for immediate independence,
stressing that the establishment of “better relationships between the inhabitants of this country”
was a more important goal.42  This resolution led the Council to oppose UDI internally and also
externally through an international  awareness-raising tour.43  Bishop Skelton noted that
statements issued under the aegis of the Council were few and far between because it was felt
that: “...the more we spoke the less we should be listened to.”44  As he recognized, these
pronouncements had little effect on government policy and offended many white churchgoers;
instead, they built up confidence among black members in the leadership of the Churches:
...it got around that the representative body of the Rhodesian Churches was
not afraid to stand up for justice and to challenge the Rhodesian Front's claim
to be upholding Christianity by its political policies.45
Skelton saw this principled stand of the Council also as a protective stance, which encouraged
black membership of the Churches and might help prevent Church divisions along racial lines.
As the liberation war progressed the Anglican church, more in touch with Rhodesian
society and more dependent on the white laity, became less militant.46  Individual members of
the Anglican hierarchy were especially noted for their close ties to the Smith government.47
These conservative Rhodesian Anglicans were influential in restraining the Christian Council.
Their influence was counter-balanced, however, by the World Council of Churches’
controversial Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) which supported the guerilla movement.
48  David Maxwell, “The Church and Democratization in Africa: the Case of
Zimbabwe” in Paul Gifford, ed. The Christian churches and the democratisation of Africa (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1995), 112; Watyoka, 25 years, 19.
49  Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Longman, 1980);
Lapsley, Neutrality or Co-option?  75.
50  Donal Lamont, Speech from the Dock, (Great Britain: Kevin Mayhew, 1977), 26-29.
51  Skelton, Bishop in Smith’s Rhodesia 109.
52  Interview, Mike Auret, CCJP, 14 September 1995.
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However, Bishop Muzorewa’s continuing position within the Council as head of his
denomination complicated its position. In 1978, the Internal Settlement between Ian Smith’s
Rhodesian Front,  Muzorewa’s UANC and Chief Chirau, gave power to Muzorewa as Prime
Minister of ‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’.  The liberation movements refused to recognize the validity
of this settlement, and continued their struggle until the Lancaster House agreement in 1979.
The Council, presumably influenced by Muzorewa, supported the Internal Settlement, although
this is now significantly underplayed in its official history.48
The Roman Catholic Church, with its often expatriate clergy less connected to white
Rhodesian society and influenced by the international Catholic church, became more radicalized
as the war deepened.49  Morally, the Church was also influenced by the provenance of its
members.  Bishop Lamont, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Mutare emphasizes the impact of
his time as a student in Rome, which revealed to him the brutality and injustice of the fascist
regimes of Hitler and Mussolini.50  Bishop Skelton also recalls Bishop Lamont speaking of the
“deep distress” of German nuns who “..saw too clearly the similarity of Government policy to
that of the Nazi period.”51  The Catholic Church’s position was reflected in the formation of
the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) in 1972.  The first objectives of the
CCJP were to research and educate the public on questions of sectoral injustice, for example,
amongst mineworkers, domestic workers, and land distribution.  The intensification of the war
in 1972-73, brought the CCJP to the more confrontational task of investigating and
documenting the human rights abuses of the security forces.52  The CCJP denounced the
internal settlement as a non-solution to the problems of Rhodesia and was active in the
53  R.H. Randolph, Dawn in Zimbabwe: The Catholic Church in the New Order: a report on the
activities of the Catholic Church in the Zimbabwe for the five years, 1977-1981. (Gweru: Mambo, 1985),
173-4.
54  “NGOs must keep in step with government” Herald 1 May 1984, 3.
55  Revd. Canaan Banana, “Official Opening” in Val Thorpe and John Vekris,
“Workshop on the Effects of ESAP on Zimbabwean NGOs and their Services.” Harare,
Zimbabwe, 20-24 March 1995,  4.
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negotiations and diplomatic efforts throughout 1978 and 1979 that led to the Lancaster House
peace agreement and independence.53 
5.3 Independence: from Euphoria to Conflict
At independence a transformation occurred as previously welfarist or political organizations
turned to development, following the government’s lead in reconstruction and de-racialization.
In this section we will examine how individual organizations developed during independence
and their individual relations with the state.  Unlike countries which had become independent
at a time when state-led development was de rigeur, such as Tanzania or Malawi, local and
international NGOs in Zimbabwe have been accepted contributors to the development
process. In keeping with their socialist ethos, co-operatives were prominent on the
government’s agenda, but NGOs were not discriminated against.  Like churches, unions and
other groups, the government made it clear that as long as NGOs contributed to the
government’s development efforts in ways that complemented the state’s efforts, they would
be left alone.  As the Minister of Social Welfare advocated “NGOs must keep in step with
government...It’s completely counter-productive to contradict government thinking.”54
Reflecting on this period, former President Banana noted, “...many NGOs...accepted our
prescriptions [of socialism]—should I say, joined us...we became partners in development.”55
In general, the groups which had been  active during the liberation war found
themselves suddenly working not against the government but with it. This brought certain
adjustments.  Because many organizations now had links with the state, Paul Themba Nyathi
56  Interview, Paul Themba Nyathi, 18 September 1995.
57  Raftopoulos, “The State, NGOs, and Democratization”, 45.
58  “Church probes charge by president” Herald 10 November 1981, 3; “[Editorial]
Visionary dilemma” Herald 10 November 1981, 6; “[letter to the editor] WCC Charges must get
serious consideration” Herald 16 November 1981, 8;  Carl Hallencreutz, “Ecumenical
Challenges in Independent Zimbabwe” in Hallencreutz and Moyo, Church and State, 267.
59  “Church probes charge by president” Herald 10 November 1981, 3.
60  Carl Hallencreutz, “Church and State in Zimbabwe and South Africa” in Carl F
Hallencreutz and Mai Palmberg, eds. Religion and politics in Southern Africa (Uppsala: Scandinavian
Institute of African Studies, 1991), 159-165.
61  Hallencreutz, “Ecumenical Challenges,” 275.
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says, “we laid down our advocacy.”56  As Raftopoulos has noted,  “their accommodating role
stemmed from a perspective of shared goals and a belief in having emerged from a common
tradition of struggle.”57  This relationship was more complicated for those groups which did
not clearly have a liberation war pedigree, and who came under internal and external pressure
to prove their loyalty to the new regime’s developmentalist agenda.
5.3.1 Adjusting to Independence 
Groups which were not perceived as working sufficiently in-line with the state’s agenda
encountered difficulties.  The state took a particular  interest in the ZCC, as the largest
ecumenical church NGO.  In November 1981, President Banana criticized the ZCC  in the
national press for taking a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards the government.58   He claimed to
have heard this from the WCC, which was withholding funding because of the “unco-operative
attitude of the Christian Council towards the Government’s policy of reconciliation and
reconstruction.”59 The continuing involvement of Bishop Muzorewa  with the  ZCC, and the
Ndau ethnicity of the General Secretary which associated him with Ndabaningi Sithole’s
ZANU Ndonga, apparently led the state to see the ZCC as a political irritant.60  These
developments led the ZCC to replace its General Secretary, in the hope of restoring relations
with both the state and the WCC.61 
Another NGO which encountered problems was Self-Help Development (SHD).  
62  Brian Raftopoulos, and Jean-Paul Lacoste, “From Savings Mobilisation to Micro-
Finance: An Historical Perspective on the Zimbabwe Savings Development Movement” Paper
presented at the SARIPS Colloquium 2001, on “Social Policy and Development in Southern
Africa”, Harare, 23rd-26th September 2001. 
63  Michael Bratton, “Non-governmental Organizations in Africa: can they influence
Public Policy” Development and Change vol 21 (1990), 96-99.
64  Raftopoulos and Lacoste, “From Savings Mobilisation to Micro-Finance” 10.
65  Interview, Sally Zimbiti, SHDF, 19 September 1995.
135
The organization, essentially a co-operative society, was formed in 1963 by a white Catholic
Missionary, and two white laymen, who encouraged and supported the establishment of savings
clubs among small scale farmers.  By the time of Independence, there were approximately 200
clubs with 4000 members, organized under the name Savings Development Movement (SDM).
 Soon after independence, the movement was targeted by the Department of Co-operatives,
who threatened to absorb the movement into the government system and seize their assets
because they were running co-operatives outside its remit.62  Michael Bratton’s study of this
case suggests that it was the very success of the organization that prompted this intervention.63
The founding members argued that, at the time of registration, they had not been aware of the
risks associated with calling the clubs co-ops.  The Ministry accused the treasurer, Peter Arnold,
of financial mismanagement, an allegation that was not substantiated by auditor’s reports.
Arnold took the Ministry to court, and won his court action.64   However,  faced with the
forced appropriation of their buildings and organization, they followed government advice and
removed the (white) founding members from its board of directors and replaced them with
blacks “to cool it down” and changed its name “as a way of trying to escape from this
problem.”65  Currently, the movement has an MP on its Board of Directors and the relations
with the government are  considered much improved as the organization works extensively
with Agritex and the Department of Co-operatives.  Raftopoulos and Lacoste further note that
this good relationship developed after the 1987 Unity Accord, and emphasize that conflict
66  Raftopoulos and Lacoste, “From Savings Mobilisation to Micro-Finance” 10.
67  See for example, “Why the outcry over curfew, premier asks Church” Herald 18 April
1984, 1; “[editorial] Church and State” Herald 19 April 1984, 6; “Stop the gossip, President tells
Church” Herald 8 May 1984, 1; “Church accused of double standards” Herald 20 February 1986,
1. 
68  Auret, Reaching for Justice, 215-217; Interviews Nick Ndebele, former CCJP Director,
27 September 1999;  Mike Auret, Former CCJP Chair and Director, 14 September 1995 and
28 September 1999.
69  Paul H. Gundani, “The Catholic Church and National Development in Independent
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between a ZAPU supporter on the original board and the government contributed to the
tension during the Matabeleland Conflict.66 
5.3.2 NGOs during the Matabeleland Conflict
In general, most NGOs reinvented themselves as development organizations and embraced
the new government’s agenda of reconciliation, development and unity with  enthusiasm.  But
while this was possible for NGOs working in areas like Mashonaland and Manicaland, where
rebuilding after the war started in earnest, it was not so easy for groups working in
Matabeleland.  As discussed in section 3.1.2 , the tense political situation in Matabeleland
shaped state-society relations for much of the 1980s.  
The CCJP was receiving numerous reports of human rights abuses of civilians being
perpetrated by the security forces from church-members and priests on the ground.  Their
attempts to document and publicize them were rebuffed and denied by the state.67  As
discussed in section 3.2.5, the CCJP Director, Nick Ndebele and the Chairman, Mike Auret,
were arrested in 1986, although they were eventually freed by direct intervention of Prime
Minister Mugabe.68  In this case, the CCJP’s reputation  helped guarantee the release of
Ndebele and Auret, but led to an immediate cooling of the formerly close relationship between
the Catholic Church and the governing party.69 
Similarly, the Matabeleland branch of Christian Care experienced some friction with
the government during the period of unrest in Matabeleland because government officials
70  Interview, John Bakila Sibanda, Christian Care, 26 September 1995.
71  Dexter M. Chavunduka, Gerrit Huizer, Tholakele D. Khumalo, and Nancy Thede,
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suspected that if  NGOs were not being targeted by ZAPU ‘dissidents’ then they must be
collaborators.  They would ask: “Why aren't your cars being burned?”  Nevertheless, Christian
Care, among others, felt itself to benefit from the linkages with the government during the
liberation war: “when in trouble [the government] will call upon us to assist them.”70
ORAP, the Organization of Rural Associations for Progress, was a new organization
that emerged in the post-independence period to contribute to the reconstruction and
development of rural Zimbabwe, answering what the Executive Director referred to as “..the
open but sincere invitation to all those who wanted Zimbabwe to succeed to come forwards
and collaborate with the Government in its development efforts.”71  ORAP drew on previously
existing groups, like women’s clubs, as well as newly formed groups including ex-combatants
to bring people together to foster local culture and traditions along with income-generating
projects.72   Like other NGOs, ORAP was affected by the intolerant political activity in
Matabeleland in the mid-80s, when the curfew and banning of meetings made it difficult to
carry out programmes. Because ORAP, unusually for a Zimbabwean NGO,  worked only in
Matabeleland and the Ndelebe speaking areas of the Midlands, it was perceived as being a tribal
organization.73  Yet after the 1987 Unity Accord, ORAP was rehabilitated and Sithembiso
Nyoni, the founder and director of ORAP was elected to Parliament in 1990 as a ZANU(PF)
MP; she later became a junior Minister.  Nomalanga Zulu, the ORAP administrator, felt that
ORAP’s high-profile had helped other NGOs secure funding and therefore the government
hadn’t made any problems for them, but within ORAP there remained divisions about how
close they should be to the ruling party.74
75  Zimbabwe Project Trust Annual Report, 1998, 5.
76  Interview, Paul Themba Nyathi, 18 September 1995. 
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The Zimbabwe Project (ZimPro), had been formed in the UK in 1978 by exiles and
deportees of Smith’s Rhodesia, to raise awareness of and raise money in support of refugees
in camps. In 1981, ZimPro relocated to Zimbabwe and started working exclusively with ex-
combatants: “Zimbabwe Project Trust was transformed from a channel for emergency
humanitarian aid to a service and development agency that complimented  the government’s
efforts for growth and development.”75  The director was Judith Todd, (daughter of the former
liberal Prime Minister Garfield Todd) who had supported the liberation struggle for many
years.  
As the decade progressed, ZimPro widened its client base and worked with
Community Based Organizations (CBOs) from all backgrounds to reflect the fact that the ex-
combatants themselves did not exist apart from the rest of society: “over the years the role of
the organization was redefined, sometimes not very consciously, by developments within
Zimbabwe.”76  Like the Savings Development Movement, the Zimbabwe Project also endured
opposition because of its leadership’s ties to ZAPU and its work with ex-combatants but “after
a lot of advocacy work and lobbying, it has improved.”77
5.3.3 New Issues and New NGOs
After the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987, it became easier for NGOs to function, as they
were less likely to be accused of supporting ZAPU and constituting a divisive influence on
national unity.  At the same time, international funding was beginning to shift towards NGOs
and new groups emerged to deal with new sets of issues.  No doubt influenced by the
78  Sam Moyo, “Towards an Understanding of Zimbabwean NGOs” Paper prepared
for the NANGO/MWENGO Self-Understanding Workshop, November 1995.
79  Interview,  Simeon Mawanza, Street Kids in Production, 25 September 1995. 
80  GOZ, Parliamentary Debates, 16 August 1995, vol. 22 no. 29 , 1643-4.
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incremental growth of a middle class, environmental NGOs proliferated, as did organizations
working with streetchildren and on women’s issues.78 
Early in the 1990s, the existence of streetchildren was seen as an affront to the
government’s pro-development policies.  Three distinct tactics seem to have been used by the
state in responding to NGO and donor  interest in the issue. In one case, an organization that
wanted to make videos and publicize the plight of streetchildren was prevented from forming
when the government deported the American volunteer who had started the project, and
harassed the  Zimbabweans who were working with him.79  At the same time, however, two
other NGOs – Streets Ahead and the Harare Street Children’s Organisation – started up with
little difficulty, although the latter’s close links with the prominent ZANU(PF)  Mayor of
Harare may have  facilitated matters.   In 1995, a further strategy was implemented, in which
the government attempted to take advantage of donor funding for NGOs working with the
urban poor.  The state created the National Organisation for the Development of the
Disadvantaged (NODED), described in Parliament as a “Government NGO” to remove
street-children and destitute families from the streets of urban areas and relocate them to the
refugee camps on the eastern borders, from which Mozambicans had recently been
repatriated.80  NODED was initially funded by a government grant, although its administrator
emphasized that they were looking for donor funding.81  
The government seems to have responded to the proliferation of women's
organizations in the 1980s and 1990s by attempting to bring them into a more corporate
relationship.  From at least 1986, the government attempted to introduce legislation to create
a National Women’s Council, that would regulate women’s organizations, arguing that existing
82  Cephas Chitsike, “Government, NGOs head for show-down” Sunday Mail 13
October 1991, 1, 7.
83  Peggy Watson, Determined to Act: the first 15 years of the Women’s Action Group, (Harare:
WAG, 1998). 
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NGOs were failing to support rural women. NGOs, however, interpreted this as being
“swamped by the [ZANU(PF)] women’s league.”  The proposal was effectively stalled until the
1990s, when NGOs argued that the proposal was out of keeping with post-cold war  trends
towards de-regulation and liberalization.82  Although the sector is very diverse, the post-
independence women’s NGOs have tended to be policy-oriented, with an emphasis on
changing laws to enhance women’s social, political and legal status. 
The Women’s Action Group (WAG), for instance, was founded in reaction to the
infamous 1983 Operation Clean-up, in which the police arrested over 6000 women in urban
areas all over Zimbabwe on the pretext of removing prostitutes from the streets.  The women
arrested included the elderly, schoolgirls, and women with babies.  A group of middle-class
women, mainly foreigners and whites working in the NGO sector, met with the intention of
researching the incident and lobbying parliament and created what became the Women’s
Action Group (WAG).83 The process catalyzed further meetings with women, and advocacy
around other issues of concern to women including access to birth control.  At this stage,
WAG’s campaigning efforts were quite high-profile.  Although they failed to meet with Prime
Minister Mugabe over the continuing detention without trial of the women, they did have a
sympathetic hearing from the Minister for Women’s Affairs.84  When they later protested to
then President Canaan Banana over discrepancies in sentences passed on women convicted of
infanticide (which the press referred to emotively as baby-dumping) compared to male
murderers, 23 women were given presidential pardons and freed from prison.85 Nevertheless,
the attitude of the government to WAG’s intervention is clear in an anecdote reported by a
86  Watson, Determined to Act, 35.
87  Watson, Determined to Act, 45.
88  Interview, Selina Mumbengegwi, WAG, 6 October 1999. 
89  Interview, Jonah Gokova, WAG Trustee, 20 September 1999.
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former women’s ministry official that “a directive was issued to staff at the ministry [that]
WAG must be discredited and destroyed.”86 
 In 1986, WAG became a donor-funded rather than a voluntary organization, with paid
workers.87   By 1998, it had a full-time staff of 14, plus six field workers.  All but two of the
original volunteers had moved away, died or left the organization.  When I interviewed the
director, who had been with WAG since 1990, she emphasized:
...when we have our members meeting, I always call for a government official
to attend, to show we are not doing anything wrong.  I always emphasize that
as NGOs we complement the government. Strategies are important...lobbying
depends on the issue we are dealing with, what level you should act on....there
are situations where confrontation doesn’t help.  If people agree to sit down
with you then you can get somewhere....you may seem to be weaker but you
can make mileage that way, try not to make enemies....If you are allowed to sit
at the right table, that is where you can have influence.88
Although this attitude was common earlier in the decade, the director was making these
statements at a time of polarization between NGOs and the State.  Considering WAG’s radical
origins, some of those involved in WAG felt that the organization was “moving from critical
engagement to co-option...they want to bring everyone into ZANU.”89  The director would no
doubt suggest that she is simply being pragmatic.  She notes that since many of the problems
with women and law occur at the level of magistrates, every two years she visits all the
provincial magistrates with the intention of telling them about the problems that women face
in court.  The magistrates agree to meet with WAG because the chief magistrate provides them
with a letter of introduction, on the condition that WAG does not “go to the press,” which is
acceptable because “my aim is to change policy.”90 
The Musasa Project began in 1988 to provide counseling and support for battered
women.  However, the movement also finds itself lobbying the government because “the
91  Interview, Rudo Kwaramba, Musasa Project, 25 September 1995.
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government doesn't feel it has any role in domestic violence.”91  The Musasa Project has made
a conscious effort to foster support in government by having a number of MPs and high level
ZRP officers on their board, even though they feel that: “...the Government doesn't even
morally support us.”92  Musasa’s advocacy is often on a case by case level: when, for instance,
local police refuse support or protection to woman, the project lodges a formal complaint on
her behalf with higher levels of the ZRP.  This ad-hoc advocacy is  complemented by the
presentation of petitions and more explicit lobbying of the police and policy-makers. Sheelagh
Stewart, a co-founder of Musasa, suggests that the organization  became radicalized as it moved
from being a ‘helping’ organization to campaigning for cultural and legislative change.93 
The state’s reaction to the formation – and popularity – of the  Matabeleland Zambezi
Water Project (MZWP) an explicitly policy-oriented group in 1991, is also instructive.  MZWP
was formed by group of mainly white businesspeople in Matabeleland, to promote the idea of
a pipeline to bring water to the drought-stricken areas of Matabeleland from the Zambezi
River. Despite its narrow origins, this group galvanized public support from all sectors of
Bulawayo society, with donations coming from schoolchildren, factory workers, the city council
and local businesses.  By 1994, the MZWP had collected a total of ZWD 8 million. Despite
having Dumiso Dabengwa, then Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, as chair, the scheme was
seen with some suspicion by the ruling party.  In 1994, a new NGO called the Matabeleland
Zambezi Water Project Trust, was launched, which had representation from the MZWP, the
Bulawayo City Council, the Matabeleland Chamber of Industry, the Chamber of Commerce,
the Matabeleland Action Group (a group of ZANU PF politicians), ZANU-PF Bulawayo,
ZANU-PF Matabeleland North, ZANU-PF Matabeleland South, the Commercial Farmers
Union, the Zimbabwe Farmers Union and the government.  While the government had been
94  Derek Gunby, Roger Mpande, and Alan Thomas, “The campaign for water from the
Zambezi for Bulawayo” in Alan Thomas, Susan Carr and David Humphreys, eds. Environmental
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hostile to the MZWP, it seemed to have accepted the involvement of an NGO in the policy-
making process, but required it to be less confrontational.94  
In the 1990s, some existing NGOs started paying attention to new sets of issues.  In
1993, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches diversified their activities and created a  Justice,
Peace and Reconciliation (JPR) desk, to deal with issues of economic justice and civic
education.95  The ZCC also claims credit for having lobbied the Electoral Supervisory
Commission to permit NGOs and Churches to monitor the 1995 parliamentary election.96 
After that election, churches and NGOs which had been involved in election-monitoring,
formed a coalition to pursue civic education in preparation for future elections.  They
organized workshops and meetings throughout the country, bringing local church members
and community activists together to talk about civic issues.97
Ecumenical Support Services, a small but very active church-based NGO, started out
as a theological reflection group in 1992.  Run by an ecumenical and inter-racial group of lay
Christians, committed to “achieve liberation and self-reliance for the oppressed, poor,
marginalized and disadvantaged” it began to organize meetings and conferences on religious
topics ranging from economic justice to gender discrimination.98  As a small NGO, with no
membership and only two paid staff members, but substantial funding from European Church
groups, it has chosen to tackle quite controversial topics.  In 1997, when most Zimbabwean
99  ESS. “Sexual Orientation in Zimbabwe: A Christian Reflection” 1997.
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Churches were actively supporting the President’s anti-homosexuality campaign, ESS’s co-
ordinator, Jonah Gokova, issued a progressive statement on homosexuality and Christianity,
which condemned the reaction of both church and state:
It is very unfortunate that some elements within the Church in Zimbabwe
have contributed ideologically to the persecution of homosexuals by the state
without bothering to address fundamental questions to do with Christs’
teaching of love, understanding, compassion and tolerance.99  
ESS’s internationally recognized gender programme, Padare/Enkundhleni/Men’s Forum on
Gender also broke taboos by involving men in discussions of gender violence.100  Another
unusual emphasis of ESS’s programmes was to provide capacity-building workshops for
membership NGOs and community-based organizations, rather than attempting to build up
its own membership.101  Links developed through these workshops were then called upon when
ESS began establishing coalitions of NGOs to work together on controversial issues (as
discussed in Chapter 6).
Despite the positive note on which state-NGO relations had started at independence
and subsequent meetings to advance co-operation in NGO - state relations, by the end of the
1990s, the regime was increasingly suspicious that NGOs were no longer co-operating as part
of the development process.102  
103  Although there are signs that ZimRights has continued to function in a much
reduced capacity, I shall examine only the period until the declaration of bankruptcy. 
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106  “New Human rights organisation formed” Herald 22 May 1992. 
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5.4  ZimRights: “To the Extent of Doom”? 
As a high-profile human rights organization in Zimbabwe, ZimRights followed a more
confrontational path than the older, development-oriented NGOs on which we have so far
focused.  However, ZimRights succumbed to infighting and terminal collapse just when state-
society relations in Zimbabwe were at their most critical, losing much of its funding in 1999-
2000 and declaring bankruptcy in June 2001.103  The state had consistently targeted ZimRights
for attack over the years.  As one member put it “..the party of the present government has
waged a protracted war against ZimRights membership countrywide to the extent of doom.”104
Some describe this as the CIO’s most effective infiltration of civil society to date.105   There is
no doubt that ZimRights’ collapse suited the interests of the state.  However, an examination
of the broader history, impact of donor funding and organizational development of ZimRights
helps us to understand the organization’s vulnerability to external and internal challenges. 
ZimRights was founded in 1992  by a group of prominent professionals and activists
including lawyers, doctors, an award winning author, and a former prime minister of Southern
Rhodesia.106    It was Zimbabwe’s only significant NGO dedicated explicitly  to  human rights
issues.  As such, it was perhaps inevitable that ZimRights was  both visible and controversial
within Zimbabwean politics.  Indeed, since its founding ZimRights has rarely been out of the
headlines, ironically, most often providing the story itself, rather than uncovering human rights
abuses.  
ZimRights was both a membership organization and a professionally-run NGO.  Its
offices provided membership services and co-ordinated donor-funded programmes.  The latter
107  ZimRights, “Self-evaluation report” March 1997.
108  Memo from the Gweru Chair of ZimRights to the National Director, 16 December
1996.
146
included projects run by the Education, Information and Legal departments.  The Education
department organized civic education workshops in peri-urban and rural areas.   The
Information office, which relied on a steady stream of foreign interns, mainly issued press
releases and published the membership newsletters.  The Legal Desk, which came into being
in May 1996, gave legal advice to members and clients, as well as the organization. 
5.4.1 Membership, Staff and Employment Opportunities
The grass-roots of ZimRights were its estimated 14 000 members.  Membership  gave
ZimRights a particular cachet with donors, who want to work with grass-roots organizations.
Further, the existence of ZimRights’ members gave a certain weight to its pronouncements in
the press.  Yet a  membership survey which I carried out in 1997 suggested that most members
felt they had neither been adequately informed nor involved in the organization.107  Indeed,
membership lists, which would enable members to at least receive newsletters,  have tended
to be sketchy and addresses frequently incorrect.  Relatively few members ever actually received
the publications of the information desk.  The Gweru chair claimed that none of the 300 plus
members of his branch ever received a ZimRights publication.108  
In contrast, ZimRights’ élite is the Advisory Board  —  composed of well-known
public figures who lend prestige to the organization, such as  Sir Garfield Todd,  Enoch
Dumbutshena,  Chenjerai Hove, and Morgan Tsvangirai.  Members were represented through
a structure of regional committees, known as Regional Councils, the chairs of which were
automatically members of the National Council, the main policy-making body, to which others
were also elected  at the AGM.  Councils did not exist consistently in all provinces, but have
tended to reflect the existence of donor-funded projects, which catalyze membership and
109  Interview, Arnold Payne, National Vice-chair, ZimRights, 26 February 1997.
110  Discussions with National Councillors throughout 1996-7; issues raised at
Institutional Development Workshop, 5-6 April, 1997, see Thoko Ruzvidzo and Alice
Zinyemba, Report on ZimRights  Institutional Development Workshop, 5-6 April, 1997, n.d. esp. pp.
18-19.  The main outcome of this workshop, which discussed the conflicts between National
Council and Secretariat,  was to abolish sub-committees through which National Council had
supervised secretariat structures, i.e. to strengthen the Secretariat’s position vis-a-vis the
Council. 
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organization.  Some regional councils were quite actively involved in nationally-driven activities
such as workshops and election-monitoring, while others pursued local human rights cases,
which are brought to their attention.  In rural areas, regional council members may have been
quite involved in complaints relating to land tenure, for instance attempts to remove squatters,
disputes over land ownership or water usage rights. More recently, they also supported
communities displaced by political violence. 
In between the membership and the Advisory Board is the National Council which
used to oversee much of the day-to-day management of the organization, but since 1994 the
Executive Director and staff took on increased responsibilities and the Council met less
frequently.  This was a matter of regret for some older members who remembered the old
‘activist’ days fondly.  Inevitably there was been  conflict between Council and staff, as many
of the older members believe that they had more commitment to the issues than the new,
younger, staff.109  Council members, especially those based in Harare or Bulawayo, did continue
to exercise some authority until 1996, as they sat on committees which supervised particular
areas or programmes. However, these ‘activist’ council members tended to demand input into
day to day management, leading to staff complaints of interference.  In reaction, committees
were abolished, except on an ‘ad-hoc’ basis, further reinforcing staff-control over decision-
making.  
Many older council members – those who recall the ‘good old days’ – suggested that
the people employed by ZimRights were not ‘activists’ in the sense of those who were involved
in starting the organization.110  There was also a sense of nine-to-fiveism and an expectation
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that volunteers would be paid for the time they put in outside regular office hours, although
this reflects a wider attitude in the Zimbabwean NGO community, reinforced by the dire
economic situations of many.  However, ZimRights did not see a simple withering of the
Council.  Former Council members formed the backbone of the secretariat as well — of the
twenty-four employees in 1997, six were former National Council members, and these were
often in particularly powerful positions within the organization. 
As more staff were hired divisions between staff and membership became blurred.
When ZimRights was formed, all the staff of ZimRights were volunteers, who were paid
allowances and eventually given salaries.  Subsequently, ZimRights has expanded immensely,
moving from two part-time staff in 1993, to three full-time staff members in 1994, to eight in
1995, eleven in 1996, twenty-four in 1997, and forty in 1998.   External evaluators in 1997
recommended the decentralization of the secretariat which resulted in the opening of regional
offices in Bulawayo, Midlands, Mashonaland East, Masvingo and Mutare, all requiring their
own staff.  This might have contributed to ZimRights strengthening its membership base and
diminishing the power of the Harare central office, but at the same time it strengthened the
Secretariat.  
In addition to the six former National Council members who became staff members,
other positions were filled by ZimRights members and/or volunteers who turned voluntary
positions into paid ones.  While it is difficult to be conclusive, my research suggests that at least
half the secretariat from 1996 onwards were members or volunteers who had fundraised and
created full-time jobs for themselves.
Indeed, for some, being active in an NGO like ZimRights is only possible when
unemployed, but is also seen as a ‘job’ in so far as it occupies one’s time, inspires respect in the
community, and brings in some remuneration.  It is not insignificant, perhaps, that a listing of
National Council members for 1999-2001 identifies 8 out of 20 as ‘unemployed’ – although
111  ZimRights. “ZimRights National Council, 1999-2001 April”.
112  “We are not Political, says ZimRights” Weekend Gazette, 5 June 1992, 5.
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some of them might dispute this label, preferring to be described as ‘self-employed’.111  The
saliency of this issue is most strongly revealed in the dependence on ‘per diems’ given to
members for attending meetings.  Theoretically, per diems cover out-of-pocket expenses,
recognizing that receipts are rarely available on informal-sector transport.  In reality, though,
the money is an incentive to attend, or at least a reward for attending.  For Harare based
participants, 1997 AGM transport expenses were unlikely to have been higher than ZWD 30
(USD3), for transport from most suburbs to the city centre, where transport was organized to
take delegates to the conference centre in an outlying suburb.  However, all delegates received
ZWD100.00 (USD10.00) attendance allowances per diem, which grew to ZWD200 in later
years. 
5.4.2 Activities and Advocacy
Most ZimRights’ activities were organized by the staff and not the membership.  They tended
not to emphasize human rights per se – instead they resembled civic education and legal aid
projects run by other NGOs throughout the country.  While the membership structures did
channel some grass-roots concerns to the national level,  most staff were occupied with
relatively uncontroversial donor-funded ‘projects’.  Occasionally, the ZimRights information
office responded to current political events by issuing press releases.  While many of these were
picked up by the government and independent media, reference to particularly sensitive
incidents provoked attack from the ruling party.  
Within a month of its formation, ZimRights was in the media, defending the inclusion
on its board of former Chief Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, denying any link with
Dumbutshena’s Forum for Democratic Reform Trust, which went on to become the Forum
Party.112  And then, at the official launch, Garfield Todd,  the former Southern Rhodesian
113  “Zimpaper editors are monkeys, says Todd” Sunday Mail, 30 August, 1992, 1. 
114“Fifth Brigade – Mahachi replies Todd” Sunday Mail, 6 September 1992, 1; “Don’t
point accusing finger – ZimRights” Herald 9 September 1992, 3. 
115  Cris Chanaka, “Mugabe labels Zimbabwe human rights activists gangsters” Reuters
13 December 1995.
116  “State orders a ‘blackout on strike” MISA 28 August 1996; “Civil servants strike to
continue” Independent, 30 August 1996; “Civil Servant strike costs $120 million” Independent 30
August 1996; John Vekris, “Chronicle of two strikes” Social Change and Development February
1997, 3-7, 29.
117  “Government slated for its handling of strike” Independent 15 November 1996; John
Vekris, “Chronicle of two strikes” Social Change and Development February 1997, 3-7, 29.
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Prime Minister, attacked the state press, comparing their editors to the three monkeys who see
no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil.  In the racially charged environment, this was
interpreted in the worst possible way by the state-controlled Sunday Mail: “Zimpapers editors
are monkeys.”113  And, in the same speech, he also criticized the decision to promote Perence
Shiri, former commander of 5 Brigade, to Air Force Commander, which led to another
acrimonious exchange in the media, in which Defence Minister Moven Mahachi challenged
Todd’s record on human rights while Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.114  
ZimRights was again targeted in the official media in November 1995, in the aftermath
of a rally protesting police brutality.  While pursuing petty criminals,  police officers accidentally
shot and killed three by-standers.  The protest march organized  by ZimRights, degenerated
into rioting and looting.  In an inflammatory speech, President Mugabe labeled ZimRights
“ZimLooters” and a “gangster organization.”  ZimRights denied that the rioting and looting
had any link at all to their protest, suggesting that the march had concluded and dispersed long
before the riots, and that ZANU(PF) youths were responsible for the violence.115 
In 1996, ZimRights also came under attack in the government-controlled media, for
their support for a sustained and damaging strike by doctors and nurses.  The largest civil
service strike since independence appeared to be resolved by the offer of a 20 percent
increment.116  However, nurses and junior doctors in Harare resumed the strike in October in
protest against delays in contractual negotiations to confirm the increment.117  They were joined
118  “Strikes spread countrywide” Independent 8 November 1996; John Vekris, “Chronicle
of two strikes” Social Change and Development February 1997, 3-7, 29.
119  ZimRights Information Dept, “Junior Doctors and Nurses Strike: Report to
ZimRights Advisory Board and Council” 6 December 1996. 
120  “Fired Nurses await pledged cash” Herald 24 December 1996, 1; “Editorial: Nurses
and doctors strike was hardly normal” Herald 25 December 1996, 4;  ZimRights Press release,
“The Herald Xmas day comment” 27 December 1996. 
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by medical staff from Bulawayo and other regional hospitals after strikers  were dismissed, and
the strike leaders were prosecuted.118  In October, the nurses and junior doctors were dismissed
by the government.  Their union, the Zimbabwe Nurses Association (ZINA), denied any
further responsibility for them and they were tear-gassed when they attempted to congregate
at their union headquarters.  They then sought sanctuary at ZimRights – an interesting choice,
because the leader of their union, Clara Nondo, was a member of the ZimRights National
Council.  ZimRights let the nurses and doctors meet on their premises during the day – in lieu
of picketing – and let their leaders use ZimRights telephones and faxes.  On their own front,
ZimRights issued several press releases to the media about the need to resolve the strike issue,
and in particular, appealed to MPs to find a solution, which led to a very critical discussion of
the issue in Parliament.119  ZimRights was attacked for this very visible and public support of
the nurses and doctors in both a Herald news story and an editorial, which claimed that the
strike was ‘hardly normal’ and alleged outside interference.  The editorial claimed that
ZimRights had been used as a conduit to transfer ZWD 2 million from ‘foreign well-wishers’
to the nurses and doctors, although this was firmly denied.120
A more pro-active project was undertaken in 1996 when an American intern, Charlie
Cater, proposed that ZimRights conduct research on the human rights abuses in Matabeleland
with the intention of publishing a book.  Even here, of course, Cater was reacting to the CCJP
and LRF project which drew primarily on records of human rights abuses collected by the
CCJP in the early 1980s.  Cater proposed that ZimRights should interview survivors of the
Gukurahundi in the interest of providing a more contextualized and analytical account of the
121  Research Notes, February 1997. 
122  Interview, Munyaradzi Bidi, Acting Director ZimRights, 13 September 1999.
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period.  He solicited donor funding for the project mostly from European embassies, and
conducted much of the research himself, with the aid of ZimRights members in Matabeleland.
In January 1997, following the conclusion of Cater’s internship and his departure from
Zimbabwe, I took over what we thought were the  final stages of production – copy-editing,
lay-out and production. At the time, we thought the major delay would be waiting for the
cover-art, which we had commissioned from a talented local artist and the foreword which was
to be written by the then ZimRights’ Chair,  Reginald Matchaba-Hove.  While I waited for this
material, I liaised with the LRF’s Dave Coltart and the CCJP’s Mike Auret on the publication
of their long-awaited book.  We agreed that their book would come out first, as the CCJP itself
negotiated with the Bishops’ Conference, which was unwilling to publish the book without
prior approval from the President.121   This process, was, however, circumvented by leaking of
the CCJP/LRF book to the South African Mail and Guardian newspaper in March. 
In May  I left ZimRights with printer-ready text – with exception of Chair’s foreword
–  with cover-art, and quotes from publishers, and schedule and bookings for its launch.
However, despite pressure from the donors who wanted the project completed on deadline,
there was a further hiatus after the ZimRights 1997 AGM while the newly appointed National
Council members – many of whom who had not been councillors previously and did not know
of the existence of the publication – considered the draft.122  Those with personal knowledge
of the Matabeleland conflict wanted their experiences included and were concerned that it
missed events they considered significant.  Eventually, the text was deemed to conform with
the demands of the National Council, giving them a sense of ownership over the project.  In
February 1999, another foreign intern, Rigmor Argren,  took up the task and again collected
quotes from printers.  From this stage, Argren started documenting delays and categorizing
them as internal (ZimRights) or external (technical hold-ups at the printers).  Of the 11
123  ZimRights, Choosing the Path to Peace and Development: Coming to terms with Human
Rights Violations of the 1982-1987 Conflict in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces (Harare:
ZimRights, 1999); “ZimRights releases report on '80s atrocities” Financial Gazette,  November
11, 1999; “ZimRights launches book on civil strife” Herald 5 November  1999.
124  Personal Communication, Charles Cater, 7 August 2001.
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documented delays between February and August, 8 were internal to ZimRights – delays
caused by controversies between staff and council members about the title of the book and
responsibility for the foreword.  In the end, the Executive Director wrote a foreword and the
book was released in October 1999 nearly two years after its text was finalized.123  By this time,
discussion of the  Matabeleland conflict  had become less sensitive owing to widespread media
discussion and the acceptance of culpability by some party and army officials.
The Matabeleland book was probably the most controversial project undertaken by
ZimRights between 1992 and 1999.   The book was both a product and a victim of ZimRights’
organizational culture.  The informality of ZimRights’ office life allowed Cater to get approval
for the book from the Executive Director and Chairman: 
Chimhini [the director] was initially very supportive because he wanted the
organization to be seen to be doing ‘serious work’ like other NGOs that
publish books and document abuses ... Matchaba-Hove [the chairman]
appeared to be most concerned about what the donors would think and how
they would react...he did not want the project to jeopardise funding for the
organization by being too controversial, but once the donors lined up with
funding, then he showed some support.124
However, their commitment to the project was weak, because there were more potential costs
than benefits to such a controversial project and publication was easily delayed once the newly
elected Council members expressed concern.  The book’s eventual publication, with which staff
members credit Director David Chimhini, was probably influenced by donors who wanted the
organization to account for the expenditure of their funding.
125  See for instance, Sarah Helen Chiumbu, Democracy, Human rights and the Media Masters
Thesis University of Oslo, Dept of Media and Communication 1997; David Jamali, “How to
sustain a human rights organisation in the face of challenges and sabotage: a case of ZimRights
- Zimbabwe” unpublished paper, Coady International Institute, 2000.
126  “Catholic Commission director quits” Sunday Mail, 31 March 1991, 3.
127  Auret, Reaching for Justice, 162.
128  Auret, Reaching for Justice 161-2; ZimRights, Choosing the path to Peace and development,
(Harare: ZimRights, 1999) section 4.3; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,  Zimbabwe: Wages
of War (New York, Lawyers Committee), 28.
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5.4.3 Leadership Struggles and Organizational Growth
As the previous sub-section suggests, ZimRights did come under attack from the state and its
intelligence operatives, but it suffered more grievously from internal, personalized conflicts
arising from the blurred distinction between members and staff discussed in 5.4.1.  To date,
these have been little considered in accounts of ZimRights’ troubled history, which either
ignore ZimRights problems, or blame them all on malicious infiltration.125  
ZimRights’ first Secretary-General was the former director of the Catholic Commission
for Justice and Peace (CCJP) Nick Ndebele, who, it is widely believed, had been forced to
resign from the CCJP in 1991 owing to accusations of financial mismanagement.126  These
allegations made Ndebele an ambiguous figure, but many continued to respect his
championing the cause of those tortured and brutalized in Matabeleland in the 1980s.  Ndebele
“...with no thought for his own safety, had traveled through the troubled areas of Matabeleland
and the Midlands interviewing people who had been the victims of atrocities.”127  He did not
escape unscathed.  As previously discussed, Ndebele was arrested and detained under the
Rhodesian-era Law and Order Maintenance Act.  He and his family were also been traumatized
during the conflict, in which his father was detained and tortured and his grandfather was
allegedly shot by government soldiers disguised as dissidents. His grandmother was forced to
cut off her husband’s limbs; she later committed suicide.128 
In 1992, after serving as Secretary-General of ZimRights for only a few months,
Ndebele was replaced by Ozias Tungwarara, after further accusations of financial irregularity
129  Anonymous National Council Member, “A case study of ZimRights” 8; “ZimRights
man replaced” Herald 4 November 1992, 1; Interview, Nick Ndebele 27 November 1996;
Interview, Nick Ndebele 27 September 1999.
130  Interview, Nick Ndebele 27 September 1999.
131  ZimRights, “Minutes of the ZimRights 3rd AGM, 27-28 April 1996", 4.
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– charges he always strenuously denied, but which were lodged by the highly respected
Zimbabwe Project, which had been providing offices and access to phones for ZimRights, as
well as ‘banking’ their monies.  They claimed that cash advances had been requested by
Ndebele, of which the Council had remained unaware.129  Ndebele later claimed that his
dismissal was because in 1992 he had again highlighted issues around the Matabeleland
massacres— alleging that human remains found near a CIO building were linked to the
Matabeleland disappearances.130   Nevertheless, as a member of the organization, Ndebele
continued as chair of the human rights education committee, and, as we shall see,  was given
a full-time job organizing human rights education in 1994.  
After this initial controversy, ZimRights grew gradually and relatively smoothly from
1993 until 1995 under Tungwarara’s leadership.  Programmes and budgets had expanded and
ZimRights acquired new staff members and moved in 1995, from cramped city-centre offices
to a spacious, if somewhat run-down,  house on the outskirts of the Central Business District.
In the tenser political environment of 1995, which was an election year, ZimRights began to
feel they were being targeted by a ‘destabilization’ campaign, typified by Mugabe’s labeling
them“ZimLooters.”131  This feeling of attack intensified in late 1995 when a document was
circulated accusing Tungawarara of sexual misbehaviour.  ZimRights has always claimed that
this was planted by the CIO plant.  Despite support within the organization, he left soon
afterwards.  He was replaced by David Chimhini, a ZimRights member and former employee
of the Zimbabwe Teachers Association. 
Despite his dismissal as Secretary-General, Nick Ndebele had remained a member of
ZimRights, and he had  returned as a paid employee of ZimRights, in 1994, working as
132  Interview, Nick Ndebele, 27 September 1999.
133  Interview, Nick Ndebele,  27 September 1999; This is, I suspect, standard practice
for most NGOs in Zimbabwe.  See for instance, Peggy Watson, Determined to Act: the first 15
years of the Women’s Action Group, pp. 40-41, which notes that WAG had always invited the CIO
to their workshops and provided them with copies of workshop reports.  Many other
Zimbabwean NGOs report similar relations to the CIO.  
134  Interview, Emma Chiseya and Cousin Zilala, 8 October 1996.
135  Research notes, ZimRights AGM, Adelaide Acres, 10 May 1997.
136  Research notes, ZimRights Harare Regional Council AGM, 19 April 1997.
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education officer until 1996.  When Tungwarara left, Ndebele applied for his job: “as the
second most senior employee” Ndebele felt that  he was the “obvious” successor to
Tungwarara.132  However, when asked in his interview how ZimRights should relate to the
CIO, Ndebele says he answered that it was best to make information available to the CIO, so
as to “clear misunderstandings.”133   Soon after this, a story appeared in the respected weekly
Financial Gazette saying, that Ndebele had admitted to being a CIO agent, and the job went to
David Chimhini.  
Ndebele lost his job as Education Officer with ZimRights the next year, when Ford
Foundation funding for the project expired.  But soon after, a new department for civic
education for community theatre, funded by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was opened and
therefore the new civic education officers were hired, who had both worked in the  Zimbabwe
Association of Community Theatre (ZACT).134   Ndebele claimed that the new director, David
Chimhini, had manufactured the move from Ford Foundation funding to the NPA project as
an excuse to get rid of him. 
The claims that Ndebele was a CIO informant continue to reverberate, despite an
apology made by Reginald Matchaba-Hove for the rumour at the 1997 AGM.135  Many of
Ndebele’s former close associates steered clear of him and concerted efforts were made within
the organization to prevent him holding an elected office at either regional or national levels,
though these proved unsuccessful.136 
137  ZimRights, Director’s report to the 2nd AGM October 1995,  1.
138  ZimRights,  Report of the 3rd AGM, 27-28 April 1996,  8.
139  ZimRights,  National chairman’s report to the 4th AGM, 10 May 1997, 2.
140  ZimRights,  1998 Annual Report, 18.
141  Research Notes, ZimRights Harare Regional Council AGM, 19 April 1997.
142  Much of the following is based on interviews with: Munyaradzi Bhidi, Acting
Director 13 September 1999; Peter Maregare, Legal Officer, 13 September 1999; Paul Themba
Nyathi, former National Council Member, 16 September 1999; Weston Kwete (member) and
Never Gadaga, former Information Officer, 24 September 1999; David Chimhini, [Former]
Director, 4 October 1999; Interview, Reginald Matchaba-Hove, Zimbabwe Human Rights
Association, 8 October 1999.
143  Interview, Paul Themba Nyathi, Zimbabwe Human Rights Association, 16
September 1999; Interview, Reginald Matchaba-Hove, Zimbabwe Human Rights Association,
8 October 1999.
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Nevertheless, despite these internal conflicts,  ZimRights grew even more rapidly under
Chimhini’s guidance.  The numbers of staff more than doubled between 1996 and 1997, and
then doubled again between 1997 and 1998.  Similarly, membership doubled from a claimed
3000 in both October 1995137 and April 1996,138 to 6 000 in May 1997,139 to 10 000 in 1997, and
14 000 in 1998.140  This growth served to exacerbate internal tensions further.  Unemployed,
and smarting from rejections, Nick Ndebele had made no attempt to hide his interest in either
the Directorship or the Chairmanship.  He was unsuccessful in his bid to win control of the
Harare Regional Council in 1997 but was subsequently elected to represent Harare on the
National Council.141  In 1999, he was elected Chair of the Council.  When Reginald Matchaba-
Hove resigned the Chair in 1999, the anti-Ndebele faction felt sure that they had guaranteed
the election of academic Charles Nhachi as Chair and Paul Nyathi as Vice-Chair.142  Indeed,
they have accused Ndebele of unfairly influencing ‘naive, rural’ voters into voting for him as
an anti-élite candidate.143   
It was clear from the outset that, despite protestations to the contrary,  David
Chimhini, who had presided over Ndebele’s departure as education officer, would be unable
to work with Ndebele, and vice-versa.  The Advisory Board, composed of several members who
had previously been Councillors and had resigned in protest at Ndebele’s election as Chair,
intervened, advising that, Ndebele should resign for the good of the organization.   Allegations
144  Basildon Peta, “ZimRights fumes over chairman Ndebele’s praise letter to Mugabe”
Daily News, 11 May 1999.
145  Interview, Nick Ndebele, 27 September 1999. See also, “Ndebele’s fate in the
balance”, Standard 23 May 1999; “Gubbay, ZimRights boss clash over alleged racism” Financial
Gazette, 6 January 2000.
146  “ZimRights unhappy with NCA decision” Chronicle, 26 July 1999, 9.
147  “Sex Scandal at ZimRights” The People’s Voice 28 June 1999.
148  Stephen Ndlovu, “Misuse of funds alleged at ZimRights” Sunday Mail, 18 July 1999;
ZimRights “NO Misuse and abuse of funds” Press statement, 25 July 1999; “ZimRights denies
report on books” Herald 30 July 1999.
158
against Ndebele at this point included his firing as Secretary-General of ZimRights in 1992 over
alleged financial mismanagement, unpaid debts to the organization, and alleged connections
with the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). 
Ndebele also began to articulate political positions which were very much at odds with
the attitudes of most other NGO  élites.  For instance, influenced by a particular strain of
radical Africanism, he wrote a letter of support to President Mugabe over Zimbabwe’s
intervention into the Congo War.144  Similarly, he backed campaigns against the white judges,
who Mugabe was also attacking.145  He later  tried to pull ZimRights out of the National
Constitutional Assembly framework, just as it was squaring up to the government.146  At a time
when politics in Zimbabwe was becoming more and more polarized, the closeness of policy
between ZimRights and the President’s pet projects was interpreted by observers as complicity.
 Replicating the scandal over Tungwarara in 1995, Ndebele then leaked allegations that
Chimhini had sexually harassed his former secretary to the  ruling party’s paper.147  A month
later, it was also alleged that there had been financial mismanagement, although internal
investigations failed to reveal any wrong-doing.148  
In August,  Chimhini organized a meeting between staff and donors at which he
emphasized the importance of the staff in the running of ZimRights, hinted at the dangers of
‘uncontrolled’ membership decisions for such an organization, and enunciated a plan under
149  See for example, the documentation prepared for this meeting: “Donor’s/Partners
meeting with ZimRights” 19 August 1999, paper presented by David A Chimhini and David
Chimhini, ZIMCET proposal n.d.. 
150  David Jamali, “How to sustain a human rights organisation” discusses this point
usefully.
151  “Chimhini, ZimRights saga takes a new twist” Daily News 11 October 2000. 
152  “ZimRights loses appeal against reinstating Executive Director” Daily News 2
February 2001
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which ZimRights would become a Trust which would be more active in lobbying and advocacy
and eschew membership-driven activities.149  
Upon hearing of this meeting, the National Council voted to suspend Chimhini, and
seek his dismissal, describing his actions as an attempt to sideline both them and the
membership.  Chimhini, on the other hand, suggests that Ndebele was under pressure from his
‘supporters’ to remove him from the office.  Chimhini was correct to note that the then extant
ZimRights constitutional structures were not equipped to rein in a ‘rogue’ chair.150  Council
members might not agree with statements being issued by Ndebele, but they had no formal
sanction.  They were dispersed across the country and communication with them was not
always possible, nor was it feasible to arrange ad-hoc meetings.
Unlike Matchaba-Hove, who was both on the Faculty of Medicine at the University
of Zimbabwe and kept up a profitable private practice, Ndebele was unemployed or
periodically self-employed and quite prepared to become Chair full-time.  In the circumstances,
it surprised few that, although a former employee was brought in as Acting-Director, Ndebele
essentially took over the position, using the Director’s office and issuing statements which
would previously have come from the Director.
Chimhini pursued a case for  unfair dismissal, which he won in August 2000.151
ZimRights protested against his reinstatement but lost that suit as well in February 2001, a
decision which required them to pay him some months of back pay and costs, which amounted
to more than ZWD 1 million.152  In the interim, he founded the Zimbabwe Civic Education
Trust, as he had earlier advocated, which has attracted funding from some of ZimRights
153  “Crusade against newspapers unconstitutional says Moyo” Herald 29 March 2001.
154  “Ndebele resigns as ZimRights chairman” Daily News 29 August 2000; David Jamali,
“How to sustain a human rights organisation”; various discussions with Jamali and others in
September 1999 and June 2000 
155  Pedzisai Ruhanya, “ZimRights goes bankrupt” Daily News 13 June 2001.
156  Interview, Clare Morris and Hilary MacKay, Westminister Foundation, London, 30
January 2001; Letter from David Chimhini to unspecified donors, dated 10 September 1999.
157  Collin Chiwanza, “ZimRights puts office on sale” Daily News 10 August 2001.
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former donors.  He was briefly the administrator of the new opposition party MDC and active
in another organization entitled United People for National Survival.  The state, and especially
the state media,  has not been slow in trying to play off the divide between ZimRights loyalists
and those who left with Chimhini.153   At the same time, however, Ndebele was forced to resign
as ZimRights chair by members who saw his resignation as the only way to salvage the
organization.154  However, in June 2001 the remaining rump of ZimRights admitted that it
could no longer pay salaries, as there were no incoming donor funds.155  Donors, who had
flooded ZimRights with substantial funding, began removing their financial support soon after
Ndebele’s election as Chair, in response to letters from Chimhini.156   ZimRights has since sold
its headquarters to settle its debts.157
5.4.4 Understanding ZimRights’ Collapse
ZimRight’s demise had a number of causes.  These included: a protracted and unequal
confrontation with the Zimbabwean state, the internal dynamics of the organization in a setting
where NGOs become a preferred source of employment for their ostensibly ‘volunteer’
members and the funds with which donors supplied it.  All of these factors should lead us to
be skeptical that NGOs – by virtue of their ‘voluntary’ nature – represent a panacea for donors
trying to foster grass-roots advocacy as part of some larger governance or civil-society project.
Even if one discounts assertions that ZimRights was the victim of CIO machinations,
the organization was in an isolated position throughout its brief existence.  Without the
protection of a larger body grounded in Zimbabwean society – the CCJP, for example, was
158  Never Gadaga, “ZimRights infighting open’s a Pandora’s box” Independent 21 May
1999; David Chimhini, “Gadaga’s ramblings on ZimRights complete lies” Letter to the Editor
Independent 4 June 1999;  Reginald Matchaba-Hove, “Attack on ZimRights reveals wider covert
strategy” Independent 4 June 1999; “ZimRights breaks all the tenets of democracy-
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bolstered by its position within the Catholic Church – it had little protection when singled out
for attack.  ZimRights was also one of the only NGOs in Zimbabwe which occasionally used
Moyo’s oppositional tactics by issuing press releases and organizing demonstrations.  No other
Zimbabwean organization was so regularly attacked in the media by President Mugabe and
such pressures contributed to internal tensions and suspicions.  Yet, at the same time,
ZimRights’ only pro-active attempt to document human right abuses  – the Matabeleland book
– was initiated and carried through almost entirely by volunteer interns from the US, Canada,
and Sweden.  
Perhaps even more crucially, the resources to which ZimRights had access made it
a site of even more determined contestation. Its objectives as an advocacy organization
were undermined by the job-creating and resource-distributing functions it came to serve. 
For example, one of the issues of conflict between David Chimhini and Nick Ndebele in
1999 was a proposal to remove sitting allowances for Council members and staff to attend
meetings.  This was a particular threat to those councillors who were unemployed, many of
whom were allied to, or sympathetic to the position of,  Ndebele who played a populist card
against the ‘élite’.  
The intra-organizational  divisions are on one level merely a fight between two
disparate personalities and their factions, exacerbated by both sides’ willingness to use the press
to press their points.  Ndebele’s relation, Weston Kwete, became a reporter for the explicitly
pro-ZANU Sunday Mail and leaked  many of the anti-Chimhini stories. On the other hand, the
independent press did publish a vituperative exchange between Chimhini and Matchaba-Hove
on the one side versus Ndebele, and the former ZimRights’ information officer Never Gadaga,
with the dubious, but high-profile,  backing of  Jonathan Moyo.158
Ndebele”Independent 11 June 1999;  Jonathan Moyo, “ZimRights leader’s stooping too low”
Independent 11 June 1999.
159  Moore and Stewart, “Corporate Governance” End-note, 3.
160  ZimRights. Executive Director’s Report to the Fourth Annual General Meeting. 10
May 1997, 2.  
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However, while this reveals the dangers implicit in hiring councillors as staff it also
reflects the ability of a large, professionalized secretariat to alienate membership.  Ndebele has
always described himself as the founder of ZimRights and feels that he deserved more respect
from the organization.  ZimRights under Chimhini’s leadership had gained a high profile and
large increases in donor funds, all of which had merely led to the organization distancing itself
from its roots.  Donors developed particularly good relations with Chimhini, who is articulate
and speaks their language well.  
This conflict between advocacy and employment was, ironically, aggravated by the
donor funding, upon which ZimRights came to depend.  Many donor-dependent organizations
go through similar explosive spurts of growth, often accompanied by crisis.  ZimRights was
clearly a case of the ‘flavour of the month’ syndrome in that it was so popular it rapidly raised
money from multiple sources. While Oxfam is reported to have a rule that an annual budget
increase of more than 25% is likely to lead to organizational difficulties,159 ZimRights, in just
one of the years studied, is reported to have multiplied its budget nearly five-fold.160 
The people who have lost out are the Zimbabweans, especially those displaced by the
recent violence, who  have need of both documentation of their rights and protection from
those abusing them.  ZimRights members too, still have great faith and hope in their
organization.  Donors, on the other hand,  have merely transferred their funds to other,
perhaps equally vulnerable, organizations.
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5.5 Conclusion
The politics of inclusion incorporated NGOs firmly with the ZANU(PF) regime.  NGOs were
vulnerable to co-option because of their roots in the liberation war and their commitment to
the government’s agenda of development.  Although NGOs with links to opposition parties
were required to prove their loyalty, the 1980s were relatively free of conflict between NGOs
and the state.  In addition to their  ideological and social tendencies, material and organizational
factors reinforced NGOs’ inclination to work co-operatively within the state’s framework.
In the 1990s, the decreasing importance of the state and the decline in civil service
salaries made the NGO sector an increasingly attractive place of employment.  Increased donor
funding to NGOs increased staff numbers and strengthened their position vis-à-vis volunteers.
This tendency of so-called voluntary organizations to ‘professionalize’ leads to conflicts
between ‘old, committed’ members and new staff.  In many cases, volunteers also see NGOs
as sources of employment or enrichment.   
As a result of all these influences, NGOs may become more interested in completing
projects,  accessing funding, and meeting donor requirements.  The case study of ZimRights
shows how such internal pressures can create divisions within NGOs that threaten their
viability and render them vulnerable to malicious attacks.  The case of the Association of
Women’s Clubs (AWC), presented in the next chapter, follows a similar pattern. At the same
time, organizational growth  may also make NGOs less inclined to pursue demands for policy
change with the state.  There is too much at stake to risk when a more adversarial relationship
might affect the organization’s ability to function, impairing both its developmental and its
employment creation function.  
Yet, as we shall see in Chapter 6, working in concert with other NGOs helps overcome
some of these impediments to lobbying and advocacy.
1 Sheila White, “A New Voice in Rural Welfare” Herald 27 November 1981, 13. 
2 Advert for National Director, 18 November 1981, p23; conversations with Zebediah
Gamanya, July 1991. 
3 “Teaching good management by Voice...” Herald 1 February 1984, 6; “Voluntary body
sets up 1000 pre-schools” Herald 29 July 1985, 3.
4 “NGOs to map out further strategies” Herald 9 March 1991, 3; “Director of Voice
suspended” Herald 17 June 1990; “Former director awarded full pay and benefits” Herald 26
April 1991, 5.
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Chapter 6  NGOs and the State: Inter-politics, Issues and Coalitions, 1990-1997
Previous chapters have suggested that relations between state and NGOs in Zimbabwe are
complex and multi-faceted.  Many NGOs do not undertake lobbying and advocacy activities.
They tend to describe their relationship with the state as co-operative and based on non-
confrontation.  Yet NGO activists in Zimbabwe have tried to network with each other and
engage the state in order to challenge its autonomy in policy-making in several key issue areas,
despite its consistent obstruction of pluralistic participation in decision-making.
6.1  VOICE, NANGO, and Ad-hoc Coalitions
NGOs in Zimbabwe have had a series of ineffective umbrella bodies which claimed to co-
ordinate them and facilitate their relations to the government since independence.  The
Southern Rhodesian National Council of Social Services (NCSS), at that time predominantly
white-run, renamed itself Voluntary Organisations in Community Enterprise (VOICE) in 1981,
asked the new President to be its patron,  and proposed to move from supporting welfare
projects towards self-help.1  At the same time, VOICE advertised for a new national director
and later appointed Zebediah Gamanya, an ex-combatant who had been based in Mozambique
during the war.2  While VOICE continued existing NCSS projects such as starting pre-schools
in rural areas, they also moved more towards providing support for the new NGOs.  In 1984
they convened the first  workshop on NGO management.3  VOICE remained centralized and
welfare-oriented.  In 1990, Gamanya was dismissed for mismanagement, as the organization
could no longer pay its staff’s salaries,  and VOICE was again renamed.4  The new National
5  Interview, Agatha Dodo, NANGO, 5 September 1995; NANGO, Constitution,
Welfare Organisation No. 221/68); JB Kiragu and Sarah Sakupwanya, Evaluation of NANGO,
18 October - 27 November 1995 .
6 The lower figures are from the 1995 Evaluation Report: Kiragu and Sakupwanya,
Evaluation of NANGO n.p.; the higher figures are from: Sam Moyo “The Structure and
Characteristsics of NGOs” in Sam Moyo, John Makumbe, and Brian Raftopoulos, NGOs, the
State and Politics in Zimbabwe” (Harare, SAPES, 2000), 57 and appear to be based on statistics
from 1992.
7   Letter from S.S.P. Matindike, Executive Director of NANGO to the Hon.  Mr. J.
Nkomo, Minister of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare.  7 February 1995.
8  Letter from S.S.P. Matindike, Executive Director of NANGO to the Director of
Social Welfare, 9 February 1995.
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Association of NGOs (NANGO) was intended to be more decentralized and represent a
broader coalition of groups, reflecting the newer NGOs and their concerns with social and
economic issues and human rights; however, its constitution and format remained much the
same.5  NANGO, like VOICE, also continued to receive an operating grant from the
Department of Social Welfare.  Through the 1990s NANGO experienced financial and
administrative problems which were exacerbated, rather than solved, by  decentralization into
regional offices.  For most of the 1990s, around 500 - 800 NGOs have been registered with
the Department of Social Welfare (as required by law) but at most only  140 - 300 of those have
been members of NANGO, and even fewer paid their membership dues.6  
As will be seen in section 6.3, NANGO’s weakness became very visible when faced
with the PVO Act, introduced in 1995 to replace the Rhodesian-era Welfare Organisations Act
in regulating the sector. NANGO failed to notify members of the Act until it had reached
Parliament,  nor did it lobby the Social Welfare Department on their behalf. Its main
contribution seems to have been a letter to the Minister of Public Services and Social Welfare
pointing out that the proposed name change from “Welfare Organizations” to “Private
Voluntary Organizations” was “...rather alien to Zimbabwe.”7  A second submission, written
after a meeting of concerned NGOs and directed to the Director of the Social Welfare
Department, detailed a few other concerns.8 
9  NANGO “A report of the Northern region general meeting held on 4th September
1996 at the Holiday Inn Crown Plaza Monomatapa Hotel”. 
10  J.B. Kiragu and S. Sakupwanya, Evaluation of NANGO, 1995; NANGO,  Report of a
workshop on strengthening the planning process within NANGO structures, 2-3 April 1996 (often referred
to as the Adelaide Acres report); NANGO,  Report of a workshop on strengthening the planning process
within NANGO structures16 July 1998 (often referred to as the Westwood report); G. Madzima,
A Co-ordinated voice for NGO’s—The path ahead.  May 1997.
11 “Officials resign as NANGO goes broke” Financial Gazette, 1 August 1998. The
members who resigned were: Paul Themba Nyathi, Thoko Ruzvidzo, Eunice Njovana, Niki
Jazdowska, and Priscilla Misihairambwi.
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This failure was compounded by a financial and administrative crisis, which intensified
in 1996.  Like VOICE, NANGO had lost the capacity to pay its staff, who not surprisingly left
for jobs elsewhere in the sector.  While it appears that no monies were misappropriated, they
had been spent improperly. Administrative funding  had ended in 1994, but activities had
carried on,  using programme funds to finance NANGO’s day-to-day administration.
NANGO was therefore unable to report to donors on the expenditure of their funds and as
a result donors had refused to continue payment.9  This led to a debt-load of at least ZWD 1.5
million (USD 150 000).   Attempts to reverse the decline, including a detailed external
evaluation and two comprehensive workshops involving staff and membership failed.10   The
entire northern region committee, including two national committee members resigned.11  They
were also, at this critical time, given notice by the landlord, Lonrho, which had for many years
subsidized their rental of a prime piece of real estate along Samora Machel Ave, which housed
the increasingly dilapidated head offices.
Against this back drop, a few NGOs began organizing in issue-driven coalitions.  Key
policies between 1995 and 1997, to which Zimbabwean NGOs have responded with the
creation of  issue-based coalitions have been economic policy, land, gender, health, the
Constitution, and the PVO Act.  This chapter will examine the evolution of campaigns
surrounding two of these issues — economic policy and the PVO Act — assessing their
strengths, weaknesses, strategies and results. 
12  P. G. Kadenge, H.  Ndoro, B. M. Zwizwai, "Zimbabwe's Structural Adjustment
Programme: the First Year Experience" in Structural Adjustment Programmes in SADC ed.  Allast
Mwanza, (Harare: Sapes, 1992), 169.
13  A S Mlambo, The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme: the case of Zimbabwe, 1990-
1995(Harare: UZ, 1997), especially Chapter 5, 83-96.
14  Dashwood, Political Economy of Transformation 172-4, 178-9; see also, “Inquiry begins
into SDF looting” Herald 15 January 1999, 1; “SDF reels under $206 million debt” Herald 18
January 1999, 1, 11.
15  Debby Potts, “Structural Adjustment and Urban Poverty: the impact on employment
and immigration patterns” paper presented at the BZS Research Day, St Antony’s College June
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6.2  Structural Adjustment
The case of adjustment in Zimbabwe shows the extent to which moments of opportunity,
intended or not, may provide an opening for the creation of a lobbying and advocacy
campaign.  Zimbabwean NGOs, caught off guard with the introduction of ESAP, proved
unable or unwilling to develop a campaign, until there was a reason for contacting the
government — the expected design of the next phase of the programme, into which they
wished to be able to make an input.
As we have seen in Chapter 4, ESAP was a major policy shift for the Mugabe
government.  It liberalized trade, reduced the civil service, lifted subsidies and price controls,
devalued the currency, and was accompanied by a  reduction in real incomes for most
families.12   The introduction of health user fees and school fees, in urban areas, coupled by
decreases in the availability of drugs and equipment  for hospitals, have led to decreasing levels
of maternal health, and left many others unable to seek medical care or remain in hospital for
treatment.  School fees have led to declining enrollment in education in urban areas and the
overburdening of rural schools, where poor urban children may be sent since there are no
school fees.13  The Social Development Fund (SDF), part of a programme to mitigate the social
costs of adjustment, which was supposed to help poor families pay for tuition and examination
fees and health costs, was inadequate and poorly administered.14  Formal job creation failed to
provide employment for school-leavers, although this was not necessarily translated into
widespread unemployment but rather into increased self-employment in the informal sector.15
2000; see also, Debby Potts, “Urban unemployment and migrants in Africa; evidence from
Harare, 1985-94" Development and Change, 31, 4 (2000), 879-910.
16 Interview, Elijah Chiwoto, Popular Education Collective, 19 September 1995.
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6.2.1  The Dog That Didn't Bark in the Night,  1990-1994
Yet, despite the impact of ESAP on many Zimbabweans, NGOs paid relatively little attention
to the policy-level of government, contenting themselves with trying to alleviate the impact of
ESAP.   Although associational life expanded rapidly and criticism of the government was
prevalent in the wake of several scandals, NGOs failed to question ESAP in any extensive way.
Those organizations which  might have been expected to lobby for change, particularly for
change in socio-economic policies, did not do so.  NGOs stress that ESAP’s implementation
took them by surprise, that people believed the government when it said that the Social
Dimensions Fund would support the poor and that they didn’t know how to respond to ESAP.
Even the ZCTU, which did publically question the implementation of ESAP, moved from a
confrontational engagement with the state, to a much more co-operative one between 1992-5.
This is not to say that ESAP was not a matter for discussion and limited mobilization.
The local press, especially the independent magazines, regularly published articles questioning
the implementation of ESAP. In 1991, the Popular Education Collective (PEC) published an
issue of Read On, a magazine aimed at people with basic literacy, which addressed the impact
of ESAP.  Read On, although reaching a limited audience, attempts to provoke debate on
current issues.  Although PEC do not see themselves as doing advocacy per se, their goals are
to empower groups by “cultivating an interest in people standing up for themselves.”16
Similarly, in 1992, Silveira House, a Catholic Development Training Centre,  published the first
in a series of critical booklets on socio-economic issues, ESAP and Theology which was followed
in 1993 by A Critical Guide to ESAP.  These booklets, aiming “to be in some small way a voice
for the voiceless and to advocate with the poor to change socio-economic policies and
17 Peter Balleis, ESAP and Theology, (Harare: Silveira House, 1992), 7. 
18 Rev M C Kuchera, “Official Opening Address”, ZCC National Consultation on the
second phase of the economic structural adjustment programme/ZIMPREST, 29-30 October
1996, 2.
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structures which disadvantage them”, were published and sold at a price level to be accessible
to “ordinary Zimbabweans.”17    
6.2.2 Advocacy and Action: 1994-1995
From 1994 onwards a small group of mostly church-based NGOs came together to discuss the
impact of structural adjustment on them, and their members in a series of meetings starting
with a workshop organized by Ecumenical Support Services (ESS).  At this workshop, NGOs
discussed taking up advocacy strategies.  Many of the NGOs which attended this meeting did
become involved in further activities.  Yet they were unsuccessful in dealing with the
government and in attempting to recruit more NGOs to their cause. 
In 1994, as the government, aided by UNDP and the World Bank, began to design the
second phase of ESAP, NGOs began to demand a say in such policy-making.  As the then
General Secretary of the ZCC, Murombedzi Kuchera,  said: “...even before the nation has
collectively evaluated ESAP I and drawn a balance sheet, we suddenly find ourselves at the
threshold of another ESAP, with a new name, but with a similar body and soul.”18  The
remainder of this section will chart the progress of civil society advocacy as both indigenous
and international NGOs demanded participation in the development of the second phase of
adjustment, known as the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Strategic Transformation
(ZIMPREST). 
The first decisive action was taken by OXFAM UK&I, which published a critical
pamphlet about the implementation of user-fees in the health care system in October 1994,
entitled Paying for Health.  The research prepared was part of a study that OXFAM had been
asked to provide for a World Bank Country Economic Memorandum on Zimbabwe.  The
19 Jean Lennock, Paying for Health, (Oxford: Oxfam, 1994), 14-15.
20 “State angered by Oxfam report” Daily Gazette, 17 October 1994, 1,4.
21  GOZ,  Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 21 No. 36, 12 October 1994, 2729.
22 Michael Holman, "Zimbabwe may tell Oxfam to leave" Financial Times 28 October
1994, 4.
23  Interview,  Kevin Watkins, OXFAM UK&I, 28 November 1995.
24 ESS.  Report on the Workshop on the Effects of ESAP on Zimbabwean NGOs and their Services,
1995. 
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report criticized the implementation of user-fees and the real-term decline in funding for health
and the decreasing percentage of national income being spent on health care, which is leading
to less investment in medication, accessibility of vaccination programmes, and medical
equipment.19
The government's attack on OXFAM alleged factual inaccuracies in the report and
their failure to clear the field research conducted with the Government Research Council.20
The government hinted that OXFAM had come close to abrogating its agreement to “respect
the law and institutions of Zimbabwe and...conduct its affairs in consultation with the
Government, people, and institutions of Zimbabwe.”21   The government was appalled at the
unnecessarily public character of OXFAM’S disclosure in New York, without having previously
shown the material to the Zimbabwean government.  A Financial Times report alleged that the
Zimbabwean government was threatening to expel OXFAM.22   OXFAM   refused to confirm
the allegation that the government had threatened to expel the organization, although a
researcher described the report as “fairly accurate.”23   In March 1995 health user fees for rural
residents were removed, suggesting that the government may have rejected the medium, but
accepted the message.
In March 1995 ESS organized a workshop on the effects of ESAP on Zimbabwean
NGOs.  The workshop brought participants together  to examine the impact of ESAP, to make
a collective response to ESAP, and to collect data for use in advocacy work.24  The workshop
involved representatives of 34 indigenous NGOs and three international organizations,
including the World Bank.  
25 John Makumbe, “The Effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
(ESAP) on NGOs and their Services in Zimbabwe” in ESS,   Report on the Workshop on the Effects
of ESAP on Zimbabwean NGOs and their Services, 1995, 15-19. 
26ESS.  Report on the Workshop on the Effects of ESAP on Zimbabwean NGOs and their Services
ESS. , 31.
27 Interview, Tawanda Mutasah, ZCC-JPR 15 September 1995.
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At the workshop, NGOs discussed how they had changed to meet the challenges of
ESAP.  Some had increased their capacity and/or reprioritized demands, while others had cut
back on service-provision.  Most NGOs reported responding to ESAP by trying to meet the
new needs of their clients and to overcome the obstacles established by ESAP.  Only one
NGO recorded undertaking lobbying to have policies changed which affected its members.
The workshop was challenged as to whether it could provide an alternative to ESAP and what
role NGOs could play in implementing that alternative.25  
Participants developed a series of recommendations.  The workshop noted that NGOs
are no longer able to meet the increasing demands for their services but must instead: “insist
that government should do more for its people.”  It also advocated that NGOs, as
“development actors” should insist on inclusion in debates on national development.  NGOs
also agreed that they must move past the simple provision of services towards “policy analysis
and advocacy.”26  
6.2.3  Networking: ZCC-EJN
The Zimbabwe Council of Churches expanded their range of operations in the 1990s, creating
a  Justice, Peace and Reconciliation (JPR) desk, which was intended to pursue advocacy and
lobbying activities.27  In December 1994, staff from the JPR desk organized a meeting of what
became the  Economic Justice Network (EJN) — a network of regional groups organized
through the member churches.  The EJN, working with Christian Aid (UK), organized regional
28 NORDIC-FOCCESA, Economic Justice workshop report, 10-14 April 1996;
Interview, Deprose Muchena, ZCC Economic Justice Desk, 8 October 1996; Jessica
Woodroffe, Suggestions for ZCC on the Economic Justice network, unpublished mimeo
September 1995; Interview, Tawanda Mutasah, ZCC-JPR 15 September 1995.
29 Research Notes, ZCC national pre-budget consultation meeting, 6 May 1997; ZCC,
1996-1997 Post National Budget Consultation Discussion Document, 7 August 1996; ZCC, A
People Centred National Budget (Harare ZCC, 1996).
30 ZCC. National Consultation on the second phase of the economic structural
adjustment programme/ZIMPREST. Official opening address by Rev M C Kuchera, 29
October 1996; 2-3.
31  Research Notes, LAG meeting, Harare 18 March 1997.
32  Memorandum from Jonah Gokova to NGO and church fraternity, 20 September
1995
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working groups to target local government and also to link with similar local level groups in
the UK.28 
In 1996 and 1997, the EJN held regional and national meetings on the annual budget
before submitting the results of this consultation to the government.29  In late 1996 the ZCC
also hosted a national consultation on ZIMPREST “ a platform for civic actors and actresses,
men and women of Zimbabwe, an opportunity to rethink and relaunch the development
process in Zimbabwe.”30   Yet this bold attempt floundered when the Minister responsible
failed to turn up for the workshop.  Since none of the participants had actually seen the
ZIMPREST document, it was difficult to debate its pros and cons in any concrete fashion.
The final status of the workshop report is also unclear,  Deprose Muchena, a member of the
JPR team, said later “We sent it to the Minister and didn’t hear from him.  We then sent it to
ZANU(PF) after we heard that they make the policies.”31
6.2.4  NGO-LAG: A Call to Justice
Between September and November 1995 NGOs and Churches in Zimbabwe began a
Campaign called: A Call to Justice.32  Sparked by the World Bank’s approach to NGOs for
dialogue on the second phase of ESAP, in preparation for the October IMF/World Bank
meetings in Washington, D.C., the events organized under this theme began the resurgence of
33  Interview,  Tawanda Mutasah, Zimbabwe Council of Churches, 15 September 1995.
34  ZCC. “Economic Justice Network/Ecumenical Support Services/NGOs meeting
on the preparation to meet the Zimbabwean Delegation going to Washington for the October
7 and 8 meeting”. Minutes compiled by Deprose Muchena, n.d. 
35  "An appeal to the IMF/WB on the occasion of your AGM, 9 October 1995, from
the very concerned NGOs and church related organisations in Zimbabwe” n.d. n.p.
36 NGO-LAG, Arguments, evidence and suggestions for discussions with Zimbabwe
delegates to the World Bank/IMF Directors annual general meeting in Washington DC, 9
October 1995. 
37 NGO-LAG, Minutes of LAG meeting 24 May 1996.
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activism in Zimbabwe.  In September, ESS, the ZCC, and other NGOs met with the
Zimbabwean delegation to the Washington meetings.  This meeting was preceded by a strategic
preparatory meeting to ensure that all the NGOs had something to say “so that there was not
just one loud mouth NGO” but a clear NGO agenda.33  As Deprose Muchena, the ZCC
delegate to the preliminary meeting, noted, “...[the people] require [sic] take an active role in
defining the development paradigm, through churches, civic groups, and NGOs.”34  The
NGOs claimed that as ‘development actors’ they must be involved in the planning process and
stressed the need for ESAP to have a human face and to emphasize job creation and equity as
well as economic growth.35  The meeting with the government delegation was the first time that
they had met with NGOs.
In October, NGOs organized two days of events focusing on the WB/IMF meetings
in Washington.  This was started with drama, poetry and speeches in  Stoddart Hall, in Mbare.
The next day, NGOs faxed a statement to the IMF/WB in Washington.  Finally, in November
the series of meetings was held with the IMF/WB Poverty Mission, in which NGOs asked for
World Bank poverty studies to examine the structural causes of poverty and to look specifically
at how adjustment policies have contributed to the increase of poverty in Zimbabwe.36
The return of the World Bank Poverty mission in April 1996 provided another chance
for LAG to meet and re-invigorate itself.  On the 24 May 1996, LAG established an internal
taskforce to evaluate the second phase of adjustment.  It was assumed that the ZIMPREST
document would be sent to ESS on behalf of LAG.37  However, the government’s failure to
38 NGO-LAG, Minutes of LAG meeting 24 May 1996.
39 Letter from ESS to Minister of Finance, 29 May 1996.
40 Letter from M Dzinotizei for senior secretary for finance, to Jonah Gokova, ESS 10
March 1997.
41 Letter from M Dzinotizei for senior secretary for finance, to Jonah Gokova, ESS 10
March 1997 (emphasis added).
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release the document formally rendered this taskforce irrelevant.  A campaign was also
mounted of sending letters of protest  to the Ministry of Finance against lack of consultation
in the drafting of the economic policy.38  As the letter sent from ESS to the Minister of
Finance, the permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commissioner
in the President’s office said: 
This is the only opportunity available over the next five years maybe for us to
consult with each other...we wish to remind you that ESAP is a National
programme who success will only depend on our people’s sense of
ownership...You are therefore, in our opinion, obliged to open up national
debate, discussion on both ESAP I and the process and content of ESAP II.39
The Ministry responded to all thirteen letters sent by LAG members, with what appeared at the
time to be a very encouraging tone, welcoming the participation of civil society.  However,
hearing nothing further from the Ministry about participation, LAG, on late September,
forwarded a petition signed by fifty-eight individuals.   In February 1997, the Minister was
invited to address a LAG meeting in March, which he was not able to attend because “the
ZIMPREST document was still in its draft stage...”40  As he explained, the: 
...draft document is in the process of being discussed by heads of Ministries
and the Cabinet.  Thereafter the document will be discussed widely by the
various stakeholders in a series of workshops. It is hoped that your organisation will
be invited to attend the workshops for your inputs...41 
Perhaps this was merely a grammatical infelicity, but the letter explicitly did not invite either
NGO-LAG or ESS to contribute to the process, but merely expressed the hope that they might
be invited to do so.  The irony, of course, that the document can only be discussed by
“stakeholders” when it is no longer in a draft stage, was not lost on the recipients. 
42  Research Notes, Manicaland NGO Lobbying and Advocacy Meeting 20 May 1997.
43  Research Notes, Bulawayo NGO Lobbying and Advocacy Meeting 16 July 1997.
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As ZIMPREST was not formally launched, nor were NGOs invited to “workshops
or consultations,” LAG  more or less stalled.  At a meeting in March 1997, LAG members
agreed that the Ministry was obviously unwilling to meet with them.  In reaction, it was
proposed that LAG instead target   “progressive” Parliamentarians.  Various strategies were
discussed and it was decided to hold a one day meeting with a select group of parliamentarians.
This planned meeting was delayed as MPs left on summer recess.  Plans restarted in August,
facilitated through contacts with the Chair of the Parliamentary Reform Committee, whose
wife conveniently shared an office with ESS, but were over taken by hearings on civil society
participation in Parliament.  
 LAG’s weakness in approaching the government stemmed primarily from its Harare-
dominated membership.  While the NGOs involved are committed, they are by no means
representative of the NGOs which form the mainstay of the development sector. Although
attempts were made to expand LAG’s  membership in the provinces of Manicaland and
Matabeleland, little emerged from these efforts.  In Manicaland, only a small number of NGOs
were represented at a meeting called for this purpose.  Some participants complained that there
was no per diem or transport money provided for participants while others were somewhat
hostile to the LAG member’s portrayal of government policy.42  In Matabeleland, a large
number of participants showed up for the afternoon meeting, filling the meeting room to
overflowing.  Nevertheless, participants were again hostile and critical of the organizer’s
motives.  Participants were wary of the idea of joining LAG, which was seen as a challenger to
NANGO.  Although the Matabeleland Chair of NANGO said that there was no reason that
NANGO should monopolize advocacy and that NANGO was unable at this time to carry out
any such activities, the concern was expressed, several times, that the proposed advocacy group
or coalition would duplicate the efforts of NANGO or trespass on NANGO’s territory.43
44 Kairos Theologians Group. The Kairos document : a theological comment on the political crisis
in South Africa 2nd rev. ed (London : Catholic Institute for International Relations  and the
British Council of Churches, 1986).
45  Address by His Excellency, the Rev. Professor Canaan Banana on the occasion of
the Ecumenical Support Services Conference at the Management Training Centre in Msasa-
Harare, 2 December 1996; Research Notes, 2 December 1996.
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Much as the NGOs were interested in talking about lobbying and advocacy, they were also
suspicious of becoming involved in a ‘political’ or unpopular campaign.  
.
6.2.5  A Call to Prophetic Action
Drawing on both the idea of the international Jubilee 2000 campaign for debt forgiveness and
the Kairos document of South Africa, which called for church people to act against an unjust
government44 ESS convened a regional workshop in October 1996 on Prophetic Action.  This
meeting was attended by the prominent churchmen from Zambia and South Africa—Revd.
Edwin Sakala of the Zambian Christian Council and Dr Molefe Tsele of the Institute for
Contextual Theology in South Africa—as well as church-people and laity from Zimbabwe.
The enthusiasm for the three-day meeting led to the idea of writing a “Kairos” document for
Zimbabwe which could then be used within churches for discussion or action.   The meeting
attracted the interest of the CIO, probably because of the attendance of Sakala and Tsele, and
that of the former President Revd Canaan Banana, who opened the meeting.
The Kairos process revealed most strongly the importance of both language and
content in the advocacy process.  The former President, Revd Banana, also Zimbabwe’s best
known ‘progressive’ theologian, called for a “collective onslaught by the government, NGOs,
churches and the people themselves” against the impact of structural adjustment, although
discussions also stressed issues of governance, youth, AIDS, gender and the environment.45
Yet, despite the meeting being entitled “A Call to Action”— designed explicitly to move the
churches towards action, participants felt insulted, rather than challenged, by Revd Banana’s
46  Research  notes, “It is time for Prophetic Action: Towards a Threshold of Jubilee”
Harare, 2 December 1996.
47  Research Notes, Drafting Meeting: A Call to Prophetic Action!, Mutare, 11 February
1997.
48  Research Notes , Drafting Meeting: A Call to Prophetic Action!, Mutare, 10 March
1997.
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call to “more and more programmes of action” in place of “pious prayers;” Banana’s radical
theology did not appeal to all.46 
Drafting committees were brought together composed of a balance of men and
women, denominations, and with student/youth delegates included, to address the three main
areas of concern — governance, economic justice, and gender and youth – through the drafting
of a ‘Kairos’ document.  At each meeting drafts were prepared, then read out and discussed.
On the following morning, participants would examine a typed draft of the previous day’s
discussions, and begin to discuss the impact of the word-usage, and, in some cases, add/derive
a theological basis for the arguments being made.  It was a fascinating balance of wanting to
be critical, but at the same time wanting to be acceptable to the government, so that it would
listen.  
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Mutare, Bishop Muchabaiwa, provides an interesting
example. As the highest profile participant in the drafting process, he had the most to lose by
being connected with the project.  He was most insistent that the document must be sent to
the President before it was released and absolutely refused to allow the inclusion of any
reference to the Matabeleland crisis.  But it was not just the inclusion/exclusion of material or
the fashion in which it was released which concerned him, but also the language used in the
document.  He warned participants at the first drafting meeting on the issue of governance that
“we should speak with the voice of God...we must avoid speaking like an opposition party.”47
At a subsequent meeting,  he again reminded participants, “We are people sent by God to say
something about our country...We are not political people.”48  And indeed, the most intractable
debates were less about the inclusion of material — sexuality, references to vote-rigging, or
49  ESS, A call to prophetic action! Towards the jubilee year 2000 (Harare, ESS, 1998);
Stephen Brown, “Zimbabwe Kairos document dares to condemn corruption and inequality”
ENI 14 December 1998. 
50  Research notes, Highfield Kairos meeting, 21 September 1999
51  Research notes, ZIMCODD founding meeting, 23 September 1999; Busani Bafana,
“NGO calls for probe into govt debt” Independent 1 September 2000; “Developing countries
debt be written off - ZCC” .Mirror 11 September, 1998.
52  Interview with Murombedzi Kuchera, ZCC, 11 September 1995.
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Matabeleland — and more about toning down the explicitly ‘political’ language in the
document.  
The document, a fifty page booklet,  was launched during the World Council of
Churches meeting in Harare in 1998.49 It was then distributed to individual churches and
workshops were organized by ESS, with the intention of bringing together clergy who worked
in town or high-density areas to discuss the issues.50  The jubilee theme also linked into the
international Jubilee 2000 campaign, with both the ZCC and ESS organizing further around
the issue of Zimbabwe’s debt in 1999-2000.51
6.2.6 Church NGOs and Economic Policy Issues
 The two most striking aspects of NGO involvement with economic issues in Zimbabwe are
 the preponderance of church organizations and the language used in contacts among NGOs
and between NGOs and the state.
ESS and ZCC have been the leaders of advocacy around issues of economic justice,
basing their critiques on biblical citations and/or theological premises, reflecting both their
rationale for addressing such issues and their recognition that explicitly political actors will be
ignored.  The ZCC calls this its ‘midwifery role’ and denies that there are political overtones
to their activities.  Reverend Kuchera insisted fervently that “we [ZCC] are not a political
organization,”52.  Similarly, as we have seen, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Mutare reminded
participants in the drafting of a document on economic justice and governance that, they were
church people, not political activists.  At the same time, a strong thread of nationalism is also
53  Kuchera, “Official Opening Address” 3.
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present in  criticisms that the “[economic] planning system is outward looking”53 and that the
people of Zimbabwe must be involved in the planning process.  
These two trends mean that in many ways the discourse of economic advocacy in
Zimbabwe reflected the official discourse of Zimbabwe, adopting a nationalistic tone and
deferring  to government.  The leaders of these groups were not unsophisticated and using the
language of the state and refusing to challenge the government’s ostensible monopoly on
politics both protected their status and encouraged the less radical among their flocks to
become involved.
6.3 The PVO Act
The introduction of the PVO Act in 1995, while interpreted by some as a sign of increasing
government repression, was not initially of concern to a wide number of NGOs.  The PVO
Campaign illuminates both the strengths and the weaknesses of the NGO community in
Zimbabwe.   
6.3.1 The History of the Act
In 1995, the Welfare Organizations Act, which had been brought in in 1967 to oversee the
actions of organizations supporting the ‘terrorists’ and their families during the liberation war,
was amended and renamed the Private Voluntary Organizations Act.  The amended Act gave
the Minister responsible for NGOs (currently the Department of Public Service, Labour and
Social Welfare) the power to suspend (or ‘gazette’) any or all members of executive committees
and to appoint trustees to run the organization.  The Minister was to base such a decision
“...on information supplied to him” which would determine if an organization was deemed to
have “...ceased to operate in furtherance of the objects specified in its constitution; or the mal-
54 GOZ, Welfare Organizations Amendment Act 1995. 
55  “New hope for ailing organisation” Herald 3 September 1982, 7.
56  “Learning never stops” Herald 3 September 1982, 7.
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administration of the organization is adversely affecting the activities of the organization; or,
the organization is involved in any illegal activities; or it is necessary or desirable to do so in the
public interest.”54  The Minister was therefore not required to carry out any investigations into
the allegations, nor were organizations provided with the possibility of appeal or presentations
of their case.  The Minister was to be constrained by an appointed Board composed of
representatives of NGOs, Ministries, and the provinces of Zimbabwe; however, all
appointments were made through the Minister.
6.3.2  The AWC Case
To date the Act has been used only once, to ‘gazette’ the executive members of the
Association of Women’s Clubs (AWC), a grass-roots NGO with over 40 000 members
founded in 1938.  Helen Vera Mangwende founded the organization to “uplift the lives of her
fellow women.”  The AWC faced administrative and financial difficulties in the 1980s as
membership had declined in the later years of the liberation war.55   The first post-
independence chair of the AWC appointed in 1982, Mrs Betty Mtero, was also at that time
employed in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Community Development.56  She then
became the National Director of AWC, but was dismissed in 1992 for financial
mismanagement.  
In the 1990s the AWC had begun to revive, under the chairship of Sekai Holland.
Holland was the daughter of the first black editor of a newspaper, MM Hove, later a Rhodesian
MP and ambassador to Nigeria for the Federation of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias.  A student
overseas in the 1960s, Holland was  ZANU’s representative in Australia in the 1970s and
57  “Sekai begins a new struggle” Herald 6 November 1981, p. 12 and various
discussions, 1996-7. 
58  Vincent Chikwari, “Shamuyarira accused of bid to hijack women’s projects” Financial
Gazette 30 November 1995; Diana Mitchell, “Political leaders frustrating women’s efforts”
Independent 11 October 1996, 23; various discussions with Sekai Holland, 1996-1997.
59  GOZ, Government Gazette Extraordinary, Vol. LXXIII, No. 59A, 2 November
1995.
60 “Team of Trustees to run association of women’s clubs” Sunday Mail, 5 November
1995; “Newly elected women’s clubs council urged to be vigilant” Sunday Mail 9 June 1996
“Party Women take over NGO” Independent, 19 July 96, 1; various discussions with Sekai
Holland 1996-1997; personal communication from Jim Holland, 7 August 2001.
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remained a staunch supporter of the Women’s League in the 1980s and 1990s after her return.57
The AWC’s outlook improved in the 1990s, with promised donor funding of ZWD$ 11 million
for programmes between 1994 and 1998.58  However, in 1995,  after some informal meetings
with the Social Welfare department, the government issued a gazette, or notice, that the
Executive Committee of the AWC was suspended, indefinitely, from their roles and
responsibilities.59  A caretaker administration was installed, which was later replaced with an
elected committee of women alleged to be “loyal” representatives of ZANU(PF)’s Women’s
League.  The former Chair and Director, Mrs Mtero was reappointed Director, which led to
suspicions that the attack on AWC was little more than her orchestrated revenge.60  
The gazetted women applied to the Supreme Court in May 1996, asking the court to
rule on the constitutionality of the Act.  They alleged that it infringed on rights guaranteed in
three sections of the constitution. Firstly, it was suggested that the Act infringed on the right
to freedom of association (section 21(1) of the constitution) as the gazetted women were
removed from being able to exercise rights and duties of members of the AWC. Similarly, the
suggested that their gazetting infringed on their rights of freedom of expression (section 20(1)
of the constitution), arguing that expression might be construed broadly to include serving as
an executive member, that is, putting into practice their thoughts and beliefs through the
executive office.  Finally, they argued that their right to a fair hearing was infringed because the
61 Applicants’ Heads of Argument. Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Case No. S.C.
333/96, 14 October 1996, 2.
62  Judgement No S C 15/97 Civil Application No. 333/96. Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe. 11 February 1997, 9; Judgement also reported as “Holland &  Ors. V. Minister of
the Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Zimbabwe Law Reports, 1997 (1), pp. 186-196.
63  E.  Maisiri, “The Fourth NANGO national annual general meeting: Cresta Oasis
Hotel, Harare: January 7, 1995" NANGO News and Views, February 1995.
64   “State to introduce Bill to monitor activities of NGOs” Herald 8 February 1995;
Interview,  Agatha Dodo, NANGO, 4 September 1995.
65  Letter from S.S.P. Matindike, Executive Director of NANGO to the Hon.  Mr. J.
Nkomo, Minister of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare.  7 February 1995.
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Act makes no provision for a fair hearing, nor was one held, in violation of section 18 (9) of
the Constitution.61
In February 1997, the judges found unanimously in favour of the third argument, that
the right of the applicants to a fair hearing had been obstructed.  They noted that there had
been no notice given of the charge or complaint, that the applicants had been given no chance
to respond to the charge or complaint and that therefore there had been no impartial hearing.62
6.3.3  The Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act
NGOs were slow in responding to the invasive potential of the Act.  In January 1995 the then
Acting Director (subsequently Director) of the Department of Social Welfare had informed the
Annual General Meeting of NANGO that the Ministry was in the process of revising the Act.63
However, both NANGO and most NGOs insist that the details of the Amendment only came
to the attention of NGOs after its second reading in Parliament on 7 February 1995 led to a
report in the daily newspaper.64  There seems to have been no consultation between NANGO
and Social Welfare until this time, at which point the Executive Director of NANGO
contacted the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare to criticize the proposed
name change from Welfare Organizations to Private Voluntary Organizations.65 
However, in the months following the adoption of the act, some NGOs became aware
of the Act and concerned about the potential for Ministerial abuse.   ZimRights publicized
66  ZimRights.  “New NGO Act Threatens Freedom.”  (Harare: ZimRights, n.d.).
67  Interview, Murombedzi Kuchera, ZCC General Secretary, 11 September 1995. 
68 NANGO. “Amendments to the Social Welfare Organisations Act (PVO)
Recommendations by the Task Committee”. n.d.
69 NANGO, "Amendments to the Social Welfare Organizations Act (PVO),
recommendations by the Task Committee.”  n.d.
70  “Officials resign as NANGO goes broke” Financial Gazette, 1 August 1998. The
members who resigned were: Paul Themba Nyathi, Toko Ruzvidzo, Eunice Njovana, Niki
Jazdowska, and Priscilla Misihairambwi.
71  ZimRights.  Report of a Workshop on NGO Activisim held at Adelaide Acres Jun1 17-19,
1996 (Harare: ZimRights, nd.) 2.
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concerns about the Act at the 1995 Zimbabwe International Book Fair, but there was little
other public attention.66  In mid-1995, when I asked Revd Kuchera of the Zimbabwe Council
of Churches, what his organization was doing about the new Act, he said: 
I am not really very worried about it...the basic welfare operations will remain
the same...so I am not going to spend my time and my energy trying to look
at the dots and the full-stops.....what difference does it make?67
But this did not represent the views of all NGOs.   A taskforce established by NGOs within
NANGO's Northern region suggested that “..the present Act goes beyond the legitimacy of
the Government to oversee the work of NGOs.  NGOs feel that the Act has every room to
cater for abuse, corruption and even threatening the independence of NGO work.”68  The
NGOs therefore suggested several amendments to the Act including definition of what sources
of information the Minister can use to justify the suspension of an NGO, that the Board
should be appointed from a short list of nominees prepared by NGOs and that at least two-
thirds of the members should represent NGOs, and the inclusion of a process of appeal.69
This effort to respond to the Bill within the strictures of NANGO failed to reach a broad
spectrum of NGOs and fell into abeyance with the resignation of several key actors from the
Northern Region Executive committee, who had also been involved in the TaskForce.70
Finally, in June 1996, seven months after the gazetting of the AWC and eighteen
months since the introduction of the Act, ZimRights organized a workshop on NGO Activism
—“...instigated by the failure of NGOs to unite in opposition to the PVO Act”71 —  which was
72 Another Working Group on Land also evolved from this process, convened by
ZimRights.  It  organised a workshop on Land Issues in July 1997.
73 Emilia James, Streets Ahead (an organisation working with streetkids), Barbra Kohlo
and Regis Mtutu (Convenor) of Housing People of Zimbabwe (an organisation working with
housing co-operatives), Jonah K. Gokova of Ecumenical Support Services (an
interdenominational church organisation), Paul T. Nyathi of the Zimbabwe Project (a
development NGO), and David Chimhini of ZimRights (a human rights organisation); the
latter three are all directors of their organisations.
74  Research Notes, Steering Committee Meeting, 10 February 1997.
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followed in September 1996 by a second meeting sponsored by  MWENGO, a regional NGO
led by Ezra Mbogori, one of the lead actors in Kenya’s own campaign against regulation.  Out
of this workshop emanated the Steering Group of the Campaign for the Repeal of PVO Act,72
which was composed of six staff members of five different NGOs.73  While the Campaign had
a mailing list of dozens of NGOs, these initial members remained the key players.  As the
Campaign progressed, other people, including myself, attended meetings regularly, but were
never publicly recognized as campaign members.  The steering committee was aware of its
potentially high profile and concomitant points of weakness — such as “foreign influence” —
leading them to suggest that the taskforce be extended by inviting staff from MWENGO,
OXFAM, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to attend as “invisible members.”74 
Costs of the Campaign were shared between NGOs, one paying for meetings, another
for advertising space in newspapers, others providing photocopying for materials, or meeting
space.  This channeling of funds was facilitated by the relative access to funds of those
members who were directors of their NGOs.  Funds were also found from OXFAM, and
channeled through the Committee to support the AWC women in collecting signatures.  In
August 1997, it was proposed that donors be approached to fund the campaign formally.  
The PVO campaign was handicapped by the limited networking of NGOs in
Zimbabwe, which prevents the spread of information  and the reluctance of the mainstream
press to print articles on the PVO Act.  At the same time, the Campaign had decided not to
seek media attention for itself, but to ‘conscientize’ NGOs first and then ‘go public’.  It was felt
75  Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act, “Minutes of the PVO Act NGO Meeting
held at Monomotapa Crowne Plaza 23 October 1996, 2:30pm-5pm.” 7.
76 Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act, “NGO Briefing paper: The private voluntary
organisations Act: A widening rift between civil society and the state in Zimbabwe.” n.d. n.p.
77 Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act,  “NGO Briefing paper: The private voluntary
organisations Act: A widening rift between civil society and the state in Zimbabwe.”  N.d. 5.
78 Campaign  for the Repeal of the PVO Act, Joint statement by Non Governmental
Organisations and concerned citizens demanding the Repeal of the Private Voluntary
Organisations Act 1995 (chapter 93). October 1996.
79 Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act,  Joint Statement by Non Governmental
Organisations and Concerned Citizens demanding the Repeal of the Private Voluntary
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that the Minister of Social Welfare would not understand if a public campaign was launched
before the Ministry had been formally appraised of the Campaign’s activities: “This could be
seen as a sign of negotiating in bad faith.”75
Few NGOs had much information about the PVO Act or the gazetting of the AWC.
The Campaign’s first tactic was to prepare a briefing paper with information about the Act.76
The briefing paper explained the Act, gave details of the AWC case, and suggested that the Act
was neither enabling nor supportive of NGO efforts.  It proposed that: 
...serious and constructive dialogue between the Government of Zimbabwe
and leaders within the NGO community from across the country is long
overdue....Otherwise the conflicts and antagonisms will continue to the
detriment of development.”77
A ‘joint statement’ or  petition launched in October was circulated to as many NGOs
as we could find addresses for along with copies of the briefing paper.78   The petition began
by explaining the PVO Act, suggested that NGOs need to be accountable, and concluded by
noting that:
...civil society has always and continues to make valuable contributions to the
development of this nation and that Government has on numerous occasions
committed itself to promoting good governance, democracy and the rule of
law.  The Private Voluntary Organisations Act runs contrary to these
commitments.  We, the undersigned are therefore determined to have the
Private Voluntary Organisations Act repealed.  We demand a democratic
environment free of the threatened government interference for meaning ful
NGO participation in Zimbabwe.  We call upon the Minister to institute an
open and serious discussion with NGOs so as to involve them in the drafting
of acceptable NGO legislation.79
Organisations Act 1995 (Chpater 93), October 1996, 2.
80 Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act, Fact Sheet No. 1 “The PVO Act: A
History and Analysis”; Fact Sheet No. 2: “A Case Study: The AWC”; Fact Sheet No. 3 “NGO
Responses to the PVO Act”; Fact Sheet No. 4 “New legislation? Towards a Consultative
Drafting Process” n.d.n.p.. 
81 Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act,  The Non-Governmental Organisations
Act, Zimbabwe: for discussion; first draft, July 1997.
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It was widely signed and although several hundred signatures came in from NGOs, most of
the signatures were collected by the gazetted women from rural members of the AWC.  In
March 1997 the Campaign sent several letters to the Minister of Social Welfare requesting a
meeting at which these petitions could be presented, but as no response was ever given, this
was never done.
In April 1997, the campaign realized that the briefing paper needed to be supplemented
with some easier to read materials and created an Information Kit of four fact sheets, which
were initially distributed at the NGO Convention.80  These sheets tried to address some of the
issues raised in the briefing paper in an accessible point-form format, as well as updating
NGOs on recent events, such as the AWC case and the campaign’s activities.  As word came
in that the Ministry was willing to consider consulting NGOs on the revised Act, a decision was
made by the campaign that it was essential to begin a consultative process with NGOs.  It was
agreed to ask a consultant to draft a new Act, to be used as a discussion piece with NGOs.
Tawanda Mutasah, a ZCC employee with legal training,  prepared the draft.81  A funding
proposal was prepared to be distributed to likely donors, and a timetable developed for
contacting NGOs in all regions.  
6.3.4 The Politics of not being NANGO
One of the strengths of the PVO Campaign was the trust that developed between campaign
members, as they talked, joked and shared information.  Nevertheless, the Campaign was
82  Research Notes, PVO Act Meeting, 29 January 1997.
83  Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act,  “Minutes of the PVO Act meeting held
at Monomatapa  Crowne Plaza 23 October 1996, 2:30pm-5pm” 4.
84  Research Notes, PVO Act meeting, 23 October 1996. 
85   Research Notes, PVO Act meeting, 23 October 1996.
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regularly challenged by members of other NGOs to justify its existence.  The Campaign was
seen as trespassing on NANGO’s space, since NANGO remained the Government-endorsed
umbrella organization for NGOs.  Therefore, NGOs who disapproved of the Campaign’s
notoriety were sceptical of the campaign’s motives.  As a new attendee at one meeting said
“We’ve never had any such thing in this country, we have been working so well with
government” asking, “had we [the campaign] gotten legal advice before proceeding?”82
Committee members answered such  criticisms by saying that NGOs needed to speak
for themselves.  At previous meetings (under the aegis of NANGO), the government had set
the agenda and sometimes government representatives had outnumbered the NGOs present.
It was therefore proposed that NGOs need a united front: “We as NGOs should lay down the
agenda and follow it through.”83 
Another challenge to the Campaign’s legitimacy was that the NGOs within the
Campaign were not necessarily representative of the NGO community in Zimbabwe as a
whole, but were instead a Harare-based élite, concerned with issues less “grounded” than those
of rural or small-town NGOs.  As the chair of the first meeting of the Campaign said, even if
all the NGOs in Zimbabwe were not involved,  it doesn’t matter because “...we are letting the
government get away with what it wants to do.”84
Another frequent challenge was “Is NANGO here? Were they invited?”; “What about
NANGO, shouldn’t NANGO be doing this instead of you?”  The campaign was perceived to
have been working behind NANGO’s back.   Some campaign members  responded  by
suggesting that there was no reason that all NGOs must be united, decrying the Zimbabwean
“fetish for unity.”85  A more common response was to legitimize the PVO campaign by linking
86 NANGO,  “Minutes of the NANGO Northern region Extra-ordinary Meeting.
Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau, Harare,” 20 November 1996.
87  Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act.  “Minutes of the joint PVO Act Steering
Committee/NANGO.  Held at NANGO offices, 6 November 1996.”
88  Research Notes, PVO Act meeting “Unfinished Business” 7 March 1997.
89  Research Notes, PVO Act meeting “Unfinished Business”, 7 March 1997.
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it with NANGO and suggesting that the Campaign was the logical outcome of previous
NANGO involvement.  In order to minimize the problems created by such questions,  the
Campaign made a tactical decision to meet with NANGO’s Chair, Alexander Phiri, who was
known to resent the Campaign, and had warned NGOs publicly of “the dangers of operating
in an unco-ordinated way” and suggested that the problem with the AWC issue was that “there
are too many actors working on it.86  Phiri appeared to support the campaign in the private
meeting, but then suggested activists “hand it over” to NANGO, leaving matters at a
standstill.87  
The state also used NANGO’s inefficiency and the campaign’s unofficial status to
justify its own failure to consult or inform NGOs of developments.  As the Director of Social
Welfare, said: 
The problem we have had with you NGOs is that when we want to dialogue
with you who do we approach?  There are 700 of you...One of the things we
want to encourage is that NGOs have boards we can approach who are
actually representing you.  Currently we do not have this.  Some of you have
denounced your own board but have not managed to replace it with
something else. 88
When challenged to consult with NGOs, and not simply present another fait accompli, the
Director replied: “I can’t be in limbo...I must go to NANGO if there is a decision to be
made.”89
6.3.5  The Politics of Opposing the State
The PVO Campaign’s ambiguous status, in that the Ministry claimed that NANGO was the
preferred channel for complaints about policy, meant that it never formally met the
90  Research Notes, ZCC-PVO Act Meeting, 13 February 1997.
91  Research Notes, ZCC-PVO Act Meeting, 13 February 1997.
92  Research Notes, ZCC-PVO Act Meeting, 13 February 1997.
93   Research Notes, PVO Act Meeting “Unfinished Business” 7 March 1997.
94   Research Notes, PVO Act meeting “Unfinished Business” 7 March 1997.
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government.  However, two mediated meetings were organized to bring NGOs and the state
together.  The first, organized by the ZCC, occurred soon after the Supreme Court ruling on
the AWC case.  The Minister of Social Welfare had been invited, but sent the Director instead.
 In welcoming people to the meeting, Deprose Muchena, who chaired the meeting, described
it as merely an example of the ZCC’s “midwifery role to bring government to dialogue with
civil society.”90  The Director argued that the new Act was intended to recognize the shift of
NGOs from charity work towards development, indeed that “the soul of the new Act places
emphasis on development.”91  Although not attacking this pronouncement directly, Rudo
Kwaramba, one of the speakers, suggested that: 
It is essentially the right to development of our entire society that is at
stake...This is why people should not be unnecessarily confrontational...We
need to come up with a process that will continue the discourse of
government and civil society.92
At the next meeting, this time organized by a collection of organizations which had been
present at the previous meeting and entitled “The PVO Act: Unfinished Business,” the
Director stressed that he almost didn’t accept the invitation to address the meeting because “..at
the last meeting it seemed there was no dialogue; that people were more interested in
attacking.”93  There was discussion, however,  at this meeting, and the Director insisted, “we
want to see NGOs operating with us as partners.  NGOs are doing a very good job in this
country, and we want to facilitate that...we want to see NGOs being complementary to
Government activities.”94  Yet, despite NGOs and government both laying out their positions
and clearing the air somewhat, neither the government nor the NGOs initiated any further
contact or negotiations in 1997.  
95   Telephone conversation with Sekai Holland 14 February 1997.
96   Research Notes, Steering Committee meeting with gazetted women, January 1997.
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While official contact with the Ministry was limited, the ruling party and the
government’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) seemed more interested.  On the Friday
following the Supreme Court ruling, ESS received a phone call from the gazetted chair of the
AWC, saying that she had just been warned to maintain a low profile on the weekend following
because the ZANU(PF) Women’s League was “out to get gazetted women and PVO
Committee members; that we would all be beaten up.”95  Similarly, when the AWC members
were campaigning for signatures on their petition, women in Masvingo only put their first
names on the petition because they were afraid that CIO would “wake them up at dawn”, but
they wanted their names on it because they thought “ there might be some money in it if it was
successful.”96
ESS was also vulnerable because it was not registered with the Department of Social
Welfare as an NGO.  A senior official in the department called one morning to arrange a
meeting, at which he said that ESS was on a list of unregistered NGOs which the government
planned to close down.  The Co-ordinator promised to register and nothing further was heard
about it.  It was also during this period that Housing People of Zimbabwe, which provided the
Campaign’s official address and phone numbers, was paid its first visit by the CIO’s NGO
desk.  On the whole, members of the Campaign did not feel themselves to be particularly
threatened, nor felt the need to hide their activities, although the single mothers who were
members were conscious of their more precarious situations.
Despite its slow start, the Campaign was successful in educating and informing people
about the PVO Act.  Its failure to interact on any formal level with the Ministry responsible for
the Act suggests that the state’s stonewalling or non-decision-making tactics — aided and
abetted by the divisions within the NGO community — were effective in keeping the campaign
at an arm’s length.  Nevertheless, the Campaign stirred up NGOs in Zimbabwe and became
97  Personal communication, Regis Mtutu, December 1997.
98  For an initial commentary on this process, see: Erin McCandless, “Zimbabwe’s Social
Movement Organizations: Challenging Economic Policy Reform” in Yuka Suzuki and Eric
Worby, eds. Zimbabwe: the Politics of Crisis and the Crisis of Politics (New Haven: Yale Centre for
International and Area Studies, 2001)
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a model for further lobbying and advocacy.  The Campaign’s depiction of NGOs as
development actors, deserving of input into state policies, effectively made a mockery of the
state’s own discourse of facilitating development.  
6.4 From Ad-hoc Coalitions to the NGO Coalition for Change
These coalitions were not without their weaknesses.  They were reactive rather than proactive
in that they only came into existence when there was an issue to be addressed.   The arrival of
a new issue easily distracts many of the key actors into a new stream of coalitions and advocacy.
While coalitions of this sort may be less vulnerable to government intrusion, they are more
vulnerable to other challenges and it is more difficult for them to keep up the momentum of
activities.   The PVO Coalition proved to be especially dependent of the more active members
— those who got something done.  In August 1997, the regular meeting pattern broke down
and following my departure and the departure of the convenor for a business trip to Sweden,
even less happened.97  Several key actors of the PVO Campaign— Jonah Gokova, Regis Mtutu,
and Niki Jazdowska — joined by Fr Brian MacGarry, a Catholic priest deeply involved with
campaigns for economic justice, then became involved in the Parliamentary Reform
Committee’s call for input from civil society. The World Bank’s SAPRIN initiative, designed
to bring civic organizations into dialogue with their governments and the Bank, also made
demands on activists’ time and energy.98
The PVO campaign also indirectly spurred activity within those NGOs dedicated to
resuscitating NANGO.  A remarkably well attended national meeting was held in 1997, to
discuss NANGO’s crisis.   Yet,  the meeting failed to explicitly refer to either NANGO’s debt
99  Research Notes, 29 April 1997; NANGO. A Co-ordinated voice for NGO’s—The path
ahead by G. Madzima  May 1997,  48.
100 “Phiri vows to change NANGO” Sunday Mail, 19 July 1998.
101  Interview, Jonah Mudehwe, NANGO, 16 September 1999. 
102  NANGO “Dissemination of news on election of a new NANGO national Board”
8 June 1999; “Kgogo Mudenge is new Nango chairperson” Herald 16 June 1999; Interviews,
Jonah Gokova 9 September 1999, Paul Themba Nyathi, 16 September 1999. 
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or the record of financial mismanagement. It was also left to the PVO campaign group to
circulate information and let non-Harare based members know about their activities.  The
meeting further elected the Deputy Director of Social Welfare onto the Task Force charged
with resolving NANGO’s administrative and financial crisis.99  
NANGO was forced to retrench most staff, leaving a core of only three, closed the
regional offices that had been opened as part of the transition from VOICE to NANGO, and
managed to reduce debt to a manageable ZWD 500, 000.100  By 1999, NANGO seemed to
have been resuscitated with the appointment of a new Director whose probity  was respected
by many of the NGOs.  New donors had been signed up including the EU, DFID, USAID,
and NPA and an updated membership list recorded 200 members, of which perhaps 50-60%
had paid fees.101   Leaving the VOICE and NANGO offices in 1999, they had moved into
smaller, but tidier premises in Mass Media House. With new funding, staffing levels rose back
up to eight, and the NANGO offices presented a far more efficient and orderly presence than
in the previous 10 years.
Yet, it was not clear, despite these promising moves that NANGO was going to be any
more effective in co-ordinating NGOs, especially vis-a-vis government.  Those NGO
personnel who had been  most active in networking and activism refused to be nominated for
the NANGO board, because the new chair was Mrs Kgogo Mudenge, the director of the
Danhiko project but also the wife of Stan Mudenge, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.102  As a
result, the new committee was distinctly lacking in seasoned activists.  
103 Interview, Jonah Mudehwe, NANGO Executive Director, 16 September 1999. 
104  NGO Coalition for Change, Minutes of the first meeting for the establishment of
an issue-based Non-governmental Organisations Coalition held on the 24th of September 1998;
NGO Coalition for Change, Minutes from constituting meeting of the NGO Coalition for
Change, NCC, on 30 November 1998;NGO Coalition for Change, NGO coalition meeting
held at OTD on 16-17 February 1999; NGO Coalition for Change, NGO coalition meeting
held at NPA offices on 20 March 1999.
105  NGO Coalition for Change, Press statement,  30 November 1998; “NGOs in
coalition” Independent 11 December 1998. 
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At the same time, although the new committee of NANGO had decided that advocacy
would be one of its three key programmes, the on-going NCA-CC confrontation (discussed
in chapter 7) meant that NANGO “was having to take a back seat because some members feel
strongly about the CC.  We don’t want problems, for NANGO to be split.”103  While this
would no doubt assuage the concerns of the more pro-government NGOs, including
presumably the new national Chair, it only served to further alienate the ‘activist’ NGOs.  In
response, ESS co-ordinated a series of meeting in late 1998 and 1999, attended by a select
group of  ‘activist’ NGOs.104  The NGO Coalition for Change (NCC) was created as an
informal coalition which aligned itself explicitly and publicly to the NCA and ZCTU.105  As we
shall also see in chapter 7 and 8, all of those involved in the economic justice networks and the
PVO campaign also became key players in the NCA and the MDC.  
6.5 Conclusion
While the 1990s represented a growth period for NGOs in Zimbabwe, it was also a time when
economic and social conditions became much more difficult.  Despite NGOs’ involvement
with the social welfare of both urban and rural peoples, few NGOs were involved in lobbying
and advocacy work concerning economic policy.  Even when legislation was implemented to
control NGO activity, NGOs were reluctant to intervene.   
While most NGOs were constrained by ideological and material constraints, a few
‘activist’ NGOs attempted to create networks through which activism could be initiated.  Many,
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if not most, of the activists were staff or board members of NGOs, yet because of their
functional difference from NGOs, coalitions seem to accomplish more, at least on overtly
political issues, than individual NGOs.  Coalitions were “safer” from attack either by the state
or donors because they were not isolated NGOs,  in that they were not vulnerable to
‘gazetting,’ and  because they depended less on donor-funding.  
The cases discussed in this chapter reveal the continuing power of the regime’s politics
of inclusion.  Even those NGOs concerned about economic policy or the PVO Act continue
to be wary of moving outside the approved networks that mediated relations between the state
and NGOs.  NGOs were sensitive to the way appeals were framed and the mechanisms used
to propagate their perspectives.   They attempted to avoid confrontation with the state and
party policy-makers, for  their own protection and because they were balancing the concerns
of disparate organizations.
As we shall see in Chapter 7, it is only when NGOs are able to ally with other social
forces, and when the political hegemony of the regime is much weakened, that NGOs are
willing to enter into more adversarial confrontation with the state.
1  Raftopoulos, “The State, NGOs and democratization” 45.
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Part IV    The Politics of Exclusion, 1997-2000
Between 1997 and 2000 politics in Zimbabwe changed dramatically, culminating in the
constitutional referendum in February 2000 and the election in June 2000. While, as it will be
seen below, a series of events both political and economic contributed to these changes, NGOs
were significant in originating the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA).  Unlike earlier
NGO coalitions, which seemed to exist on the periphery of political events, the story of the
late 1990s is very much the story of the NCA, and the ways in which it opened up political
debate.  Analyses of the NCA and the political shifts that follow its formation need to be
carefully nuanced.  The story of the NCA discussed in Chapter 7,  reveals the government’s
continuing ability to divide and co-opt civil society actors.  In our surprise at the opposition’s
strength in the 2000 elections and the regime’s desperate recourse to violence, we should not
forget the ambiguities revealed by a careful case study of the NCA.  As Brian Raftopoulos
notes,  
... some NGOs have been willing to develop a more openly critical political
stance against the state, particularly on the issue of constitutional reform.  This
development does not means that such NGOs have completely discarded
their more cautious political strategy towards the state.  However, it does
signal the capacity to move beyond such caution when national and regional
conditions make this a calculated risk.1
Therefore, Chapter 7 will examine the NCA and the broader context of politics between 1997
and 2000, following on both from the focus in section II on state and societal politics more
broadly and section III’s engagement with the specific relation between NGOs and the state.
Chapter 8 will conclude our analysis of the period.  First, it will examine how the constitutional
debate sparked the re-emergence and remobilization of the ruling party and its key allies, the
war veterans.   Next it examines the development of opposition parties after 1997, emphasizing
the MDC, and its links to the ZCTU and NCA.  Finally, it considers the regime’s tactics vis-à-
2  “Minister attacks acts of sabotage” Herald 5 February 1999, 9.
3  “Reconciliation policy may be revisited: President” Sunday Mail, 28 February 1999.
4  Zolberg, Creating Political Order, 87.
5  Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, 166. 
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vis farmers, farm-workers, and other perceived supporters of the opposition. Like the violence
after the referendum, the conduct of the election tells us a great deal about the regime’s attitude
not only to its formal opponents, but also those – especially NGOs – who it has by this time
declared to be ‘enemies’.  As this suggests, the final section of the chapter brings the thesis back
to the question of regime endurance. 
The mobilization of the war veterans in 1997, the increasing militarization and
politicization of the state apparatus, and the regime’s increasingly heavy-handed approach to
the media, together with the self-inflicted economic crisis, drove previously quiescent groups
into alliance with the ‘opposition’.  By February 1999, Minister Sidney Sekeramayi alleged that
“some foreign governments are forming an informal coalition with the press to try and remove
the Zimbabwean government from power.”2  And later the same month, the President stated
that the actions of some groups (presumably including the NCA and journalists) might force
the party to ‘revisit’ the policy of reconciliation.3  Such rhetoric intensified  during the
referendum and elections, and relations between state and society became increasingly
polarized.
The material presented in the following chapters suggests that the regime also
continued to attempt to incorporate activists and others into its coalition. As Aristide Zolberg,
observing the West African party states in the 1960s, noted, even as coercion and violence
escalated, “the earlier process of co-optation, negotiation and reconciliation [was] never fully
superseded.”4  The mobilization of one group  – the war veterans – within the ruling coalition
was not just perceived as a threat, but was a real threat to the continued livelihood of farmers and
white businesspeople, as well as farm workers.5  By 2000, the war veterans had made it clear
that the condition of their co-option was the appropriation of land. ZANU(PF) then integrated
6  Robert Rotberg, “Africa’s Mess, Mugabe’s Mayhem” Foreign Affairs, 79, 5 (2000). 
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the discourses of land and nationalism into a potent rhetorical vision.  In arguing this, I am not
dismissing the ways in which land, like the concomitant anti-white rhetoric,  was an electoral
tool, nor am I suggesting that the war veterans were in control of the party’s agenda.  But I am
suggesting that we need to step back and situate these political decisions against the historical
development of state-society relations.  To simply dismiss the Zimbabwean crisis as the result
of poor leadership, connived at by weak neighbours and donor governments,  as in Robert
Rotberg’s “Africa’s Mess, Mugabe’s Mayhem” is unsatisfactory.6  Nationalism continues to be
a potent force in Zimbabwean politics, as does the incontrovertible desire for access to land
among both urban and rural peoples.
Between 1997 and 2000, we see a regime struggling to maintain its hold on power,
losing both the active and passive support of groups which had been significant to regime
maintenance since 1980, and attempting to go back to the allies of the 1960s and 1970s. 
1  “Meetings with war vets turn nasty” Herald 21 July 1997, 1, 8; “Ex-combatants loot
ZANU (PF) HQ” Herald 14 August 1997, 1;”Compensation demands to continue: Hunzvi”
Herald 15 August 1997, 1, 7;  GOZ. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the
Administration of the War Victims compensation Act [Chapter 11.16].  May 1998.
2  Iden Wetherell, “Mugabe under siege: ending the plunder?”  Southern Africa Report
March 1998, 16-18
198
Chapter 7   The Politics of 1997-2000: the January 2000 Referendum
Apparently contradictory trends dominate the political landscape after 1997.  While some have
described this process as a period of ‘democratization’ it might also be seen as increased
authoritarianism, following trends set between 1990 and 1997.  This chapter will track the
changes in state-society relations, looking at how NGO coalitions worked with a  broad range
of societal organizations to profoundly shape political outcomes at the end of the decade.
7.1 Growing Unrest
In 1997 a series of incidents, which included the crisis over the claims of the war veterans,
Zimbabwe’s entry into the Congo war, and the weakening economy sent reverberations across
the political sphere. The regime’s basis of legitimacy was called into question as veterans of the
liberation war camped outside the President’s official residence and stormed the ZANU(PF)
headquarters, in reaction to Margaret Dongo’s revelation in Parliament that a fund set up to
compensate war veterans injured during the liberation war scandal had been looted by high-
level ZANU(PF) functionaries.1  These embarrassing disclosures led Mugabe to commit funds
to war veteran pensions in November 1997, which was one of a series of financial actions that
led to the dollar’s collapse on ‘Black Friday’.2  While import and investment sectors of
Zimbabwe’s economy had benefitted under ESAP,  the dollar’s collapse in 1997 meant that
conditions worsened for all but a very few.
3  “Commuters relive ‘80s public transport blues” Herald 15 February 1999, 11.
4  “Ordinary workers worse off now than 10 years ago as inflation bites” Herald 24 May
1999, 1.  
5  “ZCTU bills strike the most successful ever” Financial Gazette, 11 December 1997;
Never Gadaga, “Rage at Police attacks in Zimbabwe” Mail & Guardian, 11 December 1997;
Chris McGreal, “Zim’s ‘unholy alliance’: black workers , white farmers” Mail & Guardian, 17
December 1997.
6  Never Gadaga, “Violent demos rock Harare” Mail & Guardian 20 January 1998;
Pedzisai Ruhana, “Riots bring hasty reverse  on maize prices” MISA 20 January 1998.
7  “Tens of thousands defy Mugabe in Zimbabwe anti-government strike” SAPA 3
March 1998; “National strike cripples economy for second day” SAPA 4 March 1998; Iden
Wetherell, “Threats fail to  halt Zim's workers” Mail & Guardian, 6 March 1998.
8  “Demo ban unconstitutional - lawyers” Independent 1 August 1997, 8.
9  “Army deployed to quell food riots” PANA 20 January 1998; “Military spark panic
in Zimbabwe’s riot-torn capital” SAPA-AFP 21 January 1998.
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7.1.1 Economic conditions and labour unrest 
The economic crises of the late 1990s,  typified in the falling value of the Zimbabwe dollar and
the fuel shortages of 1999-2000, coupled with continuing issues of unemployment, declining
health and education standards, catalyzed an unprecedented and public critique of the Mugabe
regime.  In 1999, even the Herald commented that the failing urban transport system was back
to pre-structural adjustment conditions, with many workers cycling and walking to their jobs.3
Although the failures of economic policy were mainly blamed on ESAP, the Herald further
noted that workers were on average 10 times poorer in 1999 than in 1990.4
As detailed in Chapter 4, a wave of strikes in all sectors of the economy  in 1996 and
1997 articulated widespread popular discontent.  In protest at tax increases, the  ZCTU
successfully called for a ‘stay-away’ in December 1997, which they estimated to have been
supported by 3.5 million workers.5  While this estimate may have been optimistic, the stay-away
was the first widely observed national protest at government policy since independence.  In
January 1998 food riots erupted throughout Chitungwiza and Harare’s high-density areas, 6
followed by a two-day stay-away called by the ZCTU in March.7  The government’s first
reaction to these ‘stay-aways’ was to ban all demonstrations8 and then to send in the army.9
After the December stay-away, Morgan Tsvangirai was attacked in the Harare ZCTU offices
10  Never Gadaga, “SG of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions attacked”
ZimRights Press release 11 December 1997; “Union is Strength” Africa Confidential, 20 March
1998, 5-6.
11  Lewis Machipisa, “Zim panic over price rises” Mail & Guardian   29 September 1998;
Andrew Meldrum, “Fuel riots erupt in Zimbabwe” Guardian (UK)  5 November 1998; Lewis
Machipisa, “Zim unionists upbeat  after massive strike”, Mail & Guardian  12 November 1998;
“ZCTU to go ahead with next stayaway”Independent 13 November 1998.
12  “Housing for all misses 2000 target’ Herald 13 August 1999, 10
13  See for instance: Angeline Mushakavanhu, “A filthy problem” Standard 24 September
2000; “Virginia Dhliwayo, “Ratepayers protest over rubbish” Standard 26 November 2000.
14  “Bulawayo council to meet” Independent 20 April 2000; “Harare council owed $120
million: ministers not paying rates” Independent 4 June 1999..
15  See for instance: Farai Mutsaka, “Mutare residents want demo over 4000% rates
hike” Standard 7 January 2001; Farai Mutsaka, “Ratepayers halt payments” Standard 11 February
2001; Chengetai Zvauya, “Norton residents refuse to pay rates” Standard 22 August 1999.
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and after  the March stay-away, the ZCTU offices in Bulawayo were destroyed by fire.10 Further
protests occurred in November and December 1998, in reaction to increased fuel prices and
the Congo war intervention.11 
7.1.2 Urban conditions
Housing shortages in urban areas, always a problem, had intensified at the end of the decade
with a recognition that government policies had failed to meet its target of housing for all by
the year 2000, set in 1985.  By 1999, there was a backlog of 1 million units of housing, with
only 200 000 housing units/serviced stands having been created in the intervening period.12 
Municipal facilities, including refuse collection, sewage disposal, water supplies and
roadworks, have been under particular stress with city councils increasingly unable to provide
basic services.  The Harare Council called upon residents to “hold meetings among themselves
to discourage refuse dumping.”13  Municipalities also suffered as the central government failed
to pay bills, leaving them ‘cash-strapped’.14   The decline of socio-economic standards appears
to have also sparked the increasing militancy of rate-payers associations in most towns and an
intensification of urban politics.15
16  “Tawengwa and Vingirai arrested” Herald 23 March 2000; “Tawengwa appears in
court” Herald 24 March 2000.
17 “Massive corruption costs NOCZIM $1.4 bn” Herald 4 February 1999, 1.
18  Wisdom Mdzungairi, “Ex-NOCZIM Boss, senior staff arrested” Herald 1 March
2000; “Chihuri consults Mugabe on ministers implicated in NOCZIM/GMB scandals”
Independent, 3 March 2000. 
19  “Chefs offshore accounts probed” Financial Gazette 6 April 2000.
20  “Scam may have cost DDF $12 million” Herald 10 April 1999, 1;”DDF prejudiced
of millions of dollars” Herald 21 May 1999, 1; “As DDF scandal widens, high level graft
impoverishes rural folk” Independent 16 July 1999.
21  Brian Hungwe “AG’s office accused of taking bribes” Independent 8 October 1999.
22  “Mugabe accuses ministers of accepting bribes” Daily News 21 July 1999;  “Sudden
anti-corruption drive raises eyebrows” Independent 31 March 200.
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 7.1.3 Scandals
As detailed in Chapter 4, in 1997 three major political scandals had hit the headlines: the VIP
housing scheme, the War Veterans, and the Airport tender.  As the decade continued, the list
of scandals unearthed by the increasingly vigilant press increased.   
 The Harare city council  was disbanded after charges of corruption and fraud were laid
against the mayor and senior officials.16 At the same time, senior ministers were implicated in
corruption scandals within two significant parastatals – the National Oil Company of
Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) and the Grain Marketing Board (GMB).17   Ministers were reported to
have benefitted from clandestine fuel deals, which cost NOCZIM an estimated ZWD 1
billion.18  The consequent debts resulted in the fuel crisis of 2000-1.   Kumbirai Kangai, a long-
serving cabinet minster, was alleged to have siphoned ZWD 228.4 million from the GMB while
Minister of Lands and Agriculture.19  In other cases, Ministers were accused of benefitting
disproportionately from the use of government vehicles and services through the District
Development Fund (DDF),20 while in 1999 allegations surfaced that bribery was widespread
within the Attorney-General’s office.21  In the lead-up to the 2000 election,  the government
established an anti-corruption commission, which was widely interpreted as a politically
expedient move.22 
23  Michael Nest, “Ambitions, Profits and loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” African Affairs 100 (2001), 470-471.
24  UN Security Council. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (2001) 28; Andrew
Meldrum, “Zimbabwe loans cut off as leak shows war costs” Mail &Guardian  7 October 1999;
“Zimbabwe’s Congo intervention in official figure” Mail &Guardian  27 October 1999. 
25  “Inside Zimbabwe Inc” Focus 19 (September 2000); UN Security Council. Report of
the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (2001) 33-36.
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7.1.4 The Congo Intervention
In August 1998, the Zimbabwean government sent soldiers to support Laurent Kabila’s
government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which was being militarily
challenged by internal rebels allied with Rwanda and Uganda.   The motives for this
intervention remain somewhat murky but probably include two main factors. First, Mugabe’s
concern to present himself as the leader of the Southern Africa Development Community
(SADC), whose charter obligates members to assist each other in the case of foreign invasion.
Second, the Zimbabwean government had an interest in preserving Kabila in power because
of substantial outstanding loans, which the rebel forces would doubtless not repay.23 
More recently, as Zimbabwe’s commitment to the Congo war has been extended and
expanded, economic interests – especially investments made by army officials – have come to
predominate explanations of Zimbabwe’s involvement.  Increasing emotional costs to the
families of soldiers, and financial costs to the Treasury thought to be  USD 3 million a month,
led to questions  being asked about how the army supported its Congo activities.24   It is alleged
that soldiers were being paid bonuses directly from some DRC companies, and more
significantly, that concessions and joint ventures have been set up to facilitate the expansion
of Zimbabwe investment, benefitting companies controlled by high-ranking military officers
and ZANU officials.25 A UN Security Council report suggests that, “[a]mong all of its allies,
Zimbabwean companies and some decision-makers have benefitted most from this scheme,”
26  UN Security Council. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
(2001) 34.
27  Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe loans cut off as leak shows war costs” Mail
&Guardian  7 October 1999; “Netherlands cancels aid to Zimbabwe” Mail &Guardian 29
September 1999.
28  “Private press editors dismiss government claims” Daily News 4 May 1999, 2.
29  “Grisly trail of 5th Brigade atrocities exposed” Mail & Guardian 9 May 1997;
“Memories of army atrocities still haunt Matabeleland, Mail & Guardian, 13 May 1997; “The
Matabele wounds are still open” Mail & Guardian, 21 May 1997.
30  The independent media had run stories on the atrocities in the 1990s, and in 1996-7,
but the CCJP report provided a particularly stringent account, and the CCJP’s role was, in and
of itself, an important story.  “CCJP Submits report on Mat atrocities to Mugabe” Independent
21 March 1997; “Matabele Slaughter: CCJP report exposé” Standard 4 May 1997, 1, 4;
“Matabeleland atrocities return to haunt the President: Mugabe battles with past that won’t go
away” Financial Gazette, 15 May 1997, 4; “Fifth brigade victims demand official apology”
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which they refer to as “incentives for assistance.”26  The World Bank’s suspension of a much-
needed USD140m loan in October 1999, and aid cancellations by bilateral donors, after a
leaked government memo revealed the extent of government expenditure in the Congo, further
contributed to economic strain.27   Unsurprisingly, many Zimbabweans view these
developments as further evidence that the developmental priorities of the state have shifted
away from poverty-reduction and  towards providing investment opportunities to the élite.
7.1.5 Media Expansion and Crackdown  
Media and communication technology expanded greatly with more urban consumers able to
access cell phones, email and independent radio, TV, and more newspapers than ever before,
but at the same time, government attacks on such media intensified.  In 1999, the  independent
editors were accused of being used by “hostile forces in the UK, South Africa and the United
States to plot the downfall of President Mugabe’s government.”28     
A turning point for the media was the South Africa publication of the CCJP/LRF
report on human rights abuses in Matabeleland in the weekly Mail and Guardian.29  Not only was
the Mail and Guardian widely available in Zimbabwe, but the local independent media
immediately carried the story and followed it up.30  In response, the government acknowledged
Independent, 16 May 1997, pp 1, 2;  “Amnesty challenges Mugabe to atone for Matabeleland
rights violations” Independent 23 May 1997; “Government must not cover up 5 Brigade
atrocities, says ZimRights” Daily News, 27 September 1999; “Remains of 5 brigade victims
exhumed” Daily News 10 October 1999;  “Mat exhumations help to heal wounds of bereaved”
Financial Gazette 11 November 1999.
31  For example, “Zimbabwe compensation offer” BBC 12 July 1999; “Committee on
Gukurahundi seeks to meet Mugabe” Mirror 24 March 2000. 
32  “Chihuri admits illegal Act” Standard, 19 September 1999.
33  Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto, Royal Commonwealth Society Meeting, London,
16 April 1999; see also news reports, Andrew Meldrum, “Mugabe ‘Foiled Officer’s Coup’”
Guardian (UK) 11 January 1999, Andrew Meldrum, “Zimbabwe Army Torture Alleged”
Guardian (UK), 22 January 1999.
34  “Zim police arrest three journalists” Mail & Guardian  8 February 1999; “Zimbabwe
Mirror journalists further remanded” Herald 2 March 1999.
35  Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (revised edition, 1996), Section 50 (1). 
36  “Charges Against Two Zimbabwean Journalists Dropped” 30 April 1999 Sapa-AFP.
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the human rights abuses perpetrated by government forces and, for the first time, made official
commitments to compensation in 1999.31 
In response to the increasing willingness of the independent media to publish stories
critical of the government, the state seemed to change tactics radically vis-à-vis the media in
1999.  After the Standard published a story written by Ray Choto alleging that an attempted
army coup had been foiled, its editor Mark Chavunduka was detained illegally by the army for
7 days.32  After the courts ordered his release, the army handed him over to the police.  Having
evaded the army, Choto turned himself into the police but was, with Chavunduka, handed over
to the army who tortured them for 36 hours.33  Clive Wilson, their managing editor, was also
detained, by the police, after holding a press conference at which the journalists alleged torture.
Ibbo Mandaza, editor of, and Grace Kwinjeh a reporter from, the Mirror, another weekly
launched in 1998, were arrested on 8 February 1999, and charged in connection with an article
published in October, also concerning the war in the Congo.34   Kwinjeh’s story alleged that
the family of a Zimbabwe man serving in the Congo had received not his body, but only  his
head.  Like Choto and Chavunduka, they were charged with publishing false information which
is “likely to cause fear, alarm or despondency among the public”35 although charges against
them were eventually dropped.36  The political unpopularity of the war in the Congo was
37  Chavunduka, speaking at Royal Commonwealth Society, London16 April 1999.
38  Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto, Royal Commonwealth Society Meeting, London,
16 April 1999.
39  “Daily News records phenomenal growth” Daily News 10 November 2000
40  “Plot to close Daily News” Daily News 21November 2000; “War vets besiege The
Daily News” Daily News 24 January 2001; “War veterans 'ban' Daily News” Daily News 27
January 2001; “Press bombed” Daily News 28 January 2001.
41  “Communications bill seen as draconian” Independent 10 March 2000; Nqobile Nyathi,
“ISPs vow to fight Bill gagging email” Financial Gazette 23 March 2000; Grant Ferrett, “Outcry
at Zimbabwe Internet bill” BBC 20 March 2000.
42  “Capitol Radio to be launched soon” Daily News 26 September 2000; “Moyo warns
Capitol Radio” Daily News 3 October 2000; “Capitol Radio defies government” Daily News 4
October 2000. “A fresh breath on the air waves” Standard 8 October 2000, “Moves to extend
ZBC monopoly to 2002" Standard 8 October 2000.
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blamed for the government’s harsh reaction.  Mark Chavunduka said, “if things had been
normal, I think they would just have laughed it off.”37  The government was also clearly
concerned about ensuring the loyalty of the army, as the torture of the reporters was aimed
solely at uncovering their sources.38
The contest between the government and the independent media was intensified with
the establishment, and rapid popularity, of the Daily News in 1999.39  The Daily News was the
first financially successful independent daily and in immediate competition with the states’ main
mouthpiece, the Herald and was attacked directly and indirectly by the state through economic
threats, intimidation, allegations of assassination plots, and, finally the bombing of its printing
press.40
In the same time frame, the state also targeted email and the radio waves. In March
2000, an act was rushed through Parliament which enabled the state to order internet service
providers (ISPs) to “...intercept or monitor communications or suspend services to individuals
in the interests of national security or the maintenance of law and order.”  The new act also
introduced a licensing scheme for ISPs, which was thought likely to threaten those which were
foreign-based.41
 Similarly, attempts to start an independent radio station were crushed by the state
which closed down the Capitol radio broadcasts, accusing them of operating illegally.42 When
43  “Freeing of airwaves unleashes scramble for radio licences” Mirror 6 October 2000;
Dumisani Muleya “New broadcasting law  grossly restrictive”  Independent  6 October 2000;
“Capital Radio judgment reserved” Daily News 10 October 2000; “Search on Auret’s home
yields nothing” Daily News 11 October 2000.
44  “Capital Radio judgement reserved” Daily News 10 October 2000; “Latest on Capital
Radio” Independent 3 November 2000.
45  “Dongo asks ZBC to lift news blackout on her” Standard 2 November 1997. 
46  On attempts to control ZBC coverage: “ZBC fires DJ for rapping police action”
Financial Gazette 18 December 1997; “Govt tightens gag on ZBC” Independent 4 December 1998.
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the broadcasters challenged the ZBC monopoly provided for by the Broadcasting Act, the
Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional.  The state responded by using the
Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act to put in place a Statutory Instrument to
regulate the issuing of licences, which gave the minister personal control of the process.43  The
Minister of Information also claimed that Capital Radio would not be given a licence under the
new regulations because all the directors of the corporation were white, and one was British.44
In the same period, the government also began to exercise more control over the state-
run media, which had been subject to self-censorship rather than outright control. In 1997, it
was revealed that a ‘D notice’ had been issued to all ZBC sub-editors the previous year to the
effect that: “All stories on Margaret Dongo, Councillor Lawrence Mudehwe, and Strive
Masiywa ... should be referred to the chief subs for radio news before being used in our
bulletins.”45  A ZBC radio personality was fired after she permitted callers to her ‘open-line’
programme to criticise police violence against protesters during the 1997 anti-tax
demonstrations and another similar programme was abruptly cancelled in December 1998.46
7.2 NGOs Take the Initiative: the Growth of the NCA
Starting in May 1997, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC) called a series of meetings
for NGOs, Churches and Unions interested in working on the Constitution.  This group
became the nucleus of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). The initiative started with
two staff members of the Justice, Peace and Reconciliation (JPR) office, Tawanda Mutasah and
47  Research notes, 28 May 1997, 11 June 1997; see also inter alia NCA, The NCA: First
Interim Report, 3 July 1997 and  T Mutasah, “Building a representative and all-inclusive
constitution: proposals and strategies” in ESS, Tolerance in Zimbabwe: towards a political, cultural and
constitutional basis, Report of a workshop held in Harare, 28 May 1997. 
48  NCA, Annexure 1: NCA income and expenditure 1998, NCA annual report, 1998.
49  Brain Kagoro, The evolution of the NCA” in Agenda, vol 2, 1 suggests that this
committee was elected in May 1997, my notes, and the meeting’s agenda suggest that this was
formalised in June. Research notes, 11 June 1997; NCA, The NCA: First Interim Report, 3 July
1997. 
50  Masipula Sithole, “Fighting Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe” Journal of Democracy 12,
1 (2001), 167 and footnote 7, 169.
51  Peter Alexander, “Zimbabwe workers, the MDC and the 2000 election” 389.
52  Munyaradzi Gwisai, “Constitutional controversy: elected constituent assembly is the
only way forward” Herald, 14 April 1999, 6.
53  Research notes, 7 September 1997; see also “Spotlight falls squarely on the
constitution” Financial Gazette, 11 September 1997. 
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Deprose Muchena, who were both ‘veterans’ of student politics as well as both the coalitions
discussed in chapter 6.   Initial funding for the period June 1997-June 1998 was  provided by
the German  social democratic NGO, Friedrich Ebert Stifting (FES).47  Their budget was later
supplemented with funding from Oxfam, HIVOS, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and the
embassies of Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and Sweden.48
The provisional taskforce was headed by Morgan Tsvangirai representing the ZCTU.
A steering committee was chosen which included both representatives of particular
constituencies, including the churches, human rights NGOs, labour, women’s groups, and
youth groups as well as individuals acting in the role of ‘consultants’ primarily lawyers and
academics (see Appendix 1).49  Masipula Sithole, emphasizing the democratic and representative
nature of the NCA, has also stressed the attention paid to ethnic balance within its leadership.50
 Labour-oriented academics, on the other hand, describe the NCA as a  middle-class alliance
because trade union participation was “not extensive.”51  Munyaradzi Gwisai claimed that the
“the popular ZCTU leaders Morgan Tsvangirai was put at its head in order to hoodwink the
masses that such a body represented them.”52  While membership was dominated by NGO and
Church members and staff, veteran unionists were present and effective participants in
discussion from the start.53 
54 Brian Raftopoulos and Gerald Mazarire. “Civil society and the Constitution making
process in Zimbabwe: NCA 1997-2000" in Kayode Fayemi and Sam Moyo, eds. Evaluating the
Constitutional Process in Zimbabwe (Forthcoming SAPES Books). MS dated September 2000, 31.
55  The phrase ‘panel-beating’ is  from Dr John Makumbe, speaking at “Public Meeting:
Establishing a Constitutional base for Democratic Practice: lessons from South Africa” Harare,
28 May 1997.   For a useful if dated  discussion see: John Reid Rowland, “Amendments to
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Unlike the coalitions discussed in chapter 6, the NCA was a much bigger and disparate
group of over 100 NGOs, community associations, and trades unions, as well as an
indeterminate number of individual members.54  With numbers of NGOs operating in
Zimbabwe estimated to be in the thousands, the 30-40 NGOs  that joined the NCA may not
be considered representative of the wider sector (see Appendix 2).  In addition to its large
taskforce with 19  members, it also created an advisory committee of 10 members, and legal,
disciplinary, media and information, finance and management, gender and youth committees
chaired by taskforce members, all of which had 6-8 members.  It also had a much larger budget
and a permanent secretariat.  So, the group of people working together in the ‘coalition’ was
much broader and much more numerous.  Nevertheless, many of the key leaders were
‘veterans’ of previous coalitions. 
7.2.1 The popularity of the NCA 
The NCA capitalized on both the latent critique of the government and the newly expanded
independent media.  Despite the sense of crisis rapidly emerging in 1997, public criticism of
government policies had remained until then the domain of a few activists.  But using the
framework of the constitution, which was described by NCA members as a  ‘non-political’ way
of talking about the exercise of politics, the NCA rapidly gained momentum.  The NCA was
premised on a critique of the constitution, which emphasized the multiple amendments made
to the Lancaster House constitution by the ZANU(PF) government. Many of these
amendments were perceived as ‘panel-beating’ designed to constitutionalize laws the  Supreme
Court had ruled unconstitutional.55   This meant that the issues discussed by the NCA
Zimbabwe’s constitution: a summary” Legal Forum, 6, 2 June 1994, 38-42.
56  NCA [Morgan Tsvangirai], Welcome address at the National conference on the
Zimbabwe constitutional debate project” Kadoma Ranch motel, 6 September 1997,3. 
57  Masipula Sithole, “Minister with many portfolios and the NCA” Agenda, April, 1999.
58  Research Notes, Constitutional Assembly Meeting, Kadoma, 7 September 1997.
59  Research Notes, Constitutional Assembly Meeting, Kadoma, 7 September 1997.
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inevitably touched on many of the key political issues of the past decades, in a political
environment which was much more volatile than any previous point after independence.
Starting with this issue of the amendments, Morgan Tsvangirai highlighted the lack of “public
scrutiny and accountability” in the legislating of those amendments and linked them in to
“abuse of power....personality cults, and lack of transparency in our governance.”56 As Masipula
Sithole sagely observed, the NCA was formed more in reaction to the creation of the Executive
Presidency in 1987 (Amendment 7), rather than the Lancaster House constitution.57  So, just
by bringing up the issue of the constitution and encouraging public participation, the NCA
catalysed and regularised a debate which until then had had no formal place in the public
domain.  
The ZCC’s presence as organizer was particularly valuable in legitimating the process.
Some participants wanted the NCA to be a free-standing body, autonomous from the ZCC,
but were told in response  that “we need an umbrella...the church is always considered
impartial.  If we have ZCC as our umbrella no one will say we are being political.”58  Even an
outspoken human rights activist suggested that “[t]here is risk of a boycott or attack if not
under ZCC...Maybe we should form an [autonomous]  body corporate?  But the ZCC umbrella
is strategically a good one.”59 
7.2.2 The NCA’s outreach programme 
From 1998 the NCA developed materials and training facilitators to provide grass-roots
‘conscientization’ using ‘participatory civic education’ techniques. In its series of pamphlets
entitled ‘Debating the Constitution’, the NCA addressed issues using simple English and
60 Raftopoulos and Mazarire, “Civil society and the constitution-making process in
Zimbabwe”, 15.
61  NCA evaluation report, n.d. NCA files, 14; also “Evaluation of Strategic Process”
NCA Annual Report 1998,  40-41;  Interview, Mrs Kowo, Head of Church and Society ZCC,
7 October 1999. 
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cartoon sketches, designed to be used in workshops by facilitators.  The booklets addressed the
issues of citizenship, the constitution, finance, principles of democracy, declaration of rights,
the executive, parliament, and the judiciary.  As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, these cartoons
combined realistic situations with humour and the occasional didactic message (see Appendix
4).  By the end of 1999, 576 facilitators across the country were trained to hold  district level
meetings, using these booklets to elicit feedback from participants.60  In its newspaper adverts,
the NCA similarly used graphics effectively to bring up sensitive issues, as can be seen in
Figures 3 and 4 (see Appendix 4).  In the first image, we can see the ‘boot’ of the Executive
crushing Parliament. Readers are asked “What should the powers of parliament be? ”  Similarly,
in the second  image we see the familiar image of bystanders being forced off the road by the
presidential motorcade and the readers are asked “ What should the powers of the Executive
be?” 
Yet these booklets and their intended users were not ready until 1999 and, during 1998,
the NCA carried out a more typical NGO agenda of urban-based meetings.61  Much effort and
resources went into the urban-based  thematic discussions of land, business, youth and
women’s issues, which attracted wide participation, including at least one Cabinet Minister.
The momentum of these meetings to some extent diverted the NCA away from  grass-roots
activism.  
The NCA was also involved in protests against the Public Order and Security Act,
which was intended to replace the Rhodesian era Law and Order Maintenance Act, sections
of which had been declared unconstitutional.  Similarly, in October 1998, the NCA organized
a protest march against the Zimbabwean intervention in the DRC.  But not all NCA members
62  “Unity of NCA hangs in balance” Herald 8 November 1998; “Activists hit at govt
ban on protest” Independent 7 November 1998.
63  Interviews, Mrs Kowo, Head of Church and Society ZCC, 7 October 1999 and Isaac
Maphosa, Director, NCA 28 September 1999. 
64  On launch of government’s CC: “Constitutional amendments to involve
all–president” Herald 23 February 1999; “President gives notice to appoint commission” Sunday
Mail, March 1999, 1, 4; “Commission of Inquiry into a new constitution for Zimbabwe”
Advertisement in the Herald 15 June 1999, ;  On NCA reaction: Daniel Manyandure “NCA
won't accept gvt 'fraud'” Standard  2 May 1999; Dumisani Muleya, “NCA vows not to take part
in presidential commission” Independent 2 April 1999.
65 Basildon Peta, “NCA and government discuss the way forward” Agenda, November
1998, 6; “Clashes as constitutional talks breakdown” Herald 26 March 1999; see also,
Raftopoulos and Mazarire, “Civil society and the constitution-making process in Zimbabwe”,
6-10.
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were comfortable with this move from ‘educating’ people about the constitution towards
advocacy on issues concerned with government policy.  On the eve of the march, the
moderator of the NCA, Bishop Nemapare, who was also Vice-President of the ZCC, issued
a press release stating that the ZCC would not participate in the march.  This enabled police
to claim that the march had been cancelled by its organizers, and to use tear gas to disperse
those who had gathered.62  Informed sources within the NCA and ZCC believe that Nemapare
was pressurized by President Mugabe to call off the march.63  
7.3 The Government Changes the Rules of the Game  
The Government launched its own constitutional commission (sometimes referred to as the
Constitutional Review Commission) in March 1999.64   While there had been suggestions that
the NCA process would feed into the government’s proposed commission, and talks were held
between the two groups, agreement could not be reached on the issue of guaranteeing the
commission freedom from presidential interference.65  
Unlike the NCA, the CC has emphasized not the amendments to the constitution, but
the problematic nature of the Lancaster House constitution, written by a small élite group in
the UK.  The CC’s goal was thus often described as a ‘home-grown’ constitution. Minister
Eddison Zvobgo said “we are not amending the Lancaster House constitution but moulding
66  “Church leaders meet over constitutional reform process” Herald 4 March 1999, 4.
67 “Daunting task for commissioners–Chidyausiku” Herald 8 June 1999, 5.
68  E.g. 5 (tabloid) pages in English in the Daily News 5 August 1999 16-21; 3
(broadsheet) pages in the Herald 5 August 1999  C1, C2, C3; 3 (broadsheet) pages in Shona in
the Herald 21 August 1999, 4, 5, 6.
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it in our own image as you cannot have a nation which breathes the historical experiences of
another nation.”66  Aware of the need for transparency, the CC went far beyond any previous
commission in Zimbabwe in using paid advertisements and press releases to outline exactly
how it would function because “the whole world is watching.”67   The CC launched its
consultation by printing a document entitled “Constitutional issues and questions” which ran
as a multi- page submission in the main papers.68  It raised a series of themes accompanied by
questions, such as:
1.2 Citizenship.  What should be the grounds for acquisition, loss and
restoration of Zimbabwean citizenship be? What rights and duties should
citizenship confer? ......
1.6 Supremacy of the Constitution. Where there is a conflict between
customary practices and provisions of the constitution, which should
prevail?.... 
4. Separation of Powers (Pillars of the State) How should the head of state be
chosen? How many terms can the head of state serve?.... 
7.7.1 The Right to Life.  Should the death sentence remain?  Should abortion
be allowed?........
7.7.11 The Right to Vote. What should the minimum voting age in public
elections be: 16 year or 18 years or 21 years?  Should voting be by secret ballot
or show of hands or head count?.........
Much the same sets of questions – in English, Ndebele and Shona – were asked in newspaper
adverts which further invited participation in the process, as we can see in Figures 5 and 6 (see
Appendix 4). 
The makeup of the commission included Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku, who had
recently chaired the investigation into the looting of the War Veterans’ Compensation Fund,
as Chair; Anglican Bishop Jonathan Siyachitema, Professor Walter Kamba, former Vice-
69 “ZUD describes CC as a political joke” Herald 6 May 1999, 6. 
70  NCA. “Resolution passed at the Harare NCA assembly” 13 April 1999. 
71 “Constitutional Commission get $20 million from US donor” Herald 24 August 1999,
11;  “Commission concerned about $500 000 demand” Sunday Mail, 3 October 1999, 15; “$30m
grant for Constitutional Commission approved” Herald 20 September 1999, 9; “Commission
put fund in private bank account” Daily News 7 October 1999,1;  “CC dismisses allegations of
misuse of donor funds” Mirror 8 October 1999, 2.
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Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe, and Mrs Grace Lupepe as vice-chairs.  Kamba
chaired the co-ordinating committee which had two sub-committees – administrative and
finance headed by Ibbo Mandaza, media and information, chaired by Jonathan Moyo.  Of the
395 Commissioners, 150 were MPs.  The remainder were described as representing interest
groups, but this included chiefs, presumed to be ZANU(PF), mayors, at that time all
ZANU(PF), as well as a wide range of opposition politicians, church-people, and NGO
representatives (see Appendix 3). This mix of ZANU(PF), opposition, and non-aligned
commissioners, was quite unprecedented, but it was still interpreted by some as over-
representing ZANU(PF).  Margaret Dongo, for instance, accused the commission of
duplicating the structures of ZANU(PF), arguing that “...three-quarters are the ruling party’s
politburo, central committee members, provincial chairpersons, and so-called indigenous
business persons aligned to the party.”69   As we will see, this led to conflict between the two
groups because the NCA held  that anyone who had accepted appointment to the CC should
recuse themselves from the NCA.70    
Like the NCA, the CC appealed for donor funding. While it is not entirely clear how
much they received, their projected budget was said to be ZWD 300 million.  They were
reported to have received  funds of ZWD 22.8 million from the Ford Foundation, and ZWD
19 million from the Kellogg Foundation, both controversially channelled through the SAPES
Trust.71  Bilateral funding also came from South Korea (ZWD 380 000), Canada (ZWD 4
72 “Commission receives financial support from Republic of Korea” Herald 6 August
1999;  “Canada pledges $4 million to constitutional commission” Herald 14 August 1999, 1;
“Five countries donate $20.1 million to Constitutional Commission” Herald 6 October 1999,
5.
73  “Five countries donate $20.1 million to Constitutional Commission” Herald 6
October 1999, 5.
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million) and Australia (ZWD 1.2 million).72  The UNDP facilitated donations of  ZWD 20
million from the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.73
7.4 Divide and Rule: the Politics of Polarization
The formation of the Constitutional Commission led to serious divisions within ‘civil society’,
as some groups chose to be incorporated into the state process, while others insisted on
remaining autonomous.  Against the background of the government’s implicit corporatist
approach to NGOs, churches and unions, the opportunity to continue to work within the
system was attractive to many organizations.  In contrast to NGOs reluctance to work outside
NANGO in the coalitions described in Chapter 6, as politics became more polarized, some
NCA members became more assured in their determination not to co-operate with and
therefore lend legitimacy to the government’s process.
7.4.1  The ZCC: Not ‘Rocking the Boat’
The ZCC had a fraught relationship with the NCA for some time before the formation of the
CC.  Conflict first became visible in October 1998, during the NCA march against
Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Congo war.  As discussed in chapter 5, the ZCC has not been
the most consistently outspoken NGO in Zimbabwe and was particularly vulnerable to
government pressure at this time because they needed its support to ensure the smooth
functioning of the upcoming World Council of Churches (WCC) meeting which was to be held
in Harare in December 1998.  Some of its clerical leaders were unwilling to be associated with
74 “Unity of NCA hangs in balance” Herald 8 November 1998; “Anti-congo demo
falters as alliance splits” Sunday Mail  1 November 1998
75  Interview, Densen Mafinyani, Secretary General ZCC, 29 September 1999.
76  Interview, Mrs Kowo, Head of Church and Society ZCC, 7 October 1999
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a protest against the government’s foreign adventure – especially if they were expected to lead
the procession through Harare.  A decision was taken at the highest level of the ZCC to
withdraw from the march, and a press release was issued to that effect.  This led the police to
claim that the march was cancelled and those who did march were dispersed and tear-gassed.74
Frustration at this sabotage led the NCA, which had been housed within the ZCC,  to
move abruptly to new offices in November – a decision taken without notice being given to
the ZCC staff who had been working with them.  ZCC staff further felt alienated as the funds
and computers their donors had provided were shifted to NCA accounts.  
When the government created the CC in March 1999, the ZCC withdrew its
membership from the NCA.  The ZCC Secretary-General described the NCA as a process  that
had grown beyond the ZCC:  “we wanted to ‘unpack’ the constitution...[by this time] the
understanding of unpacking was lost” and was out of its control: “ ...they were using our
credibility, the actors were being political, there was no way to control them”.... “Actors in the
NCA were exploiting the ZCC.” 75
While the ZCC’s Justice, Peace and Reconciliation (JPR) staff, who had originated the
NCA project considered remaining within the NCA, they felt there was no mandate for them
to do so.  ZCC staff emphasize that as the impetus developed for the Zimbabwe Congress of
Trades Unions (ZCTU), which was a major player in the NCA, to form a political party, “[i]t
was difficult to separate issues from the party and constitutional reform....” The churches felt
threatened.    As a key-player said “…as churches we had to take issues that don’t raise too
much dust or rock the boat too much, but the boat was rocking.”76  By this time, the two ZCC staff
members who had initiated the programme had also left to take better remunerated jobs with
international NGOs.  The ZCC-NCA break was complete.
77  Declaration and resolutions of the 1st People’s Constitutional Convention 18-20 June
1999; “NCA says constitutional review process in danger of being hijacked” Daily News, 20
April 1999, 2; 
78  NCA, “Resolution passed at the Harare NCA assembly” 13 April 1999. 
79  Hlatshwayo, who was probably second only to Jonathan Moyo in his prolific public
engagements with the NCA was rewarded with an appointment as a High Court judge in 2001.
80  Dumisani Muleya, “Unwieldy, accused of partisan bias, Constitutional commission
 seeks legitimacy” Independent 7 May 1999. 
81  “NCA must stop shifting goalposts” Herald 19 April 1999, 1.
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7.4.2  Further Fractures Within the Coalition
The appointment of various high-profile figures to the Constitutional Commission created
friction within a wide variety of other organizations and social groups. A three day People’s
Constitutional Convention agreed to launch an alternative constitution-writing process that
would be ‘people-driven’ instead.77  The NCA had resolved that any NCA members could not
also be Constitutional Commissioners.78  However, several well-respected individuals
previously aligned with the NCA did become commissioners.  Law lecturer Ben Hlatshwayo
and Commentator Lupi Mushayakarara both moved from the NCA to the CC, Mushayakarara
became chair of the CC sub-committee on the pillars of democracy (see Appendix 3), while
Hlatshwayo chaired a sub-committee that supported all the thematic committees.79   Professor
Heneri Dzinotyiweyi, of the Zimbabwe Integrated Programme (which later became a minor
opposition party) and Dean of the Faculty of Science at the University of Zimbabwe, who had
attended NCA meetings in the past, and who also became a sub-committee chair, expressed
many people’s opinions in saying: 
Boycotting the process creates unnecessary antagonism. We also have our
own suspicions but it is better to confront the issue than confront each 
other.... There is no balance in the commission yet but we hope the NCA and
opposition parties will come and work from within.80   
Other groups which withdrew from the NCA in order to participate in the CC included the
Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) and the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists
(ZUJ).81  The Anglican Church did not take an official position on the NCA/CC divide, but
as we have seen, the Bishop of  Harare became Vice-Chair of the CC and his Cathedral refused
82 “Anglican Church bars NCA from meeting in cathedral” Financial Gazette, 13 August
1999.
83 See for instance, the letter to the editor entitled “Church leaders negating spirit of
evangelism” Financial Gazette, 9 September, 1999, 9. 
84 “Church vote rejects constitution” Daily News 28 January 2000, pp1,2.
85 “Constitutional reforms split Catholic Church” Financial Gazette, 5 August 1999;
“Catholic Bishops Divided”Daily News 7 August 1999, 1,2; “Church Split Dramatised, says
Wermter” Standard 8 August 1999;  “We are not part of the NCA: CCJP Chairman” Financial
Gazette 13 August 1999; “Catholics protest” Sunday Mail 18 April 1999.
86  Interview, Mike Auret, Director CCJP, 28 September 1999.
87 “ZimRights unhappy with NCA decision” Chronicle, 26 July 1999, 9; Interview,
Munyaradzi Bhidi, Acting Director 13 September 1999; Interview, Peter Maregare, Legal
Officer, 13 September 1999; Interview, Paul Themba Nyathi, former National Council
Member, 16 September 1999; Interview, David Chimhini, [Former] Director, 4 October 1999.
88 “Human Rights Lawyers divided” Standard, 2 August 1999; Interview, Beverly
Hargrove, ZLHR administrator, 28 September 1999.
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to let the NCA hold meetings on their premises.82  No similarly placed Anglicans held positions
within the NCA, although individual parishes and parishioners did not follow the Bishop of
Harare.83  Indeed, an Anglican priest, Fr Tim Neill, was widely reported in the press as calling
the draft constitution flawed.84  
The Catholic Church was divided, with the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
(CCJP) remaining within the NCA, and several of their staff members playing high-profile
roles.  Their nominal superiors, the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC),
supported the Commission and called for priests and the laity to make representations to it.85
Mike Auret, who was about to leave the CCJP and to launch a political career, interpreted the
Bishops’ stance cynically: “[They] have no objection to our being on the NCA, but want to
hedge their bets.”86 
The Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), which was at a particularly
weak point with deep organizational divisions, was pressurized by the newly elected chair  to
pull out of the NCA.  Members over-ruled this and insisted on remaining within the NCA.87
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights held a referendum, in which a majority of members
advocated staying with the NCA, but a substantial minority did not.88  The women’s movement
89 “Coalition dismisses shift from ‘No’ vote stance” Daily News, 24 January 2000;
“Harare women march against draft constitution” Standard, 2 February 2000; Interviews Thoko
Matshe, ZWRCN, 30 September 1999 and Selina Mumbengegwi, Women’s Action Group, 6
October 1999.
90 “Commission funds put in private bank account” Daily News 7 October 1999, 1;
“Commission’s donor funds misused” Financial Gazette 7 October 1999;  “CC dismisses
allegations of mis-use of donor funds” Mirror, 8 October 1999, 2; Jonathan Moyo “War on
discrediting Constitutional Commission still on” Sunday Mail, 10 October 1999, 8. 
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was seen as being particularly divided, although it eventually formed a coalition to promote
women’s constitutional interests within both the CC and the NCA.89  
The long-term impact on the Zimbabwean academic community, similarly divided by
alternate loyalties, remains to be seen.  The Southern Africa Political and Economic Series
Trust (SAPES), whose director, Ibbo Mandaza, was a constitutional commissioner, also
channeled donor funds to the Commission.  A row about alleged misappropriation of funds
contributed to the increasing polarization between SAPES’ weekly Mirror newspaper, which
along with the Herald took a strongly pro-CC line and the other independent press, which was
equally as strongly pro-NCA.90   While many high profile Zimbabwean academics arrayed
themselves on different sides of the NCA-CC alignment, Jonathan Moyo was by far the most
prominent.  Moyo, a professor at Witswatersrand University in South Africa, had gained a
strong reputation as a pro-democracy activist in the ‘one-party state debate’ in the late 1980s,
but had been based in the US, Kenya, and South Africa for much of the 1990s.  As the CC’s
spokesman he  was responsible for much of the most personalized commentary against the
NCA.   
7.5 Conflicting Concepts of Constitutionality
As this suggests, the formation of the CC created a situation for a much more conflict-prone
and combative discussion of the constitution.  
91  For example,  “Citizens cold-shoulder Commission meetings” Financial Gazette, 19
August 1999,5; “Tough time for Commission team in Chirumanzu” Daily News, 20 August
1999; “Public ignores Constitutional Commission meetings” Daily News 18 August 1999.
92 Interview, Paul Themba Nyathi, NCA Taskforce,  16 September 1999. 
93 “Villagers not free to contribute views” Herald, 13 September 1999, 1. 
94 “Govt panel tries to sell itself to sceptical students” Financial Gazette, 5 August 1999;
“Chakaredza says older commissioners botched meetings with students” Daily News, 22
September 1999, 3;’Commission meeting abandoned because of UZ rowdies’ Herald 4
September 1999, 1; “Trials, tribulations of Commissioners” Herald 18 September 1999, 1.
95  Plenary Statement by Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku.  Constitutional Commission 3rd
plenary 22 October 1999. 
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7.5.1 The CC outreach programme 
In August 1999, the Constitutional Commission began a programme of 5 000 meetings,
organised by 8 provincial teams.  While the independent press took great pleasure in detailing
the Constitutional Commission meetings which had low turnouts, many people did address the
commissioners and with great forthrightness.91   As a prominent NCA activist ruefully
acknowledged: “we told people to boycott [the CC hearings] but now they are enjoying voicing
their opinions”.92  In an intriguing front-page story in the Herald, it was reported that in
Tsholotsho, villagers said that they could not speak freely to commissioners until after the CIO
was disbanded.93  Meetings with students were also particularly prone to conflict.94   The
Constitutional Commission claimed to have organized 4 321 public meetings which were
attended by 556 276 individuals, as well as 700 special ad-hoc meetings attended by 150 000
people.  In addition, they received 4000 written submissions and had 16 programmes on Radio
1 [English]; 55 programmes on Radio 2 [Shona and Ndebele]; 2 programmes on Radio 3
[English]; 70 programmes on Radio 4 [minority languages - Tonga, Venda etc]; as well as 31
programmes on ZBC-TV. 95   Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK were also consulted.
Despite the Commissions’ own over-whelming focus on the Lancaster House
constitution as flawed, the input that it received emphasized instead the reforms of 1987, which
brought in the executive presidency, and linked the growing political and economic crisis clearly
to the constitution.  Just as the ‘non-political’ NCA had sparked a most political debate, the CC
96  For example, “Residents give view on the constitution Herald 24 August 1999, 1;
“Public not aware of objective of meetings” Herald 25 August 1999, 9; “Commissioners job is
to reflect people’s wishes accurately” Herald 24 September 1999, 6. 
97  “Public not aware of objective of meetings” Herald 25 August 1999, 9.
98  Dumisani Muleya, “The public interest versus Zanu PF blueprint” Independent 29
October 1999.
99  “Gay broadcast sparks heated debate in Zimbabwe” Mail & Guardian 5 November
199; “Galz wants homosexuality enshrined in new constitution” Herald 25 October 99, 6. 
220
hearings provided a forum in which the current government’s policies were explicitly criticized.
From the time that the Constitutional Commission hearings began, the overwhelming topic of
conversation was of addressing the problems of the current government, which had led to the
economic downturn.  Their input also revealed a thorough understanding of the political
manipulation that had occurred.  The commissioners heard demands that all MPs and cabinet
ministers be elected not appointed, that the post of Provincial Governor be abolished, that the
size of the legislature be reduced, that parliament should have responsibility for the budget and
more power in general, that presidential powers be reduced, that political party financing be
reformed, that an independent electoral supervisory commission be appointed.96  This led
commissioners to accuse people of using the meetings “as a platform to present their
complaints about the economic problems they are facing, while others think the meetings are
held to source their views of the present government and the ruling party.”97
In October the CC held a three day plenary meeting at which in addition to each
provincial team reporting back, special interest groups and political parties also presented their
positions, all of which was also broadcast on ZBC and reported in both the state and
independent press.  It was at this point that clear divergence emerged between the proposals
from the opposition parties, interest groups and the general public, vis-à-vis the presentation
from ZANU(PF), which encompassed an executive presidency as well as a prime minister.98
These hearings also provided groups like Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), which
submitted a proposal to the commission that the rights of gays and lesbians be enshrined in the
proposed Bill of Rights, with access to the electronic media for the first time in 5 years.99 
100  “Storm brewing over constitutional draft” Independent 26 November 1999.
101  “Commission adopts draft constitution” Herald 30 November 1999, 1.
102  “Read constitutional draft thoroughly” Herald 2 December 1999, 1.
103  “Mugabe must resign” Independent 26 November 1999; “Constitutional commission
rift deepens: Moyo said to have threatened to resign” Herald 29 November 1999, 1;
Commission adopts draft constitution, Herald 30 November 1999, 1.
104  “Commission adopts draft constitution” Herald 30 November 1999, 4; “Draft
advocates creation of a national assembly” Herald 30 November 1999, 4; “Constitutional court
will be superior” Herald 30 November 1999, 4; “New constitution brings electoral commission”
Herald 30 November 1999, 4. 
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7.5.2 The Draft Constitution and the Referendum Campaigns
The Commission’s attempt to prepare a draft constitution after all this publicity led to internal
conflict.100  A significant minority of commissioners petitioned President Mugabe, alleging that
the draft misrepresented the people’s views.101  The draft prepared by the co-ordinating
committee resembled the submission presented to the commission by ZANU(PF), rather than
the provincial reports.102  A particularly controversial aspect was a debate within the
‘transitional mechanisms’ committee, which was divided as to whether President Mugabe
should serve out his current term as president, much less be allowed to contest future elections,
if the draft recommended a limit of two 5 year terms.  The face-saving compromise decided
upon was to drop the entire matter of transitional mechanisms, on the basis that it was not
included under the commission’s mandate, although it was one of the 9 thematic committees.103
Despite a report that 24 commissioners dissociated themselves from the draft, a final version
was made public at the end of November and a referendum on it was scheduled for  February
2000.104 
After the plenary session in October, the thematic committees had analysed the 10
provincial reports.  Because these reports had been broadcast publically and reported in detail
in an 11 part series in the Herald, people were well aware of what information the commission
received, which meant that everyone had an opinion on whether or not the draft reflected the
input. Chisaka’s useful analysis suggests that the provincial and the thematic committees ‘did
a good job’ and that it was only when these views went to the executive that ‘people’s views
105  Chenjerai Chisaka, “Did the constitution correctly interpret the views of the
people?” Social Change 50, June 2000, 3.
106  Chenjerai Chisaka, “Did the constitution correctly interpret the views of the
people?” Social Change 50, June 2000, 3, 19; see also “NCA Vote No” supplement inserted in
the Financial Gazette, the Independent, the Standard, the Daily News, the Eastern Star and the
Dispatch, 4 February 2000 which similarly details ‘what the people wanted’ vs. ‘what the
commission wrote’.
107 “3000 walk out of referendum meeting” Daily News, 27 January 2000; “Tough time
for commissioners” Daily News, 21 January 2000.
108  President quizzes commission again” Herald 10 December 1999, 1,10; “Women’s
coalition wants Constitution adjusted Herald 16 December 1999, 16; “Regard draft constitution
as a green paper: church leaders” Herald 11 December 1999, 1.
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were either distorted, ignored or rejected”.105  Most of the cases where strongly expressed views
were not reflected in the final draft concerned the limitations on the powers of the executive
and separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches.  For instance, seven
out of ten provinces favoured a non-executive president as head of state and an executive
prime minister as head of government.  
The CC’s draft constitution retained the executive presidency and added a prime
minister.  Eight out of ten provinces wanted the president only to have the power to declare
a state of emergency or a state of war after consulting parliament.  The draft constitution gave
this power to the president in consultation with the prime minister.  Seven out of ten provinces
said that Parliament should have fixed term-limits, but the CC gave the president the power to
dissolve parliament as he saw fit.  As Chisaka suggests:
the majority views of those consulted clearly wanted a governmental system
that was accountable to them through their elected representatives in
parliament...but this was denied them by the commission.”106  
The very public failure of the draft constitution to reflect the content of people’s
submissions to the commission in the course of their hearings led to particularly dramatic
rejections of the draft.107   Unsurprisingly, it was criticized by those outside the process, who
emphasized that the retention of an executive president was against the people’s wishes, and
that it retained a large assembly and made no restrictions on the size of the cabinet.108  More
damagingly, it was also criticized from within.  Commissioners were particularly critical of the
109  “Commissioner snubs draft constitution” Chronicle, 27 January 2000.
110  “Bishop changes colour on draft constitution” Chronicle, 8 February 2000.
111  “Draft ignored people, says Zvobgo” Daily News, 9 February 2000. 
112  “Mushayakarara, Mudzingwa apply for an urgent hearing” Herald 9 February 2000;
“Mushayakarara, Mudzingwa fail to stop referendum” Herald 11 February 2000;  “Last minute
bid to stop draft poll fails” Daily News, 11 February 2000, 1, 2. 
113 “Party to support draft constitution” Herald 17 December 1999; ZNLWVA “The
‘NO’ Vote to the Draft Constitution: which way forward?” 15 February 2000. 
114  “Don’t be misled - read for yourself; draft constitution for Zimbabwe; Corrections
and Clarifications” advertisement inserted by Constitutional Commission in the Mirror, 28
January 2000. 
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undemocratic way in which the draft had been rushed through their final session. Several
commissioners switched sides and urged a ‘NO’ vote. 109  
In one of the most high-profile defections, Bishop Ambrose Moyo, of the Evangelical
Lutheran church, resigned from the CC in December 1999 on the grounds that the draft
constitution did not reflect the views of the people, that the commissioners had had no time
to study or debate the draft, and that “...there was no democracy in the manner in which the
chairman...processed both the Draft Constitution and the Final Report of the commission.”110
Several commissioners, including the chair, acknowledged that the draft constitution did not
reflect all the views of the people.111  Two former commissioners launched an unsuccessful
legal battle to have the draft reconsidered and the referendum postponed. 112 The draft was
even criticized by those who were expected to support the government, ZANU(PF) and the
war veterans, because it did not provide a framework to expedite the land reform process,
although both groups did advocate a YES vote.113  In a  last ditch effort to win over voters, the
President gazetted some ‘corrections and clarifications’ to the draft constitution, the main effect
of which was to introduce a substantive new clause which permitted the state to compulsorily
acquire  agricultural land, and obligated Britain as the ‘former colonial power’ to compensate
farmers.114  
The CC had run a high-profile and professional advertising campaign in the 6 months
before the referendum in both the print and electronic media,  even launching a music video
115 “Constitutional commission launches campaign CD’ Herald 24 September 1999, 12;
ZBC programmes, September October 1999.
116 “ZBC defies court order, blocks NCA programmes” Independent 28 January 2000;
“ZBC refutes NCA allegations” Sunday Mail 30 January 2000; “NCA seeks legal advice to
recover funds from ZBC” Independent 10 March 2000, 11; see also the detailed discussion of
these negotiations in Raftopoulos and Mazarire, “Civil society and the constitution-making
process in Zimbabwe”, 17-18.
117  MMPZ, Media Update 2000/4, 24-30 January 2000. 
118 See for example, MMPZ, Media Update 2000/13 January -9 January 2000
‘Countdown to referendum’; MMPZ, Media Update no. 2000/4 24-30 January 2000,
“Referendum on the draft constitution.”    
119 “Top NCA leaders arrested” Daily News, 14 February 2000.
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and CD.115  The NCA, on the other hand, had been effectively blocked from airing
programmes or adverts on ZBC airwaves.  Officials claimed that ‘political advertising’ must
have government approval.  Persistent court battles failed to gain the NCA equal access to
ZBC channels.116  The Media Monitoring Project (MMPZ) reported that in the week following
a high court ruling which required ZBC to broadcast  adverts, there were 22 CC adverts during
and after the man news bulletins, and no NCA adverts at all.117   The MMPZ also observed that
the NCA was rarely  provided with a right of reply in either news or current affairs broadcasts
throughout the referendum campaign period.  In a one week period, they suggest that 30 out
of 42 minutes of television news coverage was allocated to CC officials.118  
Despite its vociferousness, in retrospect the referendum campaign was relatively
peaceful and free of intimidation.  Some meetings did break down into violent confrontation,
and there were reports that the police were called in to protect commissioners.  On the last day
before the referendum, two NCA leaders were arrested along with six other members.119
7.6  Who Represents the People?
The NCA-CC debate also catalyzed a much broader set of questions about the role of NGOs,
trades unions and individual citizens and their relationship to the state.  The existence of the
NCA challenged the previously dominant rhetoric and practice of the state, which presumed
120  Jonathan Moyo, “Is the NCA grouping still existing?” Financial Gazette, 30
September 1999, 12. 
121  Jonathan Moyo, “Greatest enemy of truth is myth” Independent 21 May 1999; see also
“NCA subverting constitutional process” Herald 22 June 1999, 8; “Constitution, lets stop
bickering and get moving” Herald 5 July 199, 6.
122  Welshman Ncube, “Insults won’t deter NCA” Financial Gazette, 13 August 1999, 8.
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that it must initiate and control such consultations.  The NCA was tagged as political, foreign-
funded and anti-unity because it challenged this premise.  
In language reminiscent of 1980s nation-building, the NCA was accused of failing to
support “national consensus-building”120 and of disrupting a “national process” when it refused
to take part in the CC.121  In return, the NCA emphasized its demand for a “..stabilizing and
unifying constitution-making process”.122  
The issue of which process was the more legitimate dominated much of their rhetoric.
Each accused the other of being less inclusive.  The Constitutional Commission launched its
public campaign in mid-July with a two page advert labeled “The New Democratic
Constitution...And a Few of the Questions That You Might Be Asking.”  Using a question and
answer format, the advert addressed the issues of what the commission was, how
commissioners were chosen and most tellingly of all “ Is the Constitutional Commission in
competition with the NCA?”  The answer given is:
The commission is not in competition with the NCA or any other group or
individual.  Unlike bodies like the NCA and other membership groups like
political parties, the commission is a non-partisan body determined to hear and
listen to all the views of the people of Zimbabwe and through their
organizations such as the NCA....What the commissioners will not do is be
dragged into a debate or situation that confuses changing the government with
changing the constitution...the commission will take into account even the
views of those groups or individuals who are critical of the Commission.  
These arguments were replicated in a set of adverts where the NCA and CC squared off against
each other asking “will the new constitution be about our rights...or theirs?” and “the new
Constitution is for all of us...so why can’t we all have a say in it?”(See Figure 7; Appendix 4)
versus “They say that you should boycott your national process and withhold your views on
123   Commissioner Walter Kamba, ZTV evening news, 16 January 2000 as reported in
 MMPZ, Media Update 2000/2, 10-16 January 2000; “Referendum – What will a no vote mean
for the country? Herald 18 January 2000. 
124   ZTV news, 15 January 2000, as reported in MMPZ Update 2000/2.  
125  “Political temperature rises in constitutional debate” Independent 25 June 2000.
126  Jonathan Moyo, “Is the NCA grouping still existing?” Financial Gazette, 30 September
1999, 12; see also, Alexander Kanengoni, “NCA now experiencing some rude awakening”
Herald 26 May 1999, 8. 
127  “NCA demo out to tarnish country’s image” Mirror 19 November 1999.
128  “Commission concerned about $500 000 demand” Sunday Mail, 3 October 1999, 15;
“$30m grant for Constitutional Commission approved” Herald 20 September 1999, 9; “CC
dismisses allegations of misuse of donor funds” Mirror 8 October 1999, 2; “Donors reluctant
to fund commissions work” Independent 13 August 1999, 3.
226
the new constitution...The Constitutional Commission’s outreach programme is giving all
Zimbabweans a chance to have their views heard and recorded.” (See Figure 8; Appendix 4).
The NCA was also attacked for representing foreign or colonial interests.
Representatives of the CC repeatedly suggested that a No vote was tantamount to a Yes vote
for the Lancaster House Constitution, and implied that the NCA was in favour of the Lancaster
House constitution.123  Foreign Affairs minister Stan Mudenge asserted on ZBC that ‘foreign
governments’ were working against the constitutional reform process.124  Jonathan Moyo was
quoted as saying “...this stupid bunch of protesters is being paid and used by overseas donors
who do not want to see anything good coming out of this country.”125  Or again  “...this
country would run a high risk of being a non-transparent donor’s republic.”126  An editorial in
the Mirror claimed, “The NCA has no local content and is therefore a myth, an international
myth about Zimbabwe.”127   Ironically, as we have already seen the NCA and CC were both
donor funded, but rebuttal was rarely permitted.128
The inclusion of many NCA officials and members in the leadership of the new
opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change, launched in September 1999, led to
accusations that the NCA was merely a front for opposition politics:
...the new discourse on the quest for an all embracing democratic constitution
was suddenly entangled and confused with the old quest for political power
pursued under the auspices of an array of failed political parties.....the NCA
strategy has been based on a....premise that the process of constitutional reform
129  Jonathan Moyo, “NCA not interested in changing the constitution” Independent 2 July
1999. 
130  Jonathan Moyo, “Is the NCA grouping still existing?” Financial Gazette, 30
September 1999, 12.
131  Innocent Kurwa “ Draft Constitution a ‘fraud’” Daily News 17 February 2001;
Tarcey Munaku, “referendum results rock ZANU (PF) Foundations” Daily News, 17 February
2001.
227
should be used along with the current economic crisis in the country to change
the government.129
Does the NCA still exist?  Yes and no depending on what you mean by the
NCA.  The answer is no if what is meant by the NCA is the organization that
was almost formed not too long ago as a loose affiliation of civil society groups,
churches, trade unions, academics and human rights lawyers who said they were
committed to promoting a non-partisan civic education in favour of
democratic constitutional reform.  But the answer is yes if by the NCA is meant
the de facto secretariat and fundraising arm of the Movement for Democratic
Change.  That is why the NCA is the first name of the MDC whose full name
is NCA-MDC.130
But the electorate’s rejection of the Constitutional Commission’s draft in the February
referendum, with vote of 54% against to 44% in favour,  implicitly answered many of these
questions.131  The NCA did represent the opinions of the majority of those who participated
in the plebiscite, and was therefore, a publicly legitimated voice. 
7.7 Conclusion
During the constitutional debate, the regime attempted to continue, and enhance, the politics
of inclusion, by claiming for itself the privilege of leading the debate.  Its proposals, and the
coalition it created to advance them, were participatory and inclusive.  Opposition politicians,
NGO activists, and church-people were included on an equal footing with ZANU (PF)
stalwarts.  At the same time, rhetoric against those who rejected the invitation to participate was
increasingly exclusionary and intolerant. In this period after 1997, the ruling party was beset by
revelations of scandals, financial crises, and declining social services.  The constitutional debate
was, at least in part, an attempt to regain control of political discourse, even as the state’s ability
to administer services was weakened.  Instead, the public consultations provided a platform for
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the articulation of devastating critiques of the regime’s political and economic policies in public
meetings, reported extensively in the state-controlled media.
The regime’s attempt to dominate the constitutional and civic debate by launching the
Constitutional Commission had three, perhaps unexpected, results.  Firstly, it succeeded in
polarizing and politicizing the debate, which forced groups that had previously avoided
‘politics’ to take a stand.  This forced groups, and individuals, to debate and articulate where
they stood vis-à-vis the ruling party, and the incipient opposition.   Secondly, the CC briefly
eclipsed the NCA, holding out the possibility of fair and equal consultation.  But the very
openness of the process, and the expectations it raised, was its downfall.   The publication of
the  draft constitution revealed the regime’s inflexibility and the futility of seeking change from
within. Thirdly, the victory of the ‘No’ camp publicly  recognized their claim to represent the
wider citizenry.  This fundamental challenge to the premises on which the regime was based
set the tone for the confrontation between state and society that developed as soon as the
referendum results were announced.
In winning the referendum, the NCA alliance had legitimated the existence of
organizations and ideas outside the hegemony of the ruling party/state.  The ideology of unity,
the claims to dominance of public discourse, and the control over state institutions were no
longer accepted.  The voting public (albeit a largely urban selection of the potential electorate)
affirmed the claims made by the NCA to speak and act outside the remit of the state.  This was
a fundamental rejection of the way in which politics had been done since independence. 
1  “CCJP blasts army attacks” Financial Gazette 22 February 2001; “Opposition
stronghold of St Mary’s under siege” Daily News 3 March 2001; “Riot squad unleashes terror
in Chitungwiza” Daily News  5 March 2001; “Govt incites crackdown on voters” Independent  9
March 2001.
2  “Hundreds throng Heroes’ Acre as Moyo is laid to rest” Herald 16 October 1999;
“Mugabe promises to pay Matabeleland victims” Mail & Guardian 18 October 1999;
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Chapter 8   The Politics of 1997-2000: the June 2000 election
The NCA profoundly changed politics in Zimbabwe by changing the conditions under which
the 2000 elections were to take place. In this chapter, I examine the shift in electoral and party
politics, in the context of changes in relations between the state and society after 1997. 
8.1 Recreating the nationalist coalition: the party and the war veterans
The patterns of state-society relations described in Chapters 3 and 4 were fundamentally
changed by the events of 1997 to 2000.  Ruling party attitudes to NGOs, church and unions
were affected by their involvement in the constitutional debate  and the parliamentary election
in June 2000 and also by the prospect of the presidential election in 2002.  
Until 1997 the politics of Zimbabwe may, generally, be interpreted as the politics of
inclusion, in which the ruling party and the state sought  to incorporate most groups into their
alliance, on their own terms but after 1997,  the politics of exclusion intensified.  Especially
after the constitutional referendum, the ZANU(PF) government became  increasingly
intolerant of groups organized outside the state.  After the June 2000 election, violence moved
from the rural areas into urban areas and was increasingly perpetrated by sections of the formal
security apparatus, including the army and police, and not by the war veterans and party youth
alone.1 
Yet this new politics was not solely exclusionary.  It was also about creating support
amongst land-poor rural people and unemployed or poorly remunerated urban families.
Promises were made in 1999 and 2000 that reparations would be forthcoming for victims of
the Matabeleland conflict.2   This campaign seems to have been masterminded by Jonathan
“Committee on Gukurahundi seeks to meet Mugabe” Mirror 24 March 2000; “Committee on
Matabeleland atrocities suspends operations”  Mirror 13 October 2000; “Gukurahundi genocide
compensation in doubt” Daily News 8 January 2001.
3  See for instance, Sam Moyo, “The Interaction of Market and Compulsory Land
Acquisition Processes with Social Action in Zimbabwe’s Land Reform”  Paper presented at the
SARIPS of the Sapes Trust Annual colloquium on Regional Integration: Past, Present and
Future, Harare Sheraton Hotel and Towers, 24-27, September 2000.
4  See for example, “Expert accuses observers of bias” Sunday News, 25 June 2000, 1, 5;
Baregu was also well-known as a pro-government commentator on ZBC.
230
Moyo.  In 1990, in his guise as a liberal democrat, he was a harsh critic of the ruling party.  In
1999, and since then, he has taken his place at the heart of the government’s coalition, being
appointed Information Minister after the June elections.   Other influential commentators,
mostly academics linked to SAPES,  also remained on-side.  Sam Moyo’s commitment to land
reform appears to overwhelm his ability to appraise the process critically.3    Tanzanian
academic Mwesiga Baregu extended  his nationalist critique of outside interventions to
condemning foreign election observers.4  Ibbo Mandaza’s Mirror, while occasionally critical,
maintained a sympathetic approach to the governing coalition. Structurally and rhetorically,
ZANU(PF) attempted to recreate the social and political coalition of forces that had supported
the liberation war, and to de-legitimize voices from outside that network.  Whereas the post-
liberation alliances in the 1980s and most of the 1990s were premised on the depoliticization
and demobilization of all the social forces, the new, mobilized, forces of war veterans and party
activists made this balancing act unstable, forcing groups into conflict with each other.
Although the war veterans had demonstrated their power during the 1997 conflict, they
had then receded from the public sight.  As we have seen, they did make representations about
land during the constitutional debate, but had not played a decisive role in the process.  The
referendum defeat on the 14th of February was a turning point.  The Zimbabwe National
Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), released a statement on 15th February that
reveals the thinking behind the destabilization programme that emerged:
As the liberation war veterans of this country, we have done our best to
promote the ‘YES’ vote on the constitutional Draft, not because the Draft
5  ZNLWVA “The ‘NO’ Vote to the Draft Constitution: which way forward?” 15
February 2000 emphasis in the original. 
6  ZNLWVA “The ‘NO’ Vote to the Draft Constitution: which way forward?” 15
February 2000 emphasis in the original.
7  “War veterans invade farms countrywide” Herald 29 February 2000. 
8   Jonathan Moyo, “Oppositional Press put to shame” Sunday Mail  22 April 2001.
9  “Jobless hired to seize farms” Financial Gazette, 16 March 2000. 
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favoured our position on all aspects, but because we realised the importance
of the draft as being the land issue. 5   
The veterans took issue with the longevity of many of the Cabinet Ministers and the tendency
towards corruption within the government, and the weakness of ZANU(PF) as a party. In
particular, they noted that:
Our own machinery which kept the Chimurenga war going, though disgruntled
and depressed, remains our real hope to the cause of our historic revolution.
We advice the party to give these people their rightful place and to put them to use without any
delay. The spirit of the revolution, that of 1980, must be revived now........the main factor
we see as contributing to the NO result is the weakness of the Party’s
provincial structures, the reluctant mood, the failure to change with the
times......this weakness of the Party structures has watered down our
revolutionary aspirations and has proved beyond doubt the decay within us and
that necessary and immediate steps should be taken to unify all revolutionary
groupings of ZANU(PF) and consolidate the pillars upon which our support and power
rests.6
The ZNLWVA’s attempts to rebuild the party’s coalition commenced immediately.  Farm
invasions began in Masvingo province on the 16th of February and quickly spread to the rest
of the country.7  The invasions were later called the fast-track resettlement programme and,
more evocatively still, the third chimurenga.8  
Although the invasions were initially described as ‘war veterans’ invading land, it quickly
became clear that many invaders were either ZANU(PF) cadres or simply unemployed youths.
That the invasions were not spontaneous was demonstrated by reports of invaders
congregating near roadsides to receive their payments.9  Journalists observing the invasions
claimed that CIO operatives were involved in planning them, and that government and army
10  Vincent Kahiya, “Government directs farm invasions” Independent 3 March 2000.
11  “War veterans can remain on farms says president” Herald 11 March 2000. 
12  “Police defy high court order to evict war vets” Financial Gazette, 23 March 2000. 
13  “Stay out of politics , CFU warned” Standard 2 April 2000
14  Steve Kibble and Paul Vanlerberghe, “Land, Power and Poverty: farm workers and
the crisis in Zimbabwe” (London: CIIR, 2000) 32-33, 41.
15  Steve Kibble. “Zimbabwe: the State, Development and Democratization”
Unpublished paper. 2000.
16  See for instance, Lionel Cliffe, Joshua Mpofu, and Barry Munslow. “Nationalist
Politics in Zimbabwe the 1980 elections and beyond” Review of African Political Economy 18
(1980), 51-53.
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vehicles were used to transport the  invaders.10  Certainly, their presence was encouraged from
the highest level; President Mugabe publically condoned their presence on the farms in early
March.11  High court orders to evict the invaders were ignored by police, presumably on the
advice of the Police Commissioner Chihuri, who was specifically named in the court ruling.12
 In addition to ZNWLVA president, Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi, new leaders emerged, including
Joseph Chinotimba, an employee of Harare city council, who became the self-styled leader of
the land invasions.
Violence seemed to escalate from mid-March, when reports of attacks on  farm-
workers and farmers increased.  Farmers were driven off their land, or expected to farm only
a portion of it, while veterans and others claimed the remainder.  In some cases this resulted
in a stalemate and co-habitation;  violence erupted in other cases.  Five white farmers were
killed.  The CFU was explicitly warned to avoid involvement with the MDC.13   Farm-workers
were dispersed, often after having their homes and belongings destroyed. In some cases they
were promised land.  30 000 farm-workers were estimated to have been displaced by August
2000.14  Some peasants and farm-workers were also subject to quasi-Maoist ‘re-education’
camps on occupied farms.15  These camps emulated the pre-independence  pungwes, all-night
meetings characterized by singing and dancing, which had been the guerilla’s “chief vehicle for
political education” during the liberation war.16 
17  “Police and War Vets Attack NCA” Standard 12 May 2000; “Havoc in City” Standard
2 April 2000; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, The Unleashing of Violence: A report
on violence against peaceful protestors in Harare April 2000.
18  ZBC 8 pm news bulletin, 6 April 2000, as cited in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO
Forum, The Unleashing of Violence: A report on violence against peaceful protestors in Harare
April 2000, footnote 24.
19  “Teachers abducted as political tension reaches fever high” Parade June (2000), 3, 7,
13; “Zanu PF terror targets rural professionals” Independent 26 May 2000; “Another safe home
for fleeing villagers, teachers established” Daily News 29 May 2000; “War vets blackmail
teachers” Daily News 5 June 2000; “Nun relives ordeal at the hands of ZANU (PF) enforcers”
Daily News 22 June 2000; “ZANU PF mob brutally assaults Catholic priest” Daily News 24 June
200, 1;  “Threatened teachers flee from 3 schools” Daily News 26 June 2000; numerous personal
communications.  .
20  ZimRights Early warning and Alert: 2” 5 April 2000 esp case no. 1 “Activist
headmaster brutally assaulted by land-grabbers” and case no. 2 “ZimRights members attacked”.
21   “31 deaths of MDC supporters in political violence” MDC Press release 22 June
2000; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe,
2000-2001  July 2000, 3-5.
22  EU Election Observation Mission Zimbabwe 2000, “Report of the EU Election
Observation Mission on the Parliamentary Elections which took place in Zimbabwe on 24th and
25th June 2000", (Harare/Strasbourg, 4 July 2000) 15.
23  “31 deaths of MDC supporters in political violence” MDC Press release 22 June
2000.
24  “Terror reigns in Mberengwa” Daily News 24 June 2000
25  “Refugees in their own country” Financial Gazette 22 June 2000.
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As the election approached, those thought to support the opposition or to be likely to
do so, began to be intimidated.  War veterans disrupted NCA marches in April and May.17  In
justifying police failure to protect marchers, the Commissioner of Police referred to them as
‘NCA/MDC’.18   Those targeted included teachers, priests and nuns19, activists such as
ZimRights members in Marondera20 and opposition party members.21  An estimated 7000
teachers fled their homes, shutting 250 primary and secondary schools.22  The MDC estimated
that 10 000  people were displaced;23 the Human Rights NGO Forum estimated that 13 000
rural people had fled to family in urban areas;24 the Financial Gazette estimated that 6 000 people
had fled from rural areas.25
Unsurprisingly, the rhetoric of this period, like previous elections and the constitutional
debate revolved around the liberation war and nation-building.  Referring to white farmers, the
late Border Gezi, Governor of Mashonaland Central said “They now don’t appreciate the
26  “Gezi slams whites for funding MDC” Herald 3 March 2000.
27  “MDC admits anti-Zanu (PF) alliance with whites” Herald 10 April 2000.
28  Televised Address by His Excellency the President on the Occasion of Zimbabwe's
Twentieth Anniversary, Pockets Hill, Harare, 18th April, 2000. Transcript of Address.
29   Kriger,  “Les vétérans et le parti au pouvoir.”
30  See for instance, “Confusion reigns over war vets leadership” Daily News 8
September 2000; “War vets power struggle deepens” Independent 8 September 2000; “War
veterans split over election” Independent 14 September 2001; “Ndlovu threatens to  deal  with
Nyaruwata,  Mhlanga” Mirror 14 September 2001. 
31  “War Vets group takes government to court” Standard 6 August 2000.
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benefits of the reconciliation policy because we want to redistribute land to the people.” 26  The
MDC was portrayed as the “puppet of white people who wanted to recolonise the country.”
27  President Mugabe accused whites of perpetuating: 
.... vestigial attitudes from the Rhodesian yester-years, attitudes of a master race,
master colour, master owner and master employer. Our whole struggle was a
rejection of such imperious attitudes and claims to privilege.28
The land invasions were explicitly linked to the rejection of the government’s draft constitution,
which they perceived to have been orchestrated by white and foreign interests.  In response,
in April the government enacted into law the controversial constitutional clause which entitled
it to acquire land without compensation. 
The government’s attempt to reconstruct this alliance was not without problems.  The
mobilization of the war veterans is, as Kriger shows, the culmination of their demands over
two decades for compensation and inclusion.29  However, the war veterans themselves are
divided and claims to the liberation mythology continue to be contested.  The ZNLWVA itself
is deeply divided by factional disputes.  After Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi’s death in 2001, the
leadership was hotly contested between two factions.30  The new resources have also intensified
competition from other groups, those claiming to be ‘war vets’ but not officially recognized as
such: cadres, collaborators (mujibas), and war widows, for equal access.31  While these groups
have been useful in occupying land (mujibas are an ‘official’ category of recipient under the fast-
track programme) their future organizational demands may be less easy to meet.  Not all war
veterans desire to be included in this process.  The Zimbabwe Liberators Platform, formed by
32  See for instance, David Moore [letter] “How Mugabe came to power”, London Review
of Books, 5 April 2001; R W Johnson, “How Mugabe came to power” London Review of Books, 22
February 2001; RW Johnson, “Interview: Wilfred Mhanda, former freedom fighter” Focus
December 2000. 
33  “New war vets body attacks Hunzvi executive” Mirror 15 September 2000
34   “I never saw Moyo in the struggle--Tekere” Independent 27 April 2001; “Controversy
over Hunzvi’s hero status” Independent 8 June 2001; “Chinotimba's credentials questioned”
Independent 3 August 2001; “Chinotimba Attacks General Mujuru” Standard 5 August 2001;
“Chinotimba a fake” Independent 10 Augut 2001; see also, “The struggle was not about places”
Sunday Mail 1 May 2001.
35  “Nkomo death sparks trouble” Standard 4 July 1999.
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Wilfred Mhanda, of ZIPA, was also afforded a great deal of press coverage within and outside
Zimbabwe, in an effort to construct an alternate legitimacy for anti-ZANU(PF) liberation-
based perspectives.32   The chair of the new body said, 
The farm occupations could have been a demonstration if  they had been
spontaneous....But this demonstration is illegal because it was denounced by
courts of law, which are the custodians of law in this  country....We want to
convince the people that war veterans are members of society who should not
be seen as working  against the interests of the country.33
The regime’s own emphasis on liberation war history led to the credentials of its new
leadership being challenged.  Jonathan Moyo was accused of running away from training at
Mgagao camp in Tanzania after 6 weeks; Chenjerai Hunzvi was alleged to have spent the
struggle in Poland training to become a medical doctor; Joseph Chinotimba was revealed to
have been a refugee, not a soldier, in Mozambique in late 1979.34   
The politics of choosing heroes also intensified.   The politics of choosing heroes,
already under question in the 1980s, became even more of a political hot potato in the 1990s.
Nkomo’s death in 1999 brought this to the attention of many, for while it was important
politically that Mugabe recognize him as ‘national hero’ (and thereby entitled to be buried at
the National Heroes’ Acre near Harare) many in Matabeleland were said to be calling for him
to be buried there.35  The spontaneity of grief and the huge turn-out at Nkomo’s funeral was
in sharp contrast to the stilted and artificial nature of previous ceremonial events.  Public
pressure was enunciated in the media for streets to be named after Joshua Nkomo after his
36   Daniel Muleya, “Streets to be renamed, statue erected to Nkomo”, Independent 9 July
1999.
37  “Street names change” Standard 23 December 2001; “Renaming Bulawayo Airport
after Nkomo an insult”  Standard 23 December 2001.
38  “Dongo launches political party” Sunday Mail, 20 December 1998 provides a
surprisingly detailed and sympathetic portrait of Dongo’s agenda; see also, Kempton
Makamure, “Its time we graduated from personality politics” Independent, 28 May 1999.
39  “ZUD claims CIO infiltration” Standard 23 May 1999; “Things fall apart: Margaret
Dongo, Kempton Makamure part ways” Parade September 1999, 3, 43.
40  “CIO claims victory for splitting Dongo’s party” Independent, 16 July 1999. 
41  “Misihairabwi joins MDC” Standard, 5 March 2000; “ZUD official defects to MDC”
Mirror 24 March 2000; “Mhashu to contest in Chitungwiza East” Standard, 20 February 2000.
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death.36   In the lead-up to the 2002 election, both Bulawayo Airport, the road leading to it, and
a local college were renamed in Nkomo’s honour.37  The failure of ZANU(PF) to recognize
Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the original ZANU, as a hero after his death in 2000 was seen as
further pusillanimous politicking. 
8.2 Post 1997 Party Politics
The main reason for the reinvigoration of these ZANU(PF) allies was the new momentum in
electoral politics, following the successful challenges of the independent candidates in 1996-7,
and the results of the referendum. 
The movement for independent candidates formed a political party in 1998, known as
the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats, led by Margaret Dongo.38  At the time, it was expected
to be the main challenger to ZANU (PF) in the 2000 elections.  However, following personality
clashes, exacerbated by CIO infiltration, the party split into two camps in mid-1999.39
Kempton Makamure’s formation of an off-shoot called “Zimbabwe Union of Democrats –
Transparency Front, was claimed as a victory by CIO agents.40    Following the formation of
the MDC, more of Dongo’s key members deserted.41
In 1999, an attempt to revive ZAPU, as ZAPU 2000, began in Matabeleland. Although
ZAPU 2000 has tended to capitalize on the discontent of Matabeleland, organizers insist that
42  Masipula Sithole, “ZAPU 2000: Do you see what I see?”  Financial Gazette, 11 March
1999.
43  Mercedes Sayagues, “New Party has Bulawayo on the Boil” Mail & Guardian, 30
April 1999; Mercedes Sayagues, “ZAPU starts its political revival” Mail & Guardian, 24 June
1999; “ZAPU seeks nullification of council polls” Mirror 8 October 1999, 3.
44 “President uses his powers to amend act: Mass job actions temporarily banned”
Herald 28 November 1998; “ZCTU pulls out of tri-partite talks” Herald, 2 March 1999; “Unions
form party to challenge Mugabe” Mail & Guardian, 2 March 1999.
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they intend to organize throughout Zimbabwe.  They are campaigning for a federal system,
with devolution of powers to provinces, challenging the government’s centralized development
strategy.42  ZAPU 2000 campaigned to great acclaim in municipal elections in August 1999 but
had little practical impact, and won no seats.43
In 1999, the ZCTU announced that it would begin the process of forming a political
party, which became the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).  As suggested in chapter
4, in the mid 1990s the ZCTU had adopted a conciliatory approach to the state, typified by
their acceptance of the tri-partite bargaining schemes.  Yet in 1997, they responded to the
public mood, by successfully organizing the anti-tax demonstrations, which continued into
1998.  Several key members of the ZCTU were prominent members of the NCA. After the
President banned stay-aways and other demonstrations at the end of  November 1998, the
ZCTU withdrew from the tri-partite negotiations on a social contract between employers,
workers and the state.  Workers’ interests began to be pursued through more overtly political
means.44
In February 1999, the ZCTU called  a National Working Peoples’ Convention
(NWPC).  Without ever using the term ‘political party’, it called for a “strong, democratic and
organized movement of the people,” which would “recognize and protest the discrete and
independent role and mandate of the various associations of working people, including the
labour movement, informal traders associations and peasant farmers association.”  The
convention resolved to “implement a vigorous and democratic political movement for
45  NWPC,  “Declaration of the National Working Peoples Convention” Harare,
February 1999.
46  Research notes, 11 September 1999; “MDC launched” Standard 12 September 1999.
47  Nyathi, who had been in charge of raising funds for the launch of the MDC indicated
to me that he had intended to remain in the background of the new party, but was
unintentionally exposed (Interview, 16 September 1999) .  
48  Alexander, “Zimbabwean workers, the MDC and the 2000 election” 391.
49  “No formal links between ZCTU and new party” Herald  16 September 1999, 1. 
50  Interview, Densen Mafinyani, ZCC Secretary-General,  29 September 1999.
51  Lovemore Madhuku, “NCA cannot be a member of MDC” Financial Gazette 16
September 1999, 9, 10;  “Tsvangirai quits NCA” Mirror 17 September 1999, 1, 2; “Tsvangirai
resigns form NCA, Independent  17 September 1999, 2; “NCA denies allegiance to MDC” Daily
News 25 September 1999, 5. 
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change.”45  The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was launched in September 1999,
to an estimated 15 000 member audience at Rufaro Stadium, most of whom seemed to be
organized groups of workers representing various unions.46  
The MDC leadership contained many of the individuals who had moved onto the
public stage through the NCA, such as Welshman Ncube and Lovemore Madhuku of the
University of Zimbabwe, Mike Auret, who had just resigned as director of the CCJP, and Paul
Themba Nyathi, the Zimbabwe Project director.47  David Chimhini, recently laid off from
ZimRights,  became the MDC’s executive director.  Although the dominance of these educated,
NGO-aligned activists led to suggestions that  “key working class leaders” were sidelined,
Morgan Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda, the secretary-general and president of the ZCTU
respectively, were President and Secretary-General of the new party.48 
The links between the ZCTU, the NCA and the MDC created problems and opened
all three to attack for compromising their autonomy.49  As we have seen, the ZCC used this
development as an after-the-fact justification for their withdrawal from the NCA.50   Morgan
Tsvangirai gave up his leadership of the NCA, in order to avoid accusations of it being partisan,
which would alienate the other opposition parties, although he retained his post as secretary-
general of the ZCTU.51 
52  “Opposition parties pull out of NCA” Mirror 13 November 1998; “NCA in policy
crisis” Sunday Mail, 10 March 2000; “NCA denies siphoning off $6 billion to MDC” Daily News,
“NCA rally in Bulawayo a flop” Daily News 20 September 1999, 1; “Opposition political parties
slam NCA” Sunday Mail, 26 September 1999.
53  “Misihairabwi joins MDC” Standard, 5 March 2000; “ZUD official defects to MDC”
Mirror 24 March 2000.
54  “Recommendations on electoral conduct made” Herald 18 February 1999, 11; “ESC
concerned with by-election delays” Herald 22 February 1999, 6.
55 “Case for an independent electoral body” Mirror 17 September 1999, 6; “Polls
conduct taxes man of the cloth’s patience” Financial Gazette, 30 September 1999, 3; “ESC
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As we have seen in Chapter 7, conflicts still emerged.  Opposition parties accused the
NCA of “behaving like an opposition party.”52  However, after the NCA’s referendum victory,
this potential weakness became a strength, as a much wider and more diverse membership
adhered to the MDC, in reaction to the dramatically proven ability of the NCA-MDC team to
win a convincing victory. In this post-referendum, pre-election period many of the previously
apathetic – or at least apolitical – white voters began attending MDC meetings and joined the
party.  During this period, after attempts to create a voting coalition between the MDC and
ZUD failed, prominent ZUD candidates joined the MDC.53  
For the first time since independence, ZANU(PF) was facing an opposition which
brought together diverse social forces, including the experience of the independent candidates
victories, the recently victorious NCA, and the financial backing of the business and farm
communities.  This election was to be the hardest fought since independence, with violence
allied to the electoral manipulation developed over the years.
8.3 The Election: Free and Fair or Flee and Fear?
As in the past, the election was run by the Director-General and the elections directorate and
the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). The ESC, however, was a less willing accomplice
than in the past.  Frustration with the conduct of the local council elections in 1998 and 1999,
led to much more open criticism.54  The long-time chair, former Anglican Bishop Peter
Hatendi, resigned in protest at government obstruction in January 2000.55  The remaining three
members protest”  Financial Gazette 30 March 2000.
56  “ESC members protest”  Financial Gazette 30 March 2000.
57  “ESC hamstrung: parties” Daily News 29 May 2000. 
58  “Gula-Ndebele tipped to head ESC” Independent 9 June 2000.
59  EU Election Observation Mission, Report of the EU Election Observation Mission
on the Parliamentary Elections which took place in Zimbabwe on 24th and 25th June 2000,
chapter 3, 10.
60 FODEZI, The state of the voter’s roll: preliminary findings local authority elections
(1999). Interviews,  Rashida Fazilahmed,  FODEZI,  8 October 1999,  Dr Christopher
Mushonga, FODEZI 8 October 1999.
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members were also much more public about their predicament, and called for an independent
body to be set up to oversee the elections.56  When, a week before the nomination court was
to sit, the ESC had not received details of constituency boundaries or polling stations, they
complained that the Elections Directorate was ‘not co-operative’.57 An ex-combatant and
retired army colonel, Sobuza Gula-Ndebele, was appointed as head of the ESC in June just days
before the election.58
Three aspects of the election’s administration by these problematic groups need to be
examined: the electoral roll and voting (including postal ballots); the role of observers and
monitors, and the ability of parties to campaign. 
8.3.1 The Electoral Roll and Voting
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 1995 election and subsequent by-elections provided clear
evidence that past electoral rolls were not accurate. A UN Electoral Assistance Mission
assessed the electoral roll in December 1999 and calculated that between 10 and 20 percent of
the names on the voter’s roll were deceased and that as many as two million voters — 40
percent of the electorate — had moved constituency since 1995 without being re-registered.59
A study carried out by a local NGO on the municipal elections in July 1999, gave similar
results.60   Ministry officials said that 5.1 million out of a potential 5.5 million voters had been
registered between January and March 2000.  The voters roll opened for inspection in June, but
many mistakes were found:  voters who claimed to have registered were not there, others found
61  See for instance, EU Election Observation Mission, Report of the EU Election
Observation Mission on the Parliamentary Elections which took place in Zimbabwe on 24th and
25th June 2000, chapter 3, 10-11.
62  See for instance, “Israeli-made voters cards cost a fortune” Sunday Gazette 26 March
1995 1, 3
63  “Moving the goalposts” Mail and Guardian, 24 June 2000;”Villagers adopt new
survival strategies to avoid beatings” Standard 18 June 2000; “War vets impound farm
employees’ identity cards” Daily News 20 June 2000.
64   Government Gazette 7 June 2000
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discrepancies in their ID numbers and name-spelling, while others noted that the names of
many deceased voters were still present on the list. A supplementary roll was created for those
who were registered between April and June, although it was in fact mainly a list of those who
found themselves not on the roll and re-registered.61 
One complaint was that, unlike in previous elections, no receipt or voters card was
issued to prove that one had indeed registered.  Ironically, in the 1995 election the issuing of
such cards had been a big controversy and many people complained about it.62  However, the
lack of proof of registration was now an issue, because many people claimed to have registered,
but their names did not appear on the roll.   Despite these problems, registration did seem to
function better in this election than in 1995, when there were many stories of people entirely
unable to register – long queues etc.   In this election one needed a National ID (or temporary
ID) or passport to register and to vote. It was widely reported that ZANU (PF) activists and
war veterans seized upon this and were forcing people — especially farm-workers, but also
rural people more generally — to hand over their identification documents in exchange for
ZANU (PF) membership cards.63  
Postal ballots were equally problematic.  Whereas the Electoral Act provides for
Zimbabweans away from their constituencies — whether abroad or elsewhere in the country
— to vote by postal ballot, on 7 June 2000 the President amended the Act so that only military
serving outside Zimbabwe, diplomatic staff posted overseas,  constituency registrars, presiding
officers and polling officers could take advantage of postal ballots.64  This disenfranchised
65  “Lawyers attack electoral act amendment on postal votes” Daily News, 20 June 2000.
66  “MDC wins case” Daily News, 16 August 2000. 
67  “Opposition cried foul over postal ballots” Daily News 22 June 2000.
68  “Massive vote fraud alleged in Mutare central” Daily News, 27 June 2000;
“Irregularities discovered on postal ballots from DRC” Herald 27 June 2000.  
69  Some groups refused in 1995, because there was no guarantee of independence.  See
Makumbe and Compagnon, Behind the Smokescreen, 230-232.
70  “ZCC starts training election monitors” Mirror 6 December 1999.
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Zimbabweans overseas and people serving as monitors during elections in constituencies other
than their own.65  Both of these groups, especially Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa,
had been highly critical of the regime during the Constitutional Commission hearings, and were
thought to support  the MDC.
Postal ballots issued to nearly 6 000  military personnel serving in the DRC were later
ruled invalid  by the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the Registrar-General had not
complied with the regulations.66  The intended recipients had not signed the ballot application
forms or the signatures had not been witnessed.67  In some constituencies in Mutare there were
also questions about people voting more than once, either through multiple postal ballots or
once with a postal ballot and once in person.68 
8.3.2 Observers and Monitors
International observers and local monitors, most of whom represented NGOs and/or were
funded by NGOs,  were obstructed from observing the election.  Although electoral law did
not provide for monitors, in the 1995 election the ESC had asked civil society groups to assist
them as monitors.69  It was anticipated that the same procedure would again be followed in the
2000 election and NGOs had been training monitors in preparation.70  It was expected that
there would be over 20 000 trained monitors.  On June 7, however, the government gazetted
new regulations specifying that, while the ESC could appoint Zimbabweans as monitors, the
71  GOZ. Election (Amendment) Regulations, 2000 (number 7) Statutory Instrument
161A of 2000; see also, “Amendments to electoral act gazetted” Herald 21 June 2000, 10.
72 Research notes, 20 June 2000.
73  “ESC loses case over polls” Herald 22 June 2000.  
74  “Zimbabwe Parliamentary Elections 2000: Accreditation of elections” Press Release,
GOZ, Department of Information, 20 June 2000
75  Research Notes, 20-22 June 2000; ZCC, Report of Ecumenical Peace Observer
Mission, n.d. 9; “UK-sponsored observers barred” Herald 19 June 2000; “216 more election
observers barred” Herald 21 June 2000; “Government bars 40 US observers” Daily News, 21
June 2000.  
76 “AG deplores recruitment of monitors” Sunday Mail, 18 June 2000, 4.
77   GOZ,  Election (Amendment) Regulations, 2000 (number 8)) Statutory Instrument
180A of 2000. 
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Election Directorate would “on the recommendation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”
accredit foreign observers after the payment of USD 100.71  
The ESC, headed by former ZANU (PF) politician Elaine Raftopoulos as acting chair,
took the Registrar-General to court, alleging that, by claiming the power to accredit foreign
observers, he had usurped the ESC’s role.72  As this case went to court, the government quickly
appointed Gula-Ndebele head of the ESC. On 20 June the High Court ruled against the ESC,
saying that there was no constitutional reason that the Registrar-General’s office ought not to
have responsibility for accrediting observers.73   On the same day, a press statement was
released stating that no further foreign observers would be accredited, meaning that only a few
hundred already accredited EU and Commonwealth observers would be in the field.74
However, after much  conflicting information, the  ZCC/WCC and Congress of South Africa
Trades Unions (COSATU) delegations were accredited with one day to spare before the
election, but other groups including the National Democratic Institute (NDI),  International
Republican Institute (IRI), and Oxfam Canada were black-listed.75 
The ESC’s inclusion of NCA members as monitors had also came under attack from
the Attorney-General, who accused the ESC of contravening the Electoral Act.76  Presumably
for this reason, on 20 June 2000, a further amendment was gazetted, which specified that only
one monitor could be deployed in each polling station.77  As the ESC had envisaged six
78  ZCC. 2000 Parliamentary Elections Report. n.d. n.p. Section 2.3.
79  EU, Final report, chapter 2, 9
80  ZCC,  2000 Parliamentary Elections Report. n.d. n.p. Section 5.4.
81  Research Notes, 23-25 June 2000.
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 monitors at each station, this  meant that only one fifth of the 20 000 or more trained
monitors would be deployed.  The Elections Directorate was convinced to relax this somewhat
by the new Chair of the ESC.  It agreed that four monitors would be accredited to each polling
station,  two during the day and two during the night; only one monitor would be allowed
inside the polling station at a time.78   
Like the accreditation of observers, the accreditation of monitors was confused by
misinformation and administrative delays. The EU Observer mission commented  “the
confusion over the role of domestic monitors was not due to administrative incompetence but
to a deliberate attempt to reduce the effectiveness of independent monitoring of the election.”79
Three modes of identification of monitors had been arranged by the ESC.  Monitors were to
have cardboard badges identifying them as monitors or supervisors of monitors, they were also
to have black and white ESC T-shirts, as well as fluorescent pinneys – orange for supervisors
and yellow for monitors.  However, the Registrar-General’s claim to accredit monitors included
the right to issue their own plastic badges incorporating monitor’s ID numbers, so that when
matched with a monitor’s National ID card, which incorporates a photo,  it would be
impossible for monitors to trade badges. These badges were not distributed to the NGOs until
Friday 23rd June which made it almost impossible to get the badges to the monitors.  Only 8000
badges were ever printed, and the badges then had to be dispatched to the correct
constituencies. Mistakes in this frantic process meant that Matabeleland supervisors were being
sent badges for monitors based in Manicaland and vice versa.80  Despite all this, in Matabeleland,
presiding officers paid little attention to these regulations and allowed in four to five monitors
in the polling station, as long as they had some sort of ID, either an official badge, an ESC T-
shirt or a pinney.81  Patrick Bond estimates that roughly half the presiding officers acted
82  Patrick Bond, Notes from Manicaland. Unpublished MS, June 2000.
83  “MDC accuses ZBC of holding back campaign advertisements” Daily News 21 June
2000.
84  “ZBC ordered to stop propaganda”  Independent 16 June 2000. 
85  “Former Herald editor speaks out”, Standard 15 October 2000.  
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similarly in Manicaland.82  So, despite ruling party efforts to sideline them, NGOs were
prominent during the election period.
8.3.3 Obstruction of Campaigns
The ruling party used all their usual techniques to effectively prevent the opposition parties
from campaigning in many areas.  Although the popularity of the Daily News gave the MDC
a valuable entry into urban areas, the independent press has yet to successfully penetrate rural
areas.  The dominant medium in these areas remains the radio.  ZBC broadcasts in English on
Radio 3 aiming primarily at young urban dwellers.  The MDC was allowed to run English
language adverts on Radio 3, but refused access to the indigenous language – and
predominantly rural – audience of Radio 2.83  The MDC challenged ZBC in Supreme Court,
alleging that both Zimpapers and the ZBC was violating section 23 of constitution -- freedom
of expression.  The Supreme Court issued an interim ruling to this effect and ordered ZBC and
Zimpapers which owns the Herald to  distribute news and general information impartially and
without bias.84    Bornwell Chakaodza, who was editor of the Herald during the election period,
recently  gave a particularly frank account of the Herald’s role:  “...we went out of our way [to
promote the ruling party] and abandoned all professional ethics as you know them.”
Chakaodza asserted that it was clear that the editorial position during the elections did not agree
with the general mood in the country and that “I was conscious of being an editor who lacked
credibility with readers and advertisers…also circulation had nosedived resulting in the flight
of advertisers.”85
86  “Mugabe rallies flop” Standard 18 June 2000; “ Harare residents snub Mugabe rally
— businesses defy orders to close shops” Financial Gazette 22 June 2000.
87  “Suspected war vets abduct MDC poll agents” Daily News 26 June 2000; “MDC
Polling agent abducted in Bulawayo” Daily News 26 June 2000, 17.
88  “Candidates in hospital after brutal assaults” Daily News 26 June 2000.
89  “Club monitors fail to locate MDC candidate for Kariba” Daily News 20 June 2000.
90  “MDC candidate still in hiding despite winning poll” Daily News 29 June 2000;
“MDC candidates flee terror in Gokwe” Daily News 22 June 2000.
91   ZANU (PF) Manifesto.  Election 2000: the context.
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Violence and intimidation also continued into the election period, although in most
areas, it diminished on the actual election days.  In many areas, voters were forced to attend
rallies, especially the President’s ‘star rallies’.  In Bulawayo shops and churches were forced to
close when rallies took place.86   Polling agents, whose names were required by law to be
published in the press were targeted in Mberengwa and Bulawayo.87  The MDC candidate in
Masvingo South and the Independent candidate in Mbare East were both reported to be in
hospital the morning after the election.88  In Kariba, both the MDC and UP candidates were
said to be in hiding, which rendered them unable to campaign.89  Candidates in Kwekwe and
Gokwe were also forced to flee their constituencies.90 
8.4  Election Rhetoric and Results
The election rhetoric of the MDC and ZANU(PF) diverged more than the constitutional
discourse.  ZANU (PF) resorted to a more extremist, nationalist campaign. Under the slogan,
“the land is the economy and the economy is land,” ZANU(PF) emphasized that:
Our party is the only one with a proven history of revolutionary achievement
whenever the political and economic situation in our country has called for real
transformation.... Ever since its formation, ZANU PF has distinguished itself
as an unwavering, principled,  revolutionary party with a tradition of promoting
political participation, social and economic advances and total human freedoms
that are constitutionally protected and guaranteed under conditions of unity,
peace and development....we do not blow with the winds but we blow the
winds of revolutionary change to promote unity, peace, and development.91 
The MDC was disparaged as simply another of the ‘little parties’ which had been ZANU(PF’s
main opposition in previous elections:
92   ZANU (PF) Manifesto.  Election 2000: the context.
   93  Sydney Masamvu, “Mugabe declares total war on MDC” Financial Gazette 5 April
2001.
94  Televised Address by His Excellency the President on the Occasion of Zimbabwe's
Twentieth Anniversary, Pockets Hill, Harare, 18th April, 2000.
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....it is common that just before parliamentary elections little parties with no
political history, typically led by well-known cowards trying their luck,
plagiarists, sell-outs, shameless opportunists, and other well known merchants
of confusion, spring up to distort the people by spreading lies.  Already one of
these little parties, formed only a few months ago with tainted money from
some donors and right wing conservative racists associated with Rhodesia has
proved to be a Movement  for the destruction of our Country....even defeated
and now embittered racists are using black mouthpieces to preach mean
spirited democracy.92
The campaign made effective use of the MDC’s links to white farmers in its campaign posters
and TV footage.   President Mugabe accused supporters of the MDC of siding with “the
Europeans and the British”93 and linked the election campaign explicitly to the land issue.
The 20th anniversary of independence, occurring in the midst of the land invasions and
shortly before the election, gave Mugabe the chance to bring all of these issues together in a
statesmanlike fashion. He first reminded voters of the sacrifices made in the liberation war:
I remind you today that our Independence followed over ninety years of
oppressive settler colonial rule imposed on us in 1890 when the British
occupied our country.  Our Independence followed years of bitter and
protracted struggle. Ask yourselves how many had to die for this great day to
come. Apart from our well-known national heroes of the struggle ... we recall
on this day our freedom fighters who perished inside and outside the country.
We also cannot forget the refugees and others --men, women and the children
who were cut down in cold blood, often tattered book in hand, at Nyadzonia,
Chimoio, Tembue, Mkushi, Luangwa, Solwezi, where to this day, they lie
buried in mass graves.94
The regime also made effective use of the very real successes of the regime:
The sacrifices we have made for our country and Independence simply mean
that as Zimbabweans, we cannot settle for nominal sovereignty. It is not
sufficient to have a national flag, a national anthem and a black President.
These are mere signifiers and symbolic accoutrements of our Independence
and sovereignty as a people. They need content, and content is what we have
been struggling to give in the past twenty years. We successfully consolidated
people's political power by gaining control and transforming instruments of
governance. We also ensured that the majority of our people who had been
95   Televised Address by His Excellency the President on the Occasion of Zimbabwe's
Twentieth Anniversary, Pockets Hill, Harare, 18th April, 2000.
96    Televised Address by His Excellency the President on the Occasion of Zimbabwe's
Twentieth Anniversary, Pockets Hill, Harare, 18th April, 2000.
97  See for example, Nyasha Chikwina (Harare North); Joshua Malinga (Bulawayo
North); Edward Simela (Pelandaba). 
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disenfranchised by colonialism got back and exercised their vote in choosing
who governs them. ...  All these developments gave political content to our
Independence and sovereignty. The past twenty years have also seen enormous
developmental changes that have touched practically every life.95
Land was cast as the final goal of the regime: 
The issue of land remains both emotive and vexed. ... Between 1980 and 1995,
we were able to resettle 71 000 families on about 3,3 million hectares excised
from the commercial sector. This was a far cry from the 162 000 families we
had hoped to settle on 8 million hectares of land. We resumed land reforms
under what we have termed the Second Phase and to this day over 2 422
households have been resettled on 66 farms. The Second Phase of Land
Reforms envisaged the excision of about 5 million  hectares of land from the
commercial sector, with a million hectares set to be delivered for resettlement
every year. We had hoped that this would start with nearly a thousand farms
we had designated for acquisition. Sadly this was not to be as the commercial
farmers contested the matter in the courts forcing Government to abandon the
acquisition process. ... Even after removing the constitutional barriers, we were
still faced with the issue of diminishing resources against ever rising prices.
After 1997, we also had to content with the reluctance of the new Labour
Government .... We also faced greater commercial farmer resistance whose
manifestations included not just the legal challenges ... but also resistance to the
land clause we had introduced in the rejected draft constitution. ... We should
be able to find a way forward, but one that recognises the urgent need for land
reforms. It is the last  colonial question heavily qualifying our sovereignty. We
are determined to resolve it once and for all.96  
Ironically, though, individual ZANU(PF) candidates eschewed much of this rhetoric, choosing
instead to highlight their personal,  local-level achievements within their constituencies.  Some
candidates’ posters did not even mention ZANU(PF), or use its symbols.97  
The MDC campaign by contrast, attempted to focus debate on governance issues.   In
particular, they emphasized the mismanagement of issues such as land and health, in contrast
the Mugabe’s chronicle of all the advances in education, health care and agricultural production.
Their deceptively simple slogan ‘it’s time for a change’ was remarkably effective in uniting a
wide and disparate coalition of the dissatisfied.  But their campaign was not entirely negative,
98  MDC advert, Daily News, 23 June 2000, 15.
99  Research Notes, 18 June 2000; “Victory is certain” text of Morgan Tsvangirai’s
speech to the “Freedom Rally” at Rufaro Stadium, 18 June 2000.
100  See for results, “Tsvangirai loses Buhera north” Herald 27 June 2000, 1, 3; “The full
list of candidates and results” Daily News, 28 June 2000. 
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reacting to attempts to label the opposition anti-Zimbabwean and foreign influenced, it also
took up the theme of nationalism:
Zimbabwe’s strength lies in racial and ethnic diversity – we will over come
attempts to divide us.  Without truth there is no justice, without justice no
national reconstruction.  Together we will build a great Zimbabwe.98
On a similar note, in Rufaro Stadium, Morgan Tsvangirai emphasized both the potential of the
state and his concerns for the people of Zimbabwe:
I stand before you as a messenger of peace, I have heard your anger, your pain.
I have heard what old men in dark huts say, how sad they are that the greatness
of Zimbabwe is no more....the red sand of Africa is the colour of the blood in
our veins, this is our home, we have no other.  There is a new wind whispering
through the people of Africa.  We suffered under colonialists, but after nearly
50 years of uhuru across Africa we find terrible oppression has come from
African leaders who were supposed to liberate us....In this stadium 20 years
ago, Robert Mugabe stood and announced the independence of Zimbabwe.
But Zimbabwe has moved from the hands of one oppressor to another.....a
vote alone does not give freedom and democracy is still born without
economic liberation.99
The ruling party’s rhetoric and intimidatory tactics were concentrated on rural voters.  And, in
rural constituencies,  especially in the Mashonaland heartland, this was very effective.
ZANU(PF) won by relatively large majorities in many of these constituencies.  But in urban
areas throughout the country, the MDC won by large majorities, often gaining 70-80% of the
vote.  Even if there had been election-rigging, it could only have had a negligible impact. 
Other parties, including ZUD and ZAPU, and independent candidates were nearly invisible.100
The MDC’s ability to win rural constituencies in Matabeleland and Manicaland,
suggested that the ZANU(PF) agenda did not have a uniform appeal.  Alexander and
McGregor show how the history of Matabeleland made the ZANU(PF) approach less
appealing, even after the former ZAPU leaders had realigned themselves with the ruling party.
101  Jocelyn Alexander and Joann McGregor, “Elections, land and the Politics of
Opposition in Zimbabwe: a Matabeleland perspective” unpublished paper, esp. 23-27. 
102  NB in particular reports of cheques bouncing after being handed out in
Matabeleland before the Bulawayo municipal election. “Moyo quizzed over bounced cheques”
Daily News 13 September 2001.
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As they suggest, a combination of factors led both urban and rural Matabeleland residents to
vote for the MDC: historic grievances from the 1980s violence, economic malaise, and
dissatisfaction with the meagre benefits of the unity accord. Joshua Nkomo’s death in July
1999, seemed to have freed people from the obligation to support ZANU(PF).101
The final election results gave ZANU(PF) a small elected majority in parliament, which
they bolstered through the appointment of 20 ‘non-constituency’ MPs.   Despite this success,
the MDC’s determination to challenge electoral results in several marginal constituencies, and
the forthcoming Presidential elections in 2002, meant that ZANU(PF) was by no means secure.
Although this section has emphasized the formal election process, the election campaign, and
its aftermath, was also played out in through redefinitions and contestations of the place and
role of groups such as the judges, churches, unions, and NGOs.
8.5 Changing State and Society Relations: the Cup-board Is Bare
The intense electoral politics both reflected and affected shifts within broader state-society
relations.  In section 8.1, we saw the party offering ‘sweeteners’ to its traditional supporters: this
process continues after the election, although with limited effectiveness, as other than land, the
cupboard is bare.102  But a parallel action was mounted to discredit, sideline, or re-incorporate
those groups whose access to non-state derived resources render them potentially autonomous
of the state. 
103  “Mugabe criticises 'white enemy'” BBC 14 December 2000.
104  “Mugabe blasts whites” Standard 22 October 2000.
105  Personal Communication, Angus Selby, 30 October 2001; “CFU faces split over
withdrawal of charges” Daily News, 18 August 2000; Mercedes Sayagues, “CFU opens its
chequebook to buy peace in Zim.”  Mail & Guardian, May 19 2000.
106 “White Farmers Offer Government One Million Hectares” UN Integrated Regional
Information Network 25 May 2001; Commercial farmers break deadlock with government Daily
News 27 July 2001; “State accepts land offer” Herald 6 September 2001; CFU. “GoZ /ZJRI
implementation launch” 2 November  2001. 
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8.5.1 The white farmers, the business community and state employees
Increased mobilization around issues of land and labour led to targeting of white farmers and
businessmen.  The rhetoric of reconciliation was replaced by a rhetoric which claimed that
these whites had not reciprocated the offer of reconciliation offered to them.  They were
instead, the “real enemy.”103  In a BBC interview Mugabe said: 
Yes, some of them are good people, but they remain cheats. They remain
dishonest. They remain uncommitted even to the national cause. It is as if we
are running a  government of two communities, they on their own not wanting
to get truly integrated into the social frame, but just wanting all the time to
oppose government.104
The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), which had been close to ZANU(PF) until the
1998 land designations, wavered between attempting to maintain its position of non-
confrontational interaction with government ministries and using the courts to seek redress,
reflecting the presence of two camps within its membership.  MDC members pressured the
CFU to pursue legal action against the unconstitutional land seizures.  Other groups of farmers,
notably tobacco growers, producing mainly for export, have emphasized the economic realities,
and urged the farm community to seek ways of compromising with the ruling party.105  After
several months of negotiation, in November 2001, the CFU and the state launched the
Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative.  As part of this initiative, farmers consented to the
purchase of over 500 farms, comprising over one million hectares, contributed inputs to new
settlers, and promised to support them in ploughing the soil.106
107  Human Rights NGO Forum, “Politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe, 2000-
2001” July 2001 especially sections 5 and 6.
108  "Supreme Court petitions Mugabe” Standard 31 January 1999.
109  R. G. Mugabe, Broadcast to the Nation,  February 6, 1999.
110    “Mugabe rids bench of Gubbay but not its independence” Financial Gazette  8
March 2001; “Gubbay triumphs” Daily News 3 March 2001; “I am not going, says defiant
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The regime also set out to politicize the previously relatively apolitical state apparatus.107
 As we have seen, the independent candidates, the ZCTU, the NCA, the media and the
opposition parties had used the courts to seek redress against discriminatory  government
policies. As a result, the Supreme Court had retained a strong reputation for  independent
rulings. In 1999 Supreme Court judges adopted a more progressive position when faced with
allegations of torture and a military which ruthlessly ignored court orders.   Justices McNally,
Muchechetere and Sandura petitioned the President to confirm that the military has no right
to detain civilians and that the government “...will not tolerate any torture of any persons by
any authority in any circumstances” and to reaffirm that the “...judiciary and the Zimbabwe
Republic Police [are] the proper authorities to deal with the allegations against the journalists
in question.”108  Mugabe’s reaction to this was to accuse  the judges of playing politics: 
...some of our judges have shocked us by behaving in a manner unbecoming
of their status. In their overreaction they forgot that their professional role as
judges was to sit in and hear cases and pass judgement on them on the
evidence before them. ... In accordance with our Constitution and the principle
of the separation of powers the Judiciary has no constitutional right whatsoever
to give instructions to the president on any matter as the four judges purported
to do.... Surely if Judges assume both a judicial and quasi-political role, what
suffers is in effect their Judicial function. In those circumstances the one and
only honourable course open to them is that of quitting the bench and joining
the political forum where their political views would not offend against our
Constitution and the principles of justice we should uphold.109 
Judicial rulings on the land invasions further contested the ruling party’s policies.   In reaction,
the government began sidelining independent judges, replacing them with those more
acceptable to the regime.   Chief Justice Gubbay was forced to resign after coming under attack
for rulings challenging land acquisitions, and overturning a presidential decree which banned
candidates defeated in the June election from contesting the results in court.110  Other senior
Gubbay: Government insists he must go today” Herald 28 February 2001; “Moyo insists
Gubbay will leave”  Daily News 28 February 2001; “Chief Justice won’t go” Daily News   28
February 2001; “Chief Justice Gubbay quits” Daily News 3 February 2001; “Poll petition ban
unconstitutional” Herald 31 January 2001; “State loses poll case”  Daily News  31 December
2001; “Chombo plots to oust judges” Independent 26 January 2001; “Chidyausiku attacks
Supreme Court, police”  Daily News  9 January 2000; “Supreme Court judges hit back” Standard
7 January 2001; “President attacks judiciary” Financial Gazette 14 December 2000.
111  “Assault on Judges Continues” Standard 11 February 2001; “Supreme Court resumes
sitting despite threats” Daily News 14 February 2001; “Judges refuse to meet Chinamasa”
Independent 16 February 2001; “War Vets to Raid Judges  Homes” Standard 18 February 2001;
“Supreme Court judge Ebrahim refuses to go” Herald 22 February 2001; “Judges to stay” Daily
News 23 February 2001; “State overtures in asking judges to resign mere courtesy” Herald 23
February 2001.
112  “Justice Chatikobo resigns” Independent 1 June 2001; “Justice Devittie stops hearing
MDC election petitions” Herald 15 May 2001; “Why I quit: judge” Daily News 6 October 2001;
“Only two white judges remain” Herald 3 January 2002.
113  “Supreme Court to have 3 more judges” Herald 27 July 2001; “Chidyausiku sidelines
judges”  Daily News 18 September 2001.
114  “Lawyers move in to block Chidyausiku appointment” Standard 20 May 2001; “Judge
attacks Minister” Daily News 3 October 2001; “Chinamasa slammed for 'simplistic' remarks on
judges” Independent 5 October 2001.
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judges were similarly  encouraged to resign by  the Attorney-General.  Those targeted included
not only four white High Court judges – Smith, Blackie, Gillespie, and Devitte – but also the
Supreme Court judges – Sandura, Muchechetere, Ebrahim, and McNally, of whom only one
was white.111  While several of the threatened judges resisted the pressure, others resigned,
often citing personal reasons.112  Many of the senior, long-serving judges were also approaching
retirement age, and resigned at 65, rather than extending their terms for another 5 years.  As
the remaining judges refused to resign, the numbers of Supreme Court Justices were increased
from five to eight, with three judges promoted from the High Court.113
The appointment of High Court Justice Chidyausiku as Chief Justice, presumably as
reward for his work on the Constitutional Commission,  above the more senior judges of the
Supreme Court suggested that this was not so much a racial purge as a party political one.114
Chidyausiku, a former ZANU (PF) minister, chaired several politically sensitive commissions,
and has a record of ruling in favour of the ruling party - decisions which were frequently
115  “Chidyausiku accused of bias”  Daily News 20 September 2001; “Chidyausiku is
Chief Justice” Daily News 21 August 2001; “Chidyausiku Set for New Job” Standard 24 June
2001; “Mugabe man appointed  top judge” BBC 9 March 2001; “Chidyausiku s record inspires
little confidence” Independent 16 February 2001.
116  “Top black lawyers earmarked for the bench” Standard 4 March 2001; “MDC to
contest Justice Hlatshwayo’s appointment in petitions” Daily News 25 June 2001.
117  JoAnn McGregor, “The Politics of Disruption: War Veterans and the Local State
in Zimbabwe” unpublished paper, August 2001. 
118  “War vets besiege [Chiredzi] district administrator’s office” Daily News 14 March
2001; “War vets run show at Kadoma offices” Daily News 12 March 2001; “Govt purges
suspected pro-MDC workers Financial Gazette 1 March 2001; “Workers victimised [Matabeleland
North]” Daily News 6 March 2001; “Government accused of ‘militarising’ civil service” Mirror
2 March 2001; “Prison service suspends 16 alleged MDC supporters”Daily News   6 October
2001 “Seven more officers fired for allegedly supporting MDC” Daily News  31 October 2001.
119  “Chihuri violates Police Act”  Standard 28 January 2001; “Police chief told to quit”
Daily News 16 January 2001; “Top cops victimised” Standard 25 February 2001; “Another cop
victimised” Standard 11 March 2001; “Support for MDC lands detectives in hot water” Daily
News  26 September 2000; “ZRP purge on suspected MDC cops up” Daily News 13 April 2001;
“Chihuri purges top cops” Financial Gazette 14 June 2001; “Police have an obligation to support
Government” Sunday Mail10 June 2001.
120  “Police chief told to quit”  Daily News  16 January 2001.
121  “Commander tells soldiers not to vote for Tsvangirai” Daily News  29 May 2001; 
“Army chief decampaigns MDC” Financial Gazette 24 May 2001; “MDC blasts govt over army
politics” Independent 1 June 2001;'Military does not engage in politics' Herald 1 June 2001; “Top
army jobs for war vets” Financial Gazette 19 July 2001; “Army jobs for Zanu PF militia” Standard
23 September 2001.
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overturned by higher courts.115  Lawyer Ben Hlatshwayo, was also rewarded for his support of
the Constitutional Commission with an appointment to High Court.116
In 2001, membership of the police, army and public service was also politicized.  As
JoAnn McGregor demonstrates for Matabeleland, “...the ruling party has tried to insert itself
within and gain more control over the local state at district and provincial levels.”117
Throughout the country, those who were not thought to be sufficiently loyal to ZANU(PF)
were sidelined or forced out of local government and the prison service under pressure from
the party hierarchy.118  Police officers were purged and removed from positions of authority.119
Chihuri, the Police Commissioner, made his position clear by declaring “[m]any people say I
am Zanu PF. Today I would like to make it public that I support Zanu PF because it is the
ruling party.”120    Army officers were similarly warned against supporting the MDC.121
122  Address by the First Secretary and President of Zanu (PF), Cde. R.G. Mugabe, At
the Forty Third Ordinary Session of the Central Committee, July 21, 2000.
123  “CCJP blasts army attacks” Financial Gazette 22 February 2001; “Opposition
stronghold of St Mary’s under siege” Daily News 3 March 2001; “Riot squad unleashes terror
in Chitungwiza” Daily News  5 March 2001; “Govt incites crackdown on voters” Independent  9
March 2001.  
124  “War vets to storm cities” Financial Gazette 5 March 2001
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Urban workers and white business people were also obvious targets, because of their
support for the MDC.  As we have seen, during the election, white farmers and business-
people were thought to be providing much of the MDC’s financial support.  In addition, the
overwhelming urban vote for the MDC, revealed to ZANU(PF) that they had lost the support
of many workers.  As Mugabe said to the Central Committee in July 2000,
With all price controls done away with in the spirit of liberalisation; with our
policies and programmes generally failing or being quite slow to yield positive
results; with all our safety nets simply failing, it was difficult to see how the
Party would ever escape the winter of urban discontent and the harsh political
verdict that this brings about in electoral terms. Little wonder then that the
bulk of the support and vote for the opposition came from urban or peri-urban
dwellers, chiefly from among the unemployed or frustrated youths. Little
wonder then that a significant part of the opposition leadership draws from the
trade union and tertiary student leadership. Indeed it should not be wondered
why the most trenchant criticism against the Party emanated from both the
high and low-density suburban dwellers, including professionals whose
incomes are being eroded daily, as well as owners of indigenous businesses
whose concerns are either struggling or have already succumbed to the negative
performance of the economy. 122  
These two campaigns, anti-business and pro-labour, coalesced into an attempt to intimidate
white business owners, and appear to be supporting urban labourers, as will be discussed
further in the next section.
8.5.2  Labour
Immediately after the election, intense violence permeated urban areas, perpetrated by the army
and police.123  In early 2001, this tactic shifted towards trying to regain the sympathy of  urban
voters and counter-act the influence of the ZCTU.124  This took the form of an attempt to gain
125  “ZCTU officials face expulsion” Daily News, 22 January 2001.
126  “MDC clash looms at ZCTU congress” Daily News 9 February 2001; “MDC-Zanu
PF rivalry scuppers ZCTU Congress” Mirror 17 November 2000; “Daggers drawn at ZCTU’s
Masvingo congress” Independent 23 February 2001; “ZCTU, MDC marriage comes under
spotlight” Mirror 23 February 2001; “Zanu PF suspicious of new ZCTU executive” Daily News
10 March 2001; “ZCTU faces fresh polls” Sunday Mail 18 March 2001. 
127  “Alleged Zanu PF funding needs probe — ZCTU”   Independent 15 December 2000;
“Plot to rig ZCTU poll” Financial Gazette  1 February 2001.
128 “War veterans hired to settle labour dispute” Daily News 28 March 2001; “War vets
to storm cities” Financial Gazette 5 April 2001; “War veterans force director into hiding” Daily
News 9 April 2001; “War vets displace ZCTU” Independent 12 April 2001; “War veterans close
shop” Daily News 13 April 2001; “Company chiefs flee war vets” Financial Gazette 20 April 2001;
“Steel company owner abducted by war vets” Daily News 24 April 2001; “Ex-fighters raid more
companies” Daily News 25 April 2001; “War vets force NGO to pay ex-workers” Daily News 25
April 2001; “Joy and celebrations at Zanu-PF headquarters as Firms pay-up” Sunday Mail 22
April 2001; “Hunzvi targets embassies, NGOs” Financial Gazette 26 April 2001.
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control of the ZCTU,  sanctioning war veteran involvement in labour disputes, and the re-
invigoration of a splinter umbrella union.  
ZANU(PF) first moved to take advantage of the vacancies within the ZCTU caused
by the resignations of Tsvangirai and Sibanda.  These power struggles were the continuation
of earlier conflicts within the leadership of the ZCTU.  Even before the elections, some within
the ZCTU had tried to align with the ruling party, by adopting its proposed social contract –
which Tsvangirai’s faction had rejected –  but this attempt was foiled by the union leaders.125
 The social contract advocated by the ruling party, was intended to put an end to labour
disputes, stay-aways, and return labour relations to a  more consensual framework.  As the
ZCTU’s  election approached, key individuals were positioning themselves and campaigning.126
  ZANU(PF) was alleged to have paid up membership dues for unions in arrears, so that they
could vote.127  In the end, however, the pro-MDC slate won.  
In early 2001, workers who felt that the ZCTU was not responsive were encouraged
to forward complaints to a newly formed ZANU(PF) labour committee.  War veterans, led
again by Joseph Chinotimba, further claimed the right to arbitrate labour disputes at a series
of companies, as they had done at independence, before the formation of the ZCTU.128   After
complaints from several foreign governments, the Labour Ministry finally clamped down on
129   “Zimbabwe's war vets told to back off”  BBC 16 May 2001; “'State working to stop
firm invasions” Herald 17 May 2001; “Rogue war vets arrested over alleged extortion” Herald
17 May 2001; “Police hunting for Pasipamire” Daily News 17 May 2001; “War vets blame govt
for chaos” Independent 18 May 2001; “Workers stage demo” Herald 18 May 2001; “Blitz on rogue
war veterans nets twenty” Herald 18 May 2001; “Moyo says arrest Moyo” Daily News 22 May
2001.
130  “Supreme Court to have 3 more judges” Herald 27 July 2001
131  “Chinotimba proclaims himself new ZCTU boss” Daily News 12 April 2001;
“Chinotimba continues company raids” Independent 1 June 2001; “ZFTU latest vehicle for
ZANU(PF)’s campaign” Independent 15 June 2001; “Chinotimba in new raids” Independent 29
June 2001; “ZFTU vows to intensify raids” Independent 27 July 2001.
132  “Govt pours money into Chinotimba’s union” Financial Gazette 19 July 2001.
133  Personal communication, Miles Larmer, 6 November 2001.
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the veterans, alleging that rogue elements had gone beyond ZANU(PF)’s intentions and were
merely extorting money from companies.129  Instead, several new judges were appointed to the
Labour Relations Tribunal, in an attempt to clear the backlog in cases.130
Chinotimba then attempted to resuscitate the Zimbabwe Federation of Trades Unions
(ZFTU) as a vehicle for further anti-ZCTU campaigning. The ZFTU was a pro-ZANU splinter
union, formed in 1998 by an earlier leader of the ZCTU, which had never had much support
from shop-floor unions.131  Government support is enabling ZFTU leadership to visit
workplaces and forcefully encourage the formation of splinter unions.132 
That these efforts made any head-way at all on the shop-floors must be taken as
evidence of labour weakness and divisions.  Shop-floor grievances were real, and neither the
ZCTU nor the MDC had developed strongly rooted  allegiances from the workers. Low levels
of internal union democracy also kept pro-ZANU leaders in place, even where workers were
solidly MDC, which made them available for ZANU(PF)’s  ‘infiltration’ tactics during the
ZCTU elections.133
8.5.3 Churches
Church-state relations had been strained during the constitutional debate. During the
referendum, churches had been on the verge of calling for a no vote, when, they were
134  Chengetai Zvauya, “Churches to reject draft constitution” Standard 2 December
1999; “Christian groups threaten to reject draft constitution” Daily News 13 December 1999.;
“Christian community resolves to appeal to constitutional body” Herald 26 January 2000;
“Churches Threaten ‘No’ vote in referendum” Daily News 26 January 2000.
135  “[South African] Bishops warn Mugabe” Daily News 6 July 2000; See also “Bishop
seeks to meet Mugabe” Standard 12 November 2000.
136  Address by the First Secretary and President of Zanu (PF), Cde. R.G. Mugabe, At
the Forty Third Ordinary Session of the Central Committee, July 21, 2000. 
137  “Mugabe threatens Archbishop” Daily News 3 July 2000
138  Eunice Mafundikwa, “After Zimbabwe’s divisive poll, ecumenical leader aims 
for reconciliation” ENI, 27 July 2000.
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persuaded to back away from such a stand.134  With a few exceptions, church voices were little
heard during the lead-in to the election. 
Those few individuals within the churches who took any sort of stand continued to be
blacklisted by the state.  Mugabe several times accused Pius Ncube, Catholic Bishop of
Matabeleland, of causing the party’s defeat in the election: 
In Matabeleland, I think what we saw was tribalism and ethnicity emerging.
We happen to know that some leaders of the MDC alongside leaders of the
Church and names such as that of Archbishop Ncube of the Catholic Church
have been mentioned banded together and used reasons that  emerge from the
history and the conflict situation and could want the people of Matabeleland
to believe that the government is not attending to their own   needs in as much
as it is attending to the needs of other regions.135
The most insidious side of the resurgence of white power came by way of the
pulpit and in the human form of church figures who did not hesitate to "render
unto God" things that belonged to Ceasar. Especially in suburban parishes and
in rural Matabeleland, prayers became full-blooded politics and congregations
became anti-Zanu (PF) political communities.....136
Ncube was also  reported to be on a CIO hitlist.137  Similarly, Evangelical Lutheran Bishop
Ambrose Moyo  fled the country during the election saying, “I was on the hit list of the Central
Intelligence Organisation and was advised to leave. My only crime was that I was publicly
condemning the violence.”138
During the election, churches were important providers of monitors and observers
through the CCJP, ZCC and the Evangelical Fellowship.  The ZCC, caught up in the euphoria
of the event, perhaps, was  not only highly critical of the ruling party, but claimed credit for
139  Research Notes, ZCC briefing for election observers, 22 June 2001.
140  Revd Gift Mkwasha, “[letter to the editor] Churches silence on human rights abuse
embarrassing” Daily News, 15 January 2001; “Deafening silence on violence is frightening” Daily
News 31 January 2001.
141  “Lutheran Bishop to head Zimbabwe’s ecumenical organisation”. Lutheran World
Information, August 2000.
142  “Anglican Church dispute rages on” Daily News 15 January 2001; “Kunonga
confirmed as Anglican Bishop of Harare” Herald 2 February 2001; “Committee wants Neill
removed from position” Herald 19 January 2001.
143  “Anglican church meets over objections to newly elected bishop” Daily News 7
March 2001.  
144  “Neill stripped of vicarship” Daily News, 9 March 2001; “Reverend Neill vows to
solider on”Daily News, 12 March 2001; See also, “Anglican vicar in mysterious accident” Daily
News 9 March 2001.
145  “Kunonga accused of making partisan statements” Daily News 15 May 2001; see also,
“Outrage at Bishop's praise for Mugabe” Telegraph (UK) 14 May 2001.
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launching the NCA and indirectly the MDC.139  Afterwards, they seemed to retreat into
confusion and quiescence in response to intimidation and co-option.140  Although Bishop
Moyo became the new President of the ZCC, replacing retiring Anglican Bishop Siyachitema,
his more outspoken tendencies did not manifest themselves.141
The ZANU(PF) appeals to the church were also attempts to retain support and/or get
the church back on side.  The retirement of Mugabe’s ally Siyachitema from the Harare Diocese
led to a campaign to replace him.142   Fr Tim Neill, an Anglican priest, who had been an
outspoken critic of  the government’s constitutional draft, and acting Vicar-general of the
Diocese in the absence of a Bishop, contested the election. His appointment would have made
him the only white Anglican bishop.  Neill lost the election, amid allegations that supporters
of the successful candidate circulated a letter accusing him of racism.143   His public conflict
with his church led to his removal, after he was accused of ‘tarnishing the church’s name’ by
making internal conflict public.144   The new Bishop of Harare did little to assuage concerns
when his first public statements were seen as repeating ZANU(PF) propaganda from the
pulpit.145   In a controversial speech, he said: 
You are sick to think the Western political and economic  interests are your
interests. You are sick to think the  Western  world is interested in removing
corrupt governments.  They are here to look for puppets to put in
146  Weston Kwete, “New Anglican bishop says West out to control Africa” Sunday Mail
13 May 2001. 
147  ZBC TV evening news 18 June 2000; Picture of Border Gezi at Vapostori meeting
Herald 19 June 2000, 1.
148   “Church sect demands apology from Gezi” Daily News 21 June 2000.
149  “Vapostori Vote for the first time” Sunday News 25 June 2000. 
150  “Apostolic sect supports President” Herald 3 May 2001.
151  “Militias on rampage” Daily News 7 January 2002.
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government- ignorant African political leaders who can easily be
manipulated......We do accept that Zimbabwe is a symbol of the land of
freedom where all people of all races, creeds and nationalities  could live
together. But it is not a land for all people to govern.  It is only for indigenous
Africans to govern..... Is interest in human rights in Zimbabwe not a tactical
self-defence mechanism against grabbing of land by the  Government?.....We
live in a sick country. It is a neurotic nation where the  young Africans are
losing national identity, sense of history,  African feeling and self-pride. The sad
thing is most of my priests are religious uncle Toms,  puppets, parrots and religious fakers.
Refuse to be ignorant and  greedy. I am attacking the brainwashed preachers.146
The Apostolic faith also responded positively to the continuing attempts to incorporate it  from
about 1990 onwards (the 1980s having been typified by very anti-apostolic rhetoric from the
state) as we have seen in Chapter 4.   During the election, the popular Governor of
Mashonaland Central, Border Gezi, made several very public appeals to his Vapostori
brethren.147  Although some members of the church criticized him for bringing politics – and
the media spotlight – into their worship,148 their leader encouraged all members of his flock to
vote for the first time, because “we were told by the Holy Spirit that this country would be
ruled by a black.”149   Gezi’s untimely death in April 2001 led Apostolic leaders to make even
more public statements of support to the president and ruling party.150  In early 2002, there
were reports that “hundreds of members of the Apostolic Faith sect [led by their pastor
Godfrey  Nzira] descended on MDC offices at Makoni shopping centre and later attacked the
home of Fidelis Mhashu, the MP for Chitungwiza.”151
Churches in Manicaland, frustrated by the lack of assertiveness on the part of the
national churches, organized a broad ecumenical coalition to provide shelter for those who had
152  See for instance, Pastoral Statement of the Churches in Manicaland, March 2001.
Mutare, 13 March 2001. 
153  See for example, “Catholic bishops condemn violence” Daily News   5 June 2000;
“Zimbabwe bishops  condemn violence” BBC 2 May 2001;  Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops'
Conference  Pastoral Letter  May 2001.
154  Heads of denominations. “Statement on the church’s position on land reform” 25
January 2001; “Churches back land reform” Herald 26 January 2001; “Farmer injured in war
veterans attack” Daily News 26 January 2001.
155  “Catholics dissociate themselves from Christian heads stance on land” Daily News
2 February 2001.
156   “'Nation should not be held to ransom by a few,' bishops say” Ecumenical News
International 8 May 2001; “Catholic bishops blast government”  Daily News 4 May 2001.
157  Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference, Pastoral Letter Tolerance and Hope May
2001.
158  “Mind your own business or else...war vets warn Catholics” Mirror 11 May 2001.
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been rendered homeless and to call for peace during the elections.152  The Catholic church had
also issued several pastoral communications in the lead in to the election and in response to the
post election violence.153
The mainline churches did eventually take a stand on the land issue – albeit one that
was interpreted as a victory by both sides.154  The Catholic church later dissociated itself from
this statement, because it attempted to dissuade farmers from using the courts to arbitrate the
land issue, proposing instead a national roundtable to be convened by the churches.155
The Catholic Bishops Conference took a much stronger stand, explicitly condemning
the government-condoned violence.156  Without naming either the war veterans or party leaders
by name, they challenged the ruling élite’s claim to power as liberators: 
Let us remind each other that no one person or group of persons liberated this
country alone.  The great majority of Zimbabweans, because of their love for
freedom and sense of justice, liberated it through their sacrifices... It is the duty
of the government to ensure the nation is not held at ransom by a few... We
urge the government to allow the law  enforcement agents to perform their
duties without interference so that there is a sense of security in the country.157
     
The war veterans responded to this criticism bluntly. Joseph Chinotimba said:  “The war
veterans are championing a noble cause. If the churchmen think we are wrong they should
mind their own problems and stop provoking us.”158
159  “Work together to educate society president tells opposition, NGOs” Herald 28
February 1997, 1.
160  “Money won’t make leaders: president” Herald 21 July 1999.
161  “Chombo warns NGOs against meddling in political activity” Herald 10 July 2001.
162   “CCJPZ blames Zanu PF for pre-election violence” Standard 1 October 2000; “ESC
divided over election report”  Independent 13 October 2000
163  “Govt to ban churches, NGOs from educating voters” Africa Church Information
Service, 13 July 2001; “Statutory body to educate voters” Sunday Mail 1 July 2001.
164  “State to hand over running of growth points to rural council”  Herald 16 July 2001.
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8.5.4  Non-Governmental Organizations
As both the constitutional debate and the election showed, NGO-state relations deteriorated
during this period.  In particular, NGOs were alleged to be undermining stable democratic
processes because of their foreign funding.159  In 1999, NGOs were accused of “...trying to
create political figures out of the opposition.”160  By the time of the 2000 elections, this had
become quite explicit “NGOs should leave politics to locals.”161  After all, local church and
election monitoring groups unanimously condemned the election as neither free nor fair.  Their
position, as sub-contractors to the ESC, further meant that the data on which it was supposed
to base its report to Government, was highly critical.162   This led to a ban on churches and
NGOs conducting civic education in the lead into the presidential elections.163 
Local government officials were also warned against working with NGOs.  According
to a newspaper report, the Minister of  Local Government, Public Works and National
Housing, said that councils: 
...should look for alternative ways of  raising  funds but warned the councils
against accepting money from  non-governmental organisations, which had
political agendas.   He said a number of NGOs with political agendas had
invaded rural areas to promote their own agendas and were not interested in
development    programmes.   A number of NGOs were being used to
campaign for MDC in rural areas.    The Government has warned that it would
not hesitate to cancel licences for  those found undertaking political activities
instead of focusing on developmental  work.  ‘Some of these organisations
come to you with a packaging which looks good  but the contents would be
satanic. Do not accept such type of assistance.’164
165   “SOS closes offices after war vets invasion” Standard 13 May 2001; “Canadian aid
agency director released by  militants” Globe and Mail (Canada) 5 May 2001; “Hunzvi targets
embassies, NGOs” Financial Gazette   26 April 2001; “War vets force NGO to pay ex-workers”
Daily News, 25 April 2001.
166  “NGO implicated in food scam” Sunday Mail 8 July 2001.
167  “Inyika Trust commends Government on proposed Bill” Herald 9 May 2001; “Inyika
Trust condemns CFU’s plans” Herald 11 May 2001; “Inyika Trust slams judgment” Herald 9
February 2001
168  “NCA, NDA clash over interests” Standard 5 November 2000.
169 “Heritage linked to Jonathan Moyo” Daily News, 20 January 2001;  “Heritage
Zimbabwe refutes daily’s story” Sunday Mail 26 January 2001; “Heritage Zim hosted Hunzvi
mourners” Independent 15 June 2001.
170  “Zanu PF pushes for formation of rival residents  association” Independent 26
January 2001
171  “ZBC bans another NDA programme” Daily News, 14 July 2001
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The operation of some international NGOs were disrupted when they were invaded.165  Others
were accused of helping to create artificial food shortages and distributing MDC propaganda
and party cards with food.166
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all NGOs were involved with the NCA,
or were affected by these new ways of operating.  While the ruling party doubtless tried to hold
onto some allies – as we have seen in Chapter 7 – it also pursued a new tactic with some
vigour. This strategy involved facilitating the formation of new organizations, referred to as
‘liberation-based civil society’.  In the post referendum period, several new groups, which
appeared to be more or less strongly linked to ZANU(PF) appeared on the scene: Inyika Trust
was described as a land rights association, 167 the National Debate Association (NDA)
promoted civic discussion168 while Heritage Zimbabwe was said to be a cultural association.169
In addition, like the policy of forming rival trades unions, a ‘high-density’ residents association
was proposed to contest the growing influence of the white-dominated Greater Harare
Combined Residents Association.170  Even the NDA, though, was subject to sanctions, when




During the constitutional debate, the ZANU(PF) regime had attempted to talk the language
of liberal consultation and deliberation over policy.  The failure of this strategy,  which required
the initiator to take these processes seriously,  led to an increasingly autocratic and intolerant
front.  The ruling party accused those who rejected its stance of having forgotten their history
and of being influenced by foreign interests.  Nationalism, of a particularly unsubtle sort,  was
called upon to justify the violence and intimidation that was directed at opponents of the
regime.  During the election proper, all manner of legislative and administrative stratagems
were resorted to, in further attempts to delegitimize both opponents and observers.  In many
ways, this election period resembled previous elections, what was different was that in this
election, unlike in 1990 or 1995, there was a viable opposition party with candidates in all
constituencies.  The ruling party’s loss of the constitutional referendum, and the scale of its
defeat in many constituencies set the stage for more acrimonious and intolerant exchanges in
the post-election period.  
The ruling party’s enduring scepticism that churches, NGOs, and unions were on their
side took on the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The more it targeted them and accused
them of being unfaithful, the less they had to lose by aligning themselves with the opposition
and their donors.  NGOs that had been able to close their eyes to government’ authoritarian
tendencies, were forced to speak out when their own members and staffs were the victims of
assault.  Churches, similarly, were shamed into public reaction by their members and donor
pressure.  
By the end of 2000, Zimbabwe’s state and society were deeply polarized, despite efforts
of NGOs (and probably several levels of government) to avoid such divisions.  From the
politics of inclusion, Zimbabwe moved to a politics of exclusion.   Coercion, backed up by the
distribution of incentives to select groups, dominates the rules of the game.  Those who are
willing to be mobilized in defence of the regime are rewarded with land, contracts, and
172  Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference  Pastoral Letter  May 2001.
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employment.  Individuals and groups which do not prove their loyalty are excluded socially,
politically, and through violent attacks on their homes and workplaces.  This polarization
extends into villages, churches, and schools.  As the Catholic Bishops stated in May 2001,
harkening back to the earlier form of politics: 
In unity we freed ourselves and today once more we need that unity: Unity of
purpose and vision, in spite of  different ideas of  how best to achieve our goal.
This means we should be ready and willing to accommodate different views
and really tolerate different viewpoints. There is no single Zimbabwean with
the monopoly of truth. We need each person's contribution in order to really
build up a true Zimbabwe. No person should be excluded from positively
making a meaningful contribution to nation building. Let our common enemy
be poverty, disease and ignorance, not fellow citizens. Let us unite our efforts
to defeat those enemies and we shall earn our rightful place in the family of
nations.172
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Part V   Authoritarianism and Democratization
As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, this thesis has three goals: first, to bring together the material
and ideological aspects of relations between state and society   to probe the character and
ambiguities of Zimbabwe’s shifts between authoritarianism and democratization;  secondly, to
provide an  in-depth study of NGO-state politics in Zimbabwe, based on participant-observer
research and capturing the experience of NGO activists in a period of flux;   thirdly, to identify
the relevance of this case to ongoing debates amongst political scientists studying NGOs and
democratization.  In the concluding chapter, I will consider how well and in what ways the
preceding chapters meet these goals, first considering Zimbabwean politics, then NGOs, and
finally the implications of my research for the discipline of political science.
1  Christine Sylvester, The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
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Chapter 9     Zimbabwe in Comparative Perspective
9.1 Understanding Zimbabwean Politics 
As suggested in Chapter 2, Zimbabwean politics is a surprisingly under studied topic, within
an extensively studied country.  Certain sectors of Zimbabwean politics –  land, labour and the
economy – have benefitted from extensive examination but there have been no monograph-
length studies of  politics more generally since Christine Sylvester’s admirable, but limited, The
Terrain of Contradictory Development in 1991.1  In order to draw together and bring out some of
the numerous threads of Zimbabwean politics, this thesis has pulled together numerous studies
and my own primary research, to explain how and why the Mugabe regime has maintained its
hold on power since 1980.  In emphasizing both rhetoric and policy, it has attempted to
capture the ways in which state and society related to each other throughout these two
turbulent decades.
In the years covered by this thesis there has been a remarkable shift in the discourse
and practice of politics in Zimbabwe on the part of both the ruling party and organizations in
society.  Part II illustrated and examined how the politics of inclusion worked to promote co-
operative relations between organizations and  the state, marked by demobilization and
quiescence. In Part III we saw how  a few ‘activist’ NGOs attempted to mobilize the wider
sector, to little avail.  In this period, electoral politics was also characterized by low interest and
turn-out, until Margaret Dongo and the independent candidates began to fight local elections
successfully.  However, as Part IV showed, after the turning point of 1997, NGOs, unions,
churches and students, did mobilize around increasingly ‘political’ issues, albeit continuing to
frame them in a  ‘non-political’ form.  The regime’s failure to re-incorporate these movements,
along with its more authoritarian response to protests and the news media, led to a struggle for
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control of public spaces and speech, in which the ruling party’s dominance was firmly
challenged.  The threat that this policy-oriented challenge would transmogrify into an electoral
challenge and defeat led to the emergence of a politics of exclusion, in which NGOs, donors,
and ‘foreigners’ were terrorized, and steps taken to silence and discredit critical and alternative
voices.
Zimbabwean politics between 1980 and 2000 was dominated by demobilization and
incorporation.  While elements of these strategies remain, the mobilization of certain social
groups – war veterans and party activists – in the post-referendum period in support of the
ruling clique also catalyzed the mobilization of farmers and other groups,  previously content
to work through and within the state, against the regime.  This mobilization and counter-
mobilization marks out the new instability and uncertainty of Zimbabwean politics.  It remains
to be seen if the ageing leaders who managed to retain control and balance within the
demobilized authoritarian system of rule, are sufficiently adept to maintain power with the
assistance of their younger acolytes,  in the new, more turbulent, mode of politics that they
brought into being. 
9.2 Understanding NGOs
NGOs were part of the politics of inclusion that dominated the political space until 2000.  This
was the result of  NGOs’ ideological commitment to the development agenda of the liberation
movement, the material constraints which arise when NGOs are sites of employment rather
than sites of activism; and the strategic pragmatism which dominated their decision-making
practices.  From the late 1980s, NGOs became increasingly important players in Zimbabwe
through their increased donor funding, which not only expanded their employment potential
but also access to resources such as computers, cars, and foreign travel. However, even as some
‘activist’ NGOs attempted to intervene in policy discussions, NGO discourse remained
depoliticized around the theme of ‘development’.  
2 These were: Charlie Cater (Chapter 5)  Jonah Gokova, Regis Mtutu, Niki Jazdowska,
(Chapter 6) and Brian Raftopoulos (Chapter 7); Brian Raftopoulos, an academic as well as a
practioner, also  read and commented on the thesis as a whole.
3  Personal communications, Charles Cater, 19 and 20 July 2001.
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9.2.1 Understanding in Order to Explain
Methodologically, the thesis research was premised on the argument that these dynamics of
inclusion and exclusion could only be understood through attempts to ‘understand’ NGOs
from within. Of course, even from the inside, one does not always get all the answers. As I
noted in section 1.3, my participant-observer research needed to be complemented by  archival
research and interviews in order to tell the whole story.  It can also be difficult for the
researcher to be confident that the ‘whole story’ is being told.   One measure I used of my
success  was to ask participants to read and comment on my cases. Five of my colleagues and
informants read the cases in which they had been involved, and felt that they were useful and
accurate accounts.2  The ZimRights case study in Chapter 5 was both the most controversial
and the least clear-cut. One of my informants said, 
Your characterization of ZimRights seems on target...a few things are left
vague and unanswered, but maybe that is best after all...It is OK not to have
all the answers.  In some ways it really confirms the need to take a very close
look and use ‘thick description’.  If you had done an organizational analysis
from a macro perspective, none of these scandals would even come up on the
radar screen – and they really tell a big part of the story as far as ZimRights is
concerned.  That you cannot get definitive answers is exactly the point....No
one can get definitive answers, thus a climate of suspicion and rivalry
prevailed.3 
As the sub-sections below suggest, understanding intra- and inter-organizational dynamics as
a participant-observer enables the researcher to make sense out of apparently incongruous
evidence and guards against tendencies to romanticization and pathologization of NGOs.  
9.2.2 Discourse and Practice
A major concern of the thesis has been to describe and explain how and why groups like
NGOs were demobilized and quiescent during the often turbulent 1980s and 1990s, when
4  Engels and Marks eds, Contesting Colonial Hegemony.
5  Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness, 236.
6  Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness, 236.
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significant policy shifts were undertaken by the state.   In discussing the relationship between
NGOs and the state before 2000, I have used the language of hegemony deriving from
Gramsci’s writings. In particular, my approach was influenced by Gaventa’s excellent study of
Appalachian coal-miners, Power and Powerlessness.  Gaventa’s thesis benefits from his longue durée
approach, in which he shows how generations of workers have been reduced to an acceptance
of the status quo. But the Zimbabwe case is more subtle than this.  Evidence generated from
participant-observation research shows how NGOs think about and negotiate their relationship
with each other and the state.  In the examples in chapters 5, 6 and 7 NGOs are actively
seeking incorporation into the power structures.  To middle-class, educated NGO staff
members, the ZANU(PF) government has little in common with the multi-national corporation
which mines the Appalachians nor with the remote colonial governments described in the
contributions to Contesting Colonial Hegemony.4  The ZANU(PF) government is run by their
peers, and even by  their comrades in the struggle.  
Yet, towards the end of Gaventa’s study, he relates a telling anecdote. At a moment of
great conflict over responsibility for a dangerous land-slide, hostility towards a local employer
suddenly diminished, after he started attending the local church and gave work to local people.
In ways that evoke James Scott’s landlords, Gaventa tells us that “...the operator, too, began
to insist that he, like the other residents, was a poor man who had been a victim of bad luck
and outside forces.” 5  After this appeal to the local sub-culture, “the value of harmonious
personal relation – especially with a fellow mountaineer – began to predominate over political
grievances.”6   NGOs too value harmonious relations with the state and cultural élites.  I have
argued that as NGOs become more professionalized, and are run by large staffs rather than by
volunteers, the interests of the staff may begin to predominate over those of the membership.
7  Robert Michels, Political Parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern
democracy Trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. (New York: Free Press, 1962).
8  Raftopoulos, ‘Whither Zimbabwe’1999.
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Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ operates in NGOs as well as political parties.7  My analysis of
ZimRights  also points out that these divisions – between staff and membership – are not as
clear cut as they are often assumed to be. This sort of personal politics is difficult to research
and verify, but NGOs need to be understood as organizations with histories and internal
conflicts which may have deep implications for their relations with the state.  These
organizational histories, which may be kept hidden from donors and consultants,  make them
particularly vulnerable at times of crisis.
With the formation of the NCA in 1997, some NGOs become part of a wider coalition
which “attempted to repoliticize the language of development through a more tolerant language
of politics.”8  Although they eased into this process gradually, the state’s unwillingness to allow
them this autonomy increasingly polarizes their relations. Yet, as chapter 7 reveals, this process
is not accepted by all NGOs, nor is it without its own ambiguities of co-option and inclusion.
NGOs can open up space for discussion and challenge the state’s domination of the political
sphere, but it is not a simple or straightforward process.  The state’s attempt to incorporate and
control the constitutional debate came closer to succeeding than most activists would want to
admit.
9.2.3 The Pathologization of a Romance
My critique of the romanticization of NGOs in Africa has been one of several similar projects.
Amongst a plethora of writing on NGOs, a few significant studies which have emerged from
research based mostly in East Africa, deserve serious consideration.   Jim Igoe and Greg
Cameron, studying pastoralist NGOs in Tanzania,  emphasize the ways in which donor agendas
shape NGOs, and the multiple ways in which NGOs become little more than new patronage
9  Greg Cameron, “Taking stock in Tanzania: Pastoralist NGOs and the Indigenous
Question” paper presented to the Association for the Study of Anthropology, 2000; James Igoe,
Ethnicity, Civil Society, and the Tanzanian Pastoral NGO Movement. Unpublished PhD Thesis
Boston University, 2000. 
10  Tim Kelsall, “Subjectivity, Collective Action, and the Governance Agenda in
Tanzania” unpublished Ph.D. thesis , School of Oriental and African Studies, University of
London 2000; for a more concise account of his argument see also, “Subjectivity, Collective
Action and the Governance Agenda in Arumeru East” QEH Working Paper 42, June 2000.
11  David McDermott Hughes, “Rezoned for Business: How Eco-tourism Unlocked
Black Farmland in Eastern Zimbabwe”, Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol.1 No.4,October 2001,
575 –599.
12  Jessica Vivian, “NGOs and Sustainable Development in Zimbabwe: No Magic
Bullets.” Development and Change, 25 (1994), 167-193.
13  Terje Tvedt, Angels of mercy or development diplomats?  (1998),137-157; Henrik Secher
Marccusen, “Comparative advantage of NGOs: Myths and realities” in Olav Stokke, ed. Foreign
aid towards the year 2000: experiences and challenges, 259-285.
14  Stewart, “Happily ever after” 13. 
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vehicles for ‘big men’ in rural communities.9   In contrast, Tim Kelsall’s study of NGO
operations in north-eastern Tanzania, is more interested in the attempts of NGOs to enhance
communities’ abilities to undertake collective action.  Kelsall is profoundly critical of the liberal
development agenda of NGOs, but also questions the extent to which they accomplish their
ends.  In his account, the NGOs are unsuccessful in fostering participation, accountability or
democracy within the community because of the way in which they impose their agendas.10
Also concerned about ‘liberal development’, David MacDermott Hughes’ very different
methodology enables him to examine the interaction of NGOs with local people in remote
areas of Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  Hughes effectively identifies not only the ways in which
NGO-led participatory workshops marginalize local peoples, but also their potential to eat away
at land and resource entitlements of rural groups.11  
All of these recent studies suggest that we are right to be critical of claims and
assertions about NGO abilities: “there is no magic bullet.”12  Not only is there little evidence
that NGOs are either more efficient or more participatory than other development schemes,
but the exact opposite may be true.13   What Stewart calls the “NGOs do it cheaper, better
faster” argument seems to have little evidence backing it up.14  However, there is a new danger
15  Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument
(Oxford: James Currey, 1999), 22.
16  Chabal and Daloz,   Africa Works, 117.
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of donors and academics falling out of love with NGOs and descending instead into an equally
problematic discourse which pathologizes NGOs, suggesting that they are nothing more than
new power resources for élites.  In the words of a recent, iconoclastic approach to African
Politics, NGOs are:
... a successful adaptation to the conditions laid down by foreign donors on the
part of local political actors who seek in this way to gain access to new
resources....NGOs are often nothing other than the new ‘structures’ with which
Africans can seek to establish an instrumentally profitable position within the
existing system of neo-patrimonialism....The use of NGO resources can today
serve the strategic interests of the classical entrepreneurial Big man just as well
as access to state coffers did in the past.15 
While such an account may provide a useful balance to earlier effusions, its reluctance to take
NGO activists seriously betrays an equally limited approach.  The authors dismiss NGOs
summarily as merely saying what the donors want to hear, which is more of an ad-hominem
attack than analytical reasoning or empirical evidence.16 
9.2.4 NGOs as Political Resources: Kenya and Zimbabwe
While the romanticization of NGOs needs reconsideration, so do approaches which conclude
that they fail in all capacities.  Instead, NGOs need to be understood as organizations bound
up in power relations on various levels.  In this light, it is worth briefly examining Ndegwa’s
study of the politics of Kenyan NGOs.
In 1990, Kenyan NGOs were involved in opposing an act designed by the state to
control their actions. Some of these NGOs then went on to be key players in the mobilization
for multi-party democracy.   Ndegwa charts the involvement of two significant NGOs – the
Undugu society and the Greenbelt movement – in the democratization campaign.  Ndegwa
concludes that: 
17  Ndegwa, Two Faces of Civil Society, 110.
18  Mbogori moves to Zimbabwe to become leader of Mwengo, which is peripherally
involved in both the PVO Act Campaign and the attempts to resuscitate NANGO.
19  Ndegwa, Two Faces of Civil Society, 114.
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NGOs were not predisposed to oppose the single-party dictatorship until their
very existence and free operation were threatened by the NGO Co-ordination
Act of 1990....the collective NGO action against the state was therefore a result
of the threat of restrictive legislation rather than of an articulated consciousness
to oppose the repressive state and to promote democratic values.17 
Ndegwa’s comparison of the Greenbelt movement led by the charismatic Wangari Maathai, and
the more institutionalized Undugu society, led by an NGO professional, Ezra Mbogori,
concludes that it is the quality and type of leadership – more than institutional resources – that
determines whether or not NGOs are likely to engage the state politically.18  In narrowing down
to a focus on these two individuals, Ndegwa avoids engaging at all with the question of how
these NGOs, and their leadership, reflect the wider political culture in Kenya.  Ndegwa does
note the parallel between Maathai’s ability to influence her ‘grassroots’ movement, and the
influence of key individuals within Kenya’s nascent democratization movement:
It is especially evident in opposition parties and in organizations that have been
leading agitators for political reform.  For instance, the following personalities
heading or associated with important civil associational bodies are recognized
as important political entities independent of their organizations: Paul Muite,
the former chairman of the Law Society of Kenya who is credited with
catapulting it to political prominence: Reverend Timothy Njoya of the
Presbyterian Church of East Africa; Reverend Samuel Kobia of the NCCK;
and Bishop Henry Okullu of the Catholic Church.19
Ndegwa considers that this confirms that personal politics is dominant in Africa, even within
churches and NGOs.  We might ask: does the willingness of high-profile individuals to take
stands,  but not necessarily to carry their membership or congregations with them,  reflect the
continued penetration of KANU politics?  If these high-profile individuals did reflect personal
rule, as Ndegwa proposes, surely they would have personalized followers. Perhaps the
emergence of these few high-profile activists actually tells us more about mass politics than
about élite politics.  Non-élite Kenyans may be more willing to follow the ‘safe’ line in not
20   “The faithful do not seem willing to let the Churches play the role which they have
taken upon themselves and this painful realization should cause the faith groups to reflect on
the limits of their actions.” Hervé Maupeu,“Les Églises chrétiennes au Kenya: des influences
contradictoires” in Francois Constantin and Christian Coulon, eds. Religion et transition
democratique in Afrique, (Paris: Karthala, 1997), 87.
21  Maupeu, “Les Églises chrétiennes au Kenya” 88-89.
22  Ndegwa, Two Faces of Civil Society, 104 (emphasis in the original).
23  Ndegwa, Two Faces of Civil Society, 77.
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challenging the KANU state, and the ‘leaders’ may not have followers.  Maupeu notes, for
example, “...les fidèles ne sembles pas prêts à laisser les Eglises jouer les rôles qu’elles
s’attribuent et cet amer constat devrait amener les groupes confessionels  à réfléchir aux limites
de leurs actions.”20   He emphasizes the marginalization of Protestant clerics like Njoya and
Okullu who had very little influence over the agenda of their churches.21  
A second question concerns the place of NGOs within this political culture.  Ndegwa
emphasizes the importance of “...the actual will to take advantage of political opportunity (and
organizational resources and empowered grass-roots networks).”22  As in Zimbabwe, many
groups do not have this will.  However, Ndegwa’s linkage of this will to individual leadership
is less convincing. As he himself notes, the reasons that the Undugu Society do not actively
engage the state with demands for reform “...can be found in the nature of Undugu as an
institutionalized NGO and especially in its historically fruitful co-operation with the
government.”23  As the Zimbabwe cases also suggest, the professionalization of NGOs, and
material linkages of NGOs to the state and establishment, may limit activism.  Professionalized
NGOs have little to gain and everything to lose from actively engaging in public protest.
Studying both the organizational encumbrances of NGOs and their position within the
ideological sphere or political culture may help us explain their inter- and intra-organizational
decisions.  Situating NGOs within their political context and considering internal processes
avoids both the romanticization and the more recent pathologizing of NGOs which dominate
the literature.  Considering the continued weight placed upon NGOs in donor discourses and
funding, such an approach is not only timely, but necessary.  
24  See for example,Bratton and  Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa;
Diamond,  Linz and  Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries.
25   Masipula Sithole, “Zimbabwe’s eroding Authoritarianism” Journal of Democracy 8,
1(1997), 127-141; Richard Saunders,  “Trade Union Struggles for Autonomy and Democracy
in Zimbabwe” Unpublished paper October 1996; Richard Saunders, “The Press, Civil Society
and Democratic Struggles in Zimbabwe” paper presented to the Conference on national
identity and democracy, Cape Town, March 1997.
26  Célestin Monga, “Eight Problem with African Politics” in Larry Diamond and Marc
F Plattner, eds. Democratization in Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999) 54.
27  As seen in recent conference titles, “Zimbabwe: the politics of crisis and the crisis
of politics”, a meeting of concerned scholars held at Yale University on May 15, 2000;
“Rethinking land, state and citizenship through the Zimbabwe crisis” CDR, Copenhagen,
September 4-5 2001. 
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9.3 Comparative Approaches
Large-scale comparative studies of African  politics in recent years have been unsure whether
or not to label Zimbabwean politics ‘democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’.  Some settled upon
democratic or semi-democratic.24   Country-specific studies on the other hand, were more likely
to position Zimbabwe firmly within the democratization framework (implying that it was
authoritarian).25  In the 1990s while we have seen more political activity in Zimbabwe – rallies,
protests, civic education – the political climate has become significantly more authoritarian, as
a series of laws and policies were implemented that made the polity  less democratic in
immeasurable ways. More critical assessments describe Zimbabwe’s politics along the lines of
Célestin Monga: 
...the self-justifying dictatorial model that oscillates between naked and brutal uses
of power reminiscent of colonialism at its most high-handed and the practice
of enlightened despotism African-style, informed by effulgent and elaborate
propaganda.26
The current term of choice seems to be crisis – which avoids the need to choose either
authoritarianism or democratization as a label.27    To label what one studies as authoritarianism
continues to be problematic and unpopular. As Heydemann notes somewhat defensively,
...the importance of Syria’s experience rests not in its status as a populist
authoritarian anomaly, an outlier in a world moving ineluctably toward
democracy, but as an important reminder that processes of change that have
been described as global, decisive and virtually irreversible are in fact highly
contingent...[and] subject to local logics and constraints that broaden the range
28  Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria (Ithaca: Cornell, 1999), 7.
29  Gavin Williams, Brian Williams and Roy Williams, “Sociology and Historical
Explanation” African Sociological Review 1 (1997), 89.
30  WJ Dorman, “The Egyptian State in Cairo: the Politics of Social Demobilization”
paper presented at the 2nd Mediterranean Social and Political Research meeting, Florence,
March 21-25, 2001, Mediterranean programme, Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced
Studies, European University Institute.
31  Steven Heydemann, “Why is the Middle East Still Authoritarian?” paper presented
at the 2nd Mediterranean Social and Political Research meeting, Florence, March 21-25, 2001,
Mediterranean programme, Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, European
University Institute.
32  Jill Chrystal, “Authoritarianism and its adversaries in the Arab world”, World Politics,
46 (1994), 262.
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of popular responses open to regimes.28
As the inability of researchers to label Zimbabwean politics as  ‘democratizing’ or
‘authoritarianizing’ suggests, the study of one must include the other.  In order to understand
what is being democratized and what needs democratizing one needs to consider fully the
authoritarian basis of power, which is not merely that of regulation and coercion.  The
apparatus of creating consent must be dismantled and  re-constructed by the democratizers as
thoroughly as the apparatus of coercion is replaced by liberal democratic institutions.
9.3.1 The Problem of Non-transitions
The study of ‘non-transitions’ is particularly relevant here: “the exceptional case, which stands
out from the rest, invites us to explain why it is different and to reconsider why specific
conditions gave rise to the features common to all the other cases.”29  The ‘lack’ of a transition
should lead political scientists to a more nuanced appreciation of the multiple ways in which
authoritarian regimes enhance their power, in order to survive pressures to reform.  Students
of Middle Eastern politics have probably gone farther than most in grappling with this
conundrum.  Recently, a few scholars have begun talking about durable30 or resilient31
authoritarianism, sidestepping the  tendency “to collapse into the term authoritarianism all
regimes that are not, or are not yet, democratic.”32
33  Most famously, Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World
Order   (London: Touchstone, 1998), 29.
34 For a discussion of this point see,  Thandika Mkandawire, “The terrible toll of post-
colonial ‘rebel movements’ in Africa: Towards an explanation of the violence against the
peasantry” unpublished draft paper 2001.
35  Chrystal, “Authoritarianism and its adversaries in the Arab world,” 264.
36  Dorman, “The Egyptian State in Cairo.”
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The Middle Eastern case is of interest because ideological claims have been taken
seriously (sometimes too seriously) in explaining authoritarianism by writers who see in them
long-standing non-democratic cultural norms of Arabs or of Islam.33  In contrast, in studies of
African politics, ideological claims are often dismissed as inconsequential.34  Chrystal’s
approach, which is equally valid for the African cases,  suggests that appeals to ideology by
authoritarian leaders should be understood as: 
...deliberate and careful attempts by rulers to deal with a crisis of legitimacy
either by invoking a carefully crafted, selective, and often inaccurate past or by
offering promises, perhaps wilfully false, of future material gain – an appeal to
developmentalism – in order to fragment the opposition.35  
Egypt, like the centralized bureaucratic states of sub-Saharan Africa, has been led for several
decades by nationalist leaders of a purportedly socialist inclination, making use of  nationalist
rhetoric and an implicit or explicit social contract with the masses. While minor  opposition
parties have contested Egyptian elections, and do have a presence in the parliament and
opposition press, the regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak have never been substantively
threatened.  In contrast to many of the African states, the regime does face significant  potential
challengers in the form of the Islamist parties, which are prevented from contesting elections.
Since the 1970s, Middle Eastern authoritarianism has taken on a distinctive character caused
by the presence of domestic oil revenues and the large numbers of remittance workers in the
Gulf, which create rentier-states.  Donor conditionality also had little impact on Egypt in the
1990s, unlike Africa, as aid continued to be politically assured because of its role in maintaining
Arab-Israeli peace.36   
Perhaps a more relevant comparative case is Cuba.  Here Darren Hawkins  notes that
37  Darren Hawkins, “Democratization Theory and Nontransitions: Insights from
Cuba” Comparative Politics 33 (2001), 441.
38  Hawkins, “Democratization Theory and Nontransitions” 445.
39  Hawkins, “Democratization Theory and Nontransitions” 448.
40  Hawkins, “Democratization Theory and Nontransitions”  455.
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Cuba’s lack of transition points up the need for students of democratization to “examine all
outcomes on the dependent variable: regime stability as well as regime change.”37  In some
ways, Cuba parallels the Zimbabwe case.   As the Cuban case suggests, even in the presence of
apparently influential structural variables – socio-economic development, economic crises, and
a favourable international environment – democratization may not occur. Hawkins proposes
that Cuba’s non-transition results from the lack of softliners within the regime and of
independent social groups.38  As  theories of democratization have emphasized the importance
of élite leadership choosing to liberalize or democratize, we need to consider more seriously
the ideological and social forces which constrain élite decisions.  
 The existence of the American bogeyman means that in Cuba, “...to oppose Fidel
meant to oppose national sovereignty, which is the revolution’s central legacy.’”39  It is
therefore argued that “for many Cubans, to establish autonomous groups outside the
revolution is to become a traitor to the homeland.  Very little cultural middle ground is
available for those who wish to claim autonomy from both the revolution and from Cuba’s
enemies.”40    America, and its sanctions, are also conveniently blamed for economic hardship.
Mugabe’s similar attempts to  blame capitalism, Rhodesians and the West, are less
successful after the South African transition. Both the Cuban and the Zimbabwean cases help
us to understand the role of ideological factors in  preventing the development of alternative
leadership and ideas.  The significant difference between Cuba and Zimbabwe, however, is
Cuba’s formal one-party stance, and its control over NGOs until the 1990s, both of which are
more reminiscent of Malawi, Zambia and Kenya than of Zimbabwe.  In Zimbabwe, where
there were no legal restrictions on the formation of political parties, and relatively few on the
41  Martha Brill Olcott and Marina Ottaway “The Challenge of Semi-authoritarianism”
Carnegie Endowment Working Paper # 7, 1999.
42  Olcott and Ottaway, “The Challenge of semi-authoritarianism”
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formation of NGOs, ideological factors seem to have been particularly potent.  As Olcott and
Ottaway emphasize, in what they call ‘semi-authoritarian regimes,’ 
...a combination of external pressures and countervailing forces created by
domestic opposition has limited the capacity of most governments to impose
their policies unilaterally and to continue governing in an authoritarian
fashion....but these pressures have not been sufficient to bring about a new
distribution of power...[and] regimes have been able to prevent further change
through their successful manipulation of the new institutions and often of the
opposition as well.41 
Surely what they are referring to obliquely is hegemony.  Even where rules, regulations and co-
ercion are modified by liberal trappings, the continuing hegemonic power of élites prevents any
real shifts in power.  Olcott and Ottaway  note that there are particular mechanisms which
prevent the transfer of power through elections which function:
...despite the adoption of formal democratic institutions and despite a degree
of freedom granted to citizens of the country.  Semi-authoritarian countries
may have a reasonably free press, for example; the regime may leave space for
autonomous organisations in civil society to operate, for private business to
grow, and thus for new economic élites to rise.  The regime may hold fairly
open elections for local or regional governments, or even allow backbenchers
to be defeated in a parliamentary election.  But there is no room for debate
over the nature of political power in society, where it resides and who should
hold it.42
Olcott and Ottaway are right to emphasize this point, which identifies exactly the debate which
occurred in Zimbabwe under the aegis of constitutional reform.  Once this issue had been
breached, and especially, once the referendum was won by the NO vote, the previously stable
authoritarianism, predicated as it was on the assumed power of the ruling party, could no
longer remain stable.   As a result, this form of rule that had enabled ZANU(PF) to retain
power throughout the 1980s and 1990s, was rejected, opening the way to a more mobilized and
chaotic system.   The new system retains elements of the old, but the effective challenge to the
legitimacy of the regime means that the institutional arrangements and political discourses
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which once cohered and enhanced durability, must now be bolstered by significantly more
reliance on coercion and material benefits.  All the groups which had previously adhered to the
rules of the game – NGOs, churches, labour, students, journalists, businessmen and farmers
– now require controlling legislation, intimidation, and violence to keep them in line.  
9.4 The Politics of Hegemony
Power – of both the cultural and the material sort – holds regimes together.  The challenging
of hegemony by ‘civil society’ indicates the weakening of the ideological hegemony of the
hitherto  dominant power, and may contribute to the weakening ability of coercive power to
guarantee compliance – because it is increasingly seen as illegitimate.  But the  structure of
cultural power often remains surprisingly resilient, penetrative and continues to cohere even
after material and coercive power structures are being dismantled.  
During the rush towards ‘democratization,’ political scientists tended to focus on the
formal political institutions in line with concerns of agencies, aid donors and NGOs,
international and national.  We now need to reflect on these concerns, assumptions and
findings of these studies and give more attention to political culture and hegemony. The
authoritarian regimes of eastern and central Africa relied upon the institutions of the state to
structure and legitimate their political dominance.  They used the state apparatus not just to
exercise coercion, and extract material resources, but to construct and disseminate a particular
conception of nationalism.  Politics in these regimes relied upon the incorporation of disparate
groups with often conflicting interests, under a rubric of unity and development.   Regime
strength and durability relied upon balancing the potent combination of culture, force, and
interests.  The complexity of this nexus renders democratization an equally complex and
ambiguous process. 
The material presented in the preceding chapters suggests a need to reconsider the
methodological and theoretical basis of the  ‘democratization' literature which dominated
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African politics in the 1990s. Complex and dynamic processes are best studied using a
multiplicity of methodological tools.  Interview research, participant-observation, and
documentary evidence reinforce each other and reflect different aspects of the process under
study.  Organizations like NGOs benefit from being studied from the ‘inside' so as to generate
‘deep description' and capture their internal decision-making processes. Documentary evidence
enables the study of changes within discourses.  Interview research is a necessary, if not
sufficient, tool for clarifying information, and allowing the subjects of the study to speak directly
to the topic. Together, these and perhaps other methods, provide the material through which we
can construct historical narratives that enable  understanding and explanation.
In addition to contributing to the understanding of Zimbabwean politics, and NGO-state
relations in Zimbabwe, this thesis extends discussions of democratization and authoritarianism
in the developing world.  The material presented in the preceding chapters suggests a need to
reconsider the methodological and theoretical basis of the  ‘democratization’ literature which
dominated African politics in the 1990s.  By placing weight on the political constructions of
nation-building and the establishment of political hegemony by nationalist movements, it enables
us to understand the dynamics of post-colonial politics.  In particular, it presents a much more
complex and historicized vision of the role played by NGOs and churches in state-society
politics.  Yet at the same time, it avoids demonizing or otherwise dismissing as ‘un-African’ those
political actors keen on reform.  These are important lessons for political scientists, many of
whom either accept at face value teleological narratives of democratization (and are then baffled
by the lack of ‘democracy’ in post-transition societies), or see Africa’s political cultures as
irredeemably collapsing into chaos.  
43  Based on notes from election 11 June 1997 and minutes of provisional taskforce
meeting, 30 July 1997.
44  from Agenda, vol. 2, No1 April 1999 p. 5
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Appendix 1 NCA Taskforce membership
NCA Provisional Taskforce June 199743
David Chimhini ZimRights 
Brian Kagoro Lawyer 
Sheila Kanyangarara ZWLA 
Welshman Ncube UZ 
G Nyamuzuwe WAG 
Peter Maregare ZimRights
R Matora Mavambo Development Assoc 
Tawanda  Mutasah ZCC
Brian Raftopoulos            IDS, UZ
Morgan Tsvangirai ZCTU
Everjoice Win Musasa Project
NCA Taskforce 199944
Mike Auret CCJP 
Tendai Biti, ZLHR 
David Chimhini ZimRights 
Brian Kagoro ZLHR




R Matorwa Mavambo Development Assoc
Priscilla Misihairambwi WASN 
Selina Mumbengegwi WAG
Welshman Ncube, UZ 
Lydia Nyatsanza-Zigomo ZWLA
Brain Raftopoulos IDS, UZ
Morgan Tsvangirai  ZCTU 
45  From Raftopoulos and Mazarire, “Civil society and the constitution-making process
in Zimbabwe”, 33. 
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NCA Taskforce 200045
Mike Auret Churches 
Tendai Biti ZLHR 
B. Chakanyuka YWCA 
F. Cherera NCDPZ 
David Chimhini Human Rights Organisations 
Jonah Gokova Churches (ESS)
V. Gonda Media and Information 
Brian Kagoro ZLHR 
Lovemore Madhuku UZ 
Yvonne Mahlunge ZWLA 
B Mapondera MISA 
Thoko Matshe ZWRCN
D. Mwonzora Political Parties 
Lydia Nyatsanza-Zigomo ZWLA 
Welshman Ncube UZ 
G. Kwinjeh Individual
Gibson Sibanda ZCTU
Trudy Stevenson Harare Residents Association
T. Zhanghaza ZINASU
46  From Raftopoulos and Mazarire, “Civil society and the constitution-making process
in Zimbabwe”, 31. 
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47  From Raftopoulos and Mazarire, “Civil society and the constitution-making process
in Zimbabwe”, 31. 
286

















Appendix 3 Constitutional Commission: Committee Chairs and Membership
Plenary Godfrey Chidyausiku (Judge)
Executive Committee Godfrey Chidyausiku (Judge)
Co-ordinating Committee Walter Kamba (UZ)
Financial and Administrative Ibbo Mandaza (SAPES)
Media and Public Relations Jonathan  Moyo (Witswatersrand University)
Thematic Committees:
Separation of Powers Rita Makarau (Non-constituency MP)
Executive Organs Heneri Dzinotyiweyi (UZ, ZIP)
Pillars of Democracy Lupi Mushayakarara (Media Commentator, Ex-NCA)
Citizenship Rights Canaan Dube 
Levels of Goverment Dr Themba Dlodlo (Nust)
Public Finance and Managenment Eric Bloch (Economist)
Customary Law Rudo Gaidzanwa (NGO/UZ, )
Transitional Mechanisms  Honour Mkushi (Businessman)
Legal  Patrick Chinamasa (Zanupf)
48  Names are spelled as in the officially published list. 
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Commissioners: 
In addition to the 150 MPs, the following individuals were named as commissioners on 27 April
1999:48
1. Andersen, Adv. Jonas Christian
2. Aphiri, Mr. Francis.




6. Bhala, Dr. Madlean J.
7. Bhuka, Mrs. Florence
8. Bloch, Mr. Eric W
9. Bulle, Dr Bekithemba
10. Bwerazuva, Mr. James Chizhande
11. Chakanetaa, Mr Pascoe.
12. Chakaodza, Dr.Austin.
13. Chakaredza Chief Munhumutapa III,
Lawrence Zuze.
14. Chanetsa, Mrs. Beatrice.
15. Chavunduka, Dr. Dexter.
16. Chavunduka, Prof. Gordon.
17. Chetsanga, Prof. Christopher.
18. Chidaridire, Mr. Faber.
19. Chidzero, Dr. Bernard.
20. Chihambakwe, Mr Simplicius
21. Chikambi, Mr Ernest
22. Chikerema, Mr James Robert
23. Chikukwa, Mrs Chiedza.
24. Chimhundu, Dr Herbert
25. Chinamano, Mrs Ruth.
26. Chinogurei, Mr Gedion.
27. Chirau,Chief Dzomba Robert Dzvaka.
28. Chisango, Rev Marshall Alexander.
29. Chisunga, Chief Jabu Jofurayi.
30. Chiteka, Dr Albert Zvenhamo.
31. Chitepo, Mrs Victoria
32. Chitewe, Mr Enlem.
33. Chivinge, Dr OA.
34. Chivore, Dr Boniface.
35. Chiwawa, Mr Simbarashe.
36. Chiyangwa, Mr Phillip.
37. Cousins, Mrs Cathrine Mary
38. Deary Mr John.
39. Dhlakama Mr Lazarus.
40. Dlodlo, Dr Mqhele Enock.
41. Dlodlo Mr Temba Shadreck
42. Dube, Mr Canaan.
43. Dube, Mr Kingsley.
44. Dzinotyiwei, Prof Heneri A.M.
45. Fernandez, Mr Arthur
46. Gaidzanwa, Ms Rudo.
47. Gava Mr A.
48. Gono,Mr Gedion.
49. Goredema, Mr Charles J.
50. Govere, Mr Richard
51. Gowora,Mrs Anne.
52. Gudyanga,Mrs Sarah.
53. Gumbo,Mr Boniface Mhariwa
54. Guti, Dr Ezekiel
55. Guni,Dr Vengai.
56. Hanley, Mr Paul.
57. Hasluck Ms Johanna.
58. Hatendi, Bishop Peter
59. Hawkins, Prof. Anthony.
60. Hiabangana, Ms Rachael
61. Hlalo, Mr Matson.
62. Hlatshwayo, Mr Ben.
63. Hughes, Mrs Amina.
64. Hungwe, Mr Silas.
65. Hwacha, Mr Selby.
66. Irvine, Mr William Michie (Snr).
67. Japa Japa, Mr Paddington.
68. Jirira, Ms Kwanele Muriel Onar.
69. Kachingwe, Mrs Sarah.
70. Kahari, Mrs Brenda.
71. Kahari, Prof George
72. Kamuriwo,Mr Samuel Dzidziso.
73. Kaniushinda, Mr Enock.
74. Karadzandima, Mr Fredy
75. Katsande, Mr Kumbirai
76. Kawara, Mr. Ranjenos.
77. Kazembe, Ms. Joyce.
78. Khumalo,Ms Belinda.
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79. Khumalo, Chief Mutshani.
80. Khupe, Mr. Watson Pasa Malimbe.
81. Kulube, Dr. Herbert M.
82. Kurebwa,Dr Joseph.
83. Labode, Dr. Ruth.
84. Linington, Mr. Gregory.
85. Macheka, Mr. Joseph.
86. Made, Mr. Joseph Mtakwese.
87. Madhuna, Vice Chief M.
88. Madzimbamuto, Mr Daniel.
89. Madzimbamuto, Ms Violet.
90. Mafundikwa, Ms Eunice
91. Magade, Mr Emmanuel
92. Magwaza, Mr Elliot.
93. Mahlangu, Mr Mordechai.
94. Mahlunge Ms Yvonne
95. Majome Ms Jessie.
96. Majonga. Mr Godfrey
97. Majongwe, Mr Peter.
98. Makonese, Mr D. Ignatius.
99. Makoni Dr Simba
100. Malinga, Mr Joshua
101. Malisa, Chief Cyprian Moyo.
102. Malunga, Mr Joseph Bingo.

























127.Mazobere, Dr Crispen Christopher
Godzo





133.Mkondo, Mr Paul Tangi Mhova
134.Mkushi, Mr Honour.
135.Mkwananzi, Mr Amos
136.Mombemuriwo, Mr Nofredge Lewin.
137.Moroney, Mr Michael
138.Moyo, Bishop Ambrose

























167.Mutasa, Mr Philip B.
















183.Nebiri, Chief Rabson Bere Matashu.
184.Neganje, Mr Naison.


















202.O’Shea, Mrs Bernadette Luscinda.
203.Patridge, Mr Mark Henry Heathcote.
204.Peta, Mr Basildon.
205.Peters,Mrs Rose.



















225.Tekere, Mr Edgar Zivanai.
226.Timbe, Mr Augustine.
227.Thanga, Ms Amy S.
228.Wakatama, Ms Eunice.




233.Zawaira, Mr Thomas T.
234.Zeederberg, Mrs Dawn
235.Zhanda, Mr Paddington 
236.Zhou, Adv. Happias
237. Zhou, Mr Ishmael 
238. Ziumbe, Mrs Florence 
239. Zowa, Mr Joel Bigboy 
240. Zvobgo, Prof Chengetai J. 
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Newspapers, News Services, and Magazines 










Mail and Guardian (South Africa) 
Mirror
Africa Church Information Service (ACIS)
Africa Information Afrique (AIA) 
Agence-France Press (AFP) 
Ecumenical News Internmational 
Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) 
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) 
Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) 
Pan-African News Agency (PANA) 
South Africa Press Agency (SAPA)






Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly (SAPEM)
ZimRights News
Government documents
GOZ. ZIMCORD Report on Conference Proceedings, Zimbabwe Conference on
Reconstruction and Development. Salisbury 23-27 March 1981
GOZ. ZIMCORD Conference Documentation, Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction
and Development .Salisbury 23-27 March 1981
GOZ. Growth with Equity An Economic Policy Statement, February 1981.
GOZ. Independent Zimbabwe, 1980-1990. Harare Ministry of Information, March 1990.
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Harare, Government Printers, 1998.
GOZ. Departmental Draft: Constitution of Zimbabwe n.d., circa December 1999.
GOZ. Draft constitution for Zimbabwe : corrections and clarifications  n.d., circa December
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GOZ. The 2000 Delimitation Commission Report. May 2000.
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Report)
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Supplement to the Zimbabwean Government gazette Extraordinary 7 June 2000.
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Court rulings and legal documents
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Campaign  for the Repeal of the PVO Act. Joint statement by Non Governmental
Organisations and concerned citizens demanding the Repeal of the Private Voluntary
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Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act.  “Minutes of the joint PVO Act Steering
Committee/NANGO.  Held at NANGO offices, 6 November 1996.”
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Campaign for the Repeal of the PVO Act.  Fact Sheet No. 2: “A Case Study: The
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Act”; n.d.n.p.
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CCJP. Press statement on the Parliamentary elections.  26 June 2000. 
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